Japan attacks on Dec 14th

Basically what the title says. All the attacks in Asia, as well as PH are delayed by a week, and carried out on Sunday the 14th. Would the same degree of success be achieved, on all fronts? What about the adverse effects?
 
Allowing weather hasn't caused serious damage to the K.B. enroute (IDK what it was like mid-December '41), & presuming Enterprise & Lexington are in harbor on the day (IDK what their planned schedules looked like OTL) & Saratoga has arrived (IDK if she was due back from refit yet offhand), you've actually got Japan doing significantly better.:eek:

So, what does Nimitz do? (Presuming he gets the nod as OTL.) My usual answer is, pull all the subs in PTO back to Hawaii & rely on them as his main striking arm. (I know, I'm showing a strong bias there.;)) If he does, it's bad news for Japan...

He'd pull at least two CVs from Atlantic Fleet (Hornet & Yorktown OTL), maybe Wasp, too (which pulls her from AVG duty to Malta; replaced by Ranger?) That ends up meaning no major changes through Coral Sea. Midway, he might (just) avoid fighting, or might demand Wasp for. (Was Essex near enough completion to be rushed into service? OTL she commissioned in December. I presume loss of 3 CVs at Pearl changes that somewhat...)

Short answer: you'd need to be a history buff or AHr to notice the change.
 
Presumably the Japanese take take slightly more losses from an extra week of preparation. For example, perhaps radar warnings are taken more seriously and more AA gunners are at their posts. However, the increased loses will probably be worth crippling a carrier or two.

If a couple carriers are sunk, there are significant butterflies. There will not be a Battle of Midway as we know it. American carriers were involved in two significant operations roughly simultaneously IOTL: The Doolittle Raid and the Battle of the Coral Sea. With two carriers out of action, there won't be enough decks for both events to happen. If the Doolittle Raid is forgone, we can expect a similar conclusion; a carrier or two on each side out of action. The Imperial Japanese Navy may seek its decisive battle in the South Pacific. If the Doolittle Raid is carried out, Operation MO goes off without a hitch and Port Moseby is likely lost. Additionally, Shokaku and Zuikaku are available for action. Nimitz may decline to defend Midway...and the Japanese will face the later half of 1942 with an intact fleet and complete defensive perimeter.

Personally, I think the Doolittle Raid would be cancelled. It was a risky, expensive publicity stunt. On the other hand, it was no less of a risky publicity stunt IOTL, so perhaps the political backing would force it even with a totally disastrous Pearl Harbor attack.
 
The Soviet counteroffensive is seriously underway now. By December 14 the Soviets have retaken the Kiln Bulge and are advancing several places.

Could the fact that his forces are in serious trouble on the Eastern Front make Hitler more pragmatic and prevent him from doing a DOW on the United States????
 
The Soviet counteroffensive is seriously underway now. By December 14 the Soviets have retaken the Kiln Bulge and are advancing several places.

Could the fact that his forces are in serious trouble on the Eastern Front make Hitler more pragmatic and prevent him from doing a DOW on the United States????

No. The U-boat war is a totally different theater of operations, and that's what Hitler declared war over. Hitler did not anticipate a long war with the USSR or the USA. The Japanese smashing a larger portion of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor would only further convince him the Americans could be defeated quickly blitzkrieg style.
 
Radar warnings are taken seriously the harbour defences are all manned and ready and there are overwhelming numbers of fighters from the airfields and carriers to meet the Japanese.

The Zeros inflict a heavy toll but the dive bombers and torpedo aircraft get massacred.

Not sure if enough would get through to cripple the fleet but the Carriers could be lost however they could be replaced unlike the Japanese pilots who may have sever ramifications for the Japanese later on.
 
Radar warnings are taken seriously the harbour defences are all manned and ready and there are overwhelming numbers of fighters from the airfields and carriers to meet the Japanese.

The Zeros inflict a heavy toll but the dive bombers and torpedo aircraft get massacred.

Not sure if enough would get through to cripple the fleet but the Carriers could be lost however they could be replaced unlike the Japanese pilots who may have sever ramifications for the Japanese later on.

IIRC, the signal was caught by the men of the last shift at the station, who had stayed later (past 7:00 am) waiting for their ride. I still have to find info on the radar stations being fully operational on Sundays...

OTOH, there's the chance that the mini subs get caught by the minesweepers.
 
IIRC, the signal was caught by the men of the last shift at the station, who had stayed later (past 7:00 am) waiting for their ride.
Indeed, the station was supposed to be unmanned by that time, but the breakfast truck was late that morning, so they were just playing around when they spotted the formation. Unfortunately, there was a bomber formation due to be arriving that morning and just by chance from just a few degrees off the direction the Japanese came from (and it wouldn't have been seen as unusual back then to have deviated by those few degrees due to issues of navigation), a fact known to the station officer first-lieutenant Kermit Tyler, but not to the operators, who on their part did not inform Tyler of the size of the formation.
 
Indeed, the station was supposed to be unmanned by that time, but the breakfast truck was late that morning, so they were just playing around when they spotted the formation..... ..... the station officer first-lieutenant Kermit Tyler, but not to the operators, who on their part did not inform Tyler of the size of the formation.

There was not a proper fighter control system manned either. It was being organized and some training had been conducted, but Sunday morning as most days in those weeks only a minority of pilots would have been ordered aloft, and those with little direction as to where the enemy was.

I have no clue what the schedule was for standing up a operational fighter direction system. Perhaps that would have occured in as little as a month, but probablly not one week. On Luzon there was some eight hours warning but the attempt to operate the planned and partially rehearsed fighter direction system fell apart during the morning, with the Army aircraft assigned to CAP landing for lunch and fuel & no replacement launched. The USN fighters still on CAP over the naval base failed to either receive or respond to messages about the the approaching bombers.

Allowing weather hasn't caused serious damage to the K.B. enroute (IDK what it was like mid-December '41), & presuming Enterprise & Lexington are in harbor on the day (IDK what their planned schedules looked like OTL) & Saratoga has arrived (IDK if she was due back from refit yet offhand), you've actually got Japan doing significantly better.:eek:

As I understand it this was probablly the last weekend the fleet would have been concentrated in PH. There had been a war warning just before Thanksgiving (when the Japanese had originally thought the best date for attack.) That warning had caused a considerable amount of unplanned activity, by both the fleet and Army. The Navy leaders decided to slow down operations for a few days to sort out the numerous problems developing from the unanticipated and frantic pace of the previous week. I dont know the specific schedule for post 8 December but nothing like the stand down of 5-8 December was anticipated. I expect a quarter to a third of the fleet, perhaps more, would have been at sea 14 December either on patrol or training.

Both the Army and Navy had identified a mass of problems in their patrol plans during the Thanksgiving alert. At least some of those would have been sorted out by 14 December, tho actually encountering the Japanese fleet is expecting too much.

What has not been addressed here are the series of war warnings issuing from Washington, and the information being teased out by the Allied inteligence services. If Japanese preparation has proceeded as in OTL, but the attack delayed a full week then there are increased odds of the US anticipating war starting. That would lead to another 'alert' of the sort that came to PH at Thanksgiving.

So, what does Nimitz do? (Presuming he gets the nod as OTL.)

If the worst of the Japanese attack is avoided then Nimitz may not replace Kimmel. Kmmel may even receive a medal.

[/QUOTE]My usual answer is, pull all the subs in PTO back to Hawaii & rely on them as his main striking arm. (I know, I'm showing a strong bias there.;)) If he does, it's bad news for Japan...

He'd pull at least two CVs from Atlantic Fleet (Hornet & Yorktown OTL), maybe Wasp, too (which pulls her from AVG duty to Malta; replaced by Ranger?) That ends up meaning no major changes through Coral Sea. Midway, he might (just) avoid fighting, or might demand Wasp for. (Was Essex near enough completion to be rushed into service? OTL she commissioned in December. I presume loss of 3 CVs at Pearl changes that somewhat...)

Short answer: you'd need to be a history buff or AHr to notice the change.[/QUOTE]

I agree here. War Plan Orange had long outlined a extended period of defensive strategy. the overall concept was to delay major offensive for 12-18 months until the new battleships, carriers, and new specialized logistics ships were ready, that is until 1943. Meanwhile the plan was to raid and look for opportunities to damage and attrit the Japanese military. Kimmels operational plan issued after he took over the Pacific fleet from Adm Richardson reiterated the fundamentals of WPO. The current Rainbow Plans reflected all this, placing priority on The Atlantic and Europe - leaving the Pacific theatre on the strategic defense into 1943 or even 1944. In OTL Nimitz was simply following the war plans that had been in place and to which he had trained to for much of his career. Even if he had a less damaged fleet it is unlikely the USN would have launched any sort of large scale strategic offence in 1942. The material superiority in combat units was not there and the US leaders knew it. More important the logistics capability in the form of cargo and support ships did not exist until 1943.
 
Isn't there a chance the fleet might sail if incoming bombers are detected ? With limited fighter cover, this could be a disaster for those poor sailors aboard the battleships...:(
 
Radar warnings are taken seriously the harbour defences are all manned and ready and there are overwhelming numbers of fighters from the airfields and carriers to meet the Japanese.

The Zeros inflict a heavy toll but the dive bombers and torpedo aircraft get massacred.

Not sure if enough would get through to cripple the fleet but the Carriers could be lost however they could be replaced unlike the Japanese pilots who may have sever ramifications for the Japanese later on.

Can aircraft take off from carriers that are at a stand still? I've always thought they have to sail into the wind to get the lift the panes need.
 
I have no clue what the schedule was for standing up a operational fighter direction system. Perhaps that would have occured in as little as a month, but probablly not one week. On Luzon there was some eight hours warning but the attempt to operate the planned and partially rehearsed fighter direction system fell apart during the morning, with the Army aircraft assigned to CAP landing for lunch and fuel & no replacement launched. The USN fighters still on CAP over the naval base failed to either receive or respond to messages about the the approaching bombers.
Bad management them. still, the 3/4 of an hour ought to be enough time to at least get the fighters scattered around the bases, make them harder targets, and thus maybe be able to get more airborne later. Also, they ought to be able to get more AA active before the Japanese are overhead.

Isn't there a chance the fleet might sail if incoming bombers are detected ? With limited fighter cover, this could be a disaster for those poor sailors aboard the battleships...:(
With less than an hours warning and no previous prep? I doubt it, but prepping for an attack (manning guns, closing bulkhead doors etc.) should not be out of the question.
 
Can aircraft take off from carriers that are at a stand still? I've always thought they have to sail into the wind to get the lift the panes need.

Carriers generally don't keep their aircraft aboard when in port. Presumably, at Ford Island, or perhaps one of the other NAS, (Ewa).

All carrier aircraft are different in terms of launch characteristics. The less wind over deck, the longer the takeoff run and the lighter the payload can be carried. So, a Zero fighter might be able to do it if launching from, say, closer to the fantail. An SBD with full gas and a 1,000lbs bomb - probably not. An SBD with no bomb and 1/3rd a load of gas? Maybe.
 
Supposing that the attack takes place on the 14th at the same time as it did IOTL on the 7th, would it be ASB to suggest that the raid goes undetected (at least by radar,) if the privates on duty get picked up on time at the end of their shift?

(As a result eliminating the 40+ minutes of warning that the base would otherwise have.)
 
Supposing that the attack takes place on the 14th at the same time as it did IOTL on the 7th, would it be ASB to suggest that the raid goes undetected (at least by radar,) if the privates on duty get picked up on time at the end of their shift?
Not at all, in fact I'd probably call it 50-50.
 
Wake Island would be reinforced and would hold, changing the complexion of the South Pacific theatre of war.
 
Pururauka said:
Supposing that the attack takes place on the 14th at the same time as it did IOTL on the 7th, would it be ASB to suggest that the raid goes undetected (at least by radar,) if the privates on duty get picked up on time at the end of their shift?

(As a result eliminating the 40+ minutes of warning that the base would otherwise have.)
Flipside of that is, Condor spotted a minisub over four hours before the attack, & Ward attacked & reported more than 3 before. If the duty officer (who, AIUI, was asleep:eek::eek::eek: OTL) send word to his boss, thence Kimmel, it's more than possible the Fleet is closed up for action, with guns manned & steam coming up. Plus warning to Short's fighters, so they're dispersed (at least) & on the way to being regunned & armed. Plus the radars being put back in operation (if they're down). Plus PBYs being readied for patrols. Plus CAP on top... Plus Army AA guns manned & ready.

It doesn't take a big change to have big butterflies....

All you need is which way the dominoes fall.
 
A lot depends on whether another weeks sees the radar station up and running, if so, then there could be big changes, if not, then things go pretty much as OTL, unless the mess truck is late again.
 
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