Japan 1940

The Japanese siezed French Indo China after the fall of france in 1940,
might they have been able to sieze the Dutch East Indies without provoking
US intervention.
Could or would the US have intervened.
Does this delay Japans entry into WW2.
 
The Japanese occupation of Indochina was in stages from September 40 until July 41 (the southern part which provoked the full US oil embargo).

So if the Japanese would have tried at anytime the Dutch would resist for sure.

If I were Roosevelt I would as soon as the Japanese invaded, I would assemble a scratch force of whatever I had in the Phillipines and occupy/reinforce/sabotage the major oil fields / strategic points in the Dutch colonies that I could get a hold of in those places, daring the Japanese to try something to stop me. The British and Australians should do the same.

The brazen Japanese action would let Roosevelt do anything short of war.

Meaning:
1) occupation/reinforcement of Dutch/Free French colonies anywhere in the world.
2) american divisions "training" in and direct aid to Australia.
3) earlier and larger deployment of volunteer group such as the flying tigers.
4) barely covert operations to sabotage any oil areas the Japanese do secure.
5) cutting of all remaining Japanese diplomatic/economic relations and expulsion of Japanese nationals from the USA.

War has to happen regardless because the USA just can't sit back, let the Japanese get their oil and gradually crush the life out of the Chinese while securing advanced strategic bases that threatens the Phillipines and British possesions with complete isolation. Roosevelt will be politically capable of actions that will force Japan to attack the USA even more so than the OTL oil embargo.
 
If the Japanese invade Indo China and the Dutch East Indies in 1940, the US does not intervene. tRoosevelt starts the serious sanctions. I also think that there would be more preparation for war. aA fully equipped and supplied Filipino Army could have held off the invaders.
 
The Japanese siezed French Indo China after the fall of france in 1940,
might they have been able to sieze the Dutch East Indies without provoking
US intervention.
Could or would the US have intervened.
Does this delay Japans entry into WW2.

If the Japanese attack the Dutch East Indies, they also have to attack British Malaya and north Borneo, because the Netherlands is a British ally against Germany - that is, they are attacking a party in the European war, and enter the war at once.

This is different from Indochina - France was neutral, and the Japanese forced France to allow them in without a fight.

However - if the Japanese do it before November 1940, I don't think the U.S. intervenes. FDR would lose the election if he tried it. Even after the election, until well into 1941, there would be very little support for intervention.

It's even arguable that in December 1941, the U.S. would not have intervened.

The loss of the East Indies would be a serious blow to the Allies. Also, Japan not at war with the U.S. would run wild in the Indian Ocean. This would probably bring down British control of India and cut off British forces in the Middle East and North Africa from support.
 
Probably the Army would still squander through its war in China the oil the Navy fought for in the Indies. Or maybe even use it for a "Northern Strike". Then there's a debate in Japan over "who lost China".
 

iddt3

Donor
If the Japanese attack the Dutch East Indies, they also have to attack British Malaya and north Borneo, because the Netherlands is a British ally against Germany - that is, they are attacking a party in the European war, and enter the war at once.

This is different from Indochina - France was neutral, and the Japanese forced France to allow them in without a fight.

However - if the Japanese do it before November 1940, I don't think the U.S. intervenes. FDR would lose the election if he tried it. Even after the election, until well into 1941, there would be very little support for intervention.

It's even arguable that in December 1941, the U.S. would not have intervened.

The loss of the East Indies would be a serious blow to the Allies. Also, Japan not at war with the U.S. would run wild in the Indian Ocean. This would probably bring down British control of India and cut off British forces in the Middle East and North Africa from support.
The Japanese don't have the logistics to do it if they do it before securing Indochina. What Roosevelt can do is something along the lines of what he did with Denmark, be "Invited" in by the Dutch, sit American troops in important bits, all the while claiming he's just trying to act as a mediator. Roosevelt could be pretty Machiavellian when he wanted to be.
 
Sorry to return to this so late, but if the Japanese have a soundly planned operation to quickly sieze the Dutch East Indies, and it's successful does that not remove the need to attack the Americans. I can't see an American president being able to declare war on Japan over the DEI, who would then be free to threaten Britain in the Indian Ocean.
 
Sorry to return to this so late, but if the Japanese have a soundly planned operation to quickly sieze the Dutch East Indies, and it's successful does that not remove the need to attack the Americans. I can't see an American president being able to declare war on Japan over the DEI, who would then be free to threaten Britain in the Indian Ocean.

It's unlikely to be that simple. Consider what might happen if the US detects what it believes are invasion convoys approaching the Phillippines. In reality, these convoys aren't going to the Phillippines, they're going to the DEI - but the reports don't say this. At this point it's fairly easy, IMO, to authorise a "pre-emptive" attack on the convoys using US aircraft on the Phillippine, and particularly easy if you're following policies of hostility to the Axis powers. Japan will, of course, retaliate, and the whole problem of a declaration of war goes away in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

After the war, of course, evidence might come to light that the whole thing was a colossal mistake, or even a deliberate US conspiracy to enter the war - although the absurdity of attempting to seize the DEI while leaving a hostile base across your lines of communication argue against this. But that doesn't help Japan.
 
It's unlikely to be that simple. Consider what might happen if the US detects what it believes are invasion convoys approaching the Phillippines. In reality, these convoys aren't going to the Phillippines, they're going to the DEI - but the reports don't say this. At this point it's fairly easy, IMO, to authorise a "pre-emptive" attack on the convoys using US aircraft on the Phillippine, and particularly easy if you're following policies of hostility to the Axis powers. Japan will, of course, retaliate, and the whole problem of a declaration of war goes away in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

After the war, of course, evidence might come to light that the whole thing was a colossal mistake, or even a deliberate US conspiracy to enter the war - although the absurdity of attempting to seize the DEI while leaving a hostile base across your lines of communication argue against this. But that doesn't help Japan.


Then again, this is the U.S. military, not the Japanese one (which on a good number of occasions did as it well pleased, Tokyo be damned!), so such a decision would probably have to be taken by FDR himself, meaning there is a chance he might hesitate enough for sufficient information to arrive. Plus, any convoys would be steaming from Hainan due south and would be distancing themselves more and more from the Philippines with each hour gone by.
 
I also am a proponent of the concept that attacking Dutch possesions (or British / Dutch possesions only) was better for the Japanese (if only because OTL was the worst possible scenerio). At least a compromise peace with the Americans is possible if war starts anyway with the USA later, and the concept of the American getting weary of war might be possible if Japan didn't start it directly.

However, It seems unlikely, that without southern indochina that the Japanese could launch an invasion to seize all of Indochina in a hurry, maybe they could occupy Balikpapan in a suprise attack, the big prize of Palemabang in Sumatra seems a reach, the Dutch would have much advance notice and would hardly be defenceless, it took a while to occupy all of Indonesia OTL. In this case there would be no land based air support for the Japanese, at least initially

I am thinking the Americans could put some sort of force into Palemabang before the Japanese could fight the Dutch and take the place. The British could very easily (close to Sinagapore) until the Americans arrive. The Austrailians would occupy parts of Java and Timor, allowing the Dutch to reinforce Sumatra.

The Japanese when they run into British/Australians/USA forces would have a decision to make, attack and start a war or back down.

http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/48404314

I think roughly the same problem occurs in a December 1941 Japan attacks Dutch possesions only (or maybe British and Dutch possesions). The USA has a free hand short of war, and war with the USA may result at some point in the future anyway, and the Americans might have stuck a bunch of stuff in the Phillipines and Guam in the meantime.
 
It's unlikely to be that simple. Consider what might happen if the US detects what it believes are invasion convoys approaching the Phillippines. In reality, these convoys aren't going to the Phillippines, they're going to the DEI - but the reports don't say this. At this point it's fairly easy, IMO, to authorise a "pre-emptive" attack on the convoys using US aircraft on the Phillippine, and particularly easy if you're following policies of hostility to the Axis powers. Japan will, of course, retaliate, and the whole problem of a declaration of war goes away in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

After the war, of course, evidence might come to light that the whole thing was a colossal mistake, or even a deliberate US conspiracy to enter the war - although the absurdity of attempting to seize the DEI while leaving a hostile base across your lines of communication argue against this. But that doesn't help Japan.


Consider Japans Naval losses from Dec 1941 to April 1942
5 modern Destroyers, 3 old Destroyers, a Frigate, 6 Minesweepers and 8 Submarines, are you seriously suggesting the American forces in the philliphines, which were substantially weaker and less well prepared than 18 months later were going to do anything other adopt a confused posture. I think it's a scenario where dithering and uncertainty are bound to ricochet back and forth between the various levels of Naval Command, the Whitehouse and their diplomatic services.

Just exactly what aircraft on the Philiphines are going to be available to
sink large numbers of Japanese ships and turn back an invasion of the DEI,
if they couldn't do it in early 1942 they were not going to do it in 1940.

And it's not uncommon to have hostile bases across your lines of communication, it's part of bypassing enemy strong points.

As was said earlier the US is unlikely to declare war.
If the Japanese do occupy The DEI in the summer of 1940 then i think they are better placed to prosecute a later war. They can commit more forces to the Indian ocean to deal with the British. It does surprise me that they
failed to take advantage of the fall of France to eject the British from
the far east before turning on the Americans.
 

nbcman

Donor
Consider Japans Naval losses from Dec 1941 to April 1942
5 modern Destroyers, 3 old Destroyers, a Frigate, 6 Minesweepers and 8 Submarines, are you seriously suggesting the American forces in the philliphines, which were substantially weaker and less well prepared than 18 months later were going to do anything other adopt a confused posture. I think it's a scenario where dithering and uncertainty are bound to ricochet back and forth between the various levels of Naval Command, the Whitehouse and their diplomatic services.

Just exactly what aircraft on the Philiphines are going to be available to
sink large numbers of Japanese ships and turn back an invasion of the DEI,
if they couldn't do it in early 1942 they were not going to do it in 1940.

And it's not uncommon to have hostile bases across your lines of communication, it's part of bypassing enemy strong points.

As was said earlier the US is unlikely to declare war.
If the Japanese do occupy The DEI in the summer of 1940 then i think they are better placed to prosecute a later war. They can commit more forces to the Indian ocean to deal with the British. It does surprise me that they
failed to take advantage of the fall of France to eject the British from
the far east before turning on the Americans.

The Japanese would need to invade the DEI with no land based air support using a diminished KB with 2 less CVs than in late 41 (No Shokaku or Zuikaku) as well as no A6M (Zeros) & no D3A (Vals). The invasion fleet would have to be scratched together as no one was expecting France to fall so fast and assembled in Formosa or Hainan and sail merrily down to the DEI. Also note that the Japanese had no formal plans to invade Southeast Asia until early 1941 so it would have been an improvised mess at best or a fiasco at worst.
 
The Japanese don't have the logistics to do it if they do it before securing Indochina. What Roosevelt can do is something along the lines of what he did with Denmark...

You mean Iceland?

Iceland is far closer to the U.S. and was already under British occupation. The U.S. taking over was no big deal, as there was little risk of German invasion.

... be "Invited" in by the Dutch, sit American troops in important bits, all the while claiming he's just trying to act as a mediator.

Not in 1940, not even in 1941. The area is way outside any conceivable U.S. sphere of defense, and such a deployment is a radical extension of U.S. military commitments. FDR cannot possibly do such a thing without Congressional approval, which is unlikely. Especially since the obvious intent of the move is to commit U.S. forces to the defense of the DEI.
 
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