1. I've heard this mentioned in theory but it's always a theoretical exercise. Wheeling forces towards Stalingrad would just have invited further Soviet counter strokes from what forces remained along the Don; all failed of course, but tying down German forces. Further a swifter German advance to the Don will merely cause the Soviets to concentrate forces in the region more rapidly than they did IOTL, as 1st and 4th Tank Armies will not have given them the same false hope that they did. The overcommitment of forces to the bend of the Don would also head lead to serve logistic problems in what was essentially a massive bottleneck logistically and militarily. South of the Don it's even worse.
2. 16th Panzer would have quite possibly been encircled and destroyed; it barely held out IOTL against repeated Soviet assault that forced it onto the defensive and away from Rynok. Further overextending itself would only lead to greater weakness and the inability to organize a hedgehog defense against Soviet attacks from all sides.
1. Not likely, the Soviets would just shift more reserves to halt Manstein as they did IOTL. Or, just as likely, Manstein's force would simply have been unable to evacuate Stalingrad before the Soviets commenced yet another offensive due to the disorganization of 6th Army and the lack of supplies carried by both armies. Manstein likely ends up encircled along with 6th Army.
2. Paulus's forces were too disorganized, under supplied, and weakened to possibly attack a breakout. As of November 1942 all of his divisions were rated weak or average strength, which is in comparison to early 1942 standards which were still understrength compared to 1941 strength. The Soviets invested a number of armies to reduce the city, more than enough to contain Paulus's already mauled army.
Blair, this is very interesting.
Was 4th Panzer even needed at that stage? as far as I have read, 6th could have reached its objectives but were the objective (in June) Stalingrad? i thought it was to get further East, making a bridgehead on the East bank?
If Blue had started in May as was the plan, were the Soviet forces too scattered to offer any major obstacle?
At that Time Army Group was quite big. Was it too big to manage? was it logical to split it in two?
Could the olil fields have been reached if Stalingrad was not invested, but bypassed, and could it even be by-passed?
Stalin had had some actions in the civil war exactly at that spot. How much was his experience worth in 1942?
Ivan
Agree with the sentiment that November was a bit late in the day. If anything, take the city in July.
However, the objective would and should have been the oil. No oil for Soviet would have been the one thing that could have turned the tables at this point (July, not November).
It can also be argued that Barbarossa could have been improved with a 2-pronged approach instead of a 3-pronged approach (or maybe just a one thrust approach).
Going full force for the oil in Caucasus would have crippled Soviet more than anything else, especially as good parts of the heavy industry was sitting around the Don basin.
..But it is a different discussion altogether.
August, 1941: "Army Group South has announced that they have reached the Caspian Sea and cut off all oil supplies foir Soviet. Baku and surrounding areas have been captured more or less intact and oil will flow to the Reich before Christmas"
Now, that would be different!
Ivan
Yes, ok.
Logistics: Was Blue planned in terms of tonnage on rail and roads? Was any railway in the South converted to European gauge?
Was it even possible to feed and keep ammo rolling if more troops had been allocated?
I am not up to speed on those thngs in terms of Caucasus
Ivan
Blair, this is very interesting.
Was 4th Panzer even needed at that stage? as far as I have read, 6th could have reached its objectives but were the objective (in June) Stalingrad? i thought it was to get further East, making a bridgehead on the East bank?
If Blue had started in May as was the plan, were the Soviet forces too scattered to offer any major obstacle?
At that Time Army Group was quite big. Was it too big to manage? was it logical to split it in two?
Could the olil fields have been reached if Stalingrad was not invested, but bypassed, and could it even be by-passed?
Stalin had had some actions in the civil war exactly at that spot. How much was his experience worth in 1942?
Ivan
3. That scenario is also risky; Stalin could cancel the northern pincer of little saturn to combat manstein's spearheads directly (it's what I would do); this has a fair chance of stopping him and allowing the 6th army to still be destroyed; however the 8th italian army would be saved....the super stalingrad scenario can happen to as I outlined in the desert god tl
1. The concept would certainly work better not sacrificing 6 days fooling around with the left flank before Hitler fired Bock... it would also work better if Hitler actually replaced Bock instead of splitting the command; keeping "army group south" as a command would have allowed army group a and b to actually coordinate their movements instead of waging separate campaigns... whilst I understand there would be some logistical bottlenecks in rushing the 4th panzer army to the great bend in the don; these would still pale in comparison to the traffic jam they created going through Rostov with the 1st panzer army; and the 4th panzer army (with 6th army following behind in echelon to secure supply lines and open up light rail) without diverting would have a much easier time crossing the don since they were smaller and more mobile than the 6th army (even if 6th army's panzer corps had to be temporarily dispatched to add additional muscle to the 4th panzer army; and their rate of advance could be helped by JU-52 forward deliveries of fuel and ammo to keep the spearhead companies on point (as was done later in the campaign when they were going the proper direction)... keeping 4th panzer army on the proper footing allows them to keep the 2 large soviet armies which escaped the Kharkov encirclement on their heels and probably prevents them from forming a decent defensive line on the don; and once past the don into open country a second attempt at encirclement could be tried; regardless the German rate of advance would be such that they would reach Stalingrad before a stout defense could be established
2. This option is of course risky; it would have to be done the day that 16th panzer reached the Volga... the Russians were still weak, having command changes and hadn't formed a consensus on their defensive strategy, and had only just started to bring up artillery to the east bank of the Volga... 16th panzer was 48 hours ahead of the 3rd motorized and 72 hours ahead of the 10th motorized; so Hube would have to fight alone for some time; however, the LW at that point had complete and total air superiority over the city, and Hube had scattered everything around himself; so the risk could indeed have been worth it. An immediate crossing followed by sending his panzer regiment south along the east bank would have either prevented or delayed the assembling of the city's defensive artillery; which has a chance of convincing the Russians to withdraw (as had been their original plan)... even if Hube just delays the artillery assembling before being forced to withdraw himself; that may allow the rest of the 14th panzer corps and the leading elements of 6th army's infantry to storm the city quickly and actually capture it
3. That scenario is also risky; Stalin could cancel the northern pincer of little Saturn to combat Manstein's spearheads directly (it's what I would do); this has a fair chance of stopping him and allowing the 6th army to still be destroyed; however the 8th Italian army would be saved....the super Stalingrad scenario can happen to as I outlined in the desert god tl
4. The 6th army was heavily bloodied, but it was still a 22 division field army with 260-300k men and 150 tanks; my suggestion is the moment the pincers lock at Kalach (but before the ring forces sweep around to really invest them) to immediately shift 16th panzer corps towards the southwest corner of the pocket; surrendering the exposed position at Rynok and blow a hole in the steal small forces in their rear and then send the entire army hell bent for Kotelnikovo to restore their supply lines; and upon reaching Kotelnikovo, slow the pace of the retreat towards the don down so army group a can pull back (this would all need to be done in conjunction with relieving attacks by 6th and 11th panzer from the north and 5th SS panzer wiking, 7th panzer, 13th panzer and 16th motorized from the south
1. Paulus had to deal with multiple operational pauses of 2-3 days trying to supply a single army in the bend. You're talking about shoving several more armies into the same area, plus at least one more south of the Don. German logistics simply didn't have the capacity to sustain these forces, specifically without having Rostov secured. Air supply was used consistently and yet the operational delays remained. This could easily lead to almost week long delays, more than giving the Soviets time to compensate for German advantages just as they did IOTL.
2. The same weak Soviets which nearly tore through 16th Panzer's various regiments and forced a complete halt to offensive operations? The same ones that forced the strung out division to hunker down and take multiple beatings instead of advancing as planned? I think 16th Panzer's situation was quite bad enough without stretching it even further forward.
3. Unlikely, the reserves being sent to support Saturn were mostly separate from the forces committed to operation Ring and the defense of the encirclement. All that would be needed is for a couple of the superfluous armies holding onto Paulus to be redeployed to halt Manstein's forces in their tracks, something that can easily be achieved without eliminating the viability of both holding Stalingrad and launching further offensives.
4. Bloodied? It was barely combat capable by November 1942. Divisions and regiments strung out all over the place, little to no cohesion, and of course a lack of the supplies needed to achieve anything resembling an offensive, much less a counterattack. Hube's corps were one of the weakest forces in the entire pocket, and that's saying something. 6th army had no way to organize a proper counterattack. Even if it did it would be quickly be halted by the numerous armies committed to halting breakout and breakthroughs.
Could Barbarossa have been a drive for the caucasus oil only?
Skip Baltics, Skip Moscow. Focus on the South.
It looks a bit akward as the Northern flank would be a bit exposed I should think, but with 80% of all Soviet oil coming from Baku region, it would be the big prize.
Yes?
Could Barbarossa have been a drive for the caucasus oil only?
Skip Baltics, Skip Moscow. Focus on the South.
It looks a bit akward as the Northern flank would be a bit exposed I should think, but with 80% of all Soviet oil coming from Baku region, it would be the big prize.
Yes?
the 4th panzer army was smaller than the 6th army so it wouldn't have the same supply demands... the 6th's advance could be slowed until the 1st and 17th consolidate (even transferring some of their quartermaster companies forward to assist in building up the bridgeheads and giving them room to cross and doing everything possible to open up rail lines)
the 16th panzer got roughed up AFTER it established itself at rynok (and the soviets had ample time whilst they sat supine to bring up fresh forces to lock them in place)... I am talking about not stopping when it reaches the Volga at all and just crossing; not giving the Russians a chance to catch their breath and playing on their fear of encirclement (although it would be a notably hollow fear; it could still lead to the abandonment of the city)
the russians pealed off some operation ring forces in otl to slow down manstein... if manstein has 3 or 4 more fresh divisions; they would either have to dangerously weaken the western side of the pocket or more likely divert 2nd guards to block manstein (which stalin almost did in otl)
there would have to be a solid breakout plan established the moment the pincers locked at kalach, and as you correctly point out, large scale merging of depleted units... there were still veteran formations in the pocket like the 3rd motorized and 44th infantry which whilst understrength could still crack a defensive line; and the immediate forces in their rear couldn't stop the stampede without the invested ring forces (which my scenario proposes wouldn't be in place yet)... perhaps it devolves into falaise with heavy losses, but significant elements get out
Darn, the resilience of history.
So whichever way we turn, the most logical part would still be to clean up Crimea before any more moves in the South.
Still to have "centre" to push for Moscow and securing the global flanks.
The Don bend could not be left alone either; hence Stalingrad and the rail links East of Volga had to be secured.
So, despite all our clever arguments, OTL is quite "logical".
Ivan