Its November 8th 1942, avoid Stalingrad epic fail

Sorry, it was actually meant as a bit of a joke, just to shake it up a bit.

And I would not like to side-track the discussion,which this would be.
 
1. I've heard this mentioned in theory but it's always a theoretical exercise. Wheeling forces towards Stalingrad would just have invited further Soviet counter strokes from what forces remained along the Don; all failed of course, but tying down German forces. Further a swifter German advance to the Don will merely cause the Soviets to concentrate forces in the region more rapidly than they did IOTL, as 1st and 4th Tank Armies will not have given them the same false hope that they did. The overcommitment of forces to the bend of the Don would also head lead to serve logistic problems in what was essentially a massive bottleneck logistically and militarily. South of the Don it's even worse.

2. 16th Panzer would have quite possibly been encircled and destroyed; it barely held out IOTL against repeated Soviet assault that forced it onto the defensive and away from Rynok. Further overextending itself would only lead to greater weakness and the inability to organize a hedgehog defense against Soviet attacks from all sides.

1. Not likely, the Soviets would just shift more reserves to halt Manstein as they did IOTL. Or, just as likely, Manstein's force would simply have been unable to evacuate Stalingrad before the Soviets commenced yet another offensive due to the disorganization of 6th Army and the lack of supplies carried by both armies. Manstein likely ends up encircled along with 6th Army.

2. Paulus's forces were too disorganized, under supplied, and weakened to possibly attack a breakout. As of November 1942 all of his divisions were rated weak or average strength, which is in comparison to early 1942 standards which were still understrength compared to 1941 strength. The Soviets invested a number of armies to reduce the city, more than enough to contain Paulus's already mauled army.


1. The concept would certainly work better not sacrificing 6 days fooling around with the left flank before Hitler fired Bock... it would also work better if Hitler actually replaced Bock instead of splitting the command; keeping "army group south" as a command would have allowed army group a and b to actually coordinate their movements instead of waging separate campaigns... whilst I understand there would be some logistical bottlenecks in rushing the 4th panzer army to the great bend in the don; these would still pale in comparison to the traffic jam they created going through Rostov with the 1st panzer army; and the 4th panzer army (with 6th army following behind in echalon to secure supply lines and open up light rail) without diverting would have a much easier time crossing the don since they were smaller and more mobile than the 6th army (even if 6th army's panzer corps had to be temporarily dispatched to add additional muscle to the 4th panzer army; and their rate of advance could be helped by JU-52 forward deliveries of fuel and ammo to keep the spearhead companies on point (as was done later in the campaign when they were going the proper direction)... keeping 4th panzer army on the proper footing allows them to keep the 2 large soviet armies which escaped the kharkov encirclement on their heels and probably prevents them from forming a decent defensive line on the don; and once past the don into open country a second attempt at encirclement could be tried; regardless the German rate of advance would be such that they would reach stalingrad before a stout defense could be established

2. This option is of course risky; it would have to be done the day that 16th panzer reached the Volga... the Russians were still weak, having command changes and hadn't formed a consensus on their defensive strategy, and had only just started to bring up artillery to the east bank of the Volga... 16th panzer was 48 hours ahead of the 3rd motorized and 72 hours ahead of the 10th motorized; so Hube would have to fight alone for some time; however, the LW at that point had complete and total air superiority over the city, and Hube had scattered everything around himself; so the risk could indeed have been worth it. An immediate crossing followed by sending his panzer regiment south along the east bank would have either prevented or delayed the assemblying of the city's defensive artillery; which has a chance of convincing the Russians to withdraw (as had been their original plan)... even if Hube just delays the artillery assembling before being forced to withdraw himself; that may allow the rest of the 14th panzer corps and the leading elements of 6th army's infantry to storm the city quickly and actually capture it

3. That scenario is also risky; Stalin could cancel the northern pincer of little saturn to combat manstein's spearheads directly (it's what I would do); this has a fair chance of stopping him and allowing the 6th army to still be destroyed; however the 8th italian army would be saved....the super stalingrad scenario can happen to as I outlined in the desert god tl

4. The 6th army was heavily bloodied, but it was still a 22 division field army with 260-300k men and 150 tanks; my suggestion is the moment the pincers lock at Kalach (but before the ring forces sweep around to really invest them) to immediately shift 16th panzer corps towards the southwest corner of the pocket; surrendering the exposed position at Rynok and blow a hole in the steal small forces in their rear and then send the entire army hell bent for Kotelnikovo to restore their supply lines; and upon reaching Kotelnikovo, slow the pace of the retreat towards the don down so army group a can pull back (this would all need to be done in conjunction with relieving attacks by 6th and 11th panzer from the north and 5th ss panzer wiking, 7th panzer, 13th panzer and 16th motorized from the south
 
Blair, this is very interesting.

Was 4th Panzer even needed at that stage? as far as I have read, 6th could have reached its objectives but were the objective (in June) Stalingrad? i thought it was to get further East, making a bridgehead on the East bank?

If Blue had started in May as was the plan, were the Soviet forces too scattered to offer any major obstacle?

At that Time Army Group was quite big. Was it too big to manage? was it logical to split it in two?

Could the olil fields have been reached if Stalingrad was not invested, but bypassed, and could it even be by-passed?

Stalin had had some actions in the civil war exactly at that spot. How much was his experience worth in 1942?

Ivan
 
Blair, this is very interesting.

Was 4th Panzer even needed at that stage? as far as I have read, 6th could have reached its objectives but were the objective (in June) Stalingrad? i thought it was to get further East, making a bridgehead on the East bank?

If Blue had started in May as was the plan, were the Soviet forces too scattered to offer any major obstacle?

At that Time Army Group was quite big. Was it too big to manage? was it logical to split it in two?

Could the olil fields have been reached if Stalingrad was not invested, but bypassed, and could it even be by-passed?

Stalin had had some actions in the civil war exactly at that spot. How much was his experience worth in 1942?

Ivan

Stalingrad *was* an objective because capturing it would isolate the southern USSR from the rest of it. This was the reason it had been targeted as Tsaritsyn during the RCW. However the problem is that there's a difference between grabbing it in a bounce-crossing and holding it, particularly if the Germans wind up progressively weakening the Stalingrad army in the expectation of strengthening the Caucasus army and never quite getting just *why* they can't get the classical Kesselschlacht any more (that ol' Nazi racism that blinded them to more mundane ways/means of warfighting coming home to roost again) and then the Soviets execute a "lighter" version of the Stalingrad encirclement anyhow.....
 
Agree with the sentiment that November was a bit late in the day. If anything, take the city in July.

However, the objective would and should have been the oil. No oil for Soviet would have been the one thing that could have turned the tables at this point (July, not November).

It can also be argued that Barbarossa could have been improved with a 2-pronged approach instead of a 3-pronged approach (or maybe just a one thrust approach).

Going full force for the oil in Caucasus would have crippled Soviet more than anything else, especially as good parts of the heavy industry was sitting around the Don basin.

..But it is a different discussion altogether.

August, 1941: "Army Group South has announced that they have reached the Caspian Sea and cut off all oil supplies foir Soviet. Baku and surrounding areas have been captured more or less intact and oil will flow to the Reich before Christmas"

Now, that would be different!

Ivan

Um, the Germans *did* go full force for it. The problem was the simple expanse of territory was huge, and the Germans captured a lot of useless steppes terrain. More troops in the mountains of the Caucasus won't help anything, mountain terrain does *not* lend itself to simple ability to bull through. The Caucasus and Isonzo campaigns of WWI show this, as does the Italian campaign in WWII. Instead of a Soviet encirclement on the Volga the Soviets entrap the Germans in the Caucasus, and the campaign still ends as per OTL with the Germans wrecking the majority of their best troops in an over-optimistic campaign that succeeds at first from local superiority of numbers. Too, the Soviets were successfully engaging in strategic withdrawals, so bulling through won't change this particular factor, either. Instead it just gives the Soviets a nice means to strike from the Caucasus and from the north right into the German supply lines and arguably win a Mother of All Battles mixture of Stalingrad and Kursk all at once.
 
Yes, ok.

Logistics: Was Blue planned in terms of tonnage on rail and roads? Was any railway in the South converted to European gauge?

Was it even possible to feed and keep ammo rolling if more troops had been allocated?

I am not up to speed on those thngs in terms of Caucasus

Ivan
 
Yes, ok.

Logistics: Was Blue planned in terms of tonnage on rail and roads? Was any railway in the South converted to European gauge?

Was it even possible to feed and keep ammo rolling if more troops had been allocated?

I am not up to speed on those thngs in terms of Caucasus

Ivan

No, Blue was always done on a logistical shoestring. The Nazis successfully managed to move all their remaining logistics able to conduct a major offensive to the South after the winter 1941-2 battles, but even then they were gambling on a victory whose foundation was.....poorly....situated to get he results they wanted. So no, more troops won't help anything as they literally *can't* send more troops without risking something like Operation Mars or the Battles of Siniavo turning into an uprooting of other sectors of the front.....
 
Blair, this is very interesting.

Was 4th Panzer even needed at that stage? as far as I have read, 6th could have reached its objectives but were the objective (in June) Stalingrad? i thought it was to get further East, making a bridgehead on the East bank?

If Blue had started in May as was the plan, were the Soviet forces too scattered to offer any major obstacle?

At that Time Army Group was quite big. Was it too big to manage? was it logical to split it in two?

Could the olil fields have been reached if Stalingrad was not invested, but bypassed, and could it even be by-passed?

Stalin had had some actions in the civil war exactly at that spot. How much was his experience worth in 1942?

Ivan


The 4th panzer wasn't needed at Rostov were in Kliest's words all they did was clog the roads

Army Group south was operating on a big front, but the staff could handle it as they did in 1941... directing the groups from rastenberg proved to be a huge disaster and slowed german response to changing tactical and strategic situations; this is why one of the key pod's to a better operation blue is Bock just being replaced instead of the command eliminated

The 6th was less mobile than the 4th... the capture the city off the march scenario involves the 4th surging ahead with the 6th echeloned behind to secure supply lines and flanks; the 4th capturing the city then carrying attacks south whilst the 6th and other army group b forces consolidate and form a defensive line on the volga

the 4th carrying their attacks south forces the transcaucus front to defend front and back and will loosen the resistance to army group a and give them a fair chance of reaching the turkish border before the Russians can find their footing
 
3. That scenario is also risky; Stalin could cancel the northern pincer of little saturn to combat manstein's spearheads directly (it's what I would do); this has a fair chance of stopping him and allowing the 6th army to still be destroyed; however the 8th italian army would be saved....the super stalingrad scenario can happen to as I outlined in the desert god tl

Having read the Desert God TL, I can't see the Soviets putting hits on Allied generals, or the Allies which IOTL were damned insistent on an avoidance of a Neues-Dolchstosslegende (at least before the reality of the Soviet WWII victory dawned on them) suddenly reversing that concept to negotiate a separate peace with a bunch of German officers willing to kill Hitler. The lesson of WWI about the Stab-in-the-Back Legend mitigates against that whole concept, and the idea of a sudden blitzkrieg charging uphill through mountain country is one of those dogs that don't hunt.
 
1. The concept would certainly work better not sacrificing 6 days fooling around with the left flank before Hitler fired Bock... it would also work better if Hitler actually replaced Bock instead of splitting the command; keeping "army group south" as a command would have allowed army group a and b to actually coordinate their movements instead of waging separate campaigns... whilst I understand there would be some logistical bottlenecks in rushing the 4th panzer army to the great bend in the don; these would still pale in comparison to the traffic jam they created going through Rostov with the 1st panzer army; and the 4th panzer army (with 6th army following behind in echelon to secure supply lines and open up light rail) without diverting would have a much easier time crossing the don since they were smaller and more mobile than the 6th army (even if 6th army's panzer corps had to be temporarily dispatched to add additional muscle to the 4th panzer army; and their rate of advance could be helped by JU-52 forward deliveries of fuel and ammo to keep the spearhead companies on point (as was done later in the campaign when they were going the proper direction)... keeping 4th panzer army on the proper footing allows them to keep the 2 large soviet armies which escaped the Kharkov encirclement on their heels and probably prevents them from forming a decent defensive line on the don; and once past the don into open country a second attempt at encirclement could be tried; regardless the German rate of advance would be such that they would reach Stalingrad before a stout defense could be established

2. This option is of course risky; it would have to be done the day that 16th panzer reached the Volga... the Russians were still weak, having command changes and hadn't formed a consensus on their defensive strategy, and had only just started to bring up artillery to the east bank of the Volga... 16th panzer was 48 hours ahead of the 3rd motorized and 72 hours ahead of the 10th motorized; so Hube would have to fight alone for some time; however, the LW at that point had complete and total air superiority over the city, and Hube had scattered everything around himself; so the risk could indeed have been worth it. An immediate crossing followed by sending his panzer regiment south along the east bank would have either prevented or delayed the assembling of the city's defensive artillery; which has a chance of convincing the Russians to withdraw (as had been their original plan)... even if Hube just delays the artillery assembling before being forced to withdraw himself; that may allow the rest of the 14th panzer corps and the leading elements of 6th army's infantry to storm the city quickly and actually capture it

3. That scenario is also risky; Stalin could cancel the northern pincer of little Saturn to combat Manstein's spearheads directly (it's what I would do); this has a fair chance of stopping him and allowing the 6th army to still be destroyed; however the 8th Italian army would be saved....the super Stalingrad scenario can happen to as I outlined in the desert god tl

4. The 6th army was heavily bloodied, but it was still a 22 division field army with 260-300k men and 150 tanks; my suggestion is the moment the pincers lock at Kalach (but before the ring forces sweep around to really invest them) to immediately shift 16th panzer corps towards the southwest corner of the pocket; surrendering the exposed position at Rynok and blow a hole in the steal small forces in their rear and then send the entire army hell bent for Kotelnikovo to restore their supply lines; and upon reaching Kotelnikovo, slow the pace of the retreat towards the don down so army group a can pull back (this would all need to be done in conjunction with relieving attacks by 6th and 11th panzer from the north and 5th SS panzer wiking, 7th panzer, 13th panzer and 16th motorized from the south

1. Paulus had to deal with multiple operational pauses of 2-3 days trying to supply a single army in the bend. You're talking about shoving several more armies into the same area, plus at least one more south of the Don. German logistics simply didn't have the capacity to sustain these forces, specifically without having Rostov secured. Air supply was used consistently and yet the operational delays remained. This could easily lead to almost week long delays, more than giving the Soviets time to compensate for German advantages just as they did IOTL.

2. The same weak Soviets which nearly tore through 16th Panzer's various regiments and forced a complete halt to offensive operations? The same ones that forced the strung out division to hunker down and take multiple beatings instead of advancing as planned? I think 16th Panzer's situation was quite bad enough without stretching it even further forward.

3. Unlikely, the reserves being sent to support Saturn were mostly separate from the forces committed to operation Ring and the defense of the encirclement. All that would be needed is for a couple of the superfluous armies holding onto Paulus to be redeployed to halt Manstein's forces in their tracks, something that can easily be achieved without eliminating the viability of both holding Stalingrad and launching further offensives.

4. Bloodied? It was barely combat capable by November 1942. Divisions and regiments strung out all over the place, little to no cohesion, and of course a lack of the supplies needed to achieve anything resembling an offensive, much less a counterattack. Hube's corps were one of the weakest forces in the entire pocket, and that's saying something. 6th army had no way to organize a proper counterattack. Even if it did it would be quickly be halted by the numerous armies committed to halting breakout and breakthroughs.
 
1. Paulus had to deal with multiple operational pauses of 2-3 days trying to supply a single army in the bend. You're talking about shoving several more armies into the same area, plus at least one more south of the Don. German logistics simply didn't have the capacity to sustain these forces, specifically without having Rostov secured. Air supply was used consistently and yet the operational delays remained. This could easily lead to almost week long delays, more than giving the Soviets time to compensate for German advantages just as they did IOTL.

2. The same weak Soviets which nearly tore through 16th Panzer's various regiments and forced a complete halt to offensive operations? The same ones that forced the strung out division to hunker down and take multiple beatings instead of advancing as planned? I think 16th Panzer's situation was quite bad enough without stretching it even further forward.

3. Unlikely, the reserves being sent to support Saturn were mostly separate from the forces committed to operation Ring and the defense of the encirclement. All that would be needed is for a couple of the superfluous armies holding onto Paulus to be redeployed to halt Manstein's forces in their tracks, something that can easily be achieved without eliminating the viability of both holding Stalingrad and launching further offensives.

4. Bloodied? It was barely combat capable by November 1942. Divisions and regiments strung out all over the place, little to no cohesion, and of course a lack of the supplies needed to achieve anything resembling an offensive, much less a counterattack. Hube's corps were one of the weakest forces in the entire pocket, and that's saying something. 6th army had no way to organize a proper counterattack. Even if it did it would be quickly be halted by the numerous armies committed to halting breakout and breakthroughs.

the 4th panzer army was smaller than the 6th army so it wouldn't have the same supply demands... the 6th's advance could be slowed until the 1st and 17th consolidate (even transferring some of their quartermaster companies forward to assist in building up the bridgeheads and giving them room to cross and doing everything possible to open up rail lines)

the 16th panzer got roughed up AFTER it established itself at rynok (and the soviets had ample time whilst they sat supine to bring up fresh forces to lock them in place)... I am talking about not stopping when it reaches the Volga at all and just crossing; not giving the Russians a chance to catch their breath and playing on their fear of encirclement (although it would be a notably hollow fear; it could still lead to the abandonment of the city)


the russians pealed off some operation ring forces in otl to slow down manstein... if manstein has 3 or 4 more fresh divisions; they would either have to dangerously weaken the western side of the pocket or more likely divert 2nd guards to block manstein (which stalin almost did in otl)

there would have to be a solid breakout plan established the moment the pincers locked at kalach, and as you correctly point out, large scale merging of depleted units... there were still veteran formations in the pocket like the 3rd motorized and 44th infantry which whilst understrength could still crack a defensive line; and the immediate forces in their rear couldn't stop the stampede without the invested ring forces (which my scenario proposes wouldn't be in place yet)... perhaps it devolves into falaise with heavy losses, but significant elements get out
 
Ok, so we establish that Stalingrad is of strategic importance for any "dash for the oil".

Without the flanks secured, Caucasus can be isolated. Fair enough.

So Edelweiss is intricately linked to Staingrad even in August/September.

If we also conclude that there could hardly be more troops fed and kept with ammo (Army Group A and 6th Army in Stalingrad), what would then be the solution:

Should Edelweiss have been delayed? Cancelled for the year and flanks secured instead. That would mean East bank of Volga and the Don bend secured. But could that even have been possible?

It again points to an earlier start date of the drive for Stalingrad and edelweiss.

Comments?

Ivan
 
Could Barbarossa have been a drive for the caucasus oil only?

Skip Baltics, Skip Moscow. Focus on the South.

It looks a bit akward as the Northern flank would be a bit exposed I should think, but with 80% of all Soviet oil coming from Baku region, it would be the big prize.

Yes?
 
Could Barbarossa have been a drive for the caucasus oil only?

Skip Baltics, Skip Moscow. Focus on the South.

It looks a bit akward as the Northern flank would be a bit exposed I should think, but with 80% of all Soviet oil coming from Baku region, it would be the big prize.

Yes?

How about:

Instead of doing Typhoon to Moscow in Oct 41, Keep Guderians Panzer Army in the South and continue offensive there only. Capture the Donetz basin then stop (sort of OTL lines in the south). With the center and north army groups in well dug in defensive positions, German army should be in better shape for a drive to the Caucasus in 1942.

But, its still a long way to Baku, and the whole place will be demolished if you could take it, and the British would bomb and sabatoge the place too and you have to figure out how to get the oil back to Germany. It would take years to get much oil out.

So you can deny it to the Russians, but there was still oil sources for them on the east side of the Caspian.

In 1942, instead of the drive for oil, the best bet for the Germans was to complete the investment of Leningrad and do something major in the center front before Moscow to force the Russians to agree to some sort of peace before a second front happens in the west (maybe a boundry on the Dnieper, still plenty of room for "living space" and keeping the Nikopol mines, Estonian shale oil and the Galacian oil on the German side).
 
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Could Barbarossa have been a drive for the caucasus oil only?

Skip Baltics, Skip Moscow. Focus on the South.

It looks a bit akward as the Northern flank would be a bit exposed I should think, but with 80% of all Soviet oil coming from Baku region, it would be the big prize.

Yes?

No, as that would have hit the USSR right where the Soviets expected the bulk of German strength to be in the first place. Not to mention the obvious dangers of flank attacks and Soviet diversionary offensives close to German territory that will produce Hitler freakouts as surely as night follows day.
 
the 4th panzer army was smaller than the 6th army so it wouldn't have the same supply demands... the 6th's advance could be slowed until the 1st and 17th consolidate (even transferring some of their quartermaster companies forward to assist in building up the bridgeheads and giving them room to cross and doing everything possible to open up rail lines)

the 16th panzer got roughed up AFTER it established itself at rynok (and the soviets had ample time whilst they sat supine to bring up fresh forces to lock them in place)... I am talking about not stopping when it reaches the Volga at all and just crossing; not giving the Russians a chance to catch their breath and playing on their fear of encirclement (although it would be a notably hollow fear; it could still lead to the abandonment of the city)


the russians pealed off some operation ring forces in otl to slow down manstein... if manstein has 3 or 4 more fresh divisions; they would either have to dangerously weaken the western side of the pocket or more likely divert 2nd guards to block manstein (which stalin almost did in otl)

there would have to be a solid breakout plan established the moment the pincers locked at kalach, and as you correctly point out, large scale merging of depleted units... there were still veteran formations in the pocket like the 3rd motorized and 44th infantry which whilst understrength could still crack a defensive line; and the immediate forces in their rear couldn't stop the stampede without the invested ring forces (which my scenario proposes wouldn't be in place yet)... perhaps it devolves into falaise with heavy losses, but significant elements get out

The Germans couldn't start the offensive *too* much earlier. The Soviet offensive that turned into Second Kharkov and the need to finally get the USSR out of the Crimea were delays the Germans had to take on first. Just bulling on into the Caucasus and neglecting entirely the Soviet offensives or Soviets in Sevastopol was not something Hitler would have allowed. And given the only guy in the German war effort deciding *anything* was always and always was going to be A. Hitler, well......
 
Darn, the resilience of history.

So whichever way we turn, the most logical part would still be to clean up Crimea before any more moves in the South.

Still to have "centre" to push for Moscow and securing the global flanks.

The Don bend could not be left alone either; hence Stalingrad and the rail links East of Volga had to be secured.

So, despite all our clever arguments, OTL is quite "logical".

Ivan
 
Darn, the resilience of history.

So whichever way we turn, the most logical part would still be to clean up Crimea before any more moves in the South.

Still to have "centre" to push for Moscow and securing the global flanks.

The Don bend could not be left alone either; hence Stalingrad and the rail links East of Volga had to be secured.

So, despite all our clever arguments, OTL is quite "logical".

Ivan

There are some events that really can go one way or the other in terms of AH PODs. This particular campaign is not one of them.
 
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