Japan Dodges WW2?

In my opinion, yes, had the Japanese' oil problem been magically solved there would have been much less impetus to attack the United States and other western nations, ...

Not occupy French Indo China. That scared the US politicians into the embargos. The China War had not been sufficient thus far & the Warhawks in the US were focused on Germany. If the Japanese leaders are struck with good sense they would leave the French colonies alone & focus on other ways to defeat China.
 
Not occupy French Indo China. That scared the US politicians into the embargos. The China War had not been sufficient thus far & the Warhawks in the US were focused on Germany. If the Japanese leaders are struck with good sense they would leave the French colonies alone & focus on other ways to defeat China.

I agree.

Bob has such a positive interpretation of the IJA and their plans that I'm not sure he's actually read Nomonhan like he says he has, because Coox is pretty consistently denigrating of their capabilities, what they learned, and the prospects of both the Go North plans political and military chances. For example, he claims that the IJA had learned their lessons about mechanization and firepower at Nomonhan, but Coox says otherwise saying that "Two years after the experience at Nomonhan, IJA ground divisions were still markedly inferior to Red Army divisions with respect to firepower, mobility, armor, and air support." (Page 1053)

Oh I've read the book, and it's still by far the most complete overview of the Nomonhan incident and the Soviet-Japanese relationship throughout the 30s and 40s, but Coox's history is hampered somewhat by the lack of information available at the time (he relies a great deal on contemporary Soviet sources, which as you know can be a bit hagiographic) as well as a heavy use of personal accounts leading to certain impressions, to give one example, like the leading IJA anti-tank weapon being the Molotov Cocktail (though declassified Soviet records indicate only 5 to 10 percent of losses came from this cause). Coox himself notes that in the aftermath of the battle the findings and conclusions of the "Nomonhan Research Group" represented an almost unique example of an army's ability to criticize itself on the most basic level, though the industrial base and competition with the Navy limited the ability of Japan to act on those conclusions.

With regard to the quote from page 1053, this is something I'd have to flatly disagree on. Based solely on the TO&Es of the respective formations, the RKKA Rifle Division and the IJA Kwantung Infantry Division, it's plain to see that the Japanese unit is neither outgunned nor is it at any serious disadvantage in terms of mobility. The claim is particularly egregious given its context, a future war in Siberia, seeing as how a high proportion of the Japanese divisions in Manchuria were "Type A" permanent units that were greatly strengthened over the standard "Type B" outfits. Meanwhile their opposite numbers in the Red Army tended to be immobile, garrison-type divisions with a strictly defensive mission in mind. Apart from a few select units (many of which were to the west in Mongolia) they suffered from problems of maintenance and lower-quality weapons. As a final counterpoint, it cannot be ignored how all throughout the year of 1941 the supposedly 'inferior' IJA ran rampant throughout the Pacific, inflicting huge losses for minimal cost and universally demonstrating a high degree of proficiency for high-tempo, rapid-maneuver operations in conjunction with tanks, artillery, and close air support - an achievement, taken as a whole, almost unique in the history of warfare. At the same time the Red Army was facing complete disaster as it had been bludgeoned back to the gates of Moscow taking 1 : 4 losses against the Germans and their toadies.

The inescapable conclusion is that where 1941 was concerned there was very little, if any evidence whatsoever that a given Red Army division was 'markedly' (to borrow Coox's words) superior to a Kwantung Army division in just about any way, and considerable evidence for the reverse.
 
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If Japan "wins" their gonna busy with lots of cleaning up in China but have the resources they need. The Japanese only went into French Indochina to cut off supplies to the Chinese, because by 1939 it was a stalemate. The Japanese only invaded other regions, when getting oil to help keep armed forces supplied in China.

As for the Communists Stalin really didn't care for them and with the Long March in 34 they were basically cut off from any Soviet supplies anyway. Xinjiang might become an SSR since without Chiang there's no one else friendly in China, save Sheng Shicai. I feel this might torpedo the idea of the Axis, because Japan has their own concerns that their not gonna go North or South they have all the resources they need but an all out war is the last thing they want, for all the claims of the Japanese leadership being insane they always took calculated risks. I feel it might allow for a quicker as the U.S does not need to worry about a two-ocean war, and send more troops westward.

Soviet-Japanese relations would be interesting if there's no Khalkhin Gol, then I could relations being icy, maybe a non-aggression pact.
 
.... I feel it might allow for a quicker as the U.S does not need to worry about a two-ocean war, and send more troops westward. ....

No two ocean war is huge in 1942 & 43. With no emergency in the Pacific cargo shipping remains more rationally organized-less wastage. The crisis in the Pacific contributed to the postphonement of the Gymnast & Torch operations. If those can be executed as originally planned German reserves in the west are less.

For 1943 the cargo shipping saved from a Pacific war allows 2-3 more corps and equivalent in US air power to be used in European operations.
 
How would Japan fit into the 1950s anyway? Would the US want a militarist Japan on its side in the Cold War? Or would Japan see itself as a great power?

Assuming we still had a US-USSR Cold War... Well, OTL, America would work with anyone as long as they were reliably anti-Communist which militarist Japan would be in spades...
 

Deleted member 1487

I still maintain the position that a Japanese attack, while devastating, wouldn't have produced a collapse of the Soviet state barring some sort of collective psychosis on the part of Stalin and the Politburo, especially considering Hitler was out for blood and had no interest whatsoever in a negotiated settlement. It would have been up to the Germans to militarily smash the Soviets into impotence, an extremely tall order even with an Oriental "second front."
That is something we disagree on.
There are a bunch of reasons to think it is more likely that the Soviets would collapse than not if the Japanese attack, not least of which is losing the port that brought in 50% of Lend-Lease. Soviet food production had fallen apart and most food came in via Vladivostok. Losing US food alone probably provokes a widespread famine in 1942:
https://www.amazon.com/Hunger-War-Provisioning-Soviet-during/dp/0253017122
https://www.amazon.com/Bread-Affliction-Cambridge-Russian-Post-Soviet/dp/0521522838
Murmansk and Iran cannot make up the difference; Iran itself only became a significant supply source in 1943 AFTER US entry and it had made vast investments in Iranian infrastructure. At best additional infrastructure to boost TTL's Iranian capacity in late 1943, by which time it is too late. Not only that, but Murmansk supply route was disrupted by German attacks on convoys until late 1942 and only became of minor importance in 1943, before becoming important again in 1944. Of course all of Iranian infrastructure development only happened because of US entry into the war; delayed US entry or no US entry means delayed or at best limited Iranian infrastructure investment.

Add in the additional psychological pressures that will be imparted from having a second front, even if it only consumes a fraction of Soviet resources; everything used in the Soviet Far East isn't being used in the West.
Plus the Allies might not grant Lend-Lease to the Soviets if they see them being invaded on both sides and assume that the Soviets are going to exit the war sooner rather than later as a result. IOTL they thought the Soviets were doomed until October and then granted Lend-Lease, but if Japan attacks the USSR in September, then they may assume it is all over and hold off until it is too late.

Beyond that there is the very real potential issue that the US doesn't enter the war at all. Without the Japanese attack Germany isn't going to declare war on the US, while as of late 1941, both FDR and Churchill were despairing that the US public would never declare war and at most in the Battle of the Atlantic had agreed to arm US merchant ships and allow them to travel to Britain regardless of the declared war zone, but with the understanding that their loss would not be a cause for war if sunk. So while the US public was increasingly interventionalist in terms of aiding Britain, they were explicitly not willing to be the ones to declare war. They were fine if war was declared on them, then they would fight, but the Germans weren't going to declare war without Japan attacking the US first, so it just becomes a situation where the US is going to keep supplying the Brits and daring the Germans to do something about it. That means the US is probably not going to be in the war in 1942, which when coupled with the lack of LL via the remaining ports means the Soviet economy collapses that year due to lack of food and economic disruption; the Japanese attacks then are the last targeted shove that pushes the Soviets over when they were at their weakest, even if Moscow is not taken in 1941 or 1942.

No two ocean war is huge in 1942 & 43. With no emergency in the Pacific cargo shipping remains more rationally organized-less wastage. The crisis in the Pacific contributed to the postphonement of the Gymnast & Torch operations. If those can be executed as originally planned German reserves in the west are less.

For 1943 the cargo shipping saved from a Pacific war allows 2-3 more corps and equivalent in US air power to be used in European operations.
How is the US going to get in the war without Pearl Harbor?
 
It's true that most Lend-Lease was sent through Vladivostok, but that's because OTL it was perfectly safe and made sense. ITTL, they'll have to reroute it, which will cause problems (at a minimum, more sailors will die in the Arctic and there will be more of a push to develop the Persian route earlier, but both are doable), but not completely cut it off. More broadly, Lend-Lease didn't become critical until after the German offensive had already been blunted OTL; I see no reason why that would change ITTL.

A Japanese invasion of the USSR in concert with Germany will lead to US and Allied sanctions almost immediately (as the US, while neutral, was very anti-Germany and anti-Japan by 1941, and I doubt that will change ITTL, while the British and Dutch are now effectively allied with the USSR), which means the Japanese offensive stalls rapidly (since they can't very well Strike South while bogged down in the Strike North). I doubt it adds much psychological pressure at all to the Soviets beyond the reeling they already took in 1941; if anything "we beat them at Nomonhan, we can beat them again" should actually be good for morale once the Soviet propaganda machine got working with it.

Although now I'm trying to figure out how they would justify working in Japanese samurai to be fighting alongside the Teutonic Knights in Alexander Nevsky.
 

Deleted member 1487

It's true that most Lend-Lease was sent through Vladivostok, but that's because OTL it was perfectly safe and made sense. ITTL, they'll have to reroute it, which will cause problems (at a minimum, more sailors will die in the Arctic and there will be more of a push to develop the Persian route earlier, but both are doable), but not completely cut it off. More broadly, Lend-Lease didn't become critical until after the German offensive had already been blunted OTL; I see no reason why that would change ITTL.
If you'll reread what I wrote, I make the point that there was no where to reroute it to. In 1941-42 German naval and air attacks on Arctic convoys made that route too dangerous, especially in Summer 1942 when one convoy was pretty much destroyed and they called off convoys there for months. Iran was maxed out until the US entered the war and heavily invested in building up Iranian infrastructure to allow more to come in, but that didn't really reach impressive highs until 1943; even then they were maxed out throughout 1942-43, despite it being the longest route to get LL to Russia. Making Murmansk and even bigger source of supplies then allows the Germans to concentrate their attacks there and hold back from the less profitable Battle of the Atlantic (as of late 1941, plus in 1942 shorter ranged Type VIIs were having a hard time operating in US waters, while the Mid-Atlantic gap was less profitable). Without the US in the war though, then the Brits have less escorts around and without the US waters open to German Uboats, they can concentrate probably 100 more in Norwegian waters to hunt Arctic convoys with Luftwaffe and Surface KM support.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_convoys_of_World_War_II
The route was around occupied Norway to the Soviet ports and was particularly dangerous due to the proximity of German air, submarine and surface forces and also because of the likelihood of severe weather, the frequency of fog, the strong currents and the mixing of cold and warm waters which made ASDIC use difficult, drift ice, and the alternation between the difficulties of navigating and maintaining convoy cohesion in constant darkness in winter convoys or being attacked around-the-clock in constant daylight in summer convoys.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_PQ_17

Simply put Vladivostok was irreplaceable, especially in 1941-43.

A Japanese invasion of the USSR in concert with Germany will lead to US and Allied sanctions almost immediately (as the US, while neutral, was very anti-Germany and anti-Japan by 1941, and I doubt that will change ITTL, while the British and Dutch are now effectively allied with the USSR), which means the Japanese offensive stalls rapidly (since they can't very well Strike South while bogged down in the Strike North). I doubt it adds much psychological pressure at all to the Soviets beyond the reeling they already took in 1941; if anything "we beat them at Nomonhan, we can beat them again" should actually be good for morale once the Soviet propaganda machine got working with it.
Would it though? Britain is not in a position to really sanction Japan, while the US isn't really pro-USSR. If the Japanese keep out of Indochina and the Chinese situation fell apart in 1937 due to Chiang's death, then tensions are much lower due to the lack of massive ongoing war in China to work up the US public about. They might introduce the 'moral embargo' on Japan, which was done historically after the POD here, but probably won't happen until much later if the Chinese KMT collapses early on. So while it is not the OTL 1941 embargo and asset freezing, it is some minor effort to show US displeasure. Remember the POD ITTL that changes a ton of what happened from 1937-41, so it makes it hard to say the US would take the same stance as IOTL. At Nomonhan the Soviets had Zhukov leading the attack with 10 hand picked divisions against 1 reinforced Green Japanese division. Here the Soviets are spread out all over the region, they've stripped out the best men and material to send west, they are on the defensive with no prospect to counterattack (least of all with overwhelming numerical superiority as in 1939), and the Japanese have a lot more concentrate high quality divisions, especially without being bogged down in heavy combat in China, plus air superiority. Having more enemies is generally not good for propaganda BTW, especially when the Germans are lopping off entire Fronts and regions of the USSR's economic heartland. The burden of a war on two fronts and lack of allies to help is probably a worst case scenario for the Soviets.
 
If you'll reread what I wrote, I make the point that there was no where to reroute it to. In 1941-42 German naval and air attacks on Arctic convoys made that route too dangerous, especially in Summer 1942 when one convoy was pretty much destroyed and they called off convoys there for months. Iran was maxed out until the US entered the war and heavily invested in building up Iranian infrastructure to allow more to come in, but that didn't really reach impressive highs until 1943; even then they were maxed out throughout 1942-43, despite it being the longest route to get LL to Russia. Making Murmansk and even bigger source of supplies then allows the Germans to concentrate their attacks there and hold back from the less profitable Battle of the Atlantic (as of late 1941, plus in 1942 shorter ranged Type VIIs were having a hard time operating in US waters, while the Mid-Atlantic gap was less profitable). Without the US in the war though, then the Brits have less escorts around and without the US waters open to German Uboats, they can concentrate probably 100 more in Norwegian waters to hunt Arctic convoys with Luftwaffe and Surface KM support.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_convoys_of_World_War_II


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_PQ_17

Simply put Vladivostok was irreplaceable, especially in 1941-43.
But 1941-3 is also the point that Lend-Lease is least critical for the Soviets. It's true that it took a while to get Persia up-and-running, but in this case they could and would throw more men and money at the problem.

And the US not being officially in the war doesn't mean it isn't escorting convoys, as OTL showed. Besides, not having to deploy significant forces in the Pacific frees up Allied military assets as well.
Would it though? Britain is not in a position to really sanction Japan, while the US isn't really pro-USSR. If the Japanese keep out of Indochina and the Chinese situation fell apart in 1937 due to Chiang's death, then tensions are much lower due to the lack of massive ongoing war in China to work up the US public about. They might introduce the 'moral embargo' on Japan, which was done historically after the POD here, but probably won't happen until much later if the Chinese KMT collapses early on. So while it is not the OTL 1941 embargo and asset freezing, it is some minor effort to show US displeasure. Remember the POD ITTL that changes a ton of what happened from 1937-41, so it makes it hard to say the US would take the same stance as IOTL. At Nomonhan the Soviets had Zhukov leading the attack with 10 hand picked divisions against 1 reinforced Green Japanese division. Here the Soviets are spread out all over the region, they've stripped out the best men and material to send west, they are on the defensive with no prospect to counterattack (least of all with overwhelming numerical superiority as in 1939), and the Japanese have a lot more concentrate high quality divisions, especially without being bogged down in heavy combat in China, plus air superiority. Having more enemies is generally not good for propaganda BTW, especially when the Germans are lopping off entire Fronts and regions of the USSR's economic heartland. The burden of a war on two fronts and lack of allies to help is probably a worst case scenario for the Soviets.
Britain (or more importantly, the Free Dutch in Indonesia, who are effectively under British control) will certainly view sanctioning the Japanese as an appropriate way to keep the Soviets onside. The US government had mixed feelings towards the USSR (FDR was hardly a Red-baiter), but they were firmly opposed to Germany, and would certainly not approve of Japan assisting the Nazis. And while the lack of effective war between the KMT and the Japanese would defuse some of the tensions, it wouldn't stop the continued concern over Japanese atrocities and economic exclusion of American businesses from occupied China, both of which were the major objections that the US had to Japanese actions. The China Lobby would be weakened ITTL, but the clearer link between Japan and Germany in a Strike North situation would be enough for them to get a serious embargo going fairly quickly.

And propaganda can be used in all sorts of ways; the whole idea of the Great Patriotic War being a defense of the homeland against Axis aggression works just as well if the Japanese are also invading.
 

Deleted member 1487

But 1941-3 is also the point that Lend-Lease is least critical for the Soviets. It's true that it took a while to get Persia up-and-running, but in this case they could and would throw more men and money at the problem.
Actually in 1941-43 ever bit of Lend-Lease was critical. It was in late 1943-45 that it was less necessary to survival and more necessary to bring the war to a swifter end and aid recovery. 1942 was the nadir of the Soviet economy and when the food situation was so dire that people were dying in the millions of malnutrition related causes. I already cited two books on the food situation in the USSR in WW2, but here they are again:
https://www.amazon.com/Hunger-War-Provisioning-Soviet-during/dp/0253017122
https://www.amazon.com/Bread-Affliction-Cambridge-Russian-Post-Soviet/dp/0521522838
At it's low point the USSR fell to about 42% of 1940 food production. Lend-Lease food and other resources kept the USSR from imploding in 1942, a point even Mark Harrison makes:
https://www.amazon.com/Accounting-War-Production-Employment-Post-Soviet/dp/0521894247
Lend-Lease materials were simply not available in the USSR even with different prioritization of production; in terms of food the fats, meat, sugar, and variety of canned provisions and seeds to plant new farmland was not available domestically and without it the USSR is pretty much finished. Harrison states that the Soviet economy was overmobilized by late 1942 and it was only Lend-Lease that kept them going until the war situation improved and farmland liberated (which was then replanted by US Lend-Lease seeds and agricultural materials).

Throwing more men and money at the problem doesn't speed things up necessarily and if the US is not in the war because no Japan attack on the US, then the US doesn't have OTL men and material to throw at the problem, let alone increased amounts. Even if they did, it wouldn't equal the amounts coming in via Vladivostok IOTL. The US Congress only allowed the US to get involved in Iran AFTER the US entered WW2.

And the US not being officially in the war doesn't mean it isn't escorting convoys, as OTL showed. Besides, not having to deploy significant forces in the Pacific frees up Allied military assets as well.
They are only escorting convoys to the Mid-Atlantic, they were not allowed at any time pre-war to go into declared war zones. That policy showed no signs of changing IOTL prior to US entry. The Brits didn't deploy major amounts of units to the Pacific, they mainly used units that were already there. Not having the US in the war in 1942 massively offsets any gains due to no Japanese attacks, plus of course Japanese attacks on the USSR badly weaken it and probably lead to it's economic implosion by or in 1943.

Britain (or more importantly, the Free Dutch in Indonesia, who are effectively under British control) will certainly view sanctioning the Japanese as an appropriate way to keep the Soviets onside. The US government had mixed feelings towards the USSR (FDR was hardly a Red-baiter), but they were firmly opposed to Germany, and would certainly not approve of Japan assisting the Nazis. And while the lack of effective war between the KMT and the Japanese would defuse some of the tensions, it wouldn't stop the continued concern over Japanese atrocities and economic exclusion of American businesses from occupied China, both of which were the major objections that the US had to Japanese actions. The China Lobby would be weakened ITTL, but the clearer link between Japan and Germany in a Strike North situation would be enough for them to get a serious embargo going fairly quickly.
Britain and the Dutch didn't want to piss off the Japanese and IOTL only agreed to an embargo after the US leveraged Lend-Lease aid and wanted the full court press in terms of embargoing Japan. If the US doesn't go nuclear in terms of an embargo, Britain and the Dutch won't change their stance, because the US is unlikely to be leveraging them that hard. As it was prior to the 1941 heavy embargo the Dutch were still trading with Japan despite the US sanctions. FDR is not a dictator, so it really depends on what Congress agrees to in terms of sanctions. Sure the US would not like what Japan is up to in China in the late 1930s, it's just a question of what Congress would agree to in terms of sanctions or embargo. If they expect that the Soviets will go down in late 1941 or '42 as a result of Japanese entry, they might go for some sanctions, but otherwise let nature take it's course, because they were not fans of the USSR pre-war entry. Note, I'm not saying there would be no sanctions or US reaction, it is in fact probably likely something would be done, but the full OTL 1941 embargo and asset freezing would likely be a bridge too far for Congress without the escalating problems between the US and Japan from 1937-41. ITTL the tensions won't ratchet up that quickly and we probably don't even see anything like the AVG.

And propaganda can be used in all sorts of ways; the whole idea of the Great Patriotic War being a defense of the homeland against Axis aggression works just as well if the Japanese are also invading.
Sure, but morale is going to be a lot lower when the public realizes the gravity of the situation. Stalin was getting really worried about public morale and will to fight as the Germans reached Stalingrad and was hysterically ordering units into suicide assaults on the Germans because he was afraid if any more cities/land was lost the public would give up.
 
One of the Chinese factions will be Maos communists. if the KMT disntigrates Maos group will be trying to expand. Prolly nt important in the 1940s but may become so in the 1950s.

@BobTheBarbarian
If Japan doesn't attack the US or face the oil embargo they will go to war with the USSR in 1941. It was the Southern Strike that stopped the build up for the Northern Strike that the IJA was building up for. They tried again to build up for it in 1942, but again were drawn down for further operations in the South Pacific. Without China offering organized resistance, so less of a problem than IOTL, then the Northern Strike is DEFINITELY happening. The IJA wanted revenge and to knock off the USSR as a threat in the region VERY badly. Without any other operations to divert them the USSR is in trouble. That may be enough to defeat the USSR in the longer run, while the US stays out of the war and the Axis forces dismantle the USSR. In that case the Brits cannot win the war, the US still hasn't found a way in to it, and you get Axis dominated Eurasia. Even a delayed US entry due to no war in the Pacific means the Brits will have major problems in the Mediterranean come 1942 without US help and a worse off USSR. If then the Axis is able to defeat the USSR and Germany is able to get peace with the UK without US entry in the war, then the Axis will have control over European colonial empires, so Japan will not only have dominance in East Asia, they will have trade with Nazis Germany and the DEI, plus probably Britain who wants to stay on the good side of Japan. At that point it is a question of how well mercantilist policies would work for Japan in the 20th century while having to constantly fight a low level guerrilla war in China and perhaps the ex-Soviet Far East.

The Kwantung Army would get pulverised in any war with the Soviets, if Khalkin Gol in 1939 and August Storm in 1945 are any guide. Mao might still be able to capitalize on this by moving into Manchuria, though Japan could avenge its defeat by blockading Vladivostok. Dr. Lend-Lease won't be happy with this.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Kwantung Army would get pulverised in any war with the Soviets, if Khalkin Gol in 1939 and August Storm in 1945 are any guide. Mao might still be able to capitalize on this by moving into Manchuria, though Japan could avenge its defeat by blockading Vladivostok. Dr. Lend-Lease won't be happy with this.
Neither of those battles was a guide, as both were extremely different circumstances to the 1941 one. For instance in 1939 the Soviets were able to pull out 10 divisions with handpicked troops and equipment and concentrate tens of thousands of trucks and hundreds of aircraft against one reinforced Japanese inexperienced division holding a dispersed line with poor supply lines; it was effectively even out of command range and isolated by 10x as many Soviet troops stripped out from all over the Soviet Far East and Siberia and personally led and organized by Zhukov. In 1945 the Soviets shipped entire veteran armies from Germany to fight the Japanese in a surprise attack while the non-aggression pact still was on. The pick of the entire Soviet military was used for that campaign. In 1941 the Soviet Far East and Siberian commands gave up their best troops, equipment, and most of their munitions and padded out their weakened divisions with untrained conscripts that weren't fit to send west. The Japanese meanwhile were free to concentrate the cream of their military (all services) against a Soviet defensive force was was spread out over the entire border region and incapable of offensive action. The Japanese could isolate and destroy whatever sections of the Soviet border defenses that they wanted at leisure, as the Soviets were so spread out in defensive zones that they could not mutually support one another; the Soviets were prepared to sacrifice the entire region too, so they could maintain their commitments to defending their heartland in European Russia, so actually winning in the Far East in 1941-42 was impossible, especially if Lend-Lease was not available via Vladivostok due to the Japanese attack. All supplies would have to come from the Urals via the Trans-Siberian RR over something like 5000 miles or more.
 
Didn't Stalin pull the best troops out of Siberia after he got intelligence that the Japanese wouldn't be striking north?
 

Deleted member 1487

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