Iwo Jima Kuribayashi Right Strategy?

Interesting so Yamashita was overall best Japanesse commander of the war? How do you see him and Kuribayashi comparing to more China centered commanders like Iwane Matsui?

Matsui was an old, traditionalist officer. He was militarily competent, but no genius. Probably the best field commander over there was Yokoyama.
 
Good point on that. IGHQ's fanatical desire to throw the Americans out of the Philippines by transferring additional divisions to Leyte both compromised Yamashita's plan for the defense of Luzon and ensured that said divisions suffered heavy losses en route. (Though at the same time it could be argued that IGHQ was justified because prolonged Japanese resistance on Leyte prevented the development of proper airbases to support the Luzon operation).

Based on their war records it could possibly by argued that Kuribayashi was a better defensive fighter, though it's apples and oranges as Kuribayashi (a division commander) had the benefit of Iwo's unique volcanic terrain and Yamashita's force (an Army Group) was hampered by disease (noncombat causes claimed fully 80% of Japanese deaths in the Philippines) and a fanatically hostile population.

Overall, while both were excellent leaders I don't think Kuribayashi had the resume necessary to be put on the same level as Yamashita. Whereas the former is famous for his dogged defense of one island, the latter proved himself a superb officer both on the attack and the defense, as well as being personally responsible for major doctrinal improvements within his military establishment. He was just a bigger figure within the IJA than Kuribayashi, for good reason.



Yeah, attacking headlong into possibly the most heavily defended spot on the planet wouldn't exactly have made for light losses.

Yamashita deserved better than judicial murder by Macarthur although he wasn't exactly guiltless in terms of controlling his men in Singapore and Luzon, he wasn't responsible for the Imperial Navy's decision to slaughter Filipino civilians by the tens of thousands.

Olympic would have destroyed all three of those marine divisions
 
I've got the OLYMPIC plans (got them for my MA thesis), and the Marine landing beaches were at Kushikinio, west of Kagoshima City. The V Amphibious Corps was given the Kushikino mission, and that meant 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Marine Divisions. 2nd and 3rd MarDivs would have made the assault, with 5th in floating reserve. Their X-Day opponent was the 303rd ID, coastal-defense division raised in June '45. The beaches chosen for the Marines only had a reinforced battalion defending each beach, as the Japanese expected the landings a little further to the north.

After the surrender, VAC had the job of occupying Kyushu, and they found that the Japanese 40th Army (defending SW Kyushu) was very short of just about everything. Motor vehicles and fuel being at the top of the list. The Marine planners expected any counterattack to begin within 36 hours of the initial landings, then they found out from talking with their Japanese counterparts that it would've taken nine days. By that time, VAC has broken out of the beachheads and is pushing north to Sendai and east to Kagoshima City. Before they were demobilized, the 40th Army staff participated in a wargame with VAC, and both sides agreed as a result of the wargame, that though the terrain greatly favored the defender, the American advantages in firepower, the lack of fuel and motor vehicles to move reinforcements to the beaches, American air superiority, the very poor condition of roads, and with only one mobile division (77th ID) and a tank brigade meant that VAC would have accomplished its mission by X+30.
 
After the surrender, VAC had the job of occupying Kyushu, and they found that the Japanese 40th Army (defending SW Kyushu) was very short of just about everything. Motor vehicles and fuel being at the top of the list. The Marine planners expected any counterattack to begin within 36 hours of the initial landings, then they found out from talking with their Japanese counterparts that it would've taken nine days. By that time, VAC has broken out of the beachheads and is pushing north to Sendai and east to Kagoshima City. Before they were demobilized, the 40th Army staff participated in a wargame with VAC, and both sides agreed as a result of the wargame, that though the terrain greatly favored the defender, the American advantages in firepower, the lack of fuel and motor vehicles to move reinforcements to the beaches, American air superiority, the very poor condition of roads, and with only one mobile division (77th ID) and a tank brigade meant that VAC would have accomplished its mission by X+30.

I'd be interested to see where you saw this. The only material I have thus far in regard to actual studies as to what would have happened on the ground comes from Giangreco pp. 144:

"Long after the war, a comprehensive Marine examination of the opposing forces, terrain, and operational plans came to the conclusion that "V Amphibious Corps would likely have expended itself trying to reach its two primary objectives, Sendai to the north and Kagoshima to the east." Use of the words "trying to reach" instead of "reaching" was not likely by accident.​

The source is stated to be an interview done by Gen. Ridgway in "War in Korea, 1050-53" pps 175-76, also 163-72.

Edit: found the original source, here: http://fas.org/irp/eprint/arens/chap5.htm The postwar casualty estimate for the land fighting in Southern Kyushu was 94,000 KIA and 234,000 WIA. VAC alone would have sustained 13,000 KIA and 34,000 WIA, an estimate made without the inclusion of additional Japanese forces in the combat zone.
 
Last edited:
John Ray Skates' book The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb.

He had access to VAC records from the USMC Historical Center, including those of the war game.

IX Corps did the same thing, sending a team to the Satsuma Peninsula, on the SW side of Kagoshima Bay, where IX Corps was set to land with one division, possibly two, on X+4. Very few fortifications had been built by the time of the surrender, none of the units assigned to the area had arrived, and weren't due until 1 Oct 45. One division that they would have faced pushing inland, if it hadn't been sent to counter VAC, the 146th ID, only had rifles for ten percent of its soldiers, and its artillery regiment had nothing heavier than 75-mm. A number of other divisions in Kyushu, especially those raised in June and July '45, were just as bad off, if not worse, in terms of having their weapons and equipment at hand.
 
John Ray Skates' book The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb.

He had access to VAC records from the USMC Historical Center, including those of the war game.

IX Corps did the same thing, sending a team to the Satsuma Peninsula, on the SW side of Kagoshima Bay, where IX Corps was set to land with one division, possibly two, on X+4. Very few fortifications had been built by the time of the surrender, none of the units assigned to the area had arrived, and weren't due until 1 Oct 45. One division that they would have faced pushing inland, if it hadn't been sent to counter VAC, the 146th ID, only had rifles for ten percent of its soldiers, and its artillery regiment had nothing heavier than 75-mm. A number of other divisions in Kyushu, especially those raised in June and July '45, were just as bad off, if not worse, in terms of having their weapons and equipment at hand.

Pretty interesting. It would be nice to see what source Skates used and if it were possibly available online. I wonder how they thought the landings at Miyazaki and Ariake would have gone?
 
I Corps (Miyazaki) and XI Corps (Ariake Bay) never sent observers postwar to study the terrain and project the course of the battle had OLYMPIC been launched. They should have, especially XI Corps, as the Japanese intended to commit their main reserves in Kyushu to Ariake Bay as they considered landings there the main threat.
 

ben0628

Banned
Iwo Jima Kuribayashi Right Strategy?

Kuribayashi's strategy at Iwo Jima and his defence of the Island is hailed by many as brilliant. However I'm curious what the board thinks of Kuribayashi's strategy? Was it the correct one under the circumstances? Anything the Japaneses could have done better in defending the Island?

This debate kind of reminds me of Normandy Rommel-Rundstedt.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planning_for_the_Battle_of_Iwo_Jima


Probably would have failed, but maybe after the landings, Kuribayashi gambles everything on a massive night time counter attack and drives the Americans into the ocean? Could work, but Marines probably would have expected something like that.
 
They were. In fact, Marine commanders wanted a counterattack because that usually broke the back of the defenders in terms of casualties. Think Saipan and Guam the first two days after the landings there. VAC was surprised that it didn't happen on Iwo.
 
They were. In fact, Marine commanders wanted a counterattack because that usually broke the back of the defenders in terms of casualties. Think Saipan and Guam the first two days after the landings there. VAC was surprised that it didn't happen on Iwo.

So how would Japan have done at Saipan and Guam if they held off trying to drive the Americans into the sea? Could the Mariana Islands campaign been dragged out longer? Would their be any noticeable effect on the war if this occurred?
 
Both islands took about three weeks to "secure." Though holdouts continued to be flushed out for months afterward-and one Japanese soldier wasn't found until Jan of '72 on Guam.

Try extending three weeks to maybe two months, maybe three (think Pelileu). Tinian would've been delayed, but maybe 1st Marine Division and 81st ID(earmarked for Pelileu and Angaur) gets that job due to the delays on Saipan and Guam....The garrison on Tinian was only 4,000, and they were caught off guard because the Marines came ashore at beaches where they weren't expected.
 
Both islands took about three weeks to "secure." Though holdouts continued to be flushed out for months afterward-and one Japanese soldier wasn't found until Jan of '72 on Guam.

Try extending three weeks to maybe two months, maybe three (think Pelileu). Tinian would've been delayed, but maybe 1st Marine Division and 81st ID(earmarked for Pelileu and Angaur) gets that job due to the delays on Saipan and Guam....The garrison on Tinian was only 4,000, and they were caught off guard because the Marines came ashore at beaches where they weren't expected.

Thanks for the reply.:)
 
Top