Japan does badly 1941-2

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
You don't think the U.S army might have made a better accounting for itself in the Philippines, I recognize Japan pulled off numerous troops from the island after it seemed the battle was over but the U.S troops did hold for quite some time. You don't think with a little better warning and preparation they couldn't have fared better? Basically any early minor victories or prolonged defenses just hasten Japan's eventual defeat. Just wondering though. :)

The forces in the PI could have held longer with some better leadershuip and planning (the whole "burn the rice" thing that MacArthur pulled, which destroyed enough food to feed the entire military on Luzon for MONTHS, should have gotten him cashiered), but in the end, it is mainly a matter of morale on the Home Front and not military utility. The one thing that a longer defense might force is a premature attempt to retake the Islands. That could be expensive to the Fleet.
 
Interesting little tidbit on the Philippines: Apparently in the spring of 1941 (I'll have to look up the exact timing) the US acquired several sizable ocean liners--enough shipping to deliver an infantry division plus 90 days of full equipment and supplies. The army offered MacArthur a division for the Philippines. He apparently thought that was coming at the expense of needed equipment instead of in addition to it, so he turned the offer down. The ships ended up loaned to the Brits on an 8 month meandering that was supposed to end up in the middle east, but eventually ended up with them delivering an Australian division to Singapore just before the surrender.

Put a fully-equipped US infantry division in the Philippines before Pearl Harbor and how does that change? Just another 20k troops on the Bataan Death March? Probably. On the other hand, that nearly doubles the number of full-trained and equipped troops the US would have available (I'm not counting the non-Scout Filipino units, and for good reason--some brave men among them, and some guys who with more training and better equipment would have made excellent soldiers, but they weren't even close to a match for the Japanese)
 
...less ships lost but potentially higher casualties.
Very probable. Presuming pre-strike recce (limited as it was...) reveals the PacFleet has sortied, we can safely presume the shallow-running gear is removed (or never fitted), so no degredation.
Another interesting thought, how much ASW capability did the Japanese TF have going to attack PH? If the US truly surprised the Japanese PH attack fleet and pinpointed their location, how well could the Japanese have dealt with a pack of US subs (albeit with questionable torpedoes)?
IJN ASW was pretty terrible. It didn't need to be good, tho, since there were small numbers of subs at Pearl, & the threat to Kido Butai was tiny, even allowing for torpedoes working as advertised (which chances were vanishingly small).
It is likely that the U.S. losses at Pearl are worse. As I have discussed here in other threads (at probably too much length), the ideal waring is one that is believed and comes in around 03:00-04:00 hrs. That gives enough time to shake out what crew is aboard the ships (it was Saturday night in peacetime), get integrity set, and steam partly up so power is available. It give the Army time to gets the AAA armed and manned, arm up most of the fighters and get them ready to fly & have a decent Dawn Patrol up.

You get all that in place and the 1st wave gets pretty well hammered. Losses will go up a bit for pilots, you have to assume that half the fighters (mostly the P-36s) are lost, but out right losses of the ships may be less, although Nevada probably get out to sea and is lost either to aircraft or to one of the many I-boats that were waiting for exactly that eventuality. As far as the other BB it comes down to luck and butterflies.
My thoughts almost exactly.;) I'd add Ward's 0430 contact report as trigger. I wonder if having more men aboard doesn't lead to higher casualties, Condition Z set or not. I also think losses in P-40s would be heavy; the Japanese had way more experience, & were combat-experienced, as well, which gave them an important edge. Moreover, AAF would try to dogfight, which was demonstrably a bad idea...:eek: & I doubt Hawaii's pilots had adopted Chennault's methods.
You give less than the time needed for the IJN to scrub, but enough for the fleet to get steam up and have most of the fleet sortie you could permanently lose several ships and might have the bad luck of having one block the main channel when it goes down.
That could be the worst possible outcome.:eek::eek:

One prospect occurs to me. If Nagumo has to fight, does it spill over onto the facilities, in particular the tank farm? Can you imagine 140 million USgal fuel oil burning?:eek::eek::eek::eek: (OTOH, destruction of the Torpedo Store might've been better for Sub Force.:rolleyes:)

Nothing save the Philippines. Even if MacArthur has the good grace to fall down a flight of stairs and break his stiff neck the numbers simply aren't there.
You don't have to save P.I. to have an enormous impact on the war. A stiffer fight tying up forces means they aren't available elsewhere. (Malaysia? Op MO? Kokoda Track? Does the lack of forces for MO mean Kokoda goes ahead sooner?) Could Brereton's B-17s have hit Japanese a/c before they left Formosa? That seems like a big butterfly to me... Just having B-17s escape destruction is significant, since it gives Hart's Asiatic Fleet subs the air recce he had expected to rely on. (That they'd accomplish little due to bad dispositions & lousy torpedoes is another matter.:rolleyes:) He had enough S-boats (with reliable Mk Xs:rolleyes:) for any better intel to be of assistance. Plus, if P.I. was giving stiffer resistance, would it attract Soryu &/or Hiryu, per Wake? Come to think of it, could PacFleet boats have been placed at Wake in time? Would Kimmel (presuming he kept his job) have called back his carriers & avoided a fight around Wake? Or would we get a *Coral Sea there?
Same goes for Malaya, Singapore, and the DEI (although it would be REALLY interesting to get Force Z up on the Japanese invasion force on December 8th, say about an hour before dawn).
IMO, Phillips was well positioned to do just that. He could've slaughtered the transports as they were unloading & buggered Yamashita (which is exactly what Japan was terrified would happen:eek:), then escaped.

Don't forget, Japan's ops in the Pacific were on a shoestring, & on such a tight schedule, any delay, any losses, would have huge domino effects downstream.

There's another side to it, too. If Kimmel loses his heavies in a fight, he has to fall back on submarines, which is a very bad thing for Japan.:eek::eek: Especially if he persuades King to pull the ex-Asiatic Fleet boats back to Pearl. Also, if there's a fight, chances are Kimmel doesn't lose his job. What happens to Nimitz? (Can you say COMSUBPAC?:cool::cool: Better than Lockwood?;)) (Yes, I know: subs winning the war is a pet one of mine.:p Get over it.;)) Does Kimmel as CinCPac adopt other methods? Like, frex, does he use mining against Japanese bases?
 
Last edited:
Top