Japan Dodges WW2?

[galveston bay]

The Japanese would have been very wise to avoid entry into the war. Could they have realistically (in a political sense?), I doubt it very much. But if they could have it certainly was their best move.

Of course the Soviets would have supported proxy wars in China and Korea and that would have been a tremendous long running sore for Japan, probably more than they could have dealt with in the long term. The United States probably would have only support such movements in a distant manner, but would have been quick to condemn the certain atrocities of such wars and a likely Cold War would have resulted.

Unless the Soviets are considered more dangerous (not unlikely) in which case the US probably ignores the Japanese activities as much as it can.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The Japanese would have been very wise to avoid entry into the war. Could they have realistically (in a political sense?), I doubt it very much. But if they could have it certainly was their best move.

The problem is sort of that Tokyo isn't really in control over the IJA on the mainland, so it would be hard to keep them from screwing things up, even if the government doesn't want war.

The other route for this to take besides the Japanese actually going to war is that Richard Sorge reports the Japanese might actually attack if the Soviets draw down the Far East, so instead of sending a lot of men and equipment west the Soviets keep up their forces in the East and the Soviets and Japanese glare at each other across the border, while the Axis in Europe has an easier time during Barbarossa, because the Soviets can't send all the OTL forces west. That may make a difference around Moscow.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Sorge

In mid-September 1941, he informed the Soviet command that Japan was not going to attack the Soviet Union in the near future, which allowed the command to transfer 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East to the Western Front against Nazi Germany during the most critical months of the Battle for Moscow; one of the turning points of World War II.

Counterpoint to that narrative though:
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/...Transferred West from August to December 1941

Only 14 divisions transferred west from August to December 1941, and these are the only divisions that could possibly have been influenced by any information from Richard Sorge’s spy ring (going back as far as early August 1941). These are shown in the table below.

I can't repost table, it won't format right, so please check the link, but on there were some critical divisions like the 32nd Rifles, which was critical toward delaying the German advance from October from Vyazma to Moscow via the Smolensk-Moscow highway.

Of these 14 divisions, two were small mountain cavalry divisions from Central Asia, while the three tank and mechanised divisions were very new and had very little (if anything) to do with Siberian personnel. The 58th and 60th tank divisions had only started forming in March-April 1941.

Of the rifle divisions, three arrived in August and September and were sent to 11th Army defending the southern approaches to Leningrad or 7th Army defending the far north against the Finns. Only six rifle divisions arrived in October and only four of these went to any Army that could be even remotely linked to defending Moscow against Army Group Centre. These were the 32nd, 93rd, 78th and 238th Rifle Divisions. Of these only the 32nd and 93rd Rifle Divisions had a significant proportion of Siberian personnel, while the 238th had only started forming in March 1941 in Central Asia.

In short, of all the divisions transferred west after August 1941, only three rifle divisions originated with Siberian personnel and only two went into the Western Front defending Moscow. Where are the ‘newly arrived Siberian divisions being encountered all along the front protecting Moscow’? To fulfil this statement there would need to have been 10-20 Siberian divisions in Western Front. The only division which actually earned the reputation bestowed upon the Siberian divisions in 1941 was the 32nd Rifle Division which defended near Borodino in October 1941. Ironically this division was formed in 1922 in the then Volga Military District and only a portion of its personnel came from western Siberian oblasts.

Another thing apparent from the table above is how early these divisions transferred. Most sources claim the information from Sorge’s spy ring came in October 1941 at the earliest and November 1941 at the latest. Yet it is apparent that the decision to move the vast majority of available divisions west was made well before this time and no new rifle divisions were actually shipped after October.

What of Siberian divisions formed after 22nd June 1941? There were six rifle divisions formed after June 1941 in the Siberia Military District. They were the 366th, 374th, 382nd, 372nd, 376th and 378th Rifle Divisions. All six divisions were assigned to the 59th Army in Volkhov Front defending south of Leningrad in November 1941. These were all brand new Divisions, their combat performance was average and they had nothing to do with the winter offensive against Army Group Centre.

I suppose the question is whether or not you believe the Soviets would have stripped out as much equipment and men from existing divisions in the Soviet Far East to send west if Japan wasn't building up for the Southern Strike. Even leaving divisions in place in the Far East they sent a lot of men and equipment west that was not replaced in the Far East IOTL, which may well end up being missed in the West ITTL if there is a threat of Japanese entry.

 

[galveston bay]

The problem is sort of that Tokyo isn't really in control over the IJA on the mainland, so it would be hard to keep them from screwing things up, even if the government doesn't want war.

The other route for this to take besides the Japanese actually going to war is that Richard Sorge reports the Japanese might actually attack if the Soviets draw down the Far East, so instead of sending a lot of men and equipment west the Soviets keep up their forces in the East and the Soviets and Japanese glare at each other across the border, while the Axis in Europe has an easier time during Barbarossa, because the Soviets can't send all the OTL forces west. That may make a difference around Moscow.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Sorge


Counterpoint to that narrative though:
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/#Red Army Divisions Transferred West from August to December 1941


I can't repost table, it won't format right, so please check the link, but on there were some critical divisions like the 32nd Rifles, which was critical toward delaying the German advance from October from Vyazma to Moscow via the Smolensk-Moscow highway.



I suppose the question is whether or not you believe the Soviets would have stripped out as much equipment and men from existing divisions in the Soviet Far East to send west if Japan wasn't building up for the Southern Strike. Even leaving divisions in place in the Far East they sent a lot of men and equipment west that was not replaced in the Far East IOTL, which may well end up being missed in the West ITTL if there is a threat of Japanese entry.

That is the conventional wisdom

I have seen some interesting argument that the Siberian divisions weren't as critical as believed (as most were not actually moved from Siberia) but I remain skeptical. What is clear is that most of the armor, artillery and aircraft were indeed moved as were many of the higher quality troops

http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/

I don't think the Heer could have taken Moscow in 1941 even without the Siberian divisions. I think that the effectiveness of those reserves was more in the nature of driving the Germans back sufficiently that Hitler had to make a choice in 1942 (Stalingrad and the oil fields or Moscow). However you can argue that the immense casualties the Germans took in Barbarossa made that inevitable anyway.

However, a neutral Japan that remains neutral would have interesting effects. The Soviets firmly believed that the Japanese were not going to attack by the Fall of 1941, and as the Japanese were already moving their forces south they had every reason to believe that anyway.

IF the Japanese do not move their forces they still might commit them to China in any event (where the situation had stalemated in late 1941) and in that case again the Japanese are out of position to be a threat. It really depends on what the Japanese actually do if they don't intend to attack the Europeans and Americans and do not seize French Indochina (the event that triggers the avalanche toward war on both the US and Japanese side).

 

[Deleted member 1487]

That is the conventional wisdom

I have seen some interesting argument that the Siberian divisions weren't as critical as believed (as most were not actually moved from Siberia) but I remain skeptical. What is clear is that most of the armor, artillery and aircraft were indeed moved as were many of the higher quality troops

http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the-siberian-divisions-and-the-battle-for-moscow-in-1941-42/

I don't think the Heer could have taken Moscow in 1941 even without the Siberian divisions. I think that the effectiveness of those reserves was more in the nature of driving the Germans back sufficiently that Hitler had to make a choice in 1942 (Stalingrad and the oil fields or Moscow). However you can argue that the immense casualties the Germans took in Barbarossa made that inevitable anyway.

However, a neutral Japan that remains neutral would have interesting effects. The Soviets firmly believed that the Japanese were not going to attack by the Fall of 1941, and as the Japanese were already moving their forces south they had every reason to believe that anyway.

IF the Japanese do not move their forces they still might commit them to China in any event (where the situation had stalemated in late 1941) and in that case again the Japanese are out of position to be a threat. It really depends on what the Japanese actually do if they don't intend to attack the Europeans and Americans and do not seize French Indochina (the event that triggers the avalanche toward war on both the US and Japanese side).

My argument was that critical formations might be missing on the road to Moscow in October 1941 that might have made a difference like the 32nd Rifle division. Maybe they'd just be replaced by another unit, maybe a whole combination of butterflies could result? As it was though the Japanese were building up in August 1941 in anticipation for an invasion of the Soviet Far East when the chance presented itself, which wouldn't be reversed starting in September as per OTL. If the KMT fell apart without Chiang there is no need to send extra divisions to China, as organized resistance has stopped.

 

[galveston bay]

My argument was that critical formations might be missing on the road to Moscow in October 1941 that might have made a difference like the 32nd Rifle division. Maybe they'd just be replaced by another unit, maybe a whole combination of butterflies could result? As it was though the Japanese were building up in August 1941 in anticipation for an invasion of the Soviet Far East when the chance presented itself, which wouldn't be reversed starting in September as per OTL. If the KMT fell apart without Chiang there is no need to send extra divisions to China, as organized resistance has stopped.

there is still the mopping up in China, and the Communists are still about and a problem (not as big a problem as the KMT) which means sizeable garrisons are needed

The Japanese Army has a rather limited pool in 1941 as well, only 51 divisions in OTL as of December 1941, and of these 40 are directly tied down in either China or Manchuria.

That isn't a lot of capability for the Japanese (a swing force basically of about 11 divisions to add to the 13 already in Manchuria)

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Congrats, you created another Nazi victory scenario
Seriously though that could result in a US embargo against Japan even without the Indochina invasion. ...

Wiking nails it there. Even before June 1941 ran out the warhawks in the US were planning to assist the USSR & by August material was assembling in the port warehouses for shipment when Soviet cargo ships arrived. A Japanese attack on the USSR is going to have the same galvanizing effect on the US as the Japanese occupation of French Indo China. Probally more so since the left in the US reacted strongly when the Germans attacked the USSR. That is the isolationist movement lost the support of the US left on 22 June 1941. A Japanese attack on the USSR means the warhawks gain even stronger support from the left and the Embargo Acts are passed by Congress.

But at that point Japan is too committed to the Northern Strike to have the forces to attack the US. ...

It took Japan some five months to prepare its 'southern strike' and the supporting operation vs Oahu. If Japan attacks the USSR in August 1941 & the trade embargos are organized in September or October then is going to be March or April before Japan can be ready to make a viable attack on the US, let alone execute a southern strike. Keep in mind the US military mobilization started in 1940 with the passing of the War Powers Acts. Thats not going to change, tho with no Japanese occupation of French colonies then it will be more focused on Europe. Still the US will be much better prepared in the Pacific in March 1942 than Dec 41 OTL.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Wiking nails it there. Even before June 1941 ran out the warhawks in the US were planning to assist the USSR & by August material was assembling in the port warehouses for shipment when Soviet cargo ships arrived.

Shipping war materials to the Soviets without US entry is going to be pretty tough via Murmansk and especially Iran, because in the former case the Brits had to deal with a lot of German naval/air forces that were successful in 1941-42 in that sector, while in Iran it required major US investment in infrastructure to turn it into a major supply route in 1943. That started only after US entry in 1942. Without US entry approving the necessary billions of dollars to fund Iranian investments is going to be politically difficult even if LL is in effect and been extended to the USSR.

But remember too that LL was only extended to the USSR in October 1941 when it was though they'd hold out through winter, prior there was no aid, just Soviet cash and carry purchases. If Japan enters the war against the Soviets the US government might not approve LL out of fear of the USSR collapsing and LL material getting into the hands of the Axis.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#US_deliveries_to_the_USSR

"pre Lend-lease" 22 June 1941 to 30 September 1941 (paid for in gold and other minerals)

The Persian Corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total.[35]

It took Japan some five months to prepare its 'southern strike' and the supporting operation vs Oahu. If Japan attacks the USSR in August 1941 & the trade embargos are organized in September or October then is going to be March or April before Japan can be ready to make a viable attack on the US, let alone execute a southern strike. Keep in mind the US military mobilization started in 1940 with the passing of the War Powers Acts. Thats not going to change, tho with no Japanese occupation of French colonies then it will be more focused on Europe. Still the US will be much better prepared in the Pacific in March 1942 than Dec 41 OTL.

If Japan is committed to the Northern Strike they won't have the forces available for a Southern Strike, because those forces will be bogged down occupying and fighting against the Soviets in the Far East and Siberia.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Shipping war materials to the Soviets without US entry is going to be pretty tough via Murmansk...

Yes it was, tho US flagged ships were rare then on either route. Cargo was carried from the US ports on the Soviet cargo fleet or in British controled ships. ie: Norwegian, Dutch, or a few Greek flagged ships. The US had a relatively small cargo fleet & US flagged ships were not important in sending aid to the USSR until later.

But remember too that LL was only extended to the USSR in October 1941

Quite aware of that, but not sure what it means since the Japanese entry aggravates US hostility & can accelerate US actions.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I got that, but you cannot get around the fact that without the US being perceived as a threat Japan will fight the USSR.

And as I observed, yes you can. Even before the US embargo, opposition to the strike North option was strong and the permission for a (ultimately inadequate) build-up came with so many strings attached as to make it clear the Japanese were not thinking in terms of actually attacking the USSR except in circurmstances where it had already collapsed. It's entirely possible that Japan simply prevaricates for so long that one day they wake up and realize that their window of opportunity for those options are closed.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

And as I observed, yes you can. Even before the US embargo, opposition to the strike North option was strong and the permission for a (ultimately inadequate) build-up came with so many strings attached as to make it clear the Japanese were not thinking in terms of actually attacking the USSR except in circurmstances where it had already collapsed. It's entirely possible that Japan simply prevaricates for so long that one day they wake up and realize that their window of opportunity for those options are closed.

IOTL those conditions were imposed because the US embargo was already in place and they were planning on a Southern Strike and didn't want the IJA going to war before they were ready for the Southern Strike. Without Japan worried about war with the US thanks to no embargo and no war planned against the UK+allies, then Tokyo is going to look at the war against the USSR very differently than IOTL.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

IOTL those conditions were imposed because the US embargo

Incorrect. The Imperial Sanction for the build-up, with the attached conditions, came on July 7th. The embargo came on July 26th.

Without Japan worried about war with the US thanks to no embargo

Japan worries about war with the US long predate the embargo and would continue even without it.

then Tokyo is going to look at the war against the USSR very differently than IOTL.

Even Tokyo concluded, based off their experience at Nomonhan, that Japan should not fight the USSR unless it had already collapsed even before the German invasion (Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia 1939, by Alvin D Coox, pg 1035). Even the pro-North people in these meetings stated that the time to go north was for Japan to wait until the "persimmon ripened and fell" (that is, the Soviet Union had already collapsed to the Soviet assault). Plus, Tokyo is going to be aware that going to war with the USSR means that their going to have to worry about US and British reaction to that. Which means suddenly this:

no war planned against the UK+allies

No longer applies

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Incorrect. The Imperial Sanction for the build-up, with the attached conditions, came on July 7th . The embargo came on July 26th.

There were pending negotiations and contingency planning since early 1941 and Tokyo had yet to decide on anything; in the meantime they weren't interested in getting dragged into a war until clarification with the US was had.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#Planning

Embagoes that triggered war planned started after the occupation of Indochina in 1940:

Richardson asked the President if the United States was going to war. Roosevelt's view was:

"At least as early as October 8, 1940, ...affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become involved in a war with Japan. ... 'that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and that area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.' ... ".[5][6]

Japan's 1940 move into Vichy-controlled Indochina further raised tensions. When combined with its war with China, withdrawal from the League of Nations, alliance with Germany and Italy and increasing militarization, the move provoked an attempt to restrain Japan economically. The United States embargoed scrap metal shipments to Japan and closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping.[7] This particularly hit Japan's economy hard because 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938. Also, 93% of Japan's copper in 1939 came from the United States.[8]

So the embargo being discussed and prevented by OP's scenario is the one that happened in 1940, not in July 1941, that just clarified that negotiations were effectively over.

Japan worries about war with the US long predate the embargo and would continue even without it.

Japan's planning for war came specifically after the occupation of French Indochina in September 1940 triggered US sanctions. Both of those things do not happen per OP, so Japan continues on in China without that issue driving planning and holding back the IJA in Manchuria.

Even Tokyo concluded, based off their experience at Nomonhan, that Japan should not fight the USSR unless it had already collapsed even before the German invasion (Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia 1939, by Alvin D Coox, pg 1035). Even the pro-North people in these meetings stated that the time to go north was for Japan to wait until the "persimmon ripened and fell" (that is, the Soviet Union had already collapsed to the Soviet assault). Plus, Tokyo is going to be aware that going to war with the USSR means that their going to have to worry about US and British reaction to that. Which means suddenly this:

I don't have to book to cross check your assertion. BobtheBarbarian disagrees that that would have been an issue had the embargo not been in place since late 1940 and the IJN been planning attacks on the US and European Far East empires. There were a lot of divided attitudes, but opinions would be different without the embargo weighing on Japanese leadership.

No longer applies

I'm sure there will be contingency plans, but if they are planning war against the USSR they'd wrap that up first and expect Germany to help them in case of an Allied attack.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

that just clarified that negotiations were effectively over.

Nah, that was on October 9th when the Japanese did indeed decide that negotiations were over.

Japan's planning for war came specifically after the occupation of French Indochina in September 1940 triggered US sanctions.

Japan's planning for war against the US predates it's war in China, much less the occupation of French Indochina.

Both of those things do not happen per OP, so Japan continues on in China without that issue driving planning and holding back the IJA in Manchuria.

Instead, what is holding back the IJA in Manchuria is a furious debate over whether to take advantage of French collapse, go north, or just continue doing what they've been doing. Either the last wins out or the debate lasts so long that it winds up winning by default

BobtheBarbarian disagrees that that would have been an issue

Bob has such a positive interpretation of the IJA and their plans that I'm not sure he's actually read Nomonhan like he says he has, because Coox is pretty consistently denigrating of their capabilities, what they learned, and the prospects of both the Go North plans political and military chances. For example, he claims that the IJA had learned their lessons about mechanization and firepower at Nomonhan, but Coox says otherwise saying that "Two years after the experience at Nomonhan, IJA ground divisions were still markedly inferior to Red Army divisions with respect to firepower, mobility, armor, and air support." (Page 1053)

I should also note that, if your going to invoke him, Bob agrees with me that a Japanese attack would hardly doom the Soviets against the Germans and would be anything but a "Axis victory" scenario.

There were a lot of divided attitudes

Within the Go North party, yes, as even their people were pointing out that the withdrawal of Soviet forces were "far fewer then the optimum the Japanese army had hoped for." (Coox, page 1045) That weakened their defence against the parties who were against the Go North option... who were well and united

opinions would be different without the embargo weighing on Japanese leadership.

Oh, the embargo would weigh on the Japanese leadership because the Japanese would be aware that it would be a natural US response to their actions to impose such an embargo.

I'm sure there will be contingency plans, but if they are planning war against the USSR they'd wrap that up first and expect Germany to help them in case of an Allied attack.

Japan would be aware by September that the war with the USSR would be a long one, which they would have no prospect of wrapping up quickly (even they later concluded that their ability to project force beyond the Soviets immediate border defenses was hopelessely optimistic), and they would be exposed to a Allied attack in the meantime. They would also be aware that Germany would be physically incapable of helping them.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japan would be aware by September that the war with the USSR would be a long one, which they would have no prospect of wrapping up quickly (even they later concluded that their ability to project force beyond the Soviets immediate border defenses was hopelessely optimistic), and they would be exposed to a Allied attack in the meantime. They would also be aware that Germany would be physically incapable of helping them.

If the Japanese can hold back their aggressive impulses until early spring 1942 it will be abundantly clear that invading the USSR would be absolute folly. By Dec 1941 the Germans have been repulsed from Moscow, and were ground to a halt across the front. By spring 1942, the Japanese will be thanking their luck that they'd waited to assess the situation.

In the OP there's no mention of the Anti-Commitern Treaty between Germany, Japan and Italy not being signed, so presumably the USSR would know to be suspicious of the IJA on its borders.

Would there be military observers at the Japanese embassies in Moscow and Berlin?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Nah, that was on October 9th when the Japanese did indeed decide that negotiations were over.

Officially negotiations were going on, but Tojo had already decided on war long before October and rejected negotiations that called for a withdrawal from China, despite diplomats drawing up an agreement on that.

Japan's planning for war against the US predates it's war in China, much less the occupation of French Indochina.

Japan had contingency plans for war against the US and vice versa in the 1930s, they were set on war with the US until 1941 for sure and the path pushing them there started in late 1940.

Instead, what is holding back the IJA in Manchuria is a furious debate over whether to take advantage of French collapse, go north, or just continue doing what they've been doing. Either the last wins out or the debate lasts so long that it winds up winning by default

In the OP they don't move into Indochina in 1940, so that isn't an option ITTL. So without that, the resulting embargo, and the Chinese government falling apart due to the death of Chiang, China is effectively just an occupation, not an ongoing war and the USSR is the only game in town.

Bob has such a positive interpretation of the IJA and their plans that I'm not sure he's actually read Nomonhan like he says he has, because Coox is pretty consistently denigrating of their capabilities, what they learned, and the prospects of both the Go North plans political and military chances. For example, he claims that the IJA had learned their lessons about mechanization and firepower at Nomonhan, but Coox says otherwise saying that "Two years after the experience at Nomonhan, IJA ground divisions were still markedly inferior to Red Army divisions with respect to firepower, mobility, armor, and air support." (Page 1053)

I should also note that, if your going to invoke him, Bob agrees with me that a Japanese attack would hardly doom the Soviets against the Germans and would be anything but a "Axis victory" scenario.

I'm not sure what Coox is comparing there, so I cannot comment on whether he is right or comparing like to like. And I'm invoking Bob about war planning, I don't think he's right on his assessment of the impact of Japan in the war with the USSR.

Within the Go North party, yes, as even their people were pointing out that the withdrawal of Soviet forces were "far fewer then the optimum the Japanese army had hoped for." (Coox, page 1045) That weakened their defence against the parties who were against the Go North option... who were well and united

Again TTL is very different, with the Chinese government collapsing, so Japan having more forces than IOTL, plus no fear of immediate war with the US or USSR. The parties against the 'go north' option really don't have an alternative but wait and the IJA wasn't a party to take no on a war when sitting idle anyway.

Oh, the embargo would weigh on the Japanese leadership because the Japanese would be aware that it would be a natural US response to their actions to impose such an embargo.

I don't think they would assume that would be the US response to Japanese war with the USSR considering the USSR wasn't popular in the US at the time outside the Far Left. Without an embargo after the collapse of China and no Indochina move then they wouldn't have an indication that war with the USSR would trigger that to them.

Japan would be aware by September that the war with the USSR would be a long one, which they would have no prospect of wrapping up quickly (even they later concluded that their ability to project force beyond the Soviets immediate border defenses was hopelessely optimistic), and they would be exposed to a Allied attack in the meantime. They would also be aware that Germany would be physically incapable of helping them.

With China's government collapsing in 1937 ITTL they have the time and resources to attack and take the desired border territories and neuter the weakened Soviet forces in the area, effectively rendering them no longer a threat in the region, especially when they can defend a new line anchored on Lake Baikal, as that is a choke point for the Trans-siberian RR.

 

[Admiral Beez]

With China's government collapsing in 1937 ITTL they have the time and resources to attack and take the desired border territories and neuter the weakened Soviet forces in the area,

The moment the IJA attacks the USSR, Japan has sealed its fate. Within 36 months of that point, Japan will be facing tens of thousands of tanks and strike aircraft, millions of soldiers. It would be a Japanese bloodbath. This is not 1904-5; Japan cannot beat Russia.

 

[Just a Rube]

The primary motive of the Northern Strike was to break the USSR in the Far East and revenge. Stalin AFAIK had ceased supporting the KMT to play nice with the Japanese by 1941. The IJN lacked a veto over army actions, especially when they were not in a position to offer an alternative option as IOTL. The Northern Strike would cut off the entry point for 50% of historical LL and tied down a lot of Soviet equipment and manpower that cannot be used elsewhere, which if the strike comes in September which it was supposed to IIRC, then the Battle of Moscow would be impacted, as reinforcements cannot then be sent.

Stalin had reduced aid, but the Japanese still viewed him as one of the major puppet-masters behind the Chinese resistance. Japanese policy had, by that point, become dominated by the China quagmire, and both Strike North and Strike South camps put their proposals at least partially in terms of how their proposals would "win" the war in China. Indeed, the main incentive behind the nonaggression pact with Stalin was explicitly to get him to cut off aid to the Chinese. Striking North in and of itself was of far less interest (especially since

And the IJN had a ton of power in Japanese policy, based in large part on the same power the Army had: the ever present threat of coup (either explicit or by refusing to fill the required cabinet slot to bring down the government) and assassinations. It couldn't stop the Kwangtung Army from doing its own thing (although this TL essentially allows the Kwangtung Army to keep itself happy by continuing to stage minor incidents in China to slice off more and more bite-sized chunks), but neither could the IJA; however they can, as at Nomonhan, prevent any incident from escalating. Not to mention the large portion of the army that opposed Strike North (most of the army looked at Nomonhan and was less interested in revenge and more interested in making sure nothing like that ever happened again).

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

We've explored a Nazi victory in WW2 a fair bit, but what about a Japan that dodges the war?

Say Chiang bites it in 1937, and China relapses into warlordism. Japan continues to industrialize Manchuria, meddle in northern China, but it doesn't feel the need to strike south; there's no US oil embargo, because there's been no war in China and moves south (which were pushed by the invasion of China).

By 1943, Japan realizes that not going to war is a wise idea.

So, it's 1945. The Japanese still rule Manchukuo, Korea, and have puppeted Northern China. The Soviets and Americans, meanwhile...

One long term factor here is China still has greater economic potential than this surviving Japanese empire. Even with Japan having quasi control or domination over the economy of the north China warlord states the balance of China is a attractive investment region for the post European war global economy. At some point another group will establish some sort of centralized government of federation of provincial rules that can economically compete with Japan. The Europeans & US who had long running economic benefits in the China trade would be inclined to support such a entity. if it acted in their interests as well. Japan which had established a less open & less free market mercantilist imperial economy would be at odds with the Europeans interests in Chinas economy. More so with the US dominated global economy of the 1950s where the US strove to keep all markets open to its well capitalized businesses.

So Japan at odds with the other major players over a recovering China. On top of that it is inevitable a revanchist movement will be widespread & China. While this will lead to the eventual end of the 'Unequal Treatys' with the Europeans it would be focused far more on the 'Lost Provinces' Japan influences or controls. As a Chinese nation recovers serious tensions between it and Japan are inevitable.

 

[Faeelin]

Tensions are inevitable, but when does Japan get the nuke?

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

@BobTheBarbarian
If Japan doesn't attack the US or face the oil embargo they will go to war with the USSR in 1941. It was the Southern Strike that stopped the build up for the Northern Strike that the IJA was building up for. They tried again to build up for it in 1942, but again were drawn down for further operations in the South Pacific. Without China offering organized resistance, so less of a problem than IOTL, then the Northern Strike is DEFINITELY happening. The IJA wanted revenge and to knock off the USSR as a threat in the region VERY badly. Without any other operations to divert them the USSR is in trouble. That may be enough to defeat the USSR in the longer run, while the US stays out of the war and the Axis forces dismantle the USSR. In that case the Brits cannot win the war, the US still hasn't found a way in to it, and you get Axis dominated Eurasia. Even a delayed US entry due to no war in the Pacific means the Brits will have major problems in the Mediterranean come 1942 without US help and a worse off USSR. If then the Axis is able to defeat the USSR and Germany is able to get peace with the UK without US entry in the war, then the Axis will have control over European colonial empires, so Japan will not only have dominance in East Asia, they will have trade with Nazis Germany and the DEI, plus probably Britain who wants to stay on the good side of Japan. At that point it is a question of how well mercantilist policies would work for Japan in the 20th century while having to constantly fight a low level guerrilla war in China and perhaps the ex-Soviet Far East.

In my opinion, yes, had the Japanese' oil problem been magically solved there would have been much less impetus to attack the United States and other western nations, and the likelihood of an invasion of the USSR would have dramatically increased. This would of course have led FDR to rush to Stalin's side, but without the bite of his oil embargo there would have been drastically less the US could have done to oppose Japan short of direct military action (which the US public wouldn't necessarily have supported without a legitimate causus belli). Financial sanctions and the suspension of all scrap metal shipments would have hurt, but without the existential oil crisis the Japanese would have been in a better position to either deal with the Soviets, negotiate with the US, or both, before the situation got critical.

I still maintain the position that a Japanese attack, while devastating, wouldn't have produced a collapse of the Soviet state barring some sort of collective psychosis on the part of Stalin and the Politburo, especially considering Hitler was out for blood and had no interest whatsoever in a negotiated settlement. It would have been up to the Germans to militarily smash the Soviets into impotence, an extremely tall order even with an Oriental "second front."

Will go through the rest of the thread later...