Japan Avoids War With USA - Fall 1941

This is my first post on this forum. As a long time student of military history I have always been intrigued by this scenario. Anyone have any thoughts? Please share.

Fall 1941 - Japan enacts it's "Southern Plan" favored by the IJN. However, wishing to avoid war with the USA at all costs, Japan strikes ONLY British & Dutch territories of Malaya, Hong Kong, Java, Sumatra, Borneo...etc. Although tempted to attack US possessions, particularly the Phillipines, Japan strictly respects US neutrality and strictly avoids any overt act of war towards the US - putting the burden of US involvement in the war solely on the FDR administration. Given US public opinion in 1941, there was no way the country was prepared to go to war against Japan and spill American blood to protect British & Dutch colonial interests. No Pearl Harbor - No US declaration of war. FDR would have had no public enthusiasm, or political support for getting into to the war.

IMO, the Japanese war cabinet grossly overestimated the United States's ability to interfere with their "Southern Plan" militarily, while at the same time, underestimating the value of the fact that US public opinion was largely pro-isolationist in 1941. While most of the public sympathized with Britain, China, & Russia, there is a huge difference between "sympathy" and wishing to actively go to war for them. Had the Japanese avoided attacking Pearl Harbor, Phillipines, and other US holdings, they could have avoided war with the US in 1941 and been free to further their expansion into the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and after consolidating these gains, could have even attempted an invasion of Austrailia.

Any thoughts?
 
JonRogers1

This topic has been discussed a lot! While I would be a bit more cautious in that I wouldn't rule out a US dow, if after several months, I agree that an immediate one is highly unlikely and also that, regardless of the US response this would have been the best option for Japan. [Other than the politically unacceptable withdrawal from China]. However I think you will find we're the minority on this issue.:D

Steve

This is my first post on this forum. As a long time student of military history I have always been intrigued by this scenario. Anyone have any thoughts? Please share.

Fall 1941 - Japan enacts it's "Southern Plan" favored by the IJN. However, wishing to avoid war with the USA at all costs, Japan strikes ONLY British & Dutch territories of Malaya, Hong Kong, Java, Sumatra, Borneo...etc. Although tempted to attack US possessions, particularly the Phillipines, Japan strictly respects US neutrality and strictly avoids any overt act of war towards the US - putting the burden of US involvement in the war solely on the FDR administration. Given US public opinion in 1941, there was no way the country was prepared to go to war against Japan and spill American blood to protect British & Dutch colonial interests. No Pearl Harbor - No US declaration of war. FDR would have had no public enthusiasm, or political support for getting into to the war.

IMO, the Japanese war cabinet grossly overestimated the United States's ability to interfere with their "Southern Plan" militarily, while at the same time, underestimating the value of the fact that US public opinion was largely pro-isolationist in 1941. While most of the public sympathized with Britain, China, & Russia, there is a huge difference between "sympathy" and wishing to actively go to war for them. Had the Japanese avoided attacking Pearl Harbor, Phillipines, and other US holdings, they could have avoided war with the US in 1941 and been free to further their expansion into the Southwest Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and after consolidating these gains, could have even attempted an invasion of Austrailia.

Any thoughts?
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
FDR had already assured Churchill that a Japanese attack on British territory in the Pacific would be a casus belli for the United States.
 
There's also the fact that if the Japanese attack the East Indies and SE Asia without also attacking the US, they are basically baring their throats for any US forces based in the Philippines. After they launch their invasions, the US will have the ability to cut off the Japanese supply lines to SE Asia and anything beyond that at any time. This is far too great a risk for the Japanese.

The longer the war goes on without a resolution, the worse the risk gets for the Japanese, since they will likely be committing ever-growing forces to their campaigns against the British, assuming their invasions of the East Indies meet with as much success as OTL. That means more forces that will have to be essentially written off if the US declares war. There is no way the Japanese will accept a potentially hostile US having that much power over their war efforts.
 

Cook

Banned
Given US public opinion in 1941, there was no way the country was prepared to go to war against Japan and spill American blood to protect British & Dutch colonial interests.

American Public opinion in 1941 was strongly anti-Japan and had been for some time. The China lobby in the late 1930s was regarded by many as being almost as powerful as the Israel lobby was in the ‘90s. By mid-1941 consensus had been reached that Japan’s further expansion could not be tolerated and must be stopped. Hence Roosevelt’s confidence in imposing embargoes on Strategic exports to Japan and his guarantees to the British Colonies and Netherlands’ East Indies.

Roosevelt did not want war and their was no conspiracy to force Japan into a position where they would be compelled to attack the US, but cabinet discussions and his public statements make it clear that further Japanese expansion would be an unacceptable threat to the United States and her interests in the Far East.
 
First, I suppose I should say welcome to the original poster. This has been discussed before here of course, but it's worth examining again.

There's also the fact that if the Japanese attack the East Indies and SE Asia without also attacking the US, they are basically baring their throats for any US forces based in the Philippines. After they launch their invasions, the US will have the ability to cut off the Japanese supply lines to SE Asia and anything beyond that at any time. This is far too great a risk for the Japanese.

The longer the war goes on without a resolution, the worse the risk gets for the Japanese, since they will likely be committing ever-growing forces to their campaigns against the British, assuming their invasions of the East Indies meet with as much success as OTL. That means more forces that will have to be essentially written off if the US declares war. There is no way the Japanese will accept a potentially hostile US having that much power over their war efforts.

That's the crux of the issue. The Japanese had to look at US war-making potential and worry about what the US would do, not just immediately but half a year or more down the road.

My take: In spite of their private pledges to the British, the Roosevelt administration would probably not be able to get a declaration of war without a Japanese attack on US forces. However, Roosevelt would quickly make the Japanese very sorry they left the US alone.

First, the US would continue the frantic pace of their buildup in the Philippines. They had an enormous amount of material and a lot of men in the pipeline, including the Pensacola convoy and a lot of other stuff stacked up in West Coast warehouses waiting for shipping and units waiting to go. In another 3 to 6 months the Philippines would have been a tough nut to crack.

Second, as they got stronger in the Philippines, the US would get more aggressive, reinforcing Pacific outposts like Wake and Midway, then maybe ratcheting up the pressure by starting to build up Guam as a military and air base. We would get our butts kicked if the Japanese attacked during the buildup, but provoking a Japanese attack would be the point of the exercise. It would be difficult for the Japanese to accept a US buildup on Guam because a US base there would unlock the Japanese defenses in the Marshall islands.

Third, the US would continue with their Flying Tigers buildup in China, eventually adding bombers to the force. At that point you would have US pilots in US planes bombing the Japanese. I doubt that the Japanese would stand still for that. If they did though, the US could add longer range planes and start hitting Japanese bases in Taiwan.

Another line of provocation: the US could declare a maritime exclusion zone around the Philippines, extending it far enough to make Japanese resupply of forces in the Dutch East Indies difficult.

Bottom line: the US could use the kind of undeclared war tactics they were already using in the Atlantic to make it extremely difficult for the Japanese to avoid doing something that would justify a declaration of war, and every month that they didn't attack the US would get stronger.
 
As just one example the first military construction on Wake began in January 1941 and the first Marines, less than 200 strong, landed in late August 1941 yet the first Japanese attack on Wake failed.

Imagine Wake in December 1942 with radar coverage, fuel to keep subs at hand, a squadron or two of aircraft plus the entire Marine garrison assigned with much more fire power.
 
Guys

I would suspect most of those would work and it's still pretty grim for Japan but:

a) Given how quickly Japan was able to overrun it's aims OTL, with diversion of forces to also fight the US how quickly will it do so TTL? If the US doesn't declare war when the Japanese attacks what is the likelihood of Britain, already seriously pressed in Europe being forced to accept terms after the fall of Singapore, given only vague promises of distant possible help. If peace breaks out in the Far East will Roosevelt be able to get a dow on Japan at a later date?

Japan will still face serious problems as it can only sustain the current war in China for a while even with the southern resources. However as it's resilience showed during the war that could be a long and costly period.

b) If the US does a dow shortly after a Japanese strike south then it has the problem of defending the positions it's reinforcing, especially the Philippines, at the end of a very long supply line. If it suffers serious losses early on the war, which will be unpopular with a lot of people in the US could become dangerously so. Don't forget here the US has declared war 'in support of European colonialism' and without Japanese attacks on US possessions.

c) Even if the US preserves until it forces the Japanese to withdraw from China will it have the will for a war to force unconditional surrender or will there be a compromise peace at some point?

Steve

First, I suppose I should say welcome to the original poster. This has been discussed before here of course, but it's worth examining again.



That's the crux of the issue. The Japanese had to look at US war-making potential and worry about what the US would do, not just immediately but half a year or more down the road.

My take: In spite of their private pledges to the British, the Roosevelt administration would probably not be able to get a declaration of war without a Japanese attack on US forces. However, Roosevelt would quickly make the Japanese very sorry they left the US alone.

First, the US would continue the frantic pace of their buildup in the Philippines. They had an enormous amount of material and a lot of men in the pipeline, including the Pensacola convoy and a lot of other stuff stacked up in West Coast warehouses waiting for shipping and units waiting to go. In another 3 to 6 months the Philippines would have been a tough nut to crack.

Second, as they got stronger in the Philippines, the US would get more aggressive, reinforcing Pacific outposts like Wake and Midway, then maybe ratcheting up the pressure by starting to build up Guam as a military and air base. We would get our butts kicked if the Japanese attacked during the buildup, but provoking a Japanese attack would be the point of the exercise. It would be difficult for the Japanese to accept a US buildup on Guam because a US base there would unlock the Japanese defenses in the Marshall islands.

Third, the US would continue with their Flying Tigers buildup in China, eventually adding bombers to the force. At that point you would have US pilots in US planes bombing the Japanese. I doubt that the Japanese would stand still for that. If they did though, the US could add longer range planes and start hitting Japanese bases in Taiwan.

Another line of provocation: the US could declare a maritime exclusion zone around the Philippines, extending it far enough to make Japanese resupply of forces in the Dutch East Indies difficult.

Bottom line: the US could use the kind of undeclared war tactics they were already using in the Atlantic to make it extremely difficult for the Japanese to avoid doing something that would justify a declaration of war, and every month that they didn't attack the US would get stronger.

As just one example the first military construction on Wake began in January 1941 and the first Marines, less than 200 strong, landed in late August 1941 yet the first Japanese attack on Wake failed.

Imagine Wake in December 1942 with radar coverage, fuel to keep subs at hand, a squadron or two of aircraft plus the entire Marine garrison assigned with much more fire power.
 
Guys

I would suspect most of those would work and it's still pretty grim for Japan but:

a) Given how quickly Japan was able to overrun it's aims OTL, with diversion of forces to also fight the US how quickly will it do so TTL? If the US doesn't declare war when the Japanese attacks what is the likelihood of Britain, already seriously pressed in Europe being forced to accept terms after the fall of Singapore, given only vague promises of distant possible help. If peace breaks out in the Far East will Roosevelt be able to get a dow on Japan at a later date?

Japan will still face serious problems as it can only sustain the current war in China for a while even with the southern resources. However as it's resilience showed during the war that could be a long and costly period.

b) If the US does a dow shortly after a Japanese strike south then it has the problem of defending the positions it's reinforcing, especially the Philippines, at the end of a very long supply line. If it suffers serious losses early on the war, which will be unpopular with a lot of people in the US could become dangerously so. Don't forget here the US has declared war 'in support of European colonialism' and without Japanese attacks on US possessions.

c) Even if the US preserves until it forces the Japanese to withdraw from China will it have the will for a war to force unconditional surrender or will there be a compromise peace at some point?

Steve


Thats something I don't see being mentioned by those who say Japan would have problems in its southern campaign. Without the Surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, how willing would the US population be in engaging the Japanese in war? It was the same rightous fury that the US would turn towards Al Qaeda after 9/11.

Without that fury, how long would Americans be willing to fight a war? I'm not sure if this is true, but I've noticed that compared to some countries, America is a nation that seems to get tired of war really, really quickly.
 
Thats something I don't see being mentioned by those who say Japan would have problems in its southern campaign. Without the Surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, how willing would the US population be in engaging the Japanese in war? It was the same rightous fury that the US would turn towards Al Qaeda after 9/11.

Without that fury, how long would Americans be willing to fight a war? I'm not sure if this is true, but I've noticed that compared to some countries, America is a nation that seems to get tired of war really, really quickly.

To me its not so much a question as to how long it would be before the US joined in, or what would motivate them to get involved (although I think there are many reasons why they would which I have covered in the other thread on this), but more a question of how long the Japanese could avoid taking action against the US themselves.
The strategic situation didnt leave them a lot of choice, the US had territory within the area that the Japanese considered to be "theirs". Ignoring the US forces in the area would be a huge risk, because if the US did decide to get involved then the Japanese would be hard pressed to defend against them while also launching attacks on the British and Dutch areas of the pacific.
While some might say that the US had no intentions of getting involved before pearl harbor, as afar as the Japanese knew this was not the case. Lets not forget that the US had placed embargos against them for their actions in China, so there was every reason to suspect that launching more attacks (this time against friends of the US) would provoke an even stronger response.
And yes, with the benefit of hindsight maybe the US wouldnt have done anything due to the internal pressures and views from the time, but there was no way for the Japanese to know this, so gambling that the US would do nothing was to much of a risk.

What I would ask is for any reasons people can think of as to why the Japanese would think that the US would do nothing while they launched their war of agression throughout the rest of Asia? Baring in mind all the evidence that was available at the time, that the US was protesting the actions of the Japanese in China and has emplaced embargos against them as a consequence, that the US was willingly supplying material etc to the British in their war with Germany, that the US had interests within the territory that the Japanese wanted, and that the US had a very large fleet that the Japanese could not defeat in the traditional manner should the US decide to fight.
What would motivate the Japanese to ignore all these points and run the risk?
 
krull1m

No the Japanese wouldn't know for sure, even less than we could now. Although diplomats in the US could probably have given them a strong hint that public opposition to a US attack on Japan would be high. Not to mention that like the other fascists states they vastly underestimated the willingness to fight of the 'decadent' western powers. However consider two points:

a) The US has complained repeatedly about aggression by Germany in Europe and Japan in China. It has made available funds and materials to powers fighting those two powers. However it has not, even when France fell and Britain looked very vulnerable or China was overrun, been willing to commit it's own forces to the war and there continues to be substantial vocal public opposition to such a step. Hence the Japanese might consider it less than certain that the US would immediately join a conflict in the Far East.

b) Even if the US did later go to war, given a realistic evaluation of the long terms prospects of a war between the two nations, which some albeit not many people in the Japanese government were able to make, its still a better bet then being sure to start such a war and enrage the US public by a surprise 1st strike.

I'm not just thinking here they might avoid war altogether if they force Britain to make peace quickly, greatly reducing the US prospects for an alliance war in the Pacific. If the US does enter before Britain is forced to make terms then the US commitment will be substantially less.

Also I'm far less certain than you that the US could win fairly quickly with it's at start forces. It has a large and fairly modern navy and potentially fatal bases in the Philippines. However the latter are only important while their held and able to attack Japanese supply lines. As OTL shows in the short term the Philippines can't do this long in the face of surrounding Japanese bases. US policy is NOT to reinforce the islands in the event of war because it's considered too difficult. If political considerations do require it, over the objection of the USN senior admirals, this could well lead to a shattering defeat as their operating in Japanese controlled waters and far beyond their main bases. Something like that will trigger huge rage in the US population but would it be directed at Japan or at the American leadership who started a foreign war and then saw an humiliating defeat for the USN?

Steve

To me its not so much a question as to how long it would be before the US joined in, or what would motivate them to get involved (although I think there are many reasons why they would which I have covered in the other thread on this), but more a question of how long the Japanese could avoid taking action against the US themselves.
The strategic situation didnt leave them a lot of choice, the US had territory within the area that the Japanese considered to be "theirs". Ignoring the US forces in the area would be a huge risk, because if the US did decide to get involved then the Japanese would be hard pressed to defend against them while also launching attacks on the British and Dutch areas of the pacific.
While some might say that the US had no intentions of getting involved before pearl harbor, as afar as the Japanese knew this was not the case. Lets not forget that the US had placed embargos against them for their actions in China, so there was every reason to suspect that launching more attacks (this time against friends of the US) would provoke an even stronger response.
And yes, with the benefit of hindsight maybe the US wouldnt have done anything due to the internal pressures and views from the time, but there was no way for the Japanese to know this, so gambling that the US would do nothing was to much of a risk.

What I would ask is for any reasons people can think of as to why the Japanese would think that the US would do nothing while they launched their war of agression throughout the rest of Asia? Baring in mind all the evidence that was available at the time, that the US was protesting the actions of the Japanese in China and has emplaced embargos against them as a consequence, that the US was willingly supplying material etc to the British in their war with Germany, that the US had interests within the territory that the Japanese wanted, and that the US had a very large fleet that the Japanese could not defeat in the traditional manner should the US decide to fight.
What would motivate the Japanese to ignore all these points and run the risk?
 
Wow, some very good responses! Sorry it's taken me so long to get back on here.

I still think FDR would have had a hard time getting the US public behind a Pacific War without a Japanese first strike. I also think that Japan very much over-estimated US military capabilities in 1941. They could have conquered Southeast Asia and consolidated their holdings without attacking the US and left the onus of going to war strictly on the US.

Yes, the US was in the process of building up military strength in the Phillipines at the time the war started. However, even with reinforcements, the US would not have been powerful enough to seriously disrupt Japanese movements into Southeast Asia and the East Indies. The US only had 3 carriers in the Pacific at the time. US airpower in the Phillipines would have also been too weak (even if it had not been largely destroyed on the ground) and even had it been reinforced.
 
....
Fall 1941 - Japan enacts it's "Southern Plan" favored by the IJN.
......
It was probably a little more complicated. The IJN certainly opposed the Strike North idea when anyone from the IJA suggested it. However, in the Summer of 1940, it was the IJA who proposed occupying the Netherlands East Indies in a plan drawn up by Lt. Colonel Nishiura Susumu. The IJN argued that this would lead to war with the US. We have plenty of information on the IJA version as Nishiura was one of the writers of Senshi Sōshō (the ex-IJA part as the IJA and IJN could not agree even after the peace!) and details are online at http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10635/17361/07Yamamoto.pdf?sequence=7 . It is harder to reconstruct the IJN's arguments or establish who created them. According to Marder, Rear-Admiral Maeda Minoru, head of General Staff Intelligence Bureau, stated in an interview (19 June 1962, Boeicho Senshibu Archives) that he had argued that the Americans were inseparable from the Anglo-Dutch because they were the same race! However, clearly there were more senior figures involved.

....
However, wishing to avoid war with the USA at all costs, Japan strikes ONLY British & Dutch territories of Malaya, Hong Kong, Java, Sumatra, Borneo...etc. Although tempted to attack US possessions, particularly the Phillipines, Japan strictly respects US neutrality and strictly avoids any overt act of war towards the US - putting the burden of US involvement in the war solely on the FDR administration. Given US public opinion in 1941, there was no way the country was prepared to go to war against Japan and spill American blood to protect British & Dutch colonial interests. No Pearl Harbor - No US declaration of war. FDR would have had no public enthusiasm, or political support for getting into to the war.
......
It seems possible that if Japan had struck South in 1940, it might have avoided war with the USA over the short term. Under those conditions, perhaps Britain might have accepted a peace leaving Japan holding the NEI and Malaya to avoid losing everything around the Indian Ocean.

By 1941, American opinion was much more favourable to military action against Japan. There were some quite persuasive posts by OpanaPointer at Axishistory http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=177282&p=1581192#p1581192 referring to Gallup polls from 1941 http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/Gallup/ and http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=175387&start=30. Nobody is sure exactly what Roosevelt would have done i.e. ordered immediate military action, asked for an immediate declaration of war or continued the build up to the Philippines while preparing to get a DoW from Congress. In one of those threads I suggested that delay might have a risk if the American public's apparent preference for action against Japan over Germany was because everyone believe that war against Japan would be easy. If so, Japanese success against the British might actually reduce the American public's willingness to take action.

ps. Your suggestion was favoured by Admirals Shimada and Kondo. It may have been favoured by Nagano. However, they all caved in when Yamamoto threatened to resign.
 
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