Japan chooses not to attack Pearl Harbour. What do americans do?

Glen

Moderator
In OTL the japanese attacked Pearl Harbour to wipe the US fleet because they feared that the US would declare war on them when they tried to invade south east Asia. What if the japanese decide that awakening the sleeping giant is too much of a risk and decide to attack the british and dutch without attacking Pearl Harbour first? Would the americans sit down, or would they make true the japanese fears by joining the allies?

I am more interested by the american reaction in this scenario. With no direct japanese agression, would the american public be so eager to go to war? In fact, would the Congress even approve to declare war, even if the President and the army stated that Japan had to be stopped? And, if in the end the US declare war on Japan, what would Hitler do?

Just attacking British and Dutch colonial holdings in Asia? Nope, not going to bring the isolationists out. But on the other hand its going to continue to make it hard for the Japanese to progress given the oil and scrap metal embargo.

IF the US declares war on Japan, Hitler will probably declare war on the US.
 
Poepoe
I thought that the US was providing not just oil to Japan, but also tankers to carry the oil to Japan. Is this correct? If the US did not provide shipping, the Japanese weren't going to get enough oil anyway. Ditto scrap, etc.
 
if anything, the riches of the DEI were making a profit for the Dutch government. There were a lot of concerns that the country would become impoverished after the Indonesian independence.
They probably were before World War Two but things changed rapidly. A significant proportion of that wealth came from oil sales but DEI is not a market for oil, its a source. The oil has got to be shifted from source to market and therein lies the problem.

The oil problem from the allies point of view wasn't one of quantity, it was moving it around. The allies had more oil than they knew what to do with, they (almost) literally had it flowing out their years, These were the great years of American oil production, more was flowing in from Venezuela, yet more from Iran and Iraq. The allies were awash with the stuff. Their problem was they had to move it in tankers and tankers were in very short supply (and getting shorter as more and more were torpedoed and sunk in the North Atlantic. What oil tanker tonnage there was had to be used most efficiently and that meant the American fields came first, the Venezuelan ones second, the Middle East third. Note who doesn't figure on that list

So, the allies were short of tanker tonnage due to losses in the Atlantic and most of what was available there was concentrated on the North Atlantic and intra-American oil routes. There simply wasn't much left over for anywhere else. That meant the DEI was suddenly unable to get most of its oil to a market and the stuff was just sitting there. There is only a limited amount of storage available so unless somebody buys it, pumping will slow down and cease because there's nowhere to put the oil that's being drilled. So, facing the virtual close-down of the DEI oil industry (their primary source of hard currency) the DEI authorities are quite likely to start working out ways they can discretely sell the stuff.

Sure the loss of the Motherland made life alot harder but that was more in terms of industrial base and manpower. Not in financial way. At least not more then mobilisation does to any country.

That may be true in a direct economic sense (although I suspect it applies to the pre-war rather than the wartime situation) but its not true in a political sense. The reality of the situation is that by 1941, the Dutch Government is gone. As the government of an occupied country it has zero authority. That means the DEI are left on their own, no fresh-faced young Dutchmen getting off the boat to take part on the DEI administration and bringing the latest Hague thinking with them. Losing the homeland is an enormous political impact, not least because it severely impacts the authority and credibility of the DEI government and removes much of tehir legitimacy. If that is compounded by an economic crisis due to their inability to sell oil, then the pro-independence movement inherits the credibility that the DEI government has lost. So there is a strong political push to get the oil flowing again. The question is, where to?

My point is that if Japan has a sudden attack of common sense and starts playing the economic warfare game instead of jumping straight to the "who do we attack" meme, they might have some significant success. They go to the DEI (or rather the oil-trading subsidiary of a Chinese company that is partially owned by a consortium of Chinese banks who in turn are all owned by a group of private Chinese businessmen whose names sound suspiciously Japanese) goes to the DEI and says that they want to buy DEI oil at significantly over world prices, paying for it in (whatever the DEI is short of). The oil is to be shipped in Liberian tankers belonging to (well, you get the message) to ports in unoccupied China. Only, the tankers never arrive at those ports, instead they go to ports in Korea or even Japan itself.

If the Japanese wanted to be really slick, they could even bribe port officials in the fake destination ports to create false unloading manifests that suggest the ships did arrive, the oil was unloaded and shipped inland. "What! It never arrived! Surely you jest. Look, here are our departure manifests, it left here on trains for Chungking on the 26th and 27th. There's no record of such trains? Those treacherous swine, they must have stolen it and sold it on the black market. The depths some people will sink to......"

The real point I'm trying to make though is that Japan wasn't trapped into a situation where it had to go to war; it trapped itself into that situation by assuming going to war with everybody was its only solution. In fact, Japan could have staggered on and with some imagination (and a little judicious mendacity on the trading front) probably had a better time of it than it seemed. After all, everybody knew that FDR was determined to get the US into the war with Germany sooner or sooner still (later wasn't an option) and all an astute Japan had to do was hang on until that happened. Then, with US attention focussed on the North Atlantic, Japan and China become forgotten issues and Japan's trade problems are more or less over. That's assuming Japan stays a neutral in the war. If they were really slick and declared war on Germany, the diplomatic complications are delicious to imagine.

"From His Imperial Majesty to the President of the United States and the American People Greetings.

We read with great horror and distress of the sinking of the cruiser Northampton by a German U-boat and the tragic loss of life amongst its crew. Our armed forces are, from the highest officer to the lowest enlisted man, deeply angered by this brutal and unprovoked attack on a neutral warship. Who, they ask will be next to suffer from these outrages? Will our sailors going about their lawful business on the high seas be suddenly attacked without warning and left to drown? Such a situation cannot be tolerated by any peaceloving people.

For that reason, it is Our Imperial Will that the Japanese nation will join with the United States in its declaration of War against Nazi Germany. We are shamed by the extent to which we were misled by these brutal agressors who exploited our unawareness of European affairs to lead us down the wrong path. We therefore repudiate any and all agreements made between the Empire of Japan and Nazi Germany. Our armed forces will be commencing hostilities against Nazi Germany effective as from midnight tonight GMT.

We also suggest that a top-level meeting be held between the leading military authorities of our two countries and the United Kingdom in order to coordinate military strategy.

By the way, we have lots of destroyers that aren't doing much at the moment, would you like us to send them over to help escort convoys off your Atlantic coast? If so, would you send us the oil for them please, we're a bit short over here.

Signed, your faithfull Ally
Hirohito"

Now, you must admit, that would really set the political cat amongst the diplomatic pigeons.
 
I thought that the US was providing not just oil to Japan, but also tankers to carry the oil to Japan. Is this correct? If the US did not provide shipping, the Japanese weren't going to get enough oil anyway. Ditto scrap, etc.

The Japanese had a pretty large merchant fleet of their own. THIS TABLE gives the numbers. Basically, in 1941, Japan had 94 oil tankers rated at 401,000 tons. Now, its 3,114 nautical miles from Jakarta to Tokyo (I know the oil wasn't in Jakarta but its a big port so it'll do). That's 346 hours at 9 knots (average speed for a tanker in those days) which is almost exactly two weeks. Allowing for round trips (unloading times are pretty small for tankers), each tanker could do one trip per month. That means they could lift a total of 4.812 million tons of oil to Japan per year.

Now, from This Table, we can see that Japan imported 3.68 to 4.63 million tons of oil of which 13 percent came from the DEI and 80 percent form the US. So, we can see that the Japanese civilian tanker fleet was adequate to lift the oil requirement of Japan, if the oil was available to lift.

From This Source we can find that

Their first demand was an increase of oil exports to Japan from the existing 570.000 tons in 1939 to 3.750.000 tons, about 50% of total Dutch East Indies production. The Dutch answer was that existing obligations would only permit an increase to about 1.800.000 tons. Kobayashi initially accepted this proposal but was soon recalled to Japan on October 20th, 1940.


So, total DEI oil production was 7.5 million tons in 1939. That means the total dependance on DEI oil by Japan would consume, at most, 58 percent of DEI oil production capacity.​


So the DEI oil production capacity and Japanese civilian transport capacity existed in adequate amounts. What was lacking was the political will on the Japanese side to do anything other than go to war.​
 
It's not just a matter of oil production: any fool can get oil production.
What was needed was the high refining capability to turn that oil into military-grade oil, and that's an entirely different ballpark. It's similar to why Japan needed American scrap: it's not that Japan didn't have its own supplies of iron, its that American scrap was much better quality than was producable in the home islands.
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
Actually, the oil in the DEI was and is one of the easiest to refine oil-fields in the world. ANd there were ample refineries in the DEI as well.
 
It's not just a matter of oil production: any fool can get oil production.

That's really rather my point; certainly the United States embargo cost Japan 80 percent of its oil imports but it shouldn't have been hard to make that up, especially since the DEI was to hand. My point is that Japan didn't have to go to war to get that extra oil; what they lacked was the imagination to think of any solution outside the "who do we attack" meme.

It's very telling that in strategic debates in Japan, there was a "Strike North" faction and a "Strike South" faction but no "Don't Strike" faction.

What was needed was the high refining capability to turn that oil into military-grade oil, and that's an entirely different ballpark.

According to Japan's Economic History, 1930 - 1960 by Janet Hunter page 432, 58.05 percent of all Japanese oil imports from the United States were of crude oil which was then refined in Japan.

Detailed information on Japanese refining capacity is held HERE which is an excerpt from the USSBS report on the bombing of Japan. (Incidently an interesting but fundamentally useless piece of data - Japan did have its own oilfields around Akita; they produced 3.0 percent of Japan's oil requirements and about the same amount of synthetic oil by coal liquefaction). Crunching the numbers held in this extract is very difficult but it does show that Japan had a substantial refining capability. On JSTOR is a paper published by Far Eastern Survey "The Japanese War Economy 1940-45" that states "Japan's ability to obtain oil was not limited by its extractive or refining capacity but only by the ability of its shipping to move the oil" So it would appear that the impression of a Japanese sufficiency in refining capacity is correct. In "A Gathering Darkness" written by Haruo Tohmatsu (page 85), Tohmatsu gives the annual Japanese refining capacity in 1940 as 4.501 million tons per year (figure ammended by edit due to dumb mistake by me) and their storage capacity as being 8.415 million tons. If correct, these numbers suggest that Japan is essentially self-sufficient in refining capacity.

It's similar to why Japan needed American scrap: it's not that Japan didn't have its own supplies of iron, its that American scrap was much better quality than was producable in the home islands.

It's quite a bit more complicated than that. The situation was that the United States was the largest producer of cheap scrap steel in the world and everybody was buying it - to the point where US steel production was being hit by a scrap shortage. From the Japanese point of view, it wasn't a quality but a quantity issue; with the size of their domestic heavy industry burgeoning, they simply didn;t have enough of their own scrap steel to keep their steel production facilities working To put some numbers on this (from Time Magazine, October 17, 1940)

In 1937, again in 1939, Japan's measly 7,000,000-ton-a-year steel industry fed on some 2,000,000 tons of U. S. scrap. This year, the Japs have braked their steel production; cut scrap purchases to 900,000 ton rate. Even this is more than their recent requirements. From it the Japs have built a scrap stock pile good for about six months.

Scrap is an entirely different issue from oil imports but the same logic can be applied; there are other options available to Japan than going to war.
 
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Actually, the oil in the DEI was and is one of the easiest to refine oil-fields in the world. ANd there were ample refineries in the DEI as well.

Very true (although DEI crude is sulfur-rich and this can cause problems) - but ease of refining and the availability of domestic DEI refining capacity makes them all the more attractive to the Japanese. Especially since buying the stuff avoids the problems of sabotaged fields which are an inevitable consequence of trying to take it.
 
Bill, that's great info there. I hardly know anything about the Pacific situation (well, besides the high level stuff of course). It's a very intriguing scenario. What prompted the Japanese militarism? Besides their general mentality, I mean. Was there actually anybody or any faction that might make this "realistic"?

I mean the consequences would leave Japan off MUCH better - they would not get nuked, nor occupied; their industry might have a head-start after WW2 (although I guess it could be argued that their forced pacifism after WW2 is what made them concentrate on industry) and lead to a Japanese trade empire much more dominant than what we saw in the late 20th Century. They'd probably serve as a strong ally after WW2 in containing the commie threat - especially if they allied themselves with the USA. Could they even get away with an invasion of (now communist) China, and other parts of East Asia, backed by the US?
 
Bill, that's great info there. I hardly know anything about the Pacific situation (well, besides the high level stuff of course). It's a very intriguing scenario. What prompted the Japanese militarism? Besides their general mentality, I mean. Was there actually anybody or any faction that might make this "realistic"?

I mean the consequences would leave Japan off MUCH better - they would not get nuked, nor occupied; their industry might have a head-start after WW2 (although I guess it could be argued that their forced pacifism after WW2 is what made them concentrate on industry) and lead to a Japanese trade empire much more dominant than what we saw in the late 20th Century. They'd probably serve as a strong ally after WW2 in containing the commie threat - especially if they allied themselves with the USA. Could they even get away with an invasion of (now communist) China, and other parts of East Asia, backed by the US?
If Japan can Retain Possession of Korea and Especially Manchuria, There May be NO Communist China ...

The Exact Post-War Situation would Depend a Lot on How The European Theatre Resolved itself, But you Might Still See an Anti-Communist Alliance of Convenience Develop Amoung The Surviving States ...

OTOH, With Increased Manpower Available for Europe The Iron Curtain May Very Well Descend East of The Oder, If it Descends at All!
 

Neroon

Banned
I think a combination of previous posters idea together with something else might make for a "Japanese Best Case":

- Japanese Army discredited after loosing to Red Army
- Vichy-Type Dutch gouvernement in control of DEI leading to the British willing to allow Japanese seizure of same in return for Japanese DoW against Germany
- While we're at it lets handwave away the Ito Hirobumi assassination in 1910 and strengthen the moderates in Japan
 
What prompted the Japanese militarism? Besides their general mentality, I mean. Was there actually anybody or any faction that might make this "realistic"?

I think the Japanese problem was very much along the lines of "if you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail". They'd built up (at great cost) this large Army and Navy and looked to it as the solution to their problems. It had worked that way with the wars with China (first time around) and Russia so they thought they had 'the answer'. Of course they didn't notice that if Russia had hung on a bit longer in 1905, Japan would have collapsed economically. So militarism wan't just part of the national psyche, it appeared to be a part that worked.

I mean the consequences would leave Japan off MUCH better - they would not get nuked, nor occupied; their industry might have a head-start after WW2 (although I guess it could be argued that their forced pacifism after WW2 is what made them concentrate on industry) and lead to a Japanese trade empire much more dominant than what we saw in the late 20th Century. They'd probably serve as a strong ally after WW2 in containing the commie threat - especially if they allied themselves with the USA. Could they even get away with an invasion of (now communist) China, and other parts of East Asia, backed by the US?

I agree; its interesting to speculate what history would look like if the mercantile interests in Japan had managed to gain influence equal to the Army and Navy. Perhaps a timeline might go something like this.

late 1939 - Japanese Army is seriously defeated in fighting with Soviet Union.

early 1941 - US heavily reinforces defensive garrisons in Hawaii and Philippines

Mid-1941 - Yamamoto et al come up with plan for attack on Pearl Harbor. After careful force calculations, they realize that the extra PBYs, B-17s and B-18/23s let alone the increased fighter force make the success of an attack improbable. The Pearl Harbor plan is abandoned.

late-1941 - The Japanese Army decides that the reinforced garrison in the Philippines is too tough a nut to crack with the forces available. They reconsider after illness forces General MacArthur to resign but quickly realize his replacement (a little-known general called Eisenhower) is a far more competent opponent and reconsider reconsidering. With the Philippines still in American hands, the attack on DEI and SEA is considered too risky and abandoned.

Early 1942 - Cabinet meeting in Tokyo. Subject. "What do we do now?". Army and Navy waffle and mumble but have no real plans. Then, Japanese Treasury gives them both barrels. They state they have a plan for trading to get the resources they need using the Japanese banks and trading houses to establish fronts in a complex game of sanctions evasion. They point out that, unlike military action, this plan is risk-free; even if the schemes don't work Japan will be no worse off than it is now. This plan is accepted.

Mid-1942 - Oil starts to flow in through a number of inventive channels. Americans try to enforce blockade but the U-boat blitz on shipping off the American coast causes them to declare war on germany and their attention is elsewhere. This multiplies the flow of oil and the crisis is over.

End-1942 - Success of oil sanctions busting greatly strengthens hand of Japanese Treasury and major Japanese companies. Army and Navy lose much political influence and are even more limited when Emperor praises work of Treasury-Industry Alliance and criticizes Army and Navy. The TIA are now in the driving seat with the Army and Navy neutralized by the Emperor's condemnation of their behavior. The Army attempts a coup but it is put down by loyal troops.

Early 1943 - Japan has changed from a militaristic dictatorship to a mercantile one, using trade and economics to dominate the SEA region. This is much more to American taste and relationships begin to warm.

Late 1944 - Japan declares war on Germany (which is now clearly losing WW2)

Mid-1945. Germany collapses, United Nations is formed with Security Council having as five permament members France, UK, USA, USSR and Japan

1946 Cold War starts; Japan and US become allies against USSR.
 
What this question is really asking I think is, is there a way Japan could get its way in the Far East without going to war with America. Let's suppose the Japanese Army gets politically discredited after Khalkin Gol and the Navy gets likewise after the Pearl Harbor plan collapses. So, there's room for a third force to gain weight. I suggest the Japanese Internal Revenue Service. They're forgotten about because they didn't have tanks and ships but they report directly to the Emperor, they were incorruptible and everybody, including the Army and Navy were scared of them. Suppose they come to the fore, exploit the power of the purse-strings and suggest that rather than confront the Americans directly, they do so indirectly. Use fronts, mock companies, re-labelled shipping, third parties, all the games every country subject to sanctions takes for granted. If necessary, lay the fleet up (it isn't doing much any way) conserve oil every way possible. Basically keep the country going by hook or by crook until American attention goes elsewhere - which it will, eventually. Roosevelt's desire to go to war with Germany will see to that.

:D
The way you put this it just sounds so funny but yeah...economic means. Could work but a lot would need to be changed first.
 
Bill, that's great info there. I hardly know anything about the Pacific situation (well, besides the high level stuff of course). It's a very intriguing scenario. What prompted the Japanese militarism? Besides their general mentality, I mean. Was there actually anybody or any faction that might make this "realistic"?

What most likely prompted Japanese militarism? Perry's visit to Japan in the 1800s. The Japanese became very possessed by the idea of protect the Home Islands from direct threats - this is very much like the Soviet Union forming 'Eastern Europe' after the Second World War. The militarism of the 1920s was partially sparked by a growing population that was running out of habitable land. Larger Japanese families sent their sons into the armed forces where post-WWI promotions were pretty unavailable. The Smoot-Hartley Tariff in the US effective shut out Japanese goods and adversely effected the economy so Japan began to agressively expand into China in order to create protected markets for its exports.
 
Japan decides not to attack Pearl Harbour

Japan would strike Southwards against the Dutch East Indies and Malaya and without the Pearl Harbour attack would gain control of oil and rubber supplies more quickly. America wouls send warships and marines to the scene ostensibly to guard American property but more likely in the hopes of provoking a Japanese attack to provide an excuse for a war.

Japan had already been giving a warning over the Panay a second sinking wouild trigger demands for retaliation. There would be some resistance to any decleration of war by Congress but it would probably get a majority. In the meantime Japan may well invade the Phillipines possibly before America declared war. If the American fleet sailed over to the East it would be sailing into an area where Japan had air superiority. The US navy would suffer heavy losses without the treachery of the attack on Pearl Harbour and war weariness would set in and a negotiated settlement might be possible.

If Hitler had any sense he would stay out of it but then when did he ever have any? The European war would still have priority in this scenario
 

Markus

Banned
It's also an interesting point that if Japan launches an attack on the Philippines, then the American navy is still intact to steam across the Pacific to defend/supply the Philippines. Supplying the Philipines would cause all sorts of problems with Japan's conquest of the islands, and it's hardly guaranteed that it would be a Japanese win.

That would be bad … for the USA. The Japanese had planned for decades to fight a war against the USA by luring the USN into their defensive perimeter. First wear them down with air raids and night torpedo attacks –the USN had no clue about the capabilities of IJN torpedoes- and than fight a Mahan-type decisive battle. All of that with much less complicated logistics than in OTL.

Still it would have hardly happened, because IIRC the USN did not intend to operate in the range of land base Japanese planes without land based air support of it´s own.
 
Japan's economy is already on the knife's edge. No later than February 1942 Japan is effectively bankrupt and unable to purchase the steel and oil needed, whether from the US or elsewhere.

So Japan goes to war before that, goes to war with the national economy already in serious peril, or surrenders to FDR's demands(whatever they prove to be). By any analysis of the US military buildup December 1941 makes better sense(still very little) than February 1942.
 
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