Loving the TL so far!

I’ve been wondering how David Miliband has maintained his labour leadership? Given his terrible electoral performance and existing unpopularity among the labour-left I expected immediate resignation or at least defeat in a leadership contest.
 
Loving the TL so far!

I’ve been wondering how David Miliband has maintained his labour leadership? Given his terrible electoral performance and existing unpopularity among the labour-left I expected immediate resignation or at least defeat in a leadership contest.

Miliband chose not to resign after the 2011 GE (largely due to not wanting to be remembered as the first PM since Callaghan not to have an election mandate) and pleaded with his Parliamentary Party in the election's aftermath to give him a 'second chance' (which drew criticism from many given his justification for challenging Brown was due to him failing to achieve a majority in 2007). As of late 2012, Miliband is currently on a knife edge, having only been saved by a better-than-expected performance for Labour at the 2011 local elections, yet several members of the Cabinet are sharpening their knives.

All it would take is for one by-election loss...
 
Chapter VI: Brexit, the Heywood and Middleton by-election and the Labour leadership election 2014-15
Shortly after the results of the European Union Membership Referendum was clear and the celebration in the ‘Yes to Britain’ campaign died down, Davis began making preparations for the moment which he and many other Conservatives had been hoping for ever since Margaret Thatcher’s famous address to the Commons in which she declared ‘No, no, no!’ to European integration. First came the invoking of Article 50, which Davis did via the Royal Prerogative two weeks after the referendum (at which point the Financial Markets, after an initial dive following the referendum, had recovered), which began the formal two-year negotiating process in the lead up to Britain’s withdrawal from the EU (which many were beginning to refer to as ‘Brexit’ – a combination of ‘Britain’ and ‘Exit’). Davis and Foreign Secretary Hague would then conduct negotiations with their European counterparts, José Manuel Barroso (the President of the European Commission) and Herman Van Rompuy (the President of the European Council), on the precise details of how Britain would withdraw – negotiations at times appeared fruitless and fraught, yet, eventually, in July 2014 (three months before the withdrawal date arrived) a deal would be struck between the two sides.

Under the terms of the agreement, it was stated that the United Kingdom, upon withdrawing from the European Union, would also leave the Single Market and Customs Union (thereby granting Britain control over the entirety of her laws, immigration system and trade relations), with a separate free trade agreement being established between the two parties known as the British-European Free Trade Agreement (BEFTA). Furthermore, it was agreed that (to preserve the Common Travel Area and terms of the Good Friday Agreement) the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would remain open through what was described by many as a ‘smart border’, utilising technology such as microchipping to create a frictionless border, while a further provision was agreed under which the rights of British citizens living in EU nations and EU citizens living in Britain would be maintained. As for monetary matters, it was agreed that Britain would pay a ‘divorce bill’ of £25 billion (over an extended period of time) to the EU, in exchange for maintaining access to the Single Market and Customs union over a two-year transition period, during which the British Government would be able to negotiate free trade agreements with other countries around the world (to replace those negotiated by the EU over Britain’s forty-one year membership of the organisation and its predecessor, the EEC). Such an agreement was hailed by both sides as ‘mutually beneficial’, while Davis (when addressing the Commons during a debate on the agreement, which would subsequently be accepted by both Houses of Parliament) declared that the agreement guaranteed Britain’s ‘economic stability’ and ensured that a ‘bright future’ awaited an ‘independent and prosperous United Kingdom’.

With the agreement between Britain and the EU having been accepted by the Parliaments of both, when the withdrawal date of November the 8th 2014 arrived all loose ends had been cut and the UK was able to smoothly withdraw from the EU, beginning the two-year transition period.

And so, with Brexit and Britain’s formal withdrawal having taken place, the primary objective of the British Government was subsequently trade – it was vital that free trade agreements should be signed by Britain over the course of the two-year transition period so as to ensure the country’s economic security. The first option Britain turned to was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which consisted of the United States, Canada and Mexico. NAFTA had consistently been argued for by prominent Eurosceptics (including former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her third and final book, Statecraft) as an alternative to the European trading bloc, and when the British Government enquired as to whether or not the UK could join the bloc, there was a positive reception from all three member states. Therefore, following negotiations which took place between December and March 2014, the North American Free Trade Agreement became the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, and Britain became a formal member of the organisation as its fourth participant.

Further countries with whom Britain sought a strong trading relationship post-Brexit were Australia and New Zealand. Over the course of Britain’s negotiations prior to the withdrawal date, both New Zealand Prime Minister John Key and his two Australian counterparts, first Peter Costello and then Julia Gillard had been supportive of trade agreements with Britain following Brexit, and so, while concurrent negotiations took place with American, Canadian and Mexican diplomats on NAFTA, British diplomats sat down with diplomats from Australia and New Zealand to outline a trilateral free trade agreement. The end result would be the ANZUK Association, established in April 2015 through the signing of the Treaty of London by Davis, Gillard and Key. Under the provisions of the Treaty, the new Association would establish a free trade area between Britain, Australia and New Zealand, while the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement was submerged into the ANZUK Association and extended to include Britain (thereby creating freedom of movement between the three nations) and increased defence and intelligence-sharing ties were forged as part of the Association. Such an agreement was praised by many Commonwealth enthusiasts who saw the new ANZUK Association as Britain rekindling her connection with the Commonwealth post-Brexit, although there was some dismay at Canada’s absence from the agreement (with Britain having instead established trading ties with Canada via NAFTA), although there was hope that, in the future, Canada could apply to join the agreement.

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***
Since the 2011 General Election, David Miliband’s authority over the Labour Party had been tenuous at best. Initially, as the results of election night poured in and Labour was relegated to the Opposition benches, most people expected Miliband to announce his resignation, either at the count at his constituency of South Shields or in his speech outside Downing Street shortly before leaving to tender his resignation to Elizabeth II. Yet no resignation was forthcoming – Miliband was terrified at the prospect of going down in history as the first Prime Minister since James Callaghan not to receive an electoral mandate, and so he sought to remain in his position and contest the 2015 General Election. This, of course, did not sit well with many left-wing backbenchers (who despised Miliband) and indeed with many members of the Cabinet (who saw their leader increasingly as a liability electorally), with Miliband’s plea to the Parliamentary Party to be given a ‘second chance’ being scoffed at by many, with calls of hypocrisy coming from many corners (given that Miliband’s justification for challenging Brown for the leadership had been due to Labour losing its majority in 2007). Nonetheless, Miliband would secure some breathing space when, in 2012, the local elections produced a better-than-expected result for Labour, while, in opinion polls, Labour was able to overtake the Conservatives by late-2011 and held leads of between three and six percent in most polls over early 2012.

However, the political tide would eventually swing against Miliband as 2012 drew on – a surge in national pride created by Elizabeth II’s Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympics and Paralympics allowed the Conservatives to overtake Labour for a brief period between over the spring and summer and, although Labour managed to retake the lead as this boost wore off in September, in October, following the EU Membership Referendum (which was seen as a personal victory for Davis) the Conservatives once again polled ahead of Labour.

Miliband’s response to Brexit also hindered Labour’s polling position somewhat – the Labour Leader has campaigned passionately for a ‘No’ vote over the course of the referendum, which did not sit well with the former industrial cities who voted en masse for ‘Yes’, while, in the aftermath of the referendum, Miliband joined Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg in calling for a second referendum on EU membership and for Britain to remain inside the Single Market and Customs Union. This further alienated the Labour-supporting working-class voters who had not switched to the Conservatives or UKIP in 2011, and so the Party’s support amongst that demographic shrunk further in opinion polls. This would become evident to many in October 2014, when a by-election took place in Heywood and Middleton following the death of Labour MP Jim Dobbin.

Such a by-election took place in the shadow of the Scottish independence referendum (held the previous month, which resulted in the Scottish electorate voting in favour of remaining part of the United Kingdom) and the announcement of the agreement between Britain and the EU, while Heywood and Middleton had, in 2011, been a three-way marginal between Labour, the Conservatives and UKIP and had voted heavily for ‘Yes’ in 2012. As a consequence, the by-election would be intensely fought, with Labour seeking to maintain their support in the constituency, the Conservatives pushing to become the first incumbent Party to win a by-election since 1982 and UKIP pursuing a breakthrough in Northern England. Eventually, a combination of dissatisfaction at Labour’s Brexit policy and Conservative voters willing to protest for UKIP pushed John Bickley, the UKIP candidate, narrowly ahead of Liz McInnes, the Labour candidate, thereby resulting in a UKIP victory, subsequently giving the Party two seats in the Commons.

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The Heywood and Middleton by-election would prove to be the death knell for Miliband’s leadership of the Labour Party – it was clear that his stance on Brexit was visibly unpopular in Labour’s traditional heartlands, while the belief that UKIP, in the aftermath of the EU Referendum, would simply fade away was becoming increasingly discredited given Miliband’s leadership of Labour provided UKIP with fertile ground to grow. It was therefore expected, in the aftermath of the by-election result, that at least one Cabinet minister would sharpen their knife and aim to topple Miliband and the eventual candidate who did so would be Douglas Alexander, the Shadow Home Secretary. Upon receiving Alexander’s challenge for the leadership, Miliband recognised that he had little choice but to accept a leadership election, resigning from the Labour Party leadership and subsequently standing for re-election.

Throughout the campaign there was little doubt over the outcome – Miliband had become deeply unpopular amongst Labour activists after the setbacks which had occurred over his leadership, while Alexander, being from the right of the Party, secured the support of those who, in any other circumstances, would have supported Miliband. There were, therefore, few gasps when, at a special Party Conference in January 2015 organised to announce the results, that Alexander had won decisively, winning 65.3% of votes cast to Miliband’s 34.7%.

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In the aftermath of his election to the Labour leadership, Alexander sought to reclaim Labour’s polling position by committing the Party to respecting Brexit and ruling out any re-entry into the EU, which did have some degree of success – a combination of this announcement and a usual honeymoon period for new leaders allowed Labour, by February to move back into the lead in most opinion polls, overtaking the Conservatives (who had led in most polls since the announcement of the agreement with the EU), while UKIP, which had held a polling average of 16% in the aftermath of the Heywood and Middleton by-election, dropped to an average of 12%. Yet, as the 2015 General Election approached and voters began to think more about policies and which Party would benefit them, such a Labour lead began to decrease until, by the time that Davis requested a dissolution of Parliament (in accordance with the Fixed-term Parliament Act) in late March, the two main parties were once again neck-and-neck, with both the Conservatives and Labour holding an average of 35% in most opinion polls. Meanwhile, UKIP's vote share had experienced a modest recovery and stood at 13% at the time of Parliament's dissolution, while the Liberal Democrats, who, under Nick Clegg, had recovered since their disastrous result in 2011 through securing the support of centrist Conservative voters (partly through opposing Brexit until, following Britain's withdrawal from the EU in November 2014, the Liberal Democrats had, like Labour, recognised and pledged not to attempt to undo), stood at 12%. And so, the battle lines were drawn for the 2015 General Election, with most pundits hedging their bets on a Hung Parliament and only one certain result - uncertainty.
 
This seems to have gone Brexity wish-fulfilment pretty sharpish.

Agreed. It's gone exactly as the present UK government would like (Swapping EU for, effectively a FTA - one sided for the UK - along with the UK then going out into the world and securing all these great trade deals). I say this as a Leaver myself. The UK will struggle with Brexit, even with a government committed to it BEFORE a vote. And you've glossed over the obvious ructions that would likely come within both Labour and the Conservatives in the run up to the vote (especially the latter).

The Conservatives have NEVER had a PM who is anti-EU/EC/EEC. They sometimes have leaders who are such, but they never win elections. And the one leader/PM who became anti-EU was given the heave ho by a dead sheep when it became obvious that she was going that way.
 
I wonder if the SNP will surge as in OTL or will Davis and the Conservatives being the main Unionists rally Unionist Scots to support them as in 2017
 
I wonder if the SNP will surge as in OTL or will Davis and the Conservatives being the main Unionists rally Unionist Scots to support them as in 2017
I think the SNP surge to an extent created the Conservative push back. If you're a unionist, having only 3 out of 59 Scottish MPs sharing your views is going to make you feel underrepresented, and drive you to take steps you might not have previously considered, such as supporting the Tories, or at least tactically voting for them as the lesser of two evils. Prior to 2015, that kind of marginalisation didn't really exist, even after the referendum.

I'm more interested to see if Davis responds by pushing EVEL (even that hasn't been implemented already) as Cameron did, or whether he will take a different path. The man was once a supporter of an English Parliament, and I can remember thinking that he being PM would be a good premise for a TL on that subject at some point in the future.
 
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