Japan accepts the Potsdam declaration

[Tyr]

I've just got back from a holiday to Hiroshima and my visit got me thinking a lot about the closing days of the Asian theatre of WW2.
One thought has struck me- if only Japan had been sane.
It might at first seem a minor change to have Japan accept the declaration in grand historic terms but...the effects could really be rather large....

1: No atomic bombings. Not just a change in terms of loss of life, industry and culture (so much in Nagasaki lost....). The atomic bombings served a dual purpose, firstly of course to help contribute to defeating Japan...but also
a: it helped explain the sheer cost of the Manhatten Project. It was a bloody expensive thing. Having the atomic bombs painted as the weapon that won the war and saved lots of American lives (of course, not strictly true...) made the investment seem worthwhile and so further investment in atomic research was a lot easier to sexure.
b: it showed the Soviets where the balance of power in the post-war world lay. It was a message to them not to try anything funny as they had nothing to match this weapon.
Just what impact could come of nuclear bombs never having been used in anger?
Also...the realisation of the human affect of such weapons would be very slow to come....

2: No Soviet entry into the Pacific theatre.
Potentially a huge one this.
We'd have a united independant Korea, perhaps a better and more democratic one too without the need to pick any random strongman to rule in the south to counter Kim in the north....perhaps the whole lot could end up soviet alligned with the popularity of Kim....So many ifs there.
Manchuria does not end up occupied by the Soviets- a huge one this, the Manchukiko industry is what won the Chinese civil war for the reds. Put it into the hands of the RoC instead and...we have quite a different China. Which again would have impacts beyond China.
Karafuto and the Kurils remain Japanese. Japan has a land border with the Soviets. Potentially very interesting for spy novels and the like. Would be a big factor in Japanese post-war thinking and Cold War planning.


So....perhaps somebody who knows a lot about Japanese thinking decides to term the declaration a bit better. Makes it clear that the west wants Japan to be a democratic constitutional monarchy with full respect remaining with the emperor.
Or perhaps the Japanese realise that it is only a matter of time before the Soviets jump in to try and grab something now the war in Europe is done. The Soviet threat really worried the Japanese.

Any thoughts?

 

[lukedalton]

Honestly if the Japan leadership was sane they will nevet tried to conquer China and let alone try to expand the war

 

[Mike Stearns]

Honestly if the Japan leadership was sane they will nevet tried to conquer China and let alone try to expand the war

The only way for Japan to win is not to play.

 

[mcdo]

Honestly if the Japan leadership was sane they will nevet tried to conquer China and let alone try to expand the war

That's the thing, Japan never set out to "conquer" China, only to defeat it. It just spiraled out of control. At first they thought they could defeat China's handful of German-trained modern infantry, and then China would surrender--but they didn't. Then they thought they could hold a couple of important cities, like Beiping and Shanghai, and China would give in--but they didn't. Then they told themselves that if they took the capital (Nanking), the Chinese would give up--but they didn't. Next they thought maybe if they bombed the new Chinese capital relentlessly, the Chinese would quit--but they didn't. Finally, they told themselves that if they overran the western powers supplying aid to China through HK and Burma, the Chinese would surrender--we will never know if that one would have worked, since Japan never did quite manage to cut off all foreign aid to China.

The war just kept expanding, with neither side willing to withdraw. The Japanese militarists could not bring themselves to quit, since victory always seemed just around the corner. No matter how much it cost in lives and treasure, why should they give up when they won virtually every single engagement on the ground? In that sense, it is exactly like the US campaign in Viet Nam.

Before anyone gets angry, let me point out that I realize the US and Japan did not have the same motivation for their campaigns. Japan was far more brutal and exploitative in China than the US ever was in Viet Nam. But they faced the same reality on the ground: neither side felt compelled to give up, because they won every single stand-up fight. But neither could make their control stick, so they ended up pouring in more and more troops. Both wars expanded relentlessly, but neither side went into their war with the intention of controlling the entire nation.

 

[lukedalton]

On the other side, the USA thinking to beat Vietnam is a more logical thing that resource poor Japan convince himself that he can beat the rest of the world, seriusly after a while someone must see that the situation is becoming ridicolous.

 

[mcdo]

On the other side, the USA thinking to beat Vietnam is a more logical thing that resource poor Japan convince himself that he can beat the rest of the world, seriusly after a while someone must see that the situation is becoming ridicolous.

Of course, yes--I don't think I explained myself very well. The point I was trying to make is this: a lot of people act as though the Japanese militarists suddenly woke up one day and decided to take on the entire world. If that were the case, then they would be completely, utterly irrational, and there would be nothing we could learn from them.

In reality, what happened was that they made a series of decisions, all of them more or less plausible and reasonable on their own, that expanded the war a little bit more, and a little bit more, until the inevitable happened. It's the old story of the frog in the water. I believe there is something one can learn from what happened there. Therefore, I think to merely dismiss those decisions as the work of madmen is to do a disservice to ourselves.

 

[Ward]

Of course, yes--I don't think I explained myself very well. The point I was trying to make is this: a lot of people act as though the Japanese militarists suddenly woke up one day and decided to take on the entire world. If that were the case, then they would be completely, utterly irrational, and there would be nothing we could learn from them.

In reality, what happened was that they made a series of decisions, all of them more or less plausible and reasonable on their own, that expanded the war a little bit more, and a little bit more, until the inevitable happened. It's the old story of the frog in the water. I believe there is something one can learn from what happened there. Therefore, I think to merely dismiss those decisions as the work of madmen is to do a disservice to ourselves.

I believe you are right in your view on how Japan saw the war in China .

 

[LeX]

mcdo's view seems to be pretty accurate. Actually, I think that whole slippery-slope process began with Japan's actions in Korea. At first they just wanted Korea (and China too but Korea was more pressing) to be a strong independent country so that it couldn't be used as a base to threaten Japan with. But Korea couldn't be forced to modernize so the Japanese started to take it over. And then since the Japanese couldn't work out an agreement with Russia over Korea and Manchuria, they had a war that Russia lost and so Japan started exerting imperialist influence not only in Korea but in China as well. When nonviolent (i.e. no war declared) influence in Manchuria broke down with the death of Zhang Zuolin, the IJA felt the need to totally take Northeast China, which is of course what then led to WW2 in Asia.

The thing is that Japan as a whole and not even its entire government was dead-set on conquering Asia, but that since the late 1800s each of their imperialist advances was successful, it gave those parties in their leadership the legitimacy to continue further. It was a case of long-term (4 decades) victory disease. Had Japan been stopped in Korea it may have been content to stay with Korea.

 

[Corbell Mark IV]

1a. Explain the cost? A superweapon that shows up late is unfortunate. But I never recall anyone blaming anyone for the fact that the bomb was done to late to bomb Germany with.

That it shows up in time for the COld War would be fine. A couple of tests with news films of the mushroom clouds would do a fine job convincing the soviets and congress that this would be a good weapon to pay for.

1b Where the soviets really up for more trouble immediately post war? I guess they could push a little harder somewhere. Yugoslovia? Austria? Anyone know of any contingency plans that were shelved?

2. Interesting.

No Korean War is big.

No Red China is even bigger.

Like the land border between Japan and the USSR. Never considered that before.

 

[Tyr]

A thought; perhaps we might need some sort of coup in Japan.
A 'Showa Restoration' as it were, if at least a show one, the modern shoguns being removed and power restored to the emperor who then steps up to restore sanity.

The potential of Japan surrendering pre-a bombing and soviet invasion could perhaps have interesting and less than good post-war effects; maybe in Germany after WW1 style the militarists refuse to admit they were ever defeated and resentment remaisn high...

1a. Explain the cost? A superweapon that shows up late is unfortunate. But I never recall anyone blaming anyone for the fact that the bomb was done to late to bomb Germany with.

That it shows up in time for the COld War would be fine. A couple of tests with news films of the mushroom clouds would do a fine job convincing the soviets and congress that this would be a good weapon to pay for.

In the Hiroshima peace museum were a lot of documents from top ranked US folk going on about how they had to justify the cost of this massive expenditure.
Politically you would get opponents going "why did we blow 2 billion on letting a bunch of German scientists play with their fancy machines when our boys on the ground needed more equipment?"

It being too late to use on Germany wasn't such a huge deal- even before Germany was defeated it was decided that it would be best used on Japan; since if it failed the Japanese would be drastically less likely to be able to learn anything from it. Also, though not mentioned anywhere that I've seen, I can't help but suspect a bit of racism/spill over of the American WW2 image of the Japanese being sub-human.

I don't see nuclear research being totally stopped by it not being used, as you say the tests should speak for themselves. But...it not being the weapon that won the war would drastically reduce its public impact.

1b Where the soviets really up for more trouble immediately post war? I guess they could push a little harder somewhere. Yugoslovia? Austria? Anyone know of any contingency plans that were shelved?

This, I do not know.
It was certainly a fear however that WW3 could be just around the corner.
I...don't think it would happen. It certainly makes for a more interesting timeline if it doesn't and we instead get a very different cold war.

 

[BlondieBC]

That's the thing, Japan never set out to "conquer" China, only to defeat it. It just spiraled out of control. At first they thought they could defeat China's handful of German-trained modern infantry, and then China would surrender--but they didn't. Then they thought they could hold a couple of important cities, like Beiping and Shanghai, and China would give in--but they didn't. Then they told themselves that if they took the capital (Nanking), the Chinese would give up--but they didn't. Next they thought maybe if they bombed the new Chinese capital relentlessly, the Chinese would quit--but they didn't. Finally, they told themselves that if they overran the western powers supplying aid to China through HK and Burma, the Chinese would surrender--we will never know if that one would have worked, since Japan never did quite manage to cut off all foreign aid to China.

The war just kept expanding, with neither side willing to withdraw. The Japanese militarists could not bring themselves to quit, since victory always seemed just around the corner. No matter how much it cost in lives and treasure, why should they give up when they won virtually every single engagement on the ground? In that sense, it is exactly like the US campaign in Viet Nam.

Before anyone gets angry, let me point out that I realize the US and Japan did not have the same motivation for their campaigns. Japan was far more brutal and exploitative in China than the US ever was in Viet Nam. But they faced the same reality on the ground: neither side felt compelled to give up, because they won every single stand-up fight. But neither could make their control stick, so they ended up pouring in more and more troops. Both wars expanded relentlessly, but neither side went into their war with the intention of controlling the entire nation.

Very interesting perspective.

Do you believe if China had won one or two major battles, Japan would have sought a negotiated peace like the USA did in Vietnam? For example, lets say the Chinese successfully defend Nanking, or maybe the Chinese reconquer one modest size region in 1938, or whatever you think is the most plausible Chinese single battle win.

 

[BlondieBC]

Politically you would get opponents going "why did we blow 2 billion on letting a bunch of German scientists play with their fancy machines when our boys on the ground needed more equipment?"

The USA blew 1 Billion dollars on airplanes in WW1, with little to show for it. There were congressional hearings and a blue ribbon panel. I am sure some people careers were ended, maybe a few went to jail for minor related crimes found, but nothing major happened from the process. The same is likely on the Atom bomb. The Republicans will hold hearings to show that they could have managed the war better, would have spend money wiser, etc. It might even throw an election, and IMO, Dewey would beat Truman. There are butterflies from Dewey as president, but I don't see any other major impacts. The military will not be punished for this program, nor will its funding be cut, nor will anyone major go to jail.

 

[mcdo]

I believe you are right in your view on how Japan saw the war in China .

Thank you.

mcdo's view seems to be pretty accurate. Actually, I think that whole slippery-slope process began with Japan's actions in Korea. At first they just wanted Korea (and China too but Korea was more pressing) to be a strong independent country so that it couldn't be used as a base to threaten Japan with. But Korea couldn't be forced to modernize so the Japanese started to take it over. And then since the Japanese couldn't work out an agreement with Russia over Korea and Manchuria, they had a war that Russia lost and so Japan started exerting imperialist influence not only in Korea but in China as well. When nonviolent (i.e. no war declared) influence in Manchuria broke down with the death of Zhang Zuolin, the IJA felt the need to totally take Northeast China, which is of course what then led to WW2 in Asia.

The thing is that Japan as a whole and not even its entire government was dead-set on conquering Asia, but that since the late 1800s each of their imperialist advances was successful, it gave those parties in their leadership the legitimacy to continue further. It was a case of long-term (4 decades) victory disease. Had Japan been stopped in Korea it may have been content to stay with Korea.

Thank you. An author I read (sadly, I can't recall which one at the moment) pointed out that when Japan fought the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, the enemy defeated themselves almost as much as they were defeated by Japan. This is not to say that Japan didn't fight well--Togo's leadership in particular wwas outstanding. However, neither of these opponents could fight the long war. Qing China's government was constantly afraid of Han Chinese armies joining with foreign forces to overthrow the Manchu court. Even worse, just as in the Franco-Qing War, China did not fight as one. Units from China's south refused to move north and fight. China was fighting with one hand behind its back, and could not sustain a long war effort. In Russia's case, the Tsar could not afford a long war with Japan simply due to internal unrest.

Japan was not really prepared for a long lasting war, because she had no experience with one.

A thought; perhaps we might need some sort of coup in Japan.
A 'Showa Restoration' as it were, if at least a show one, the modern shoguns being removed and power restored to the emperor who then steps up to restore sanity.

This came very close to happening, actually:

Prince Higashikuni remained steadfast in his opposition to the war with the Allied powers, and was part of the conspiracy (with Prince Asaka, Prince Takamatsu, and former Prime Minister Konoe) which finally ousted Tōjō in July 1944 following the fall of Saipan to American forces. The American researchers with SCAP also found out that he had planned towards the end of the war to depose Hirohito, placing the minor Akihito on the throne instead, governing the country with himself as regent.

Very interesting perspective.

Do you believe if China had won one or two major battles, Japan would have sought a negotiated peace like the USA did in Vietnam? For example, lets say the Chinese successfully defend Nanking, or maybe the Chinese reconquer one modest size region in 1938, or whatever you think is the most plausible Chinese single battle win.

Personally, I think so. If it became obvious that Japan could not simply dictate a peace treaty in a few months, then they would just take what they could get. I think the militarists could be content with just Chinese recognition of Manchukuo, if that is all they could get. For all of their puported irrationality, when the IJA got its ass handed to it by the Soviets, they were sane enough to sign a treaty and quit. I don't see why they would not here.

The real trouble is the number of PoDs you need to get a China that can fight. People who only remember the modern PRC tend to underestimate just how backwards and unindustrialized China was here. They did not even have the industrial capacity to build enough rifles for all their soldiers, much less tanks, planes, and all the rest. Any PoD that helps China fight well needs to take place decades before the war.

 

[MerryPrankster]

Post-WWII, the Soviets tried to annex parts of Iran and extort "basing rights" from Turkey.

Greater Azerbaijan and Russian Constantinople at long last?

 

[Paul V McNutt]

I I RC the Yalta accords established the Soviet and US occupation zones in Korea. So therefore you still have a North Korea and since Soviet trope probably still takeover Manchuria there is still a Korean War. t The big change is the atomic bomb is a secret until the Soviets explode their first one in 1949. h How does Truman intimidate the Soviets into withdrawing from Iran.

 

[Tyr]

I I RC the Yalta accords established the Soviet and US occupation zones in Korea. So therefore you still have a North Korea and since Soviet trope probably still takeover Manchuria there is still a Korean War. t The big change is the atomic bomb is a secret until the Soviets explode their first one in 1949. h How does Truman intimidate the Soviets into withdrawing from Iran.

Did they?
Anyone?
I don't think so. I'm pretty sure that just covered Europe and the Soviets were still completely uninvolved in the pacific, even in a saying they are going to join way.
But I'm unsure.