...less ships lost but potentially higher casualties.
Very probable. Presuming pre-strike recce (limited as it was...) reveals the PacFleet has sortied, we can safely presume the shallow-running gear is removed (or never fitted), so no degredation.
Another interesting thought, how much ASW capability did the Japanese TF have going to attack PH? If the US truly surprised the Japanese PH attack fleet and pinpointed their location, how well could the Japanese have dealt with a pack of US subs (albeit with questionable torpedoes)?
IJN ASW was pretty terrible. It didn't need to be good, tho, since there were small numbers of subs at Pearl, & the threat to
Kido Butai was tiny, even allowing for torpedoes working as advertised (which chances were vanishingly small).
It is likely that the U.S. losses at Pearl are worse. As I have discussed here in other threads (at probably too much length), the ideal waring is one that is believed and comes in around 03:00-04:00 hrs. That gives enough time to shake out what crew is aboard the ships (it was Saturday night in peacetime), get integrity set, and steam partly up so power is available. It give the Army time to gets the AAA armed and manned, arm up most of the fighters and get them ready to fly & have a decent Dawn Patrol up.
You get all that in place and the 1st wave gets pretty well hammered. Losses will go up a bit for pilots, you have to assume that half the fighters (mostly the P-36s) are lost, but out right losses of the ships may be less, although Nevada probably get out to sea and is lost either to aircraft or to one of the many I-boats that were waiting for exactly that eventuality. As far as the other BB it comes down to luck and butterflies.
My thoughts almost exactly.

I'd add
Ward's 0430 contact report as trigger. I wonder if having more men aboard doesn't lead to higher casualties, Condition Z set or not. I also think losses in P-40s would be heavy; the Japanese had way more experience, & were combat-experienced, as well, which gave them an important edge. Moreover, AAF would try to dogfight, which was demonstrably a
bad idea...

& I doubt Hawaii's pilots had adopted Chennault's methods.
You give less than the time needed for the IJN to scrub, but enough for the fleet to get steam up and have most of the fleet sortie you could permanently lose several ships and might have the bad luck of having one block the main channel when it goes down.
That could be the worst possible outcome.

One prospect occurs to me. If Nagumo has to fight, does it spill over onto the facilities, in particular the tank farm? Can you imagine 140 million USgal fuel oil burning?




(OTOH, destruction of the Torpedo Store might've been better for Sub Force.

)
Nothing save the Philippines. Even if MacArthur has the good grace to fall down a flight of stairs and break his stiff neck the numbers simply aren't there.
You don't have to save P.I. to have an enormous impact on the war. A stiffer fight tying up forces means they aren't available elsewhere. (Malaysia? Op MO? Kokoda Track? Does the lack of forces for MO mean Kokoda goes ahead sooner?) Could Brereton's B-17s have hit Japanese a/c before they left Formosa? That seems like a big butterfly to me... Just having B-17s escape destruction is significant, since it gives Hart's Asiatic Fleet subs the air recce he had expected to rely on. (That they'd accomplish little due to bad dispositions & lousy torpedoes is another matter.

) He had enough S-boats (with reliable Mk Xs

) for any better intel to be of assistance. Plus, if P.I. was giving stiffer resistance, would it attract
Soryu &/or
Hiryu,
per Wake? Come to think of it, could PacFleet boats have been placed at Wake in time? Would Kimmel (presuming he kept his job) have called back his carriers & avoided a fight around Wake? Or would we get a *Coral Sea there?
Same goes for Malaya, Singapore, and the DEI (although it would be REALLY interesting to get Force Z up on the Japanese invasion force on December 8th, say about an hour before dawn).
IMO, Phillips was well positioned to do just that. He could've slaughtered the transports as they were unloading &
buggered Yamashita (which is exactly what Japan was terrified would happen

), then escaped.
Don't forget, Japan's ops in the Pacific were on a shoestring, & on such a tight schedule,
any delay,
any losses, would have huge domino effects downstream.
There's another side to it, too. If Kimmel loses his heavies in a fight, he has to fall back on submarines, which is a
very bad thing for Japan.


Especially if he persuades King to pull the ex-Asiatic Fleet boats back to Pearl. Also, if there's a fight, chances are Kimmel doesn't lose his job. What happens to Nimitz? (Can you say COMSUBPAC?


Better than Lockwood?

) (Yes, I know: subs winning the war is a pet one of mine.

Get over it.

) Does Kimmel as CinCPac adopt other methods? Like, frex, does he use mining against Japanese bases?