Japan Dodges The Bubble
- Thread starter Electric Monk
- Start date
I need to proof read better, from the first paragraph of the economic reform piece:
[…] in dying it actually helped the continent. A Federal Europe could be nothing less then a massive increase in government incurring vast costs to operate and enforce. […]
I'm sure there are other mistakes, but I'll clean them up later, those two were just bothering me.
Thanks for the comparison to DoD as I consider it the best timeline on here, however Jared's covering a century and a half while I am covering around three decades—a bit of a difference
. I will add space to the list. Europe's will probably be doing better as well, and we might see a larger/earlier private space programs.
Oh 9/11 is gone, it's 20 years after the POD, but terrorism is still an issue.
Notably, however, the French are nigh on obsessed with nuclear weapons (and, by extent, weapons of mass destruction in general) due to the loss of Marseilles and not only have an excellent intelligence agency themselves but can count on their allies who were just as horrified as the French.
[…] in dying it actually helped the continent. A Federal Europe could be nothing less then a massive increase in government incurring vast costs to operate and enforce. […]
I'm sure there are other mistakes, but I'll clean them up later, those two were just bothering me.
Thanks for the comparison to DoD as I consider it the best timeline on here, however Jared's covering a century and a half while I am covering around three decades—a bit of a difference
. I will add space to the list. Europe's will probably be doing better as well, and we might see a larger/earlier private space programs.Oh 9/11 is gone, it's 20 years after the POD, but terrorism is still an issue.
Notably, however, the French are nigh on obsessed with nuclear weapons (and, by extent, weapons of mass destruction in general) due to the loss of Marseilles and not only have an excellent intelligence agency themselves but can count on their allies who were just as horrified as the French.
New stuff is further down, but until then I've made the following changes (darn research, making me fix/change things) in bold to:
Jane's Defence Forecasts – Military Aircraft Programmes
©2012 Jane's Information Group
London
Also add the letter K after all Su-33s. Su-33 is the SU-27 upgraded model with Su-35/37 characteristics but remains 4th generation, the -K model is the fully Su-37 navalised model as a fifth generation fighter.
There are currently six non-American fifth generation fighters operational, as well as the various American fifth generation craft[1].
The non-American 5th generation fighters are the BAE Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale (including naval -M version), the SAAB Gripen, the MiG-35 (including naval -K model), the Sukhoi Su-37 Super Flanker (including naval Su-33K Flanker-D model), and the Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback (including the -K navalised version, although that is more of a dedicated strike aircraft then a fighter).
In addition to the Su-33K (a navalised model of the Su-37, and a successor to the Su-33 which was a navalised/upgraded model of the Su-27) one other model is the Maritime Patrol Su-37FN which, unlike the Western planes, utilizes a fighter in the ASW and Patrol roles which allows for much faster response times as well as reduced escorts—albeit with less loiter time.
The usual ranking of pure performance in air combat usually goes like this:
F-22
F-24 / Typhoon
Su-37 (with European avionics, it ties with the Typhoon)
F-25 / Rafale
MiG-35 (with European avionics, it ties with the F-25 or Rafale)
Gripen
And this entire paragraph above the Sukhoi section:
The MiG-35 and -35K are the fully updated version of the MiG-29 and MiG-29K and are designed to operate as a short field or naval fighter (-K model, operational on Indian and Russian carriers) that is lighter, smaller, and more agile then the Su-33K/37 while retaining good multi-role abilities. The naval -K model removes the second crew member and adds folding wings and other standard naval requirements—it replaces the MiG29K in Indian service. The MiG-35 is operated only by India, Russia, and China; the MiG-35K only by India and Russia. It is most similar to the F-25 and Rafale in western service, being a smaller multi-role model of the premier fighter. Although the MiG-35 remains less popular then the Su-37 (and older Flanker models) a number of sales have recently gone through by nations looking to replace outdated MiG-29s and keep the same basic support base as the MiG-35 is mostly compatible. This bodes well for future MiG-35 sales, but the MiG-35 has not so far been sold to a country which did not operate the MiG-29—this is a problem for MiG. Like other Russian planes European electronics can be swapped in, substantially increasing their capability.
---------
Before I get to the new post I'm also adding the below to
Jane's Defence Forecasts – Military Vessel Programmes
A Look at the Common European Platforms
©2012 Jane's Information Group
London
As the 21st century approached a number of European navies upgraded their capabilities by buying improved NDR-90 ships (although they were typically called frigates for political reasons) and using them to replace older and much smaller frigates as they transitioned their navies to primarily consist of NFR-90 and NDR-90 derived ships. This led to a French air defence 'frigate' being more capable then the Batch I of the British Type 44 air defence 'destroyers'. We of Jane's deplore this random mixing of ship classes and we will continue to follow our ship size guide.
----------
Upon research my line somewhere in Military Vessel Programmes / A Look at the Common European Platforms about no new ballistic missile submarines (except for China) since the end of the Cold War should add Russia to that list
And now, the new stuff.
---------
Jane's Defence Forecasts – Military Vessel Programmes
A Look At Export Oriented Russia
©2012 Jane's Information Group
London
With the collapse of the Soviet Union came the collapse of the Soviet Navy. From 170 nuclear submarines to a dozen. From 1,100 planes in naval aviation to 200. From 250 ship classes to a handful. However during the last decade the Russian Navy, and indeed all Russian armed forces have undergone extensive professionalization and modernization, fuelled by a Russian economy back on track and a great deal of military export-generated hard cash[1].
Starting in the late 1990s following the success of the Flanker custom build/export anywhere program which allowed the Russian Air Force to reduce funding costs of R&D by immediately selling all improvements abroad the Navy adopted a similar policy. By drastically reducing the size of the fleet and selling off anything anyone expressed an interest in (the exception being ballistic missile submarines—if you wanted one you had to provide your own missiles and warheads which no one did) the navy was able to continue development and construction.
They followed the European example, committing to single classes for cruisers, destroyers, and frigates while allowing for modular design and weapons outfits. In part this was due to the success of the European model, in part due to the improved export potential, and most of all a backlash against the vast number of slightly different ship classes (250+ in 1989) in Soviet Russia. In submarines, however, they were able to improve the Akula SSN enough to keep the new-build Akula-III as their primary attack submarine but did design and build one new class each in the SSBN and SSK field. Like the surface fleet the Cold War era submarines were rapidly retired over the 1990s in favour of much fewer and far more capable new-build construction.
Submarines
Currently the Russians operate six Akula class submarines, two Akula-IIs and four Akula-III models—the Akula-IIs are open for lease and heading for retirement though. It is believed they have all been upgraded as funds and equipment become available. They are roughly equivalent to late model American Los Angeles class submarines (the Akula-III model may be better), and somewhat inferior to the American Seawolf class. India currently operates a single Akula-I Improved class submarine under a leasing agreement with Russia to get them submarine experience.
For ballistic missile submarines the Russians maintain four Borei class SSBNs. They are somewhat smaller then the Typhoon class they replaced, and carry less missiles in total (12) but the missiles are more capable. They are among the quietest submarines in operation, quite comparable to American Ohio class submarines. The Russian navy is building 4 more of a stretched variety (the last will be finished in 2019), adding 4 more missiles to take the total to 16. With the commission of the last of these the gradual phase-down in land based ICBMs will be complete—the Russian nuclear deterrent will exist under the sea and in cruise or air delivered missiles.
In addition to the above nuclear submarines the Russians also have eight Project 677/Lada class Air Independent Propulsion conventional submarines. Along with the German and France/Spain/Sweden AIP submarines these are among the most advanced, quiet, and excellent non-nuclear submarines in the world.
Of the old Russian submarine fleet most of the Kilo class conventional submarines were sold to various powers. Currently operating the Kilo is China, India, Algeria, Libya, Poland, Romania, Iran, and Indonesia. However, India and China have turned their attention to the Lada class submarines and over the last five years most Kilo class submarines have been retired in favour of second hand Improved Kilos from China and India—as this remained much cheaper then buying either new Improved Kilos, Ladas, or any currently offered Western submarine.
The various Delta, Oscar, and Typhoon class submarines were retired and stripped for materials. The Chinese did, however, buy three Oscar-IIs over American protests as they viewed the large collection of cruise missiles those boats carried as an excellent counter against an American battlegroup and a reasonable stop-gap as they continued their own naval development.
Carriers
The Russians operate three carriers. The Admiral Kuznetsov class Admiral Kuznetsov, and the Orel class Marshal Grechko (originally the Ul'yanovsk class Ul'yanovsk) and Admiral Gorshkov (after the Kiev class Admiral Gorshkov now in Indian service as the Vikramaditya).
The Admiral Kuznetsov is 67,000 tonnes and carries 18 Su-33K Flanker-Ds (the navalised Su-37 Super Flanker) as well as 8 Su-32K Fullback-Bs (the navalised Su-34 Fullbacks) along with a number of anti-ship missiles, anti-submarines rockets, and in general is much more of a multi-role ship then Western carriers continuing the legacy of Russian carrier designs. A major refit in 2003 added catapults, giving her the ability to launch fully loaded Su-33s and allowed the addition of Su-34Ks to her flight group. In addition to the aircraft she has a great deal of helicopters, usually around 20, which cover the AEW, ASW, and SAR roles.
The Orel's are based on the original 1970s Project Orel as well as the American Nimitz class carriers. Originally designed with the standard array of missiles (both anti-ship and anti-air) in 1991 construction was stopped under the impact of worsening economic conditions, hence time was taken to conduct designs modifications (notably the access to some Western electronics). With the removal of anti-ship batteries in the design and some other changes construction resumed on the Marshal Grechko in 1993 and her sister ship, eventually named Admiral Gorshkov, in 1995. They were commissioned in late 1999 and mid 2001 respectively.
The Orel's are carriers along Western lines. Displacing 74,000 tonnes she carries roughly 70 aircraft, usually including 12 MiG-35Ks, 30 Su-33Ks, 12 Su-34Ks, and a number of helicopters and support craft. In addition she has much more powerful AAW weaponry then similar Western designs as Russian battlegroup air defence integration lags behind Western technology.
After the American Nimitz class the Orel's are the largest nuclear carriers afloat, although as they displace roughly 1000 tonnes less then the Japanese Sun class carriers they are only the the third largest warships afloat (this varies depending on their respective load-outs, and is a cause for some confusion in naval texts, we take the average displacement of both carrier classes as our benchmark).
In 2002 China licensed the Orel design to complement their existing carrier, the Mao (the Russian Admiral Kuznetsov class Varyag which finished refitting in 2001) and laid the hull down in 2003. The ship commissioned in 2010 as the Great Leap Forward and, like the Mao, operates an airgroup comparable to Russian carriers.
Cruisers
Russia currently operates three Kirov class large missile cruisers as well as two Slava class cruisers (with a third Slava sold to China). Although all five ships are quite large and powerful and have seen refits in the last decade making them more formidable the Russian Navy is following the European and American model and transitioning to smaller destroyers and frigates. Thus they will see no replacement classes and the last should leave service no later then 2035 (probably earlier, depending on new carriers and new escorts).
Typically the Kirov's operate at the centre of their own battlegroup, while the two Slava's each escort a carrier. They carry a wide variety of weapons, especially a wide variety of missiles, and can conduct any role a naval ship might be called.
Destroyers
The Russians main surface combatant is the Neustrashimy class guided missile destroyer and despite being some eight years newer is roughly similar to the European NDR-90 project (The British Type 44 or American Arleigh Burke class destroyers).
The Neustrashimy is a specifically a multi-role ship and mounts a wide variety of weapons to handle the AAW, ASW, and anti-ship roles. Compared to the NDR-90 project she has better capability in all areas (especially anti-ship) but air defence, where she seriously lags.
A number of the Sovremenny class guided missile destroyers remain in service as the Neustrashimys are still building as the Neustrashimy-II model (with much improved air defence along Western lines), and half a dozen improved Sovremennys were sold to China.
In addition to the Neustrashimy class the Russians also operate the Stereguschy class ASW/multi-role destroyer (they term it a frigate, see Jane's Definitions below) the first of which was laid down in 1994 and as refitted to Stereguschy-II status are considered near parity with similar sized Western ASW ships, albeit with superior multi-role capabilities.
The Stereguschy/-II class is for sale and China has bought half a dozen, a number of other countries are also looking at customized variants as it provides near Western capability for somewhat cheaper costs. The more expensive Neustrashimy-II has been bought only by China (2) and India (2) to serve as additional air defence for their carrier groups.
Frigates
The Russian navy has a number of Gepard class frigates which are small easily customized/multi-varient frigates that represent both a fast and cheap surface combatant and a very attractive export option. Many navies currently operate Gepard class frigates.
The older Krivak class frigate has been phased out of operation although a number of Krivak-3s and the improved Talwar subclass were sold to India, China, and a few other nations.
Jane's Definitions: A Note On Ship Sizes
As navies call ships destroyers or frigates or cruisers seemingly on whim Jane's has taken to standardized definitions based on size, which we then tag onto the role of the ship as well as 'large' or 'small' if they are decidedly to one side of our ranges.
A cruiser is any ship from 10,000 to 20,000 tonnes, a destroyer is any ship from 5000 to 10,000 tonnes, frigates are 1500 to 5000 tonnes, corvettes are 500 to 1500 tonnes, and patrol boats/fast attack ships are under 500 tonnes
We understand there will be some overlap in displacement between the classes and we will continue to adjust for bracket creep (as destroyers have slid upwards from 5000 to 9000 tonnes in the last three decades) but we feel some reasonable standard must be set.
[1] Generally speaking this Russian navy downsized faster and more then IOTL, and as Russia's economy is better earlier ITTL they were then able to sell/scrap their old stuff in favour of new-build ships that could effectively compete with Western designs.
As such there is somewhat more ex-Russian naval hardware out there floating around compared to OTL and the Russian Navy (and military in general) is in far better shape equipment wise, and far more professional then IOTL. However, the Russian military is somewhat smaller then OTL (despite their larger budget), especially the strategic rocket arm as the Russians have chosen to make a) a gesture of good faith and reduce their ICBM arsenal to zero by 2019 and b) have much more faith in submarine launched missiles.
By 2012 the Russian Navy is almost entirely new-build construction (their older stuff was scrapped/sold early, and they basically didn't bother to maintain them in favour of R&D cash) except for the Kirovs/Slavas/Admiral Kuznetsov and are generally on par with Western models (except electronics, and then by not too much).
This is a major reason they're getting some good export sales worldwide, not to mention European NDR-90s/NFR-90s remain more expensive and with export controls are not that much better then the Russian designs (to be fair the Russian designs are up to a decade newer then the NDR/NFR ships) but both Europeans and Russians continue to make incremental improvements to keep competitive in the export market.
Jane's Defence Forecasts – Military Aircraft Programmes
©2012 Jane's Information Group
London
Also add the letter K after all Su-33s. Su-33 is the SU-27 upgraded model with Su-35/37 characteristics but remains 4th generation, the -K model is the fully Su-37 navalised model as a fifth generation fighter.
There are currently six non-American fifth generation fighters operational, as well as the various American fifth generation craft[1].
The non-American 5th generation fighters are the BAE Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale (including naval -M version), the SAAB Gripen, the MiG-35 (including naval -K model), the Sukhoi Su-37 Super Flanker (including naval Su-33K Flanker-D model), and the Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback (including the -K navalised version, although that is more of a dedicated strike aircraft then a fighter).
In addition to the Su-33K (a navalised model of the Su-37, and a successor to the Su-33 which was a navalised/upgraded model of the Su-27) one other model is the Maritime Patrol Su-37FN which, unlike the Western planes, utilizes a fighter in the ASW and Patrol roles which allows for much faster response times as well as reduced escorts—albeit with less loiter time.
The usual ranking of pure performance in air combat usually goes like this:
F-22
F-24 / Typhoon
Su-37 (with European avionics, it ties with the Typhoon)
F-25 / Rafale
MiG-35 (with European avionics, it ties with the F-25 or Rafale)
Gripen
And this entire paragraph above the Sukhoi section:
The MiG-35 and -35K are the fully updated version of the MiG-29 and MiG-29K and are designed to operate as a short field or naval fighter (-K model, operational on Indian and Russian carriers) that is lighter, smaller, and more agile then the Su-33K/37 while retaining good multi-role abilities. The naval -K model removes the second crew member and adds folding wings and other standard naval requirements—it replaces the MiG29K in Indian service. The MiG-35 is operated only by India, Russia, and China; the MiG-35K only by India and Russia. It is most similar to the F-25 and Rafale in western service, being a smaller multi-role model of the premier fighter. Although the MiG-35 remains less popular then the Su-37 (and older Flanker models) a number of sales have recently gone through by nations looking to replace outdated MiG-29s and keep the same basic support base as the MiG-35 is mostly compatible. This bodes well for future MiG-35 sales, but the MiG-35 has not so far been sold to a country which did not operate the MiG-29—this is a problem for MiG. Like other Russian planes European electronics can be swapped in, substantially increasing their capability.
---------
Before I get to the new post I'm also adding the below to
Jane's Defence Forecasts – Military Vessel Programmes
A Look at the Common European Platforms
©2012 Jane's Information Group
London
As the 21st century approached a number of European navies upgraded their capabilities by buying improved NDR-90 ships (although they were typically called frigates for political reasons) and using them to replace older and much smaller frigates as they transitioned their navies to primarily consist of NFR-90 and NDR-90 derived ships. This led to a French air defence 'frigate' being more capable then the Batch I of the British Type 44 air defence 'destroyers'. We of Jane's deplore this random mixing of ship classes and we will continue to follow our ship size guide.
----------
Upon research my line somewhere in Military Vessel Programmes / A Look at the Common European Platforms about no new ballistic missile submarines (except for China) since the end of the Cold War should add Russia to that list
And now, the new stuff.
---------
Jane's Defence Forecasts – Military Vessel Programmes
A Look At Export Oriented Russia
©2012 Jane's Information Group
London
With the collapse of the Soviet Union came the collapse of the Soviet Navy. From 170 nuclear submarines to a dozen. From 1,100 planes in naval aviation to 200. From 250 ship classes to a handful. However during the last decade the Russian Navy, and indeed all Russian armed forces have undergone extensive professionalization and modernization, fuelled by a Russian economy back on track and a great deal of military export-generated hard cash[1].
Starting in the late 1990s following the success of the Flanker custom build/export anywhere program which allowed the Russian Air Force to reduce funding costs of R&D by immediately selling all improvements abroad the Navy adopted a similar policy. By drastically reducing the size of the fleet and selling off anything anyone expressed an interest in (the exception being ballistic missile submarines—if you wanted one you had to provide your own missiles and warheads which no one did) the navy was able to continue development and construction.
They followed the European example, committing to single classes for cruisers, destroyers, and frigates while allowing for modular design and weapons outfits. In part this was due to the success of the European model, in part due to the improved export potential, and most of all a backlash against the vast number of slightly different ship classes (250+ in 1989) in Soviet Russia. In submarines, however, they were able to improve the Akula SSN enough to keep the new-build Akula-III as their primary attack submarine but did design and build one new class each in the SSBN and SSK field. Like the surface fleet the Cold War era submarines were rapidly retired over the 1990s in favour of much fewer and far more capable new-build construction.
Submarines
Currently the Russians operate six Akula class submarines, two Akula-IIs and four Akula-III models—the Akula-IIs are open for lease and heading for retirement though. It is believed they have all been upgraded as funds and equipment become available. They are roughly equivalent to late model American Los Angeles class submarines (the Akula-III model may be better), and somewhat inferior to the American Seawolf class. India currently operates a single Akula-I Improved class submarine under a leasing agreement with Russia to get them submarine experience.
For ballistic missile submarines the Russians maintain four Borei class SSBNs. They are somewhat smaller then the Typhoon class they replaced, and carry less missiles in total (12) but the missiles are more capable. They are among the quietest submarines in operation, quite comparable to American Ohio class submarines. The Russian navy is building 4 more of a stretched variety (the last will be finished in 2019), adding 4 more missiles to take the total to 16. With the commission of the last of these the gradual phase-down in land based ICBMs will be complete—the Russian nuclear deterrent will exist under the sea and in cruise or air delivered missiles.
In addition to the above nuclear submarines the Russians also have eight Project 677/Lada class Air Independent Propulsion conventional submarines. Along with the German and France/Spain/Sweden AIP submarines these are among the most advanced, quiet, and excellent non-nuclear submarines in the world.
Of the old Russian submarine fleet most of the Kilo class conventional submarines were sold to various powers. Currently operating the Kilo is China, India, Algeria, Libya, Poland, Romania, Iran, and Indonesia. However, India and China have turned their attention to the Lada class submarines and over the last five years most Kilo class submarines have been retired in favour of second hand Improved Kilos from China and India—as this remained much cheaper then buying either new Improved Kilos, Ladas, or any currently offered Western submarine.
The various Delta, Oscar, and Typhoon class submarines were retired and stripped for materials. The Chinese did, however, buy three Oscar-IIs over American protests as they viewed the large collection of cruise missiles those boats carried as an excellent counter against an American battlegroup and a reasonable stop-gap as they continued their own naval development.
Carriers
The Russians operate three carriers. The Admiral Kuznetsov class Admiral Kuznetsov, and the Orel class Marshal Grechko (originally the Ul'yanovsk class Ul'yanovsk) and Admiral Gorshkov (after the Kiev class Admiral Gorshkov now in Indian service as the Vikramaditya).
The Admiral Kuznetsov is 67,000 tonnes and carries 18 Su-33K Flanker-Ds (the navalised Su-37 Super Flanker) as well as 8 Su-32K Fullback-Bs (the navalised Su-34 Fullbacks) along with a number of anti-ship missiles, anti-submarines rockets, and in general is much more of a multi-role ship then Western carriers continuing the legacy of Russian carrier designs. A major refit in 2003 added catapults, giving her the ability to launch fully loaded Su-33s and allowed the addition of Su-34Ks to her flight group. In addition to the aircraft she has a great deal of helicopters, usually around 20, which cover the AEW, ASW, and SAR roles.
The Orel's are based on the original 1970s Project Orel as well as the American Nimitz class carriers. Originally designed with the standard array of missiles (both anti-ship and anti-air) in 1991 construction was stopped under the impact of worsening economic conditions, hence time was taken to conduct designs modifications (notably the access to some Western electronics). With the removal of anti-ship batteries in the design and some other changes construction resumed on the Marshal Grechko in 1993 and her sister ship, eventually named Admiral Gorshkov, in 1995. They were commissioned in late 1999 and mid 2001 respectively.
The Orel's are carriers along Western lines. Displacing 74,000 tonnes she carries roughly 70 aircraft, usually including 12 MiG-35Ks, 30 Su-33Ks, 12 Su-34Ks, and a number of helicopters and support craft. In addition she has much more powerful AAW weaponry then similar Western designs as Russian battlegroup air defence integration lags behind Western technology.
After the American Nimitz class the Orel's are the largest nuclear carriers afloat, although as they displace roughly 1000 tonnes less then the Japanese Sun class carriers they are only the the third largest warships afloat (this varies depending on their respective load-outs, and is a cause for some confusion in naval texts, we take the average displacement of both carrier classes as our benchmark).
In 2002 China licensed the Orel design to complement their existing carrier, the Mao (the Russian Admiral Kuznetsov class Varyag which finished refitting in 2001) and laid the hull down in 2003. The ship commissioned in 2010 as the Great Leap Forward and, like the Mao, operates an airgroup comparable to Russian carriers.
Cruisers
Russia currently operates three Kirov class large missile cruisers as well as two Slava class cruisers (with a third Slava sold to China). Although all five ships are quite large and powerful and have seen refits in the last decade making them more formidable the Russian Navy is following the European and American model and transitioning to smaller destroyers and frigates. Thus they will see no replacement classes and the last should leave service no later then 2035 (probably earlier, depending on new carriers and new escorts).
Typically the Kirov's operate at the centre of their own battlegroup, while the two Slava's each escort a carrier. They carry a wide variety of weapons, especially a wide variety of missiles, and can conduct any role a naval ship might be called.
Destroyers
The Russians main surface combatant is the Neustrashimy class guided missile destroyer and despite being some eight years newer is roughly similar to the European NDR-90 project (The British Type 44 or American Arleigh Burke class destroyers).
The Neustrashimy is a specifically a multi-role ship and mounts a wide variety of weapons to handle the AAW, ASW, and anti-ship roles. Compared to the NDR-90 project she has better capability in all areas (especially anti-ship) but air defence, where she seriously lags.
A number of the Sovremenny class guided missile destroyers remain in service as the Neustrashimys are still building as the Neustrashimy-II model (with much improved air defence along Western lines), and half a dozen improved Sovremennys were sold to China.
In addition to the Neustrashimy class the Russians also operate the Stereguschy class ASW/multi-role destroyer (they term it a frigate, see Jane's Definitions below) the first of which was laid down in 1994 and as refitted to Stereguschy-II status are considered near parity with similar sized Western ASW ships, albeit with superior multi-role capabilities.
The Stereguschy/-II class is for sale and China has bought half a dozen, a number of other countries are also looking at customized variants as it provides near Western capability for somewhat cheaper costs. The more expensive Neustrashimy-II has been bought only by China (2) and India (2) to serve as additional air defence for their carrier groups.
Frigates
The Russian navy has a number of Gepard class frigates which are small easily customized/multi-varient frigates that represent both a fast and cheap surface combatant and a very attractive export option. Many navies currently operate Gepard class frigates.
The older Krivak class frigate has been phased out of operation although a number of Krivak-3s and the improved Talwar subclass were sold to India, China, and a few other nations.
Jane's Definitions: A Note On Ship Sizes
As navies call ships destroyers or frigates or cruisers seemingly on whim Jane's has taken to standardized definitions based on size, which we then tag onto the role of the ship as well as 'large' or 'small' if they are decidedly to one side of our ranges.
A cruiser is any ship from 10,000 to 20,000 tonnes, a destroyer is any ship from 5000 to 10,000 tonnes, frigates are 1500 to 5000 tonnes, corvettes are 500 to 1500 tonnes, and patrol boats/fast attack ships are under 500 tonnes
We understand there will be some overlap in displacement between the classes and we will continue to adjust for bracket creep (as destroyers have slid upwards from 5000 to 9000 tonnes in the last three decades) but we feel some reasonable standard must be set.
[1] Generally speaking this Russian navy downsized faster and more then IOTL, and as Russia's economy is better earlier ITTL they were then able to sell/scrap their old stuff in favour of new-build ships that could effectively compete with Western designs.
As such there is somewhat more ex-Russian naval hardware out there floating around compared to OTL and the Russian Navy (and military in general) is in far better shape equipment wise, and far more professional then IOTL. However, the Russian military is somewhat smaller then OTL (despite their larger budget), especially the strategic rocket arm as the Russians have chosen to make a) a gesture of good faith and reduce their ICBM arsenal to zero by 2019 and b) have much more faith in submarine launched missiles.
By 2012 the Russian Navy is almost entirely new-build construction (their older stuff was scrapped/sold early, and they basically didn't bother to maintain them in favour of R&D cash) except for the Kirovs/Slavas/Admiral Kuznetsov and are generally on par with Western models (except electronics, and then by not too much).
This is a major reason they're getting some good export sales worldwide, not to mention European NDR-90s/NFR-90s remain more expensive and with export controls are not that much better then the Russian designs (to be fair the Russian designs are up to a decade newer then the NDR/NFR ships) but both Europeans and Russians continue to make incremental improvements to keep competitive in the export market.
Oh they won certainly, but all the Argentine stuff that went wrong IOTL didn't always go wrong here. The British lose a couple frigates and destroyers, and suffered a hit on a carrier. This serves as a wake-up call to the limitations of small carriers as a proper air group likely would have meant no successful attacks on the fleet.
Hence they talk to the French who are running R&D on a new carrier, get on board with them, and (eventually) get some 70,000 tonne carriers down the road.
Hence they talk to the French who are running R&D on a new carrier, get on board with them, and (eventually) get some 70,000 tonne carriers down the road.
Strategic Balance of Power In East Asia is still forthcoming, I have about 10 military journal papers about Asia/China/Taiwan/Japan/balance of power I need to read (I'm sticking with Parameters, as they're readily available online but if anybody wants to recommend some stuff feel free).
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The Coming Democratic Majority: 1988 Forward
Unknown Republican Author (Sometime in 1989)
Confidential Memo to the RNC
For all the work Reagan has done to bring about the Republican Majority first talked about in 1969, and for all the work done to unite conservatives of various stripes we are on the verge of losing that.
Morning in America, the 1984 Reagan campaign, came perilously close to losing against the Democratic centrist John Glenn. They seem to have realized that they need to put Midwestern or Western centrist candidates up for the Presidential election (rather the nebulous will of the primary voters have come to that conclusion) instead of their typical north/northeastern liberals. Many of the Reagan Democrats went back to their roots, and both the personal popularity and middle American sensibilities of the 1984 Democratic nominee cut deeply into Reagan's margins.
As you know Walter Mondale nearly won the 1984 primaries and the campaign staff of the 1984 Reagan campaign (in informal talks with myself, and others) remain confident they would have crushed him. However John Glenn making the wise call to skip Iowa (contrary to the Carter strategy of 1976) eventually landed up him with the nomination (with the 1988 nominee in third place).
With the defeat of George Bush by Gary Hart in 1988 on a noticeably left-ward tilt (unlike in 1984) we face a problem. The Democratic Party controls both houses of Congress and despite CAFTA having been passed it seems unlikely that further trade deals will go through. They are quite simply too tied to their Labor base. Less, perhaps, then we are to the religious wing but unlike Labor the religious wing is willing to accept whatever governmental policies we follow as long as we maintain their values—an acceptable trade-off to all sides.
As they are tied to their Labor base, and as they are left-wing we doubt sensible economic policy will be enacted by President Hart and what seems to be a fairly under control Democratic majority. As you know Reagan got a lot accomplished in the economy but heavily increased defense spending offset much of that (we remain grateful that Europe and Japan stepped up spending in the mid-80s or our spending would have been much higher).
At the moment we do not see a nominee able to challenge Gary Hart successfully for the 1992 presidential election (especially given base dissatisfaction with the nomination of George Bush in 1988) and unless conditions change that means Democratic control of the legislative and executive branch for at least 8 years. The last time Democrats had this level of control we were stuck with the Great Society (Carter, in hindsight, was very much a centrist/economic conservative) and all the damage that caused.
I fear what we may face now.
Excerpt from:
The Contract With America: The 1990 Republican Comeback
©1991 University of Virginia Center for Politics
Longman Press, 1991.
Ethical scandals rocked the Hart White House in late 1989 as it was revealed that he had cheated on his wife with a number of mistresses both during their separation, and after they had reconciled. This gave a far more favorable then expected political environment to the Republicans then most pundits had foreseen just weeks or months before.
As Dick Cheny had stepped down from House Minority Whip due to health concerns in 1989 and Bob Michel had decided to retire after being awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal by President Reagan (he was disinclined to remain the minority party facing a Democratic White House) that same year Newt Gingrich won a tough election to the position of House Minority Leader.
With the revelations about President Hart Mr. Gingrich authored the Contract With American pledging to reform the corrupt Washington political system and carry through on his promises. Voters appeared to approve of a set policy checklist (much as parliamentary systems operated) and duly rewarded the Republicans, although much of it was purely negative votes against the Democratic Party.
Newly sworn in Speaker Gingrich promptly passed the entire Contract With America (which either died in the Senate, or was vetoed by President Hart). Nevertheless it was and remains a powerful political tool for the Republicans, one the Democratic Party has not yet managed to counter.
With President Hart's approval numbers low only a miracle can save him from the voter's wrath in the 1992 elections…
Miracles Do Happen: Gary Hart and the 1992 Presidential Election
Special to the Washington Post, November 15th 1992.
Julian Witcove
A year and a half ago the conventional wisdom was that the Democratic Party, despite epidemic Congressional corruption, was cruising to a second White House victory and retaining control of both houses of Congress.
Six months ago the conventional wisdom was that Bob Dole looked set to win the 1992 Presidential election and that he might carry the Senate with him due to the popularity of Gingrich's House Republicans and the massive unpopularity of Gary Hart.
Yet we are. Gary Hart has won a second term by the skin of his teeth, to use that tired metaphor, the Democrats still control the Senate, and although Gingrich picked up a few seats the House Republicans still only have a mere twelve seat majority.
What changed? Well you all the know answer as well as I do. Foreign affairs effected the election as one Saddam Hussein (a once upon a time stanch ally of the US) invaded Kuwait.
Dire predictions of global winter from the burning of the oil wells aside, the war was uneventful. America and European allies built up fifty thousand troops in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, bombed the Iraqi forces until they vanished, and then took back Kuwait.
A perfectly boring, utterly one-sided war that besides needless death on both sides changed the world not one iota. Hussein is still in Iraq, merrily killing his own people. The Arab world is irritated by all the foreign troops used to help them. Americans ask why did we bother (the obvious answer to help a defenseless country when no one else did remains drowned out), and so the world goes on.
The real winner in all of this is President Hart. A successful war does wonders for your numbers and the American people are willing to overlook a lot in a wartime president.
I'm not making light of the conflict, it was an important demonstration that war is pretty much obsolete, but the only person who seems to have benefited from the conflict is President Hart. The Kuwaiti people were happier before Iraq invaded. Before Iraq invaded they had an army, now they do not. Before Iraq invaded the Arab world could maintain the illusion that Western forces were not needed. Because we sent fifty thousand troops to the desert a number were killed and we spent a great deal of money in add to people who (the Kuwaiti's themselves aside) were manifestly not grateful. Almost everybody lost on this one, and yet we all hail it as a great victory.
At least I have the 1994 mid-terms to look forward to.
------
The Coming Democratic Majority: 1988 Forward
Unknown Republican Author (Sometime in 1989)
Confidential Memo to the RNC
For all the work Reagan has done to bring about the Republican Majority first talked about in 1969, and for all the work done to unite conservatives of various stripes we are on the verge of losing that.
Morning in America, the 1984 Reagan campaign, came perilously close to losing against the Democratic centrist John Glenn. They seem to have realized that they need to put Midwestern or Western centrist candidates up for the Presidential election (rather the nebulous will of the primary voters have come to that conclusion) instead of their typical north/northeastern liberals. Many of the Reagan Democrats went back to their roots, and both the personal popularity and middle American sensibilities of the 1984 Democratic nominee cut deeply into Reagan's margins.
As you know Walter Mondale nearly won the 1984 primaries and the campaign staff of the 1984 Reagan campaign (in informal talks with myself, and others) remain confident they would have crushed him. However John Glenn making the wise call to skip Iowa (contrary to the Carter strategy of 1976) eventually landed up him with the nomination (with the 1988 nominee in third place).
With the defeat of George Bush by Gary Hart in 1988 on a noticeably left-ward tilt (unlike in 1984) we face a problem. The Democratic Party controls both houses of Congress and despite CAFTA having been passed it seems unlikely that further trade deals will go through. They are quite simply too tied to their Labor base. Less, perhaps, then we are to the religious wing but unlike Labor the religious wing is willing to accept whatever governmental policies we follow as long as we maintain their values—an acceptable trade-off to all sides.
As they are tied to their Labor base, and as they are left-wing we doubt sensible economic policy will be enacted by President Hart and what seems to be a fairly under control Democratic majority. As you know Reagan got a lot accomplished in the economy but heavily increased defense spending offset much of that (we remain grateful that Europe and Japan stepped up spending in the mid-80s or our spending would have been much higher).
At the moment we do not see a nominee able to challenge Gary Hart successfully for the 1992 presidential election (especially given base dissatisfaction with the nomination of George Bush in 1988) and unless conditions change that means Democratic control of the legislative and executive branch for at least 8 years. The last time Democrats had this level of control we were stuck with the Great Society (Carter, in hindsight, was very much a centrist/economic conservative) and all the damage that caused.
I fear what we may face now.
Excerpt from:
The Contract With America: The 1990 Republican Comeback
©1991 University of Virginia Center for Politics
Longman Press, 1991.
Ethical scandals rocked the Hart White House in late 1989 as it was revealed that he had cheated on his wife with a number of mistresses both during their separation, and after they had reconciled. This gave a far more favorable then expected political environment to the Republicans then most pundits had foreseen just weeks or months before.
As Dick Cheny had stepped down from House Minority Whip due to health concerns in 1989 and Bob Michel had decided to retire after being awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal by President Reagan (he was disinclined to remain the minority party facing a Democratic White House) that same year Newt Gingrich won a tough election to the position of House Minority Leader.
With the revelations about President Hart Mr. Gingrich authored the Contract With American pledging to reform the corrupt Washington political system and carry through on his promises. Voters appeared to approve of a set policy checklist (much as parliamentary systems operated) and duly rewarded the Republicans, although much of it was purely negative votes against the Democratic Party.
Newly sworn in Speaker Gingrich promptly passed the entire Contract With America (which either died in the Senate, or was vetoed by President Hart). Nevertheless it was and remains a powerful political tool for the Republicans, one the Democratic Party has not yet managed to counter.
With President Hart's approval numbers low only a miracle can save him from the voter's wrath in the 1992 elections…
Miracles Do Happen: Gary Hart and the 1992 Presidential Election
Special to the Washington Post, November 15th 1992.
Julian Witcove
A year and a half ago the conventional wisdom was that the Democratic Party, despite epidemic Congressional corruption, was cruising to a second White House victory and retaining control of both houses of Congress.
Six months ago the conventional wisdom was that Bob Dole looked set to win the 1992 Presidential election and that he might carry the Senate with him due to the popularity of Gingrich's House Republicans and the massive unpopularity of Gary Hart.
Yet we are. Gary Hart has won a second term by the skin of his teeth, to use that tired metaphor, the Democrats still control the Senate, and although Gingrich picked up a few seats the House Republicans still only have a mere twelve seat majority.
What changed? Well you all the know answer as well as I do. Foreign affairs effected the election as one Saddam Hussein (a once upon a time stanch ally of the US) invaded Kuwait.
Dire predictions of global winter from the burning of the oil wells aside, the war was uneventful. America and European allies built up fifty thousand troops in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, bombed the Iraqi forces until they vanished, and then took back Kuwait.
A perfectly boring, utterly one-sided war that besides needless death on both sides changed the world not one iota. Hussein is still in Iraq, merrily killing his own people. The Arab world is irritated by all the foreign troops used to help them. Americans ask why did we bother (the obvious answer to help a defenseless country when no one else did remains drowned out), and so the world goes on.
The real winner in all of this is President Hart. A successful war does wonders for your numbers and the American people are willing to overlook a lot in a wartime president.
I'm not making light of the conflict, it was an important demonstration that war is pretty much obsolete, but the only person who seems to have benefited from the conflict is President Hart. The Kuwaiti people were happier before Iraq invaded. Before Iraq invaded they had an army, now they do not. Before Iraq invaded the Arab world could maintain the illusion that Western forces were not needed. Because we sent fifty thousand troops to the desert a number were killed and we spent a great deal of money in add to people who (the Kuwaiti's themselves aside) were manifestly not grateful. Almost everybody lost on this one, and yet we all hail it as a great victory.
At least I have the 1994 mid-terms to look forward to.
It's not the most plausible thing in the world, but it's possible and it was fun .
---------
A Magnificent Failure: The Last Campaigns of the Liberal Party?
©1993 Robin Searson
New Day Publishing, Toronto: 1993
The Scene
It was a bright day in early 1985. Bill Davis, the bland and brilliant premier of Ontario was tired. He had been in charge of Ontario for a long time, and his Progressive Conservative Party much longer. A decade wasn't unheard of for a premier, certainly, but he had usually mustered only a minority government and had wrestled through his policies in a constant display of the political skill that had brought him to the job. "Bland Works" was his tagline, and he had proved it correct numerous times. His choice was simple: stay one more term, or turn things over and retire.
At the Federal level Prime Minister's Mulroney government was dealing with two major issues: government debt and free trade. The debt was simple. The previous Liberal government under Trudeau had run a vast deficit piling up hundreds of billions of dollars in debt without anyone caring. The Progressive Conservatives were now stuck with it. Every penny of the budget deficit now came from Trudeau's debt—without it Canada would be running a surplus.
The free trade issue was worse, if that's possible. Canada was one of the world's most protected economies (arguably the most protected, in the First World since New Zealand had liberalized). Hence the Liberal initiated commission on the subject of Canada's economy had finally come back with "free trade with the United States is essential to the prosperity of Canada". In a stunning reversal the Liberals, free traders their entire history, had come out against free trade and found much public support.
The government's choice was simple: take the required steps to balance the budget and face the electoral consequences, or simply keep running a deficit; go for free trade in the face of public opposition for the prosperity of Canada, or bow to the public and watch Canada fade away into a third world economy….
In NDP campaign headquarters there was jubilation. The NDP had won 30 seats (with 18.81% of the vote), narrowly behind the Liberal's 40 seats. They felt they had a real chance to supplant the Liberals as the party of the left, on the popularity of Ed Broadbent. As always the main thing dragging them down was the economy. The public simply didn't believe the NDP could handle the economy, however much they believed in social justice. A bright young man watching the British Liberal party had ideas….
In Liberal command once Prime Minister Turner faced the worst debacle in Liberal history. Of 33 federal election campaigns since the Dominion of Canada was founded the Liberals had won 19 of them. If you include only the 20th century their record soars—17 of 25. With the exception of Japan's Liberal Democrat Party (but with a longer record) they were the most successful political party in the Western world, spending more years in government during the 20th century then any other political party in the democratic world.
In 1984, however, that all changed. Running one of the worst campaigns on record from the leader on down the Liberals received their worst performance to date—40 seats with 28.02% of the vote. That was their worst showing in votes since Confederation in 1867 (22.67%—where 33.84% of votes remain unknown) and in seats since 1958 (49) the last time the Progressive Conservatives took Quebec
The Right Honourable Turner had done a 180 when the Progressive Conservatives began talking about free trade. From being a man who believed in free trade and the ability of business to compete without subsides and protection, to a man who believed that the entire Canadian national identity rested on protectionism. No one of his inner circle believed him, but the public did and the Liberal polls were climbing back up, but an election was 3 or 4 years away….
Back in Ontario…*The Big Blue Machine
Bill Davis made up his mind sometime in the summer of 1985. He had one more term in him. With Bill Davis at their head no one was in doubt of the outcome and by the time the election had come the other parties had graciously accepted what was going to happen—another Progressive Conservative majority government. Toronto for one was finally going to get the transit system it needed, as Network 2011 was one of the first things funded in Bill Davis's budget.
There would be no taste of victory for Liberal leader David Peterson, and he would continue to sit in opposition along with NDP leader Bob Rae. However Bob Rae might not be staying there, as he was engaged in some deep discussion with Bill Davis about a certain interesting proposal….
The Big Red Machine & The Little Orange Machine
By 1987 the federal Liberals had managed to build up a vast amount of debt. Not least because their traditional donor base of large corporations was unhappy with their anti-free trade position.
John Napier Turner had come back to the Liberal fold after nearly a decade in 1984 becoming Prime Minister for a few brief months before leading the Liberals to what can arguably be called their worst election ever, up to that point. Perilously close to losing official opposition status, in fact.
Nevertheless Turner survived a leadership review in 1986 and would be the man leading the Liberal Party into its 34th federal election in the closing days of 1988.
However, their brief surge in the polls in 1985 and 1986 had faded away as the NDP outlined their audacious blueprint for a new Canada—dramatic economic reforms along Euro-Japanese lines combined with an overhauled and more fair social welfare net. Most notably, and most startling, was their support for free trade. They did, however, combine this with a complete removal of corporate subsides—if business wanted free trade, business would have to do so without government support.
The Liberals were benefiting from being the only party against free trade, but that was getting less and less support as the NDP's reversal on the issue had crippled much of the activist anti-free trade base. Although it seemed certain that the Liberals would pick up NDP support, a great deal of Progressive Conservative support was flowing to the NDP—primarily that unique creature known as a Red Tory.
The NDP were, quite frankly, altering their entire historic course on economics while keeping their long held social beliefs. Ed Broadbent seemed to have gone mad, to some outside observers, and to others it was genius. Regardless the NDP would enter the next election as a party firmly committed to classical liberal economics, and at the same time espousing the collective over the individual, the individual over the government, the city and the farm over the suburb; a dizzying mix that was brand new to the Canadian political scene. Their position, as the media tried desperately to sum it up neatly, seemed to be that the government existed to help those who needed it, to create a level playing field (equality of opportunity)—and to leave everybody else alone.
The Muddy Middling Progressive Conservatives
Amusingly to the media and political commentators the PC party was outflanked to its right on economics by the NDP, to its left on social issues by the NDP, and opposed in the middle by the Liberals, a party with the same policies fighting for the exact same political spectrum—except, of course, on the issue of free trade.
Although Prime Minister Mulroney remained an excellent political operator he was having to make more and more promises to get through the next election (like the eventually catastrophic promise to Quebec to redo the Constitution).
For people who liked and were used to the traditional centre-right PC, centre Liberal, centre-left NDP this was both confusing and irritating. To everybody else, it was a wild roller coaster ride and the first major shake-up since Social Credit or even the NDP themselves.
The Progressive Conservatives stuck to the centre, convinced that the NDP would self-destruct and that the Liberals under Turner were not credible on the free-trade issue. Time would tell if their pro-free trade policy and eventual balancing of the budget rather then balancing it now would take to another victory….
Welcome To Ontario: Orange and Blue, Sitting In A Tree, K I S S I NG.
In 1988 as the federal election campaign loomed overhead Ontario premier Bill Davis and NDP leader Bob Rae entered into a PC-NDP coalition government. Quite promptly Davis and Rae lost a couple MPPs who moved to the Independent part of the chamber, but the rest of the two parties parliamentarians kept together.
Bill Davis had decided to make reform his legacy, after more then a decade of bland. The NDP had agreed (given their crazy new federal cousins) in return for the introduction of proportional representation.
Thus the first modern North American example of a classical liberal economy was born under the conservatives and social democrats, much like continental Europe. The voters, certainly, didn't know what to think about it but the confidence and sureness of the PC-NDP coalition on economic issues would have wide repercussions in Ontario, and in the rest of Canada.
To The Polls, Gentlemen: The 1988 Topsy-Turvey Election
The 34th federal election campaign of Canada had begun on 1 October 1988 with the dropping of the writ by the Governor General. By the time the polls closed on the 21st of November 1988 the results had been clear for a week, indeed had been clear since the very beginning. The Liberal Party of Canada would be, for the first time in its history, sitting in third place in both seats and votes.
It was a shocking turn of events. The NDP were now the second largest party in the Commons, mustering a total of 70 seats. The Liberals had added a dozen seats, but had lost five they already held—for a total 47. The Progressive Conservatives would keep much of their majority, with some 177 seats and a solid majority.
They pushed through free trade with an America that also badly wanted it, but were unable to make the sacrifices needed to truly balance the budget. Combined with disastrous attempts at constitutional talks that led to the creation of Bloc Quebecois and defection of much of their Quebec wing they went into the election reeling.
The NDP meanwhile had gather many votes out west from both traditional NDP supporters that voted Liberal at the federal level, and from many Progressive Conservatives irritated with the PC focus on Quebec and ignorance of fiscally conservative issues—the NDPs economics were good enough these days and success in Ontario showed the NDP could handle government.
Welcome To Canada: PC & NDP Sitting In A Tree K I S S I N G
The 1993 election saw the Progressive Conservatives hurt badly, with the Bloc Quebecois winning 51 seats in Quebec and the NDP taking nearly a hundred seats (94)—many of the new ones from the PC Party out west and a few in Ontario. The Progressive Conservatives now had merely 104 seats, and the Liberals had only managed 46—consigned to the outlier status of the old NDP.
The PCs, under leader Jean Charest, had no desire to work with the Liberals or the Bloc Quebecois and so they entered into a coalition government with the NDP. As with the Ontario example that led the way the NDP demanded proportional representation and now, also, classical liberal economic reform. The PC Party had no real objections (beyond worrying about the electoral fallout from stuff like the new sales tax) and so they assented to retain power and Canada followed the Euro-Japanese lead into the modern economic system….
The Liberal Party? They had come in third in 1988 and now fourth in 1993. They had lost on free-trade, which was now essentially impossible to go back on. Both of their larger national opponents agreed on economics (roughly speaking) and in 1993 with Ontario's disruption ended and a lot of new prosperity popping up the public kinda agreed to. The Liberals now exist on a mix of base loyalty and (outside Quebec) statists who remain uncomfortable with less government, regardless of any economic benefit.
The 1988 and 1993 campaigns may not have been the last ones of the Liberal Party, but they were failures. Magnificent ones, perhaps, fighting against the future but failures, nonetheless. Only time will tell us what happens to the Liberals, and indeed what will happen to Canada under this new economic order and the Liberals are a long way back, but never count them out. There's a reason they were the most successful party in the 20th century, and there's always one more chance in politics….
.---------
A Magnificent Failure: The Last Campaigns of the Liberal Party?
©1993 Robin Searson
New Day Publishing, Toronto: 1993
The Scene
It was a bright day in early 1985. Bill Davis, the bland and brilliant premier of Ontario was tired. He had been in charge of Ontario for a long time, and his Progressive Conservative Party much longer. A decade wasn't unheard of for a premier, certainly, but he had usually mustered only a minority government and had wrestled through his policies in a constant display of the political skill that had brought him to the job. "Bland Works" was his tagline, and he had proved it correct numerous times. His choice was simple: stay one more term, or turn things over and retire.
At the Federal level Prime Minister's Mulroney government was dealing with two major issues: government debt and free trade. The debt was simple. The previous Liberal government under Trudeau had run a vast deficit piling up hundreds of billions of dollars in debt without anyone caring. The Progressive Conservatives were now stuck with it. Every penny of the budget deficit now came from Trudeau's debt—without it Canada would be running a surplus.
The free trade issue was worse, if that's possible. Canada was one of the world's most protected economies (arguably the most protected, in the First World since New Zealand had liberalized). Hence the Liberal initiated commission on the subject of Canada's economy had finally come back with "free trade with the United States is essential to the prosperity of Canada". In a stunning reversal the Liberals, free traders their entire history, had come out against free trade and found much public support.
The government's choice was simple: take the required steps to balance the budget and face the electoral consequences, or simply keep running a deficit; go for free trade in the face of public opposition for the prosperity of Canada, or bow to the public and watch Canada fade away into a third world economy….
In NDP campaign headquarters there was jubilation. The NDP had won 30 seats (with 18.81% of the vote), narrowly behind the Liberal's 40 seats. They felt they had a real chance to supplant the Liberals as the party of the left, on the popularity of Ed Broadbent. As always the main thing dragging them down was the economy. The public simply didn't believe the NDP could handle the economy, however much they believed in social justice. A bright young man watching the British Liberal party had ideas….
In Liberal command once Prime Minister Turner faced the worst debacle in Liberal history. Of 33 federal election campaigns since the Dominion of Canada was founded the Liberals had won 19 of them. If you include only the 20th century their record soars—17 of 25. With the exception of Japan's Liberal Democrat Party (but with a longer record) they were the most successful political party in the Western world, spending more years in government during the 20th century then any other political party in the democratic world.
In 1984, however, that all changed. Running one of the worst campaigns on record from the leader on down the Liberals received their worst performance to date—40 seats with 28.02% of the vote. That was their worst showing in votes since Confederation in 1867 (22.67%—where 33.84% of votes remain unknown) and in seats since 1958 (49) the last time the Progressive Conservatives took Quebec
The Right Honourable Turner had done a 180 when the Progressive Conservatives began talking about free trade. From being a man who believed in free trade and the ability of business to compete without subsides and protection, to a man who believed that the entire Canadian national identity rested on protectionism. No one of his inner circle believed him, but the public did and the Liberal polls were climbing back up, but an election was 3 or 4 years away….
Back in Ontario…*The Big Blue Machine
Bill Davis made up his mind sometime in the summer of 1985. He had one more term in him. With Bill Davis at their head no one was in doubt of the outcome and by the time the election had come the other parties had graciously accepted what was going to happen—another Progressive Conservative majority government. Toronto for one was finally going to get the transit system it needed, as Network 2011 was one of the first things funded in Bill Davis's budget.
There would be no taste of victory for Liberal leader David Peterson, and he would continue to sit in opposition along with NDP leader Bob Rae. However Bob Rae might not be staying there, as he was engaged in some deep discussion with Bill Davis about a certain interesting proposal….
The Big Red Machine & The Little Orange Machine
By 1987 the federal Liberals had managed to build up a vast amount of debt. Not least because their traditional donor base of large corporations was unhappy with their anti-free trade position.
John Napier Turner had come back to the Liberal fold after nearly a decade in 1984 becoming Prime Minister for a few brief months before leading the Liberals to what can arguably be called their worst election ever, up to that point. Perilously close to losing official opposition status, in fact.
Nevertheless Turner survived a leadership review in 1986 and would be the man leading the Liberal Party into its 34th federal election in the closing days of 1988.
However, their brief surge in the polls in 1985 and 1986 had faded away as the NDP outlined their audacious blueprint for a new Canada—dramatic economic reforms along Euro-Japanese lines combined with an overhauled and more fair social welfare net. Most notably, and most startling, was their support for free trade. They did, however, combine this with a complete removal of corporate subsides—if business wanted free trade, business would have to do so without government support.
The Liberals were benefiting from being the only party against free trade, but that was getting less and less support as the NDP's reversal on the issue had crippled much of the activist anti-free trade base. Although it seemed certain that the Liberals would pick up NDP support, a great deal of Progressive Conservative support was flowing to the NDP—primarily that unique creature known as a Red Tory.
The NDP were, quite frankly, altering their entire historic course on economics while keeping their long held social beliefs. Ed Broadbent seemed to have gone mad, to some outside observers, and to others it was genius. Regardless the NDP would enter the next election as a party firmly committed to classical liberal economics, and at the same time espousing the collective over the individual, the individual over the government, the city and the farm over the suburb; a dizzying mix that was brand new to the Canadian political scene. Their position, as the media tried desperately to sum it up neatly, seemed to be that the government existed to help those who needed it, to create a level playing field (equality of opportunity)—and to leave everybody else alone.
The Muddy Middling Progressive Conservatives
Amusingly to the media and political commentators the PC party was outflanked to its right on economics by the NDP, to its left on social issues by the NDP, and opposed in the middle by the Liberals, a party with the same policies fighting for the exact same political spectrum—except, of course, on the issue of free trade.
Although Prime Minister Mulroney remained an excellent political operator he was having to make more and more promises to get through the next election (like the eventually catastrophic promise to Quebec to redo the Constitution).
For people who liked and were used to the traditional centre-right PC, centre Liberal, centre-left NDP this was both confusing and irritating. To everybody else, it was a wild roller coaster ride and the first major shake-up since Social Credit or even the NDP themselves.
The Progressive Conservatives stuck to the centre, convinced that the NDP would self-destruct and that the Liberals under Turner were not credible on the free-trade issue. Time would tell if their pro-free trade policy and eventual balancing of the budget rather then balancing it now would take to another victory….
Welcome To Ontario: Orange and Blue, Sitting In A Tree, K I S S I NG.
In 1988 as the federal election campaign loomed overhead Ontario premier Bill Davis and NDP leader Bob Rae entered into a PC-NDP coalition government. Quite promptly Davis and Rae lost a couple MPPs who moved to the Independent part of the chamber, but the rest of the two parties parliamentarians kept together.
Bill Davis had decided to make reform his legacy, after more then a decade of bland. The NDP had agreed (given their crazy new federal cousins) in return for the introduction of proportional representation.
Thus the first modern North American example of a classical liberal economy was born under the conservatives and social democrats, much like continental Europe. The voters, certainly, didn't know what to think about it but the confidence and sureness of the PC-NDP coalition on economic issues would have wide repercussions in Ontario, and in the rest of Canada.
To The Polls, Gentlemen: The 1988 Topsy-Turvey Election
The 34th federal election campaign of Canada had begun on 1 October 1988 with the dropping of the writ by the Governor General. By the time the polls closed on the 21st of November 1988 the results had been clear for a week, indeed had been clear since the very beginning. The Liberal Party of Canada would be, for the first time in its history, sitting in third place in both seats and votes.
It was a shocking turn of events. The NDP were now the second largest party in the Commons, mustering a total of 70 seats. The Liberals had added a dozen seats, but had lost five they already held—for a total 47. The Progressive Conservatives would keep much of their majority, with some 177 seats and a solid majority.
They pushed through free trade with an America that also badly wanted it, but were unable to make the sacrifices needed to truly balance the budget. Combined with disastrous attempts at constitutional talks that led to the creation of Bloc Quebecois and defection of much of their Quebec wing they went into the election reeling.
The NDP meanwhile had gather many votes out west from both traditional NDP supporters that voted Liberal at the federal level, and from many Progressive Conservatives irritated with the PC focus on Quebec and ignorance of fiscally conservative issues—the NDPs economics were good enough these days and success in Ontario showed the NDP could handle government.
Welcome To Canada: PC & NDP Sitting In A Tree K I S S I N G
The 1993 election saw the Progressive Conservatives hurt badly, with the Bloc Quebecois winning 51 seats in Quebec and the NDP taking nearly a hundred seats (94)—many of the new ones from the PC Party out west and a few in Ontario. The Progressive Conservatives now had merely 104 seats, and the Liberals had only managed 46—consigned to the outlier status of the old NDP.
The PCs, under leader Jean Charest, had no desire to work with the Liberals or the Bloc Quebecois and so they entered into a coalition government with the NDP. As with the Ontario example that led the way the NDP demanded proportional representation and now, also, classical liberal economic reform. The PC Party had no real objections (beyond worrying about the electoral fallout from stuff like the new sales tax) and so they assented to retain power and Canada followed the Euro-Japanese lead into the modern economic system….
The Liberal Party? They had come in third in 1988 and now fourth in 1993. They had lost on free-trade, which was now essentially impossible to go back on. Both of their larger national opponents agreed on economics (roughly speaking) and in 1993 with Ontario's disruption ended and a lot of new prosperity popping up the public kinda agreed to. The Liberals now exist on a mix of base loyalty and (outside Quebec) statists who remain uncomfortable with less government, regardless of any economic benefit.
The 1988 and 1993 campaigns may not have been the last ones of the Liberal Party, but they were failures. Magnificent ones, perhaps, fighting against the future but failures, nonetheless. Only time will tell us what happens to the Liberals, and indeed what will happen to Canada under this new economic order and the Liberals are a long way back, but never count them out. There's a reason they were the most successful party in the 20th century, and there's always one more chance in politics….
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One problem with all that EM - you're mixing Ontario and Federal Politics.
Bill Davis was never the leader of the federal PCs - he was the Ontario Premier from 1971 to 1985. You got Broadbent and Turner right, but Turner took over from Trudeau and you've butterflied away Mulroney.
But the Liberals falling to pieces is something I relished back then - and the idea of a liberal-economics NDP is downright shocking, especially considering what an ignorant fool Jack Layton is. (Think Segolene Royal-level ignorant on the economy.)
Bill Davis was never the leader of the federal PCs - he was the Ontario Premier from 1971 to 1985. You got Broadbent and Turner right, but Turner took over from Trudeau and you've butterflied away Mulroney.
But the Liberals falling to pieces is something I relished back then - and the idea of a liberal-economics NDP is downright shocking, especially considering what an ignorant fool Jack Layton is. (Think Segolene Royal-level ignorant on the economy.)
I'm from Toronto and I'm a political science major. I'm really not :
Basically Bill Davis getting one more term hurts the Liberals as they don't have David Peterson in Ontario to support them. He also decides that his legacy to Ontario should be more then just good government, and in order to force through reform gets the NDP on board to protect him from the left-wing.
The NDP are happy to do so in return for proportional representation (mostly because their federal cousins have recently remade themselves as an economically classical liberal party).
This deal paves the way for a federal version of same in 1993.
However if you point out where you got confused I'll be happy to make some edits.
ETA: Ok, I did a quick run through and tried to make it more clear when was I talking about Ontario and when I moved to the Federal level, hope that helps.
:------
Basically Bill Davis getting one more term hurts the Liberals as they don't have David Peterson in Ontario to support them. He also decides that his legacy to Ontario should be more then just good government, and in order to force through reform gets the NDP on board to protect him from the left-wing.
The NDP are happy to do so in return for proportional representation (mostly because their federal cousins have recently remade themselves as an economically classical liberal party).
This deal paves the way for a federal version of same in 1993.
However if you point out where you got confused I'll be happy to make some edits.
ETA: Ok, I did a quick run through and tried to make it more clear when was I talking about Ontario and when I moved to the Federal level, hope that helps.
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Well according to people in my parallel Alternate Naval Ships—1980s Forward I need to make some changes.
So, until I finish this, edit it all over again, and start posting it in the Timelines & Scenarios thread I will do this:
Delete any mention of the French Rafale. It never existed…. Instead, add this to the aircraft thread:
Although the French had thought seriously about pulling out of the Eurofighter group to make their own fighter the Falkland War and renewed British interest in large carriers meant they now had support for their requirement of a navalised Eurofighter.
Their staying in required a moderate rethinking of the project. At the time the Eurofighter was planned to be a smaller fighter then the F-15 (and the Soviet Flanker), which would to some extent limit its capabilities despite being newer. It was a compromise to the French who had pushed for a lighter fighter.
With British support for the CVF project the French could move from the 40,000 tonne carrier they were considering to a 60,000 tonne model. As such they were much more willing to think about a larger Eurofighter, despite their earlier intransigence on the weight issue.
Thus the Eurofighter was allowed to increase in weight to roughly comparable to the American F-14 or F-15 fighters, and a navalised model would be built for the French and eventually the British.
------
As for the European naval co-operation, I also need to make a few changes, and so add this to the European vessel part:
With the loss of the Invincible in the Falklands War (along with several escorts) the Royal Navy, or rather their political masters, were forced to reconsider the idea of a large carrier. Although the Harrier had performed better then expectations the main problem was simply in the lack of deployable aircraft.
With reluctance the Royal Navy began talks with the French, who were working on replacement carrier designs for their 1960s era flattops, about a joint CVF project for a large carrier.
Eventually plans were settled. The French would proceed with a 60,000 tonne CVF whose construction would begin immediately; three more carriers would be purchased (2 British, 1 French) after the first CVF had been in operation for time and lessons learned from her would be applied to the planned follow-on ships.
Having settled on this the French obtained support for a navalised Eurofighter as the British could now use one to complement their Harrier.
AND (although, as above, this is a mix of rewrite and replacement)
With the success of both the Eurofighter and the CVF projects (along with the spun-off CVFL carrier project for replacement of the British Invincible class, and to fulfil the light carrier needs of Europe[1]) naturally turned to other programs.
The NATO Frigate Replacement project for the 1990s (NFR-90) was a natural candidate, but some things would require work: The Americans and British wanted a larger ship, the others did not. The Americans wanted different electronics and weapon systems, the Europeans were split among several others.
In the end the project split into two. The NFR-90 project would go with a ~4000 tonne large frigate with one of three weapons outfits (biased towards AAW or ASW, or multi-role—although those were customizable, as was the export model). The NDR-90 project would proceed with a ~9000 tonne multi-purpose ship outfitted with the American Aegis air defence system (in their Arleigh Burke class) and the British would outfit their Type 44 Destroyer with a joint European air defence system that would also be used on the NFR-90s—the Principal Air Defence System (PADS[2]).
Although some discussion had originally been given to entirely different types of weapons for each nation, in the end the Europeans [heavily pressured by a) the Franco-British working alliance who liked the benefits of their CVF project and wanted to keep applying them to other stuff, b) access to the CVLF project which kept Spain and Italy on board, and c) cost, as it became clear what they would pay if they didn't work together] went with standardized weapons. Although an AAW frigate from France was outfitted differently then a AAW frigate from Germany, and different again from a Spanish AAW frigate—all of them used the same types of electronics and systems. This standardization meant their costs were much lower then they have been, had each nation had their own radar and used different missiles.
Like the Eurofighter consortium the various European defence contractors worked together in a series of joint ventures to supply the required systems for the NFR-90 and NDR-90 projects—this success led to a number of mergers and continued closer European defence ties cumulating, with the end of NATO, in the European Defence Community.
The Americans, on the other hand, used entirely different systems to the Europeans and this was a major factor in their not participating in further NATO/European joint projects.
[1] Lacking the American VTOL JSF the Harrier fighter will see a lot more development money, and somewhat more export sales.
[2] This is similar to OTL Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS), which was originally meant to be put upon the Horizon frigate (successor to the NFR-90 project) and ITTL simply comes earlier with more European co-opeartion.
As with purposed variations today PADS will include the ability to launch whatever the European equivalent of the Tomahawk is, in my timeline.
So, until I finish this, edit it all over again, and start posting it in the Timelines & Scenarios thread I will do this:
Delete any mention of the French Rafale. It never existed…. Instead, add this to the aircraft thread:
Although the French had thought seriously about pulling out of the Eurofighter group to make their own fighter the Falkland War and renewed British interest in large carriers meant they now had support for their requirement of a navalised Eurofighter.
Their staying in required a moderate rethinking of the project. At the time the Eurofighter was planned to be a smaller fighter then the F-15 (and the Soviet Flanker), which would to some extent limit its capabilities despite being newer. It was a compromise to the French who had pushed for a lighter fighter.
With British support for the CVF project the French could move from the 40,000 tonne carrier they were considering to a 60,000 tonne model. As such they were much more willing to think about a larger Eurofighter, despite their earlier intransigence on the weight issue.
Thus the Eurofighter was allowed to increase in weight to roughly comparable to the American F-14 or F-15 fighters, and a navalised model would be built for the French and eventually the British.
------
As for the European naval co-operation, I also need to make a few changes, and so add this to the European vessel part:
With the loss of the Invincible in the Falklands War (along with several escorts) the Royal Navy, or rather their political masters, were forced to reconsider the idea of a large carrier. Although the Harrier had performed better then expectations the main problem was simply in the lack of deployable aircraft.
With reluctance the Royal Navy began talks with the French, who were working on replacement carrier designs for their 1960s era flattops, about a joint CVF project for a large carrier.
Eventually plans were settled. The French would proceed with a 60,000 tonne CVF whose construction would begin immediately; three more carriers would be purchased (2 British, 1 French) after the first CVF had been in operation for time and lessons learned from her would be applied to the planned follow-on ships.
Having settled on this the French obtained support for a navalised Eurofighter as the British could now use one to complement their Harrier.
AND (although, as above, this is a mix of rewrite and replacement)
With the success of both the Eurofighter and the CVF projects (along with the spun-off CVFL carrier project for replacement of the British Invincible class, and to fulfil the light carrier needs of Europe[1]) naturally turned to other programs.
The NATO Frigate Replacement project for the 1990s (NFR-90) was a natural candidate, but some things would require work: The Americans and British wanted a larger ship, the others did not. The Americans wanted different electronics and weapon systems, the Europeans were split among several others.
In the end the project split into two. The NFR-90 project would go with a ~4000 tonne large frigate with one of three weapons outfits (biased towards AAW or ASW, or multi-role—although those were customizable, as was the export model). The NDR-90 project would proceed with a ~9000 tonne multi-purpose ship outfitted with the American Aegis air defence system (in their Arleigh Burke class) and the British would outfit their Type 44 Destroyer with a joint European air defence system that would also be used on the NFR-90s—the Principal Air Defence System (PADS[2]).
Although some discussion had originally been given to entirely different types of weapons for each nation, in the end the Europeans [heavily pressured by a) the Franco-British working alliance who liked the benefits of their CVF project and wanted to keep applying them to other stuff, b) access to the CVLF project which kept Spain and Italy on board, and c) cost, as it became clear what they would pay if they didn't work together] went with standardized weapons. Although an AAW frigate from France was outfitted differently then a AAW frigate from Germany, and different again from a Spanish AAW frigate—all of them used the same types of electronics and systems. This standardization meant their costs were much lower then they have been, had each nation had their own radar and used different missiles.
Like the Eurofighter consortium the various European defence contractors worked together in a series of joint ventures to supply the required systems for the NFR-90 and NDR-90 projects—this success led to a number of mergers and continued closer European defence ties cumulating, with the end of NATO, in the European Defence Community.
The Americans, on the other hand, used entirely different systems to the Europeans and this was a major factor in their not participating in further NATO/European joint projects.
[1] Lacking the American VTOL JSF the Harrier fighter will see a lot more development money, and somewhat more export sales.
[2] This is similar to OTL Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS), which was originally meant to be put upon the Horizon frigate (successor to the NFR-90 project) and ITTL simply comes earlier with more European co-opeartion.
As with purposed variations today PADS will include the ability to launch whatever the European equivalent of the Tomahawk is, in my timeline.
Well I've wandered around the world enough for the moment (in my weaker moments, I wish I hadn't widened the scope to the entire world), and so we return to Japan, via a fairly short teaser because I have to get some sleep :
Post-Reform: The Last Two Decades of Economics in Japan
©2002 Tokyo University & Tokyo University Economics Department
Japanese Edition: Tokyo University Press, Tokyo: 2002
English Edition: Engine Publishing, London: 2002
With the Mitsubishi/Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Scandal (for more detail see the Tokyo University paper: The Short-Term Economic Consequences of the Mitsubishi/Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Scandal) and the subsequent financial and banking reform Japan entered a period of transition.
Although direct economic effects mostly manifested in slowed economic growth the underlying reforms were soon to be manifest. The first real signs of the reform were steadily increasing retail customers at the banks, as they were now more oriented via reforms towards larger growth sectors. The retail customers had long been neglected in favour of corporations.
This was mostly ignored at the time, but did serve to help the banks just after their greatest weakness when the non-preforming loans had been discovered. The easy success and underestimated surge of profitably from fairly mild efforts reaching out to retail customers encouraged them more then regulation would, and this trend would continue.
Within several years the banking and financial sectors were more stable, more profitable in real terms, and more independent of the Ministry of Finance then they had ever been—they were well on their way to developing a much healthier financial sector.
As the underpinnings strengthened so did the economy. However this was not seen by the government, who only saw the still languishing growth rates. This began the second wave of reform in 1985.
This was known as the Big Bang deregulation. Following on the American and British models (and, to be fair, their own earlier banking and financial reforms) the Liberal Democratic Party introduced a huge reform package. Among other things it included privatization of the Post Office (although that was also to make the LDP look good on the corruption issue, which still lingered high in public conscious), a major deregulation of the economy, an introduction of tighter inflation policies with a newly independent Bank of Japan, and a loosening of general trade barriers to improve foreign relations, along with a popular overhaul of the healthcare system.
As the LDP remained weaker then it had been under the 1955 system this was stalled by the opposition and a few defections, which led to the 1985 election and victory for the LDP—victory defined as winning slightly more seats and a few more votes, but that was enough.
The LDP had close ties with the United Kingdom, as both studied the other's economic reforms, and with the advent of the fourth Labour government in New Zealand*(desperate to liberalize the economy and prevent the country from being taken over by the International Monetary Fund) those three countries would forge close ties throughout the late 1980s.
They would seek to harmonize regulation, tariffs, subsidies, and overall tax levels and the fruits of their co-operation resulted in the 1988 Liberalized Trade Agreement Phase One.
LTA-1 dispensed with many trade barriers between the three countries, lowered the rest over seven years, provided for industry transition over ten years, and eliminated subsidies over five years. Although this was a bold step all three governments were able to muster the political support to pass it. The elimination of corporate subsidies gathered left-wing support, the elimination of tariffs gathered right-wing support, and industry transition money (some also liked no tariffs) got a number of important corporations on board and this division and fragmentation of pro and anti sides was a major factor in the deals passage.
This deal seriously embarrassed the pro-free trade Americans, at the time in negotiations with the Canadians over the Canadian American Free Trade Agreement, and resulted in a much better deal for the Canadians as President Reagan pushed the deal through much faster, although it wasn't ratified until the Canadians passed it in 1989.
One other interesting element of LTA-1 was that any other country could join, providing it agreed to all existing provisions and all countries currently part of LTA-1 agreed to let them enter.
[…]
:Post-Reform: The Last Two Decades of Economics in Japan
©2002 Tokyo University & Tokyo University Economics Department
Japanese Edition: Tokyo University Press, Tokyo: 2002
English Edition: Engine Publishing, London: 2002
With the Mitsubishi/Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Scandal (for more detail see the Tokyo University paper: The Short-Term Economic Consequences of the Mitsubishi/Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Scandal) and the subsequent financial and banking reform Japan entered a period of transition.
Although direct economic effects mostly manifested in slowed economic growth the underlying reforms were soon to be manifest. The first real signs of the reform were steadily increasing retail customers at the banks, as they were now more oriented via reforms towards larger growth sectors. The retail customers had long been neglected in favour of corporations.
This was mostly ignored at the time, but did serve to help the banks just after their greatest weakness when the non-preforming loans had been discovered. The easy success and underestimated surge of profitably from fairly mild efforts reaching out to retail customers encouraged them more then regulation would, and this trend would continue.
Within several years the banking and financial sectors were more stable, more profitable in real terms, and more independent of the Ministry of Finance then they had ever been—they were well on their way to developing a much healthier financial sector.
As the underpinnings strengthened so did the economy. However this was not seen by the government, who only saw the still languishing growth rates. This began the second wave of reform in 1985.
This was known as the Big Bang deregulation. Following on the American and British models (and, to be fair, their own earlier banking and financial reforms) the Liberal Democratic Party introduced a huge reform package. Among other things it included privatization of the Post Office (although that was also to make the LDP look good on the corruption issue, which still lingered high in public conscious), a major deregulation of the economy, an introduction of tighter inflation policies with a newly independent Bank of Japan, and a loosening of general trade barriers to improve foreign relations, along with a popular overhaul of the healthcare system.
As the LDP remained weaker then it had been under the 1955 system this was stalled by the opposition and a few defections, which led to the 1985 election and victory for the LDP—victory defined as winning slightly more seats and a few more votes, but that was enough.
The LDP had close ties with the United Kingdom, as both studied the other's economic reforms, and with the advent of the fourth Labour government in New Zealand*(desperate to liberalize the economy and prevent the country from being taken over by the International Monetary Fund) those three countries would forge close ties throughout the late 1980s.
They would seek to harmonize regulation, tariffs, subsidies, and overall tax levels and the fruits of their co-operation resulted in the 1988 Liberalized Trade Agreement Phase One.
LTA-1 dispensed with many trade barriers between the three countries, lowered the rest over seven years, provided for industry transition over ten years, and eliminated subsidies over five years. Although this was a bold step all three governments were able to muster the political support to pass it. The elimination of corporate subsidies gathered left-wing support, the elimination of tariffs gathered right-wing support, and industry transition money (some also liked no tariffs) got a number of important corporations on board and this division and fragmentation of pro and anti sides was a major factor in the deals passage.
This deal seriously embarrassed the pro-free trade Americans, at the time in negotiations with the Canadians over the Canadian American Free Trade Agreement, and resulted in a much better deal for the Canadians as President Reagan pushed the deal through much faster, although it wasn't ratified until the Canadians passed it in 1989.
One other interesting element of LTA-1 was that any other country could join, providing it agreed to all existing provisions and all countries currently part of LTA-1 agreed to let them enter.
[…]
Those lousy (but helpful, and nice in case they also read this thread people in the Naval Thread keep making my life difficult. Anyway.
Looks like this post will be ongoing for a while in little bite sized chunks (feedback? hole punching? ritual slaughter of cows? I'll take anything):
Post-Reform: The Last Two Decades of Economics in Japan
©2002 Tokyo University & Tokyo University Economics Department
Japanese Edition: Tokyo University Press, Tokyo: 2002
English Edition: Engine Publishing, London: 2002
[…]
In the 1980-1985 period the keiretsu were faced with a problem. Financed by easy and cheap credit they had gone global in the late 1970s, cut off from easy and cheap credit they were still global—but without the same level of resources.
They were forced to stall their ambitious takeover programs, and instead invested positive cash flow into research and development. At the same time they took advantage of their situation by hiring local consultants, and reorganizing companies.
Following the 1985 reforms the keiretsu and other corporations turned their attention back home and over the next three years a bitter corporate war was waged over newly accessible markets and territory. Although this was expensive in the short term—financed by the increasing flow of foreign direct investment and a few overseas asset sales—it also brought a great deal of money back into the Japanese economy and, more importantly, used the talents of the overseas local consultants to bring various non-Japanese business practices into the Home Islands.
By 1988 Japanese keiretsu were looking outwards again, as the fight in Japan itself had died down. Thus the LTA-1 came at the perfect time for them. With new access to Britain and New Zealand and a solid base both in Japan and overseas, keiretsu were in a nearly ideal position.
people in the Naval Thread keep making my life difficult. Anyway.Looks like this post will be ongoing for a while in little bite sized chunks (feedback? hole punching? ritual slaughter of cows? I'll take anything):
Post-Reform: The Last Two Decades of Economics in Japan
©2002 Tokyo University & Tokyo University Economics Department
Japanese Edition: Tokyo University Press, Tokyo: 2002
English Edition: Engine Publishing, London: 2002
[…]
In the 1980-1985 period the keiretsu were faced with a problem. Financed by easy and cheap credit they had gone global in the late 1970s, cut off from easy and cheap credit they were still global—but without the same level of resources.
They were forced to stall their ambitious takeover programs, and instead invested positive cash flow into research and development. At the same time they took advantage of their situation by hiring local consultants, and reorganizing companies.
Following the 1985 reforms the keiretsu and other corporations turned their attention back home and over the next three years a bitter corporate war was waged over newly accessible markets and territory. Although this was expensive in the short term—financed by the increasing flow of foreign direct investment and a few overseas asset sales—it also brought a great deal of money back into the Japanese economy and, more importantly, used the talents of the overseas local consultants to bring various non-Japanese business practices into the Home Islands.
By 1988 Japanese keiretsu were looking outwards again, as the fight in Japan itself had died down. Thus the LTA-1 came at the perfect time for them. With new access to Britain and New Zealand and a solid base both in Japan and overseas, keiretsu were in a nearly ideal position.
Going sideways again…
The Rise of the Radicals
politics.discussion/riseoftheradicals[1]
14 June 1999
Although there is but a single named Radical Party in Western Democracies with a chance of forming part of a government (in Canada, oddly enough) the rise of the 'Radicals' of whatever party must be the major political and economic news story of the last two decades.
In 1980 both 'liberals' and 'conservatives' (either in the American usage, or the European usage) were engaging in small skirmishes over the middle ground. The middle ground, to be sure, was different in Europe and American and Canada and Japan, but that was where the fight was.
By roughly the middle of the Great Depression to the Second World War and forward for three decades most people and most mainstream political parties had generally agreed on economics with differences in degrees (in democracies, at least). This continued for some time, but a gradual increase in economic discussion and a growing problem with Keynesian economics were changing things.
However, rather then a moderate shift in economics to the 'right' changing the middle ground as might be expected, there was instead a sea change. Although it was unprompted by anything as big as the Great Depression a variety of local factors would change the governing order of the world's economics.
Moreover it would do so in an altogether radical fashion. The United States had Reagan and his economic conservatism. The United Kingdom had Thatcher. Japan had scandal. New Zealand, later in the decade, had desperation and Douglas.
New Zealand took three years to drastically change their economy, arguably too fast given the disruptions they faced for some time afterward.
Japan did it in stages, but big ones. The 1980 financial sector reform, the 1985 Big Bang reform—covering everything from postal privatization to healthcare reform, tax flattening, deregulation, and more—, and the 1997 tax revolution (although there was smaller clean-up type work in-between). This worked out fairly well, certainly with less disruption then in New Zealand, albeit starting from a better economic base and going rather slower.
The United Kingdom did most of it in 1982 and 1983, followed by a decade of clean-up including radical tax reform (the 'flat tax) in 1990. Despite some missteps (initial healthcare reform and railroad privatization were failures, but since the early 1990s have improved markedly).
The USA, and a lot of blame can be laid on the feet of their political system, enacted major reforms throughout the 1980s—indeed serving as a role model in some areas—but was unable to consolidate the reforms and the passage of CAFTA in 1989 was the last major reform. As the UK, NZ, and Japan both continued reform and served as role models for the 1990s (Europe, Australia, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, and others) the United States froze and reversed much reform while using the end of the Cold War as opportunity to gradually disengage from the world.
The lessons political parties across the world took out of this was that radical change really did work, and people really were ok with it given a few years. Incrementalism was out of fashion. To be sure some politicians did not learn this lesson, President Hart in the US for one, but most did.
Hence the hard-working but unradical Conservative government in Canada was replaced by a radical Conservative-NDP coalition in 1993. Hence Europe abandoned their statist experiment (please note the difference between statist social democracy, and non-statist social democracy) and embarked into a vast wave of radical reform, the economic liberalization of nearly half a billion people, done by both 'left' and 'right' wing parties.
[…]
[1] Mostly because I despise the current top level domains of .net or .com or whatever, butterflies mean there is no www or .com or anything (http:// and the like are abstracted on a program to program basis unless directly specified).
Instead you get two names nameone.nametwo (or site.descriptionand they can be whatever the heck you want. So if politics.1 is taken, you can be politics.35 or whatever. Therefore the idea of a handful of domains is removed in favour of unlimited domains. This site might be alternatehistory.forum for example, or history.counterfactuals or something along those lines.
However, the general idea of name.description has been retained and most sites follow the convention. That said country domains in all standard variation are reserved or can be reserved. So an American government military website might be defense.unitedstates (with defense.usa and defense.unitedstatesofamerica mirrored).
------
If there's any show-stopping flaws with my internet changes or anything else, please point them out
The Rise of the Radicals
politics.discussion/riseoftheradicals[1]
14 June 1999
Although there is but a single named Radical Party in Western Democracies with a chance of forming part of a government (in Canada, oddly enough) the rise of the 'Radicals' of whatever party must be the major political and economic news story of the last two decades.
In 1980 both 'liberals' and 'conservatives' (either in the American usage, or the European usage) were engaging in small skirmishes over the middle ground. The middle ground, to be sure, was different in Europe and American and Canada and Japan, but that was where the fight was.
By roughly the middle of the Great Depression to the Second World War and forward for three decades most people and most mainstream political parties had generally agreed on economics with differences in degrees (in democracies, at least). This continued for some time, but a gradual increase in economic discussion and a growing problem with Keynesian economics were changing things.
However, rather then a moderate shift in economics to the 'right' changing the middle ground as might be expected, there was instead a sea change. Although it was unprompted by anything as big as the Great Depression a variety of local factors would change the governing order of the world's economics.
Moreover it would do so in an altogether radical fashion. The United States had Reagan and his economic conservatism. The United Kingdom had Thatcher. Japan had scandal. New Zealand, later in the decade, had desperation and Douglas.
New Zealand took three years to drastically change their economy, arguably too fast given the disruptions they faced for some time afterward.
Japan did it in stages, but big ones. The 1980 financial sector reform, the 1985 Big Bang reform—covering everything from postal privatization to healthcare reform, tax flattening, deregulation, and more—, and the 1997 tax revolution (although there was smaller clean-up type work in-between). This worked out fairly well, certainly with less disruption then in New Zealand, albeit starting from a better economic base and going rather slower.
The United Kingdom did most of it in 1982 and 1983, followed by a decade of clean-up including radical tax reform (the 'flat tax) in 1990. Despite some missteps (initial healthcare reform and railroad privatization were failures, but since the early 1990s have improved markedly).
The USA, and a lot of blame can be laid on the feet of their political system, enacted major reforms throughout the 1980s—indeed serving as a role model in some areas—but was unable to consolidate the reforms and the passage of CAFTA in 1989 was the last major reform. As the UK, NZ, and Japan both continued reform and served as role models for the 1990s (Europe, Australia, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, and others) the United States froze and reversed much reform while using the end of the Cold War as opportunity to gradually disengage from the world.
The lessons political parties across the world took out of this was that radical change really did work, and people really were ok with it given a few years. Incrementalism was out of fashion. To be sure some politicians did not learn this lesson, President Hart in the US for one, but most did.
Hence the hard-working but unradical Conservative government in Canada was replaced by a radical Conservative-NDP coalition in 1993. Hence Europe abandoned their statist experiment (please note the difference between statist social democracy, and non-statist social democracy) and embarked into a vast wave of radical reform, the economic liberalization of nearly half a billion people, done by both 'left' and 'right' wing parties.
[…]
[1] Mostly because I despise the current top level domains of .net or .com or whatever, butterflies mean there is no www or .com or anything (http:// and the like are abstracted on a program to program basis unless directly specified).
Instead you get two names nameone.nametwo (or site.descriptionand they can be whatever the heck you want. So if politics.1 is taken, you can be politics.35 or whatever. Therefore the idea of a handful of domains is removed in favour of unlimited domains. This site might be alternatehistory.forum for example, or history.counterfactuals or something along those lines.
However, the general idea of name.description has been retained and most sites follow the convention. That said country domains in all standard variation are reserved or can be reserved. So an American government military website might be defense.unitedstates (with defense.usa and defense.unitedstatesofamerica mirrored).
------
If there's any show-stopping flaws with my internet changes or anything else, please point them out
Now I'm up to three incomplete posts :
Swain, Jonathan "Strategic Balance of Power In East Asia"
©2012 Parameters US Army War College Quarterly
Spring 2012. pp 44-57
The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the security question in East Asia. No longer was the main conflict the Russian Pacific Fleet against the American Pacific Fleet with Japanese/Australian support (or, perhaps, a Second Korean War) but one where the various states could now buy advanced Russian military equipment and an economically growing China has the potential to destabilize the entire region.
With the exception of an ambitious invasion of Taiwan (still primarily an air/naval conflict) or a North Korean assault on the DMZ there are few potential land conflicts. Although SEAsia may, of course, war internally or face Chinese pressure this remains of only moderate probability as does a potential India-China conflagration. Therefore air and naval power are the primary focus of the regions powers, particularly given the sea-lanes that are economically vital to all in the region.
A more likely scenario would be an Indonesia that breaks apart, but so far they've held it together and retain a strong economy. The other main possibility for a large ground war would an India-Pakistan one. However major Indian success (as seems probable) would force Pakistan to go nuclear, and so we discount that possibility as well despite some signs that nuclear deterrence may not work there as well as it did during the Cold War. Besides, they're not in East Asia.
Air and naval power, on the other hand, is much more complex and much more likely to be used. Not least because of a decade long arms race (see The Quiet War, in the Summer 2011 issue) the Asian region now has the largest concentration of advanced naval and air assets outside Europe or the United States, and this exists in a volatile environment. Notably the only region in which military spending has increased since the end of the Cold War has been in Asia.
Although as little as ten years ago it was assumed that the Japanese-US alliance, the South Korean deployed American troops, and the generally large Pacific committed forces would act as a blanket of stability this is no longer the case. Therefore the arms race acts to endanger stability much more then might otherwise have been assumed, once.
The major players in the region are easy enough. Japan has the region's best airforce and navy. South Korea has an advanced airforce, though limited naval forces as they concentrate most resources in the army on the DMZ. Taiwan has a good airforce (although lacking fifth generation fighters) and navy, albeit not good enough given their likely adversary. China has the regions biggest airforce and navy. Singapore has a very good, but small, airforce. Australia has a good airforce and a decent navy but both are too small to project power. Indonesia and Malaysia have spent some time and effort strengthening their airforces recently and, in Indonesia's case, the navy has seen improvement. Those are the main actors as the USA in recent years has taken themselves off the board to a great deal.
The likely crisis points are equally well understood. Taiwan must loom over all. China wants Taiwan, Taiwan does not want China. Taiwan is allied with Japan. This sets the stage for the biggest air and sea conflict since World War II. Hong Kong and the United Kingdom too must consider being swept up in the battle, as much as they might wish to avoid it. The other big crisis point is the South China Sea, as that area is vital for the major powers of the region because of the shipping lanes.
First, China. China has had an impressive growth rate for a very long time, and currently has an economy roughly the size of Japan's—putting them in a dogfight for second place behind the United States. As little as ten years ago we could speak of the United States, despite having drawn down it's Asian forces, as having increased it's comparative strength with the removal of most Russian forces. Obviously this is no longer the case.
Hence we have something of a vacuum and despite continued Chinese insistence that they are not seeking to exert hegemonic influence over the Asia region, they undoubtedly are. Sensibly so, in realpolitik terms, as it's expected that Asia will comprise 50% of the world's GDP by the middle of the century.
The inherent success of professional high technology units in the Gulf War over the Soviet style Iraq army has served as a wake-up call. Russia herself has risen to the challenge and most outside observers consider her military to be very nearly as good as most European ones. China too embarked on a radical transformation. The People's Liberation Army was radically downsized and reorganized as was the Airforce and Navy. Their inability to force the issue over Hong Kong in the face of British/Japanese naval and air superiority was another blow, as they were not willing to destroy the city—the only outcome they could have won.
To look at China's current posture the best air and naval forces are arrayed against Taiwan and Japan, with the elite amphibious assault forces concentrated near Taiwan. The best army units are split, some on the Russian and North Korean borders, the rest face the various countries in Indo-China. The middling quality units are either training or on the Indian and 'Stan borders, the rest of the Army is being reduced.
Over the last two decades, despite reliance on Russian military technology, the Chinese military has improved both weapons systems (as they use Russian equipment, generally as good as Western technology excluding electronics) and professionalization. Although they still must rely on conscripts they are both much longer term conscripts and much better trained then before and if not as good as Western militaries, not that much worse.
The main thing to keep in mind is numbers. Despite downsizing the PLA is still the world's largest army. Despite having a fifth generation fighter force not much larger then Japan's, they have a vast number of fourth (and older) generation fighters. Despite a navy somewhat smaller then Japan's in modern ships, they have a number of older ships and a larger submarine force. China now has the command, control, and intelligence facilities required to control their military. In short China is now capable of power projection as they weren't a decade ago.
China has also continued to interfere with shipping and to claim the South China Sea (both overall, and via military force on individual islands) despite other nation's ownership of the real estate. Obviously a China in control of the South China Sea has vast leverage over the region. Most of the raw materials for Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan pass through Indonesian waters and the South China Sea. These powers cannot allow the Chinese to own that area, and equally cannot tolerate a China-allied Indonesia.
In 1996 this journal talked about China as a developing power, constrained by potential enemy's and instability; the American military might checking her military ambitions. This is no longer true. China must be viewed not as a superpower, but as a regional power attempting hegemonic influence. The time when superpowers and global policemen kept the world in order is long gone, and the international system is not as stable as people like to think it is.
If the region's foremost power is China, the next must be Japan. For at least the next decade Japan retains the ability to surge ahead of China in the realm of military affairs but historical, cultural, and political factors prevent this.
Japan has one of the world's largest navies, one of the best modern airforces, and small but excellent ground forces. Over the last three decades Japan has greatly enhanced her military force (some of it by necessity, with the forced withdrawal of American forces from Japan) and despite spending relatively little on defence (legally restricted to 1.5% of GDP) her large economy provides for a large military with a surge potential (i.e. if defence spending was increased to, perhaps, 3-5% of GDP) that is enormous.
Despite this limitation Japan is still third in military spending (after the United States and China, respectively) and has undergone some talk about lifting the legal limitations on the defence budget so as to match China's (known) increases. It seems clear by all rational observers that the Chinese military budget is roughly three times the size of their reported budget (and hence a little over three times the size of Japan's budget), but nevertheless Japan's technological lead and generally superior military continue to keep them competitive—at least in the short term, and potentially longer if the budget is lifted from the 1.5% restriction.
Japan's main naval assets are built around the Edo and Fuji, their two large carriers based on the Franco-British CVF project. Both were built in Japan, commissioning in 2004 (Edo) and 2008 (Fuji) and as such are somewhat more advanced then the other CVFs in operation, not to mention somewhat larger. Both operate under the protection of advanced air defence destroyers and ASW frigates, modern Air Independent Propulsion conventional submarines, and the carriers deploy the same sophisticated naval planes as the Americans. In simple truth the Japanese Navy is one of the best in the world.
The Japanese Airforce, like the navy, relies on a mix of license built American or European military equipment with major changes (better electronics, mostly) and plenty of indigenous equipment. The Japanese defence industry, although it does not (yet) design their own fighters or fighting ships like the Europeans or Americans, does make most other things, including the world's best electronics. Furthermore as all Japanese military hardware from either the Europeans or Americans is license built in Japan, and the defence industry does design almost all but modern fighters/fighting ships there is no reason except budgetary preventing Japan from designing fully competitive fighters and vessels.
The Japanese Army remains small, with a strong emphasis on rapid deployment and missile defence. Japan, quite reasonably, does not expect to actually be invaded and so the army's main concern lies in engaging incoming missiles, protecting vital facilities and infrastructure, and in a flexible and fast reaction via air, sea, and rail or roads against either invasion or to deploy in support of allies.
Taiwan must come next simply for its strategic importance in the region, although South Korea certainly is the third most powerful actor in East Asia. Taiwan lies offshore China, and is the focus of much of China's military might—including most of the best of China's military.
For fifty years Taiwan was able to rely on the American security guarantee and even when betrayed by the Americans (by the Nixon administration and the United Nations over the subject of Communist China admittance to that body) have kept close ties. Now lacking the security guarantee they have moved closer to both Japan and South Korea, as they are the other two powers most concerned with China and interested in an independent Taiwan.
Taiwan's airforce is quite good, although it currently lacks fifth generation fighters, and is considered roughly as good as the Chinese airforce with some advantages (slightly better pilots, pretty much as good electronics given Chinese deficiencies) and the big disadvantage of numbers.
The main problem the airforce faces, besides the overwhelming Chinese numbers, is that their bases are eminently vulnerable to Chinese missile and air attack. To make up for it the Taiwanese do have a lot of missile defence batteries and hardened airfields, but whether that would be enough is currently unknown.
The Taiwanese Navy is also quite good though it is of course outmatched. It has a good mix of AAW and ASW destroyers and frigates, and is considered quite the decent force. One problem is that much of the equipment is second hand and older ships, although the Chinese do have some of the same problems. Given Chinese carrier groups and the Chinese airforce's increasingly better in-air refuelling ability the Taiwanese navy cannot deploy outside Taiwanese airspace.
The Army is a fine force, but is constrained by two factors. First a Chinese amphibious assault will almost certainly have won the air and naval battles over the Taiwan Strait (or, at least, be winning) and second once Chinese forces land the Taiwan Army faces the probability of being isolated and rapidly outnumbered. Their doctrine, quite simply, relies heavily on engaging Chinese forces before they land and to that end they have an excellent shore defence network.
[…]
:Swain, Jonathan "Strategic Balance of Power In East Asia"
©2012 Parameters US Army War College Quarterly
Spring 2012. pp 44-57
The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the security question in East Asia. No longer was the main conflict the Russian Pacific Fleet against the American Pacific Fleet with Japanese/Australian support (or, perhaps, a Second Korean War) but one where the various states could now buy advanced Russian military equipment and an economically growing China has the potential to destabilize the entire region.
With the exception of an ambitious invasion of Taiwan (still primarily an air/naval conflict) or a North Korean assault on the DMZ there are few potential land conflicts. Although SEAsia may, of course, war internally or face Chinese pressure this remains of only moderate probability as does a potential India-China conflagration. Therefore air and naval power are the primary focus of the regions powers, particularly given the sea-lanes that are economically vital to all in the region.
A more likely scenario would be an Indonesia that breaks apart, but so far they've held it together and retain a strong economy. The other main possibility for a large ground war would an India-Pakistan one. However major Indian success (as seems probable) would force Pakistan to go nuclear, and so we discount that possibility as well despite some signs that nuclear deterrence may not work there as well as it did during the Cold War. Besides, they're not in East Asia.
Air and naval power, on the other hand, is much more complex and much more likely to be used. Not least because of a decade long arms race (see The Quiet War, in the Summer 2011 issue) the Asian region now has the largest concentration of advanced naval and air assets outside Europe or the United States, and this exists in a volatile environment. Notably the only region in which military spending has increased since the end of the Cold War has been in Asia.
Although as little as ten years ago it was assumed that the Japanese-US alliance, the South Korean deployed American troops, and the generally large Pacific committed forces would act as a blanket of stability this is no longer the case. Therefore the arms race acts to endanger stability much more then might otherwise have been assumed, once.
The major players in the region are easy enough. Japan has the region's best airforce and navy. South Korea has an advanced airforce, though limited naval forces as they concentrate most resources in the army on the DMZ. Taiwan has a good airforce (although lacking fifth generation fighters) and navy, albeit not good enough given their likely adversary. China has the regions biggest airforce and navy. Singapore has a very good, but small, airforce. Australia has a good airforce and a decent navy but both are too small to project power. Indonesia and Malaysia have spent some time and effort strengthening their airforces recently and, in Indonesia's case, the navy has seen improvement. Those are the main actors as the USA in recent years has taken themselves off the board to a great deal.
The likely crisis points are equally well understood. Taiwan must loom over all. China wants Taiwan, Taiwan does not want China. Taiwan is allied with Japan. This sets the stage for the biggest air and sea conflict since World War II. Hong Kong and the United Kingdom too must consider being swept up in the battle, as much as they might wish to avoid it. The other big crisis point is the South China Sea, as that area is vital for the major powers of the region because of the shipping lanes.
First, China. China has had an impressive growth rate for a very long time, and currently has an economy roughly the size of Japan's—putting them in a dogfight for second place behind the United States. As little as ten years ago we could speak of the United States, despite having drawn down it's Asian forces, as having increased it's comparative strength with the removal of most Russian forces. Obviously this is no longer the case.
Hence we have something of a vacuum and despite continued Chinese insistence that they are not seeking to exert hegemonic influence over the Asia region, they undoubtedly are. Sensibly so, in realpolitik terms, as it's expected that Asia will comprise 50% of the world's GDP by the middle of the century.
The inherent success of professional high technology units in the Gulf War over the Soviet style Iraq army has served as a wake-up call. Russia herself has risen to the challenge and most outside observers consider her military to be very nearly as good as most European ones. China too embarked on a radical transformation. The People's Liberation Army was radically downsized and reorganized as was the Airforce and Navy. Their inability to force the issue over Hong Kong in the face of British/Japanese naval and air superiority was another blow, as they were not willing to destroy the city—the only outcome they could have won.
To look at China's current posture the best air and naval forces are arrayed against Taiwan and Japan, with the elite amphibious assault forces concentrated near Taiwan. The best army units are split, some on the Russian and North Korean borders, the rest face the various countries in Indo-China. The middling quality units are either training or on the Indian and 'Stan borders, the rest of the Army is being reduced.
Over the last two decades, despite reliance on Russian military technology, the Chinese military has improved both weapons systems (as they use Russian equipment, generally as good as Western technology excluding electronics) and professionalization. Although they still must rely on conscripts they are both much longer term conscripts and much better trained then before and if not as good as Western militaries, not that much worse.
The main thing to keep in mind is numbers. Despite downsizing the PLA is still the world's largest army. Despite having a fifth generation fighter force not much larger then Japan's, they have a vast number of fourth (and older) generation fighters. Despite a navy somewhat smaller then Japan's in modern ships, they have a number of older ships and a larger submarine force. China now has the command, control, and intelligence facilities required to control their military. In short China is now capable of power projection as they weren't a decade ago.
China has also continued to interfere with shipping and to claim the South China Sea (both overall, and via military force on individual islands) despite other nation's ownership of the real estate. Obviously a China in control of the South China Sea has vast leverage over the region. Most of the raw materials for Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan pass through Indonesian waters and the South China Sea. These powers cannot allow the Chinese to own that area, and equally cannot tolerate a China-allied Indonesia.
In 1996 this journal talked about China as a developing power, constrained by potential enemy's and instability; the American military might checking her military ambitions. This is no longer true. China must be viewed not as a superpower, but as a regional power attempting hegemonic influence. The time when superpowers and global policemen kept the world in order is long gone, and the international system is not as stable as people like to think it is.
If the region's foremost power is China, the next must be Japan. For at least the next decade Japan retains the ability to surge ahead of China in the realm of military affairs but historical, cultural, and political factors prevent this.
Japan has one of the world's largest navies, one of the best modern airforces, and small but excellent ground forces. Over the last three decades Japan has greatly enhanced her military force (some of it by necessity, with the forced withdrawal of American forces from Japan) and despite spending relatively little on defence (legally restricted to 1.5% of GDP) her large economy provides for a large military with a surge potential (i.e. if defence spending was increased to, perhaps, 3-5% of GDP) that is enormous.
Despite this limitation Japan is still third in military spending (after the United States and China, respectively) and has undergone some talk about lifting the legal limitations on the defence budget so as to match China's (known) increases. It seems clear by all rational observers that the Chinese military budget is roughly three times the size of their reported budget (and hence a little over three times the size of Japan's budget), but nevertheless Japan's technological lead and generally superior military continue to keep them competitive—at least in the short term, and potentially longer if the budget is lifted from the 1.5% restriction.
Japan's main naval assets are built around the Edo and Fuji, their two large carriers based on the Franco-British CVF project. Both were built in Japan, commissioning in 2004 (Edo) and 2008 (Fuji) and as such are somewhat more advanced then the other CVFs in operation, not to mention somewhat larger. Both operate under the protection of advanced air defence destroyers and ASW frigates, modern Air Independent Propulsion conventional submarines, and the carriers deploy the same sophisticated naval planes as the Americans. In simple truth the Japanese Navy is one of the best in the world.
The Japanese Airforce, like the navy, relies on a mix of license built American or European military equipment with major changes (better electronics, mostly) and plenty of indigenous equipment. The Japanese defence industry, although it does not (yet) design their own fighters or fighting ships like the Europeans or Americans, does make most other things, including the world's best electronics. Furthermore as all Japanese military hardware from either the Europeans or Americans is license built in Japan, and the defence industry does design almost all but modern fighters/fighting ships there is no reason except budgetary preventing Japan from designing fully competitive fighters and vessels.
The Japanese Army remains small, with a strong emphasis on rapid deployment and missile defence. Japan, quite reasonably, does not expect to actually be invaded and so the army's main concern lies in engaging incoming missiles, protecting vital facilities and infrastructure, and in a flexible and fast reaction via air, sea, and rail or roads against either invasion or to deploy in support of allies.
Taiwan must come next simply for its strategic importance in the region, although South Korea certainly is the third most powerful actor in East Asia. Taiwan lies offshore China, and is the focus of much of China's military might—including most of the best of China's military.
For fifty years Taiwan was able to rely on the American security guarantee and even when betrayed by the Americans (by the Nixon administration and the United Nations over the subject of Communist China admittance to that body) have kept close ties. Now lacking the security guarantee they have moved closer to both Japan and South Korea, as they are the other two powers most concerned with China and interested in an independent Taiwan.
Taiwan's airforce is quite good, although it currently lacks fifth generation fighters, and is considered roughly as good as the Chinese airforce with some advantages (slightly better pilots, pretty much as good electronics given Chinese deficiencies) and the big disadvantage of numbers.
The main problem the airforce faces, besides the overwhelming Chinese numbers, is that their bases are eminently vulnerable to Chinese missile and air attack. To make up for it the Taiwanese do have a lot of missile defence batteries and hardened airfields, but whether that would be enough is currently unknown.
The Taiwanese Navy is also quite good though it is of course outmatched. It has a good mix of AAW and ASW destroyers and frigates, and is considered quite the decent force. One problem is that much of the equipment is second hand and older ships, although the Chinese do have some of the same problems. Given Chinese carrier groups and the Chinese airforce's increasingly better in-air refuelling ability the Taiwanese navy cannot deploy outside Taiwanese airspace.
The Army is a fine force, but is constrained by two factors. First a Chinese amphibious assault will almost certainly have won the air and naval battles over the Taiwan Strait (or, at least, be winning) and second once Chinese forces land the Taiwan Army faces the probability of being isolated and rapidly outnumbered. Their doctrine, quite simply, relies heavily on engaging Chinese forces before they land and to that end they have an excellent shore defence network.
[…]
Woe: your American politics is way off. Remember that the GOP was a hard backer of both NAFTA and later DR-CAFTA. Most of the protectionism comes from the Democrats (old labor unioners), though even they were divided on the issue.
Free trade was one issue where Clinton could and did count on the support of the GOP.
Free trade was one issue where Clinton could and did count on the support of the GOP.
American politics hints.
1. I think everything you've done here is logical and plausible thus far. I do have some suggestions moving forward.
2. The "six year itch" looks likely to hit Hart badly, probably enough for him to lose the senate. As Dole's political career is likely finished, it will be an interesting question as to who becomes senate majority leader. It could be Lott, but it could also be Allen Simpson (R-Wyo). I suspect Simpson would be retained as majority leader and Lott would come on as whip.
3. 1996 election: the question here is how will your POD effect gubernatorial elections? Given that 1990 was the contract year, I could see Cuomo going down a term early, particularly to someone like Jack Kemp (perhaps with Pitaki as his LtGov)? This positions Kemp rather nicely to run for president in 96, particularly if he's had a good term and a half as governor. Now, the question becomes, who was Hart's VP? If it's someone like Dukakas, you could see an intra-party fight as the left gravitates to him while the center goes to Clinton. Since Desert Storm was such a big thing, you might have Kemp pick Powell or Schwarzkof (spelling?) as his VP. I suspect maybe Powell.
If Kemp or Clinton wins you've got a free-trader in the whitehouse. Keep in mind that both Army and Gingrich are free-traders also. So a healthy dose of liberalization on trade is likely. Hart could be cornered into enacting large portions of the Republican agenda in 94/6, or alternatively he could be stubborn and refuse. Clinton was smart and enacted lots of stuff from the contract/welfare reform, thereby effectively denying those issues to Dole. Hart might not care about the next election, but he will probably be concerned with his legacy and so may try to get something done.
Just some thoughts.
1. I think everything you've done here is logical and plausible thus far. I do have some suggestions moving forward.
2. The "six year itch" looks likely to hit Hart badly, probably enough for him to lose the senate. As Dole's political career is likely finished, it will be an interesting question as to who becomes senate majority leader. It could be Lott, but it could also be Allen Simpson (R-Wyo). I suspect Simpson would be retained as majority leader and Lott would come on as whip.
3. 1996 election: the question here is how will your POD effect gubernatorial elections? Given that 1990 was the contract year, I could see Cuomo going down a term early, particularly to someone like Jack Kemp (perhaps with Pitaki as his LtGov)? This positions Kemp rather nicely to run for president in 96, particularly if he's had a good term and a half as governor. Now, the question becomes, who was Hart's VP? If it's someone like Dukakas, you could see an intra-party fight as the left gravitates to him while the center goes to Clinton. Since Desert Storm was such a big thing, you might have Kemp pick Powell or Schwarzkof (spelling?) as his VP. I suspect maybe Powell.
If Kemp or Clinton wins you've got a free-trader in the whitehouse. Keep in mind that both Army and Gingrich are free-traders also. So a healthy dose of liberalization on trade is likely. Hart could be cornered into enacting large portions of the Republican agenda in 94/6, or alternatively he could be stubborn and refuse. Clinton was smart and enacted lots of stuff from the contract/welfare reform, thereby effectively denying those issues to Dole. Hart might not care about the next election, but he will probably be concerned with his legacy and so may try to get something done.
Just some thoughts.
I'll point out that TheMann's contribution isn't officially part of the timeline although he may or may not do a spin-off as I suggested.
Thank you.
Yep. Unless I need somebody else reasonably plausible for some reason, that would be it.
As for Dole ITTL he passes the 1985 freeze (he gets Reagan to lean on that twerp Kemp in the House) and so the US budget is some 300 billion healthier over 3 years, roughly speaking. He balances the budget, basically.
The Senate in 1986 is thus 50-50, tying Bush down to the White House—which hurts his campaign for president and means Dole does better in 1988 (paradoxically he spends less time on it, as he has more Senate business to deal with), but Bush still wins—only to lose to Hart.
Dole gets the 1992 crack at it, and loses. ITTL his reputation will be quite a bit better as no one saw the Gulf War coming to boost President Hart. Dole will be known as the balanced budget guy and have a pretty good retirement.
I don't like Kemp at all, so no White House for him. Sure, it's a personal bias but there's plenty of other plausible people for the Republicans.
As for Hart's VP, I'm unsure. Despite Bush in '80 (or Edwards in '04) it's not really traditional to pick for VP one of your foes. So, I'm open to suggestions—just remember he's probably going to be running in 1996 for the Democratic nominee.
I haven't got to 1996 in US politics yet…
Also the adultery and protectionism tends to overshadow Hart's legacy. He reformed the military, instituted national service, and worked towards education reform and some other stuff. He also helped transition the Russians better then IOTL and so when economic liberalization sweeps Europe Russia is much more stable and not overrun with gangsters.
All in all he wasn't a bad president, he just missed the boat on economics and, well, cheated on his wife.
Thank you.
Yep. Unless I need somebody else reasonably plausible for some reason, that would be it.
As for Dole ITTL he passes the 1985 freeze (he gets Reagan to lean on that twerp Kemp in the House) and so the US budget is some 300 billion healthier over 3 years, roughly speaking. He balances the budget, basically.
The Senate in 1986 is thus 50-50, tying Bush down to the White House—which hurts his campaign for president and means Dole does better in 1988 (paradoxically he spends less time on it, as he has more Senate business to deal with), but Bush still wins—only to lose to Hart.
Dole gets the 1992 crack at it, and loses. ITTL his reputation will be quite a bit better as no one saw the Gulf War coming to boost President Hart. Dole will be known as the balanced budget guy and have a pretty good retirement.
I don't like Kemp at all, so no White House for him
. Sure, it's a personal bias but there's plenty of other plausible people for the Republicans.As for Hart's VP, I'm unsure. Despite Bush in '80 (or Edwards in '04) it's not really traditional to pick for VP one of your foes. So, I'm open to suggestions—just remember he's probably going to be running in 1996 for the Democratic nominee.
I haven't got to 1996 in US politics yet…
Also the adultery and protectionism tends to overshadow Hart's legacy. He reformed the military, instituted national service, and worked towards education reform and some other stuff. He also helped transition the Russians better then IOTL and so when economic liberalization sweeps Europe Russia is much more stable and not overrun with gangsters.
All in all he wasn't a bad president, he just missed the boat on economics and, well, cheated on his wife.
maybe in this TL their might be a joint Anglo/Japanese/French space program,
or not obviously depending on your plans, was just thinking about the extra co-operation between said countries.
also slighly oftopic but i'll throw the question out there, would the earlier economic reforms in the UK mean more British manufacturing survives?
or not obviously depending on your plans, was just thinking about the extra co-operation between said countries.
also slighly oftopic but i'll throw the question out there, would the earlier economic reforms in the UK mean more British manufacturing survives?
A tough question.
+Free trade between most of the developed world means tariff penalties hit China/India/whatever manufactured products. This matters more ITTL because OTL doesn't have free trade between say Europe and Japan.
+Lower & simple taxes, simpler regulation, a better educated workforce.
+China isn't as open as IOTL as it didn't have Hong Kong for the boost.
-No subsidies.
-As IOTL manufacturing cost for many things is cheaper elsewhere.
It's hard to say. Certainly with free trade between Europe and Japan the big Japanese carmakers will be more inclined towards European plants. Likewise this should keep European carmakers more competitive.
British companies as a whole should be healthier, so that would likely also help the manufacturing base.
There will be a heck of a lot more investment capital floating around, so that's one major problem for the UK IOTL solved.
Beyond that, I just don't know enough.
+Free trade between most of the developed world means tariff penalties hit China/India/whatever manufactured products. This matters more ITTL because OTL doesn't have free trade between say Europe and Japan.
+Lower & simple taxes, simpler regulation, a better educated workforce.
+China isn't as open as IOTL as it didn't have Hong Kong for the boost.
-No subsidies.
-As IOTL manufacturing cost for many things is cheaper elsewhere.
It's hard to say. Certainly with free trade between Europe and Japan the big Japanese carmakers will be more inclined towards European plants. Likewise this should keep European carmakers more competitive.
British companies as a whole should be healthier, so that would likely also help the manufacturing base.
There will be a heck of a lot more investment capital floating around, so that's one major problem for the UK IOTL solved.
Beyond that, I just don't know enough.