Japan aids Germany during the invasion of the Soviet Union

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CalBear

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From Wikipedia, with citations throughout: "At the same time, the supply situation for the Germans rapidly deteriorated. On 31 October, the German Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were reorganized. The pause gave the Soviets, who were in a far better supply situation, time to consolidate their positions and organize formations of newly activated reservists. In little over a month, the Soviets organized eleven new armies that included 30 divisions of Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet Far East after Soviet intelligence assured Stalin that there was no longer a threat from the Japanese. Over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft arrived along with the Siberian forces. These had been freed from the Soviet Far East after Soviet intelligence assured Stalin that there was no longer a threat from the Japanese."

These were crucial in counteroffensive after the Battle of Moscow, from what I understand.

As noted it was mostly a myth. What is true is that the Soviets moved most of their heavy armor to the West, facing the Heer. The thing is, that the didn't NEED their heavy armor, especially fighting defensively, against the IJA.

The IJA was a light infantry force, quite weak in armor. In 1941 the entire IJA had three divisions worth of tanks. These were also very poor example of the art. The best that was in heavy use was the Type 95 (37mm main gun, 2x 7.7mm mg) that was utterly helpless against the Soviet BT-5 & 7 light tank, something demonstrated in the border clashes at Khalkhin Gol where the Soviet tank's 47mm gun simply shredded the Japanese armor. Half of their total armor was sent South in December of 1941, a full tank group of four regiments (what was called a division in other armies) was with Yamashita, and two regiments were assigned to 14th Army and Homma on Luzon. They had six active armored regiments for the rest of the entire Japanese army, spread across half of China and into Manchuria.

They were also lighter in artillery than the average Western force, with most divisional formations not having anything over a 75mm (their HEAVY A type divisions included 12 x 105mm). A Soviet division of the same era had more guns (100 vs. 84 for the Type A and 66 for the standard B division) and heavier guns as well (12x 152mm, 28x 122mm, with the balance being 75mm) and was about 25% heavier in machineguns, and notably better heavy mg than the IJA (plus the addition of the submachinegun as the war progressed). The Japanese had more mortars, mainly in the 90mm and below size (the "knee mortar" was more of a grenade launcher, but extremely effective in that role).

Probably most critically is that the Red Army understood that victory via superior elan had died in Flanders and Tannenberg. The IJA never learned this. The IJA remained convinced, all the way through to the Surrender, that bravery and selfless courage was superior to shrapnel. They were wrong. That is why the IJA never defeated a "Western" force that was not "colonial" in nature (the closest it got was in Malaya, but even there most of the troops were not top quality, and the leadership was simply dreadful). Even in the Philippines it had a hard time finishing off a mostly militia force (only about 12,000 U.S. troops were "regulars" both Americans and Philippine Scouts) that was utterly cut off from resupply. Once fighting stopped being against cut-off force with poor training and/or fighting in exposed posts, the IJA never won another battle. The British Army kicked their butts, as did the Australians, the Americans, the Indians, and the Soviets. "Western" forces used firepower and maneuver, the Japanese used near insane amount of courage and deception. Exceptionally brave, entirely outmatched.
 
I can't find the sources used for the tables provided here. I can't trust the guy himself because he's not a professional historian, and the sources he's explicitly contradicting are from actual historians.
The dude is a published author, anyway his professional status is irrelevant.

Anyway the forces in the Far Eastern Theater actually increased after Barbarossa:
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Composed according to IVI (Institute of Military History) Documents and Materials 244-287-75 pp 5-7
 
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Didn't an average Soviet factory pump out, like, ten thousand tanks per month? I think we'd all agree that Japanese army equipment on average would perform worse than Soviet equivalents, so they only question would be if there were enough troops and equipment in the Far East for the Soviets to defend Siberia against the Japanese.
And even for that I'm inclined to say that the answer is yes.
 

Sabot Cat

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As noted it was mostly a myth. What is true is that the Soviets moved most of their heavy armor to the West, facing the Heer. The thing is, that the didn't NEED their heavy armor, especially fighting defensively, against the IJA.

The IJA was a light infantry force, quite weak in armor. In 1941 the entire IJA had three divisions worth of tanks. These were also very poor example of the art. The best that was in heavy use was the Type 95 (37mm main gun, 2x 7.7mm mg) that was utterly helpless against the Soviet BT-5 & 7 light tank, something demonstrated in the border clashes at Khalkhin Gol where the Soviet tank's 47mm gun simply shredded the Japanese armor. Half of their total armor was sent South in December of 1941, a full tank group of four regiments (what was called a division in other armies) was with Yamashita, and two regiments were assigned to 14th Army and Homma on Luzon. They had six active armored regiments for the rest of the entire Japanese army, spread across half of China and into Manchuria.

They were also lighter in artillery than the average Western force, with most divisional formations not having anything over a 75mm (their HEAVY A type divisions included 12 x 105mm). A Soviet division of the same era had more guns (100 vs. 84 for the Type A and 66 for the standard B division) and heavier guns as well (12x 152mm, 28x 122mm, with the balance being 75mm) and was about 25% heavier in machineguns, and notably better heavy mg than the IJA (plus the addition of the submachinegun as the war progressed). The Japanese had more mortars, mainly in the 90mm and below size (the "knee mortar" was more of a grenade launcher, but extremely effective in that role).

Probably most critically is that the Red Army understood that victory via superior elan had died in Flanders and Tannenberg. The IJA never learned this. The IJA remained convinced, all the way through to the Surrender, that bravery and selfless courage was superior to shrapnel. They were wrong. That is why the IJA never defeated a "Western" force that was not "colonial" in nature (the closest it got was in Malaya, but even there most of the troops were not top quality, and the leadership was simply dreadful). Even in the Philippines it had a hard time finishing off a mostly militia force (only about 12,000 U.S. troops were "regulars" both Americans and Philippine Scouts) that was utterly cut off from resupply. Once fighting stopped being against cut-off force with poor training and/or fighting in exposed posts, the IJA never won another battle. The British Army kicked their butts, as did the Australians, the Americans, the Indians, and the Soviets. "Western" forces used firepower and maneuver, the Japanese used near insane amount of courage and deception. Exceptionally brave, entirely outmatched.

Didn't an average Soviet factory pump out, like, ten thousand tanks per month? I think we'd all agree that Japanese army equipment on average would perform worse than Soviet equivalents, so they only question would be if there were enough troops and equipment in the Far East for the Soviets to defend Siberia against the Japanese.
And even for that I'm inclined to say that the answer is yes.

Yes this is all true of their ground forces, but couldn't Japan (for instance) sustain a blockade of crucial Lend-Lease supplies with their superior air force and navy?
 
Yes this is all true of their ground forces, but couldn't Japan (for instance) sustain a blockade of crucial Lend-Lease supplies with their superior air force and navy?
For Vladivostok sure. But 50% of the Lend-Lease came from through the Artic and Persian Corridors, and enough supplies flowed through the Persian Corridor alone to support about 60 combat divisions. In addition due to the fact that the US was at war with Japan only non-combat goods (transported by Soviet ships) could be sent through this route. In all probability the Soviets would have trouble pulling off massive offensives like Bagration, would face much more starvation, and wouldn't get as far. However they wouldn't lose to the Germans.
 

Sabot Cat

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For Vladivostok sure. But 50% of the Lend-Lease came from through the Artic and Persian Corridors, and enough supplies flowed through the Persian Corridor alone to support about 60 combat divisions. In addition due to the fact that the US was at war with Japan only non-combat goods (transported by Soviet ships) could be sent through this route. In all probability the Soviets would have trouble pulling off massive offensives like Bagration, would face much more starvation, and wouldn't get as far. However they wouldn't lose to the Germans.

50% of the Lend Lease supplies? No ALSIB, no Pacific Route? A two-front war with a beleaguered army that isn't about to have the United States jump in directly to assist them, that's starving even worse than they were in OTL to fight for meager gains at the doorstep of their capital? I don't know, that sounds pretty serious to me. War isn't all tank stats and production numbers, even though they're important; the human component cannot be neglected.
 
Given that the Far Eastern Front outnumbers the Kwantung Army and that the majority of Lend-Lease did not occur until after 1942 I think the Soviets will be just fine.
 

CalBear

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50% of the Lend Lease supplies? No ALSIB, no Pacific Route? A two-front war with a beleaguered army that isn't about to have the United States jump in directly to assist them, that's starving even worse than they were in OTL to fight for meager gains at the doorstep of their capital? I don't know, that sounds pretty serious to me. War isn't all tank stats and production numbers, even though they're important; the human componentcannot be neglected.

Of course, assuming it is that bad, and Stalin really needs to do something, there is also now a simply lovely set of locations for B-24s to start firebombing Japan in Spring of 1942.

So burning oil faster, burning up infantry against Soviet positions, open support for Chinese troops by Soviet forces, insufficient forces to manage the lunge south successfully (unless somehow they manage to engage in a mass offensive against a heavy enemy force without armor, trucks, or logistical support) and getting their cities burned out 20 or so square miles per week.


Seems sort of sub-optimal.
 
I can't find the sources used for the tables provided here. I can't trust the guy himself because he's not a professional historian, and the sources he's explicitly contradicting are from actual historians.

http://www.amazon.com/Soviet-Strategic-Offensive-Manchuria-1945/dp/041540861X

I recommend "The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: 'August Storm' (Soviet (Russian) Study of War)" by Colonel David Glantz, the foremost US Army historian on the WWII Red Army.

On p.47 of the said book, the author wrote that "...y December 1941 Red Army strength in the far East had dwindled to 32 divisions or divisional equivalents, barely enough to defend in accordance with the General Staff's calculations."
 
Which is wrong as I've posted, the strength of the far eastern theatre increased to around 1.25 million men in December 1941 and stayed there for the rest of the war.
 
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I have the red army mobilization at 182 rifle divisions, 43 militia rifle divisions, eight tank divisions, three mechanized divisions, 62 tank brigades, 50 cavalry divisions, 55 rifle brigades, 21 naval rifle brigades, 11 naval infantry brigades in the second half of 1941. 30 divisions were sent from the eastern front to the west with 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.
 
Could Japan spare forces from the pacific to blockade the Soviets, I mean it doesn't help Japan at all to have its forces supporting Germany at all.
 
You also have to look at the weather conditions. The Japanese would fare far worse in Siberian Winter than the Germans in Western Russia. Plus if there were a military build up on the eastern border, the Russians would have noticed and kept enough material and manpower they saw fit to hold a Japanese invasion.

This would only spell doom for Japan, because this would only cause the IJA to bleed without making any progress. The USA could easily transfer their lend lease through Iran or to Arkangel. Plus it would benefit us and the Chinese, because that is less troops to occupy China, defend mainland Japan and to occupy the Philippines, etc.

I don't think Stalin would care that much, because he would still get the troops necessary to hold Hitler off and still get the supplies he needs.
 
CalBear, not that I doubt you, but I still don't personally understand how the Soviet Union would be able to defeat the Axis in the west and the east at the same time. Wouldn't they be outnumbered and tasked with defending way too much territory? Like, even more than they already were OTL?

Japan's only real contribution would be to overload Soviet rail lines since things now need to move both ways. It might be a significant contribution. It won't be a decisive one.

Actually, you know, generally speaking, once Japan is beaten to dust in say, late'42/early '43, USSR will have all these tank and plane pilots with actual combat experience just waiting to be given their six weeks off in Kazakhstan and then shipped west just in time for Kharkov.

And I mean, that's also the timeframe when LL really takes off.

So if the Soviet logistics don't collapse in a fit of confusion, USSR might actually come out of this somewhat better. If they do collapse, well, everyone might be missing bullets and fuel and yeah, the Wallies might need to do a lot more rescuing of the Soviets in the end.

I am not an expert on Soviet rail lines of the time, however.

Also, transferred personnel, of which there was a lot, was mostly from the Trans-Baikal and Siberian districts, which were probably part of the rapid reaction defense plans against Japan. But with Barbarossa going on, I don't think rapid reaction would be the strategy of choice anyway and the Far Eastern district would basically bear the fight alone (plus Mongolia and whatever Transbaikal can spare). I would still think it would be enough.

And while Vladivostok is not a big challenge to blockade, taking it (considering what kind of fortress it was) would be an achievement literally no combatant had managed throughout the war. Maintaining blockades is not cheap, perhaps even too expensive for Japan, unless they plan to not fight USA at all and by extension never get into SEA.
 
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Invading the Soviet Union (or even just holding them off) not only means the Japanese get viewed even less favourably by the allies, but that will also probably preclude the invasions of PI, Malaya and DEI (not enough troops), which is an absolute death-sentence for the Japanese.
 
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