It's probably been brought up before, but one factor influencing Germany's decisions would be the fact that it's not obvious France could be defeated easily and without massive costs. This plus the lack of a Poland campaign to give the Wehrmacht some experience with blitzkrieg means that German leaders will be more desperate to secure some semblance of geostrategic security and I can't see any bigger perceived threat to Germany than Russia.

I with with @Ombra 's observation that for Hitler, securing territory in the east is not only the ultimate goal but also an immediate priority from the perspective of his circular logic. In order to have a chance against France and Britain, Germany must knock out the Soviets and steal their resources. This essentially sets up Germany for a repeat of World War I: A defensive WWI-esque war in the west is preferable to an offensive war in the west that may or may not be successful — and opens up the risk of a Soviet opportunist attack on Poland.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
@SealTheRealDeal - has there been, or will there be any Japanese-British fighting in the central pacific involving raids or invasions between the British Gilbert islands (Kiribati) on the one had and the Japanese mandates in the Caroline or Marshall Islands on the other? There was Japanese-American fighting in that arena in OTL, Japan invaded the Gilbert’s at least to Tarawa, and the Americans liberated it by assault.
 
@SealTheRealDeal - has there been, or will there be any Japanese-British fighting in the central pacific involving raids or invasions between the British Gilbert islands (Kiribati) on the one had and the Japanese mandates in the Caroline or Marshall Islands on the other? There was Japanese-American fighting in that arena in OTL, Japan invaded the Gilbert’s at least to Tarawa, and the Americans liberated it by assault.
There will be.
 
Let's start with OTL. Mein Kampf and Zweites Buch are Hitler's strategic blueprint, but not his actual plan. In fact, he proves rather flexible in the timing of his decisions - after all, Hitler is a gambler and an opportunist. The chief demonstration of this is of course the M-R Pact, a complete inversion of what he wanted to do, in which he gets Soviet support to fight Britain rather than the other way around! This pact of course is determined by his desire to avoid a two-front war, but it's especially critical because in 1938 and 1939 Allied rearmament and opposition to Hitler is starting to take on some real momentum, and the window for Germany to act is closing.
Yup. Very true.

Personally, I think there is no doubt that even if the WAllies do stand aside and let Hitler invade, such an assault would be a disaster. The attacking Polish and German forces would run into a fortified border that doesn't have the massive forward deployments of Soviet troops that made the early Barbarossa encirclements so devastating. Of course, the Soviets would lack the experience of the Winter War, but the Germans would lack the experience and materiel pool of both Fall Weiss and Fall Gelb, and I would absolutely consider that a net loss for them. No allied bombing campaign and British embargo might make the German economic position stronger, but without M-R Pact deliveries of raw materials, I'm not sure even that can be claimed with confidence.
The issue here is that, well, the Germans aren't dummies. They are fanatics who are drunk on delusional ideas, yes, but not dummies. And in OTL, German military intelligence had very good information on what exactly was waiting for them just over the border (though they thought that was all of the Soviet army and didn't realize the total size of the army was three times larger than what they were seeing), and that formation was extremely potent on paper, having almost as many men as the entire OTL German and allied force and superior numbers of certain weapons systems. Without the victory in France, Germany wouldn't have so many allies, wouldn't be able to conscript so many factory workers and farm laborers, wouldn't have so many looted weapons and wouldn't have the experience of just how devastating a strategic breakthrough fueled by the internal combustion engine and methamphetamine could be. And with no Winter War and no watching the Soviets do terribly in claiming their slice of Poland, they wouldn't have such contempt for the fighting power of the Soviet army (though they'd still think the Soviets inferior). So the Germans would KNOW they are weaker and would tend to estimate the Soviets as having greater strength. Also, the Germans at this point thought that France is the more dangerous enemy due to their WW1 experiences, so I think that all adds up to an estimation as per OTL that going after France first (before France can properly mobilize for war) is the better move. Meaning the Germans likely convince themselves that the British totally won't react to their occupying the Channel coast and going West first, and the main difference is that in TTL, they'd go for France directly, rather than clobbering Poland, then turning on France (though I suspect that every few months or so the Germans will "politely" ask their dear Polish allies for more Polish land, because even if Hitler is relatively un-Polonophobic for a right-wing German in this period, German conservatives wanted Poland dead yesterday).

As a final consideration, while Poland has struck a deal with Germany ITTL, I'm not sure they'd be on board with a risky war of aggression. Would be interesting to see how that one plays out, to be honest.
I suspect that Poland, much like Romania as a German ally, will be obliged to give up land in the West and the promise will be that all of this will be made up for by vast gains in the East. And it isn't like Poland wouldn't benefit from the destruction of the Soviet Union as an existential threat, so I could see the Polish regime being brought on board to a war of aggression. (Though I don't see Poland supporting such an attack if Germany hasn't proven to be full of miracles by defeating France, which would both give the Poles hope that the Germans can repeat that miracle on the Soviet battlefields and would remove a major option for countering German bullying of Poland.)

Bottom line though, I really can't imagine any offensive pushing deep into Soviet territory here.
Yeah, even if Poland were an enthusiastic ally, I can't imagine the Germans doing nearly as well if they do go after the Soviets first. Though I can imagine them reaching the suburbs of Kyiv and Smolensk.

The problem in many of these alt-Hitler discussions imho is that people don't quite realise that often, Hitler looked at the same information we look at, and then drew completely opposite conclusions from us. The experience of the failed rearmaments push in 1938 and early 1939 proved beyond doubt that Germany could not compete with Allied rearmament, so the sane thing would be to back off and give up, but Hitler drew the opposite conclusion: they're outproducing us by a factor of ten? Well then we need to declare war immediately, otherwise every year the gap will get worse!
And for sure. Hitler wasn't an idiot or a madman - indeed, he was actually quite talented in many ways (I'd rate him as having a better grasp of military matters than Churchill or de Gaulle for example) - he was just utterly committed to some really dumb ideas.

fasquardon
 
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One thing that could be interesting to play with in this scenario could be if the British Empire is later drawn in to a European and Mediterranean War and ends underperforming against the Germans, and even in the Italians, suffering embarrassing losses in the Med and Middle East, because the best forces have been committed to the Far East and lower rated forces, and commanders, end up garrisoning the Mideast and Med. Sort of a reversal of the Britain’s OTL’s Far East forces situation and the disasters that befell them.

It could also be interesting to see this scenario go forward with a war in Europe where Germany takes on the USSR and France, and somehow ultimately even the US, but Britain, because of its great commitment in the Asia-Pacific, has to stand aside from it and remain a friendly neutral to the anti-German powers, not an anti-German belligerent. A difficult needle to thread admittedly.

The scenario as it is written and the doors it leaves open is hella, hella interesting. Can’t wait to see what’s coming next, so take my commentary in that spirit.
One small point by this time the British will have rotated out troops and officers who will know what works and what does not work and that experience will I am sure be passed on.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Somebody upthread mentioned their estimate that the Poles would be willing to do a defensive anti Soviet alliance with the Germans but not willing to do a joint offensive war against the Soviets with the Germans staging from Polish territory. [by the way “willingful” is not a real word, but something that users invented here that irks the shit out of me]

I f Hitler thinks it’s time to conquer East, how patient would he be with Polish reluctance? Would he put off plans and spend time trying to persuade, negotiate, and sweeten the deal?

or would he treat the Poles like the Yugoslavs after their 1941 coup- treating their reluctance as unacceptable defiance and throwing together an invasion plan in a few weeks and then just smashing them down, occupying and breaking up their country?

from that point Hitler could pause and digest before his next move, East or west, depending on the world situation, loot the eff out of Poland and shout at the Balkans “King Kong ain’t got nothing on me! I am the sheriff here bitches”

more he could roll East into an anti Soviet offensive right away without skipping a beat.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Or is Poland going to go along with an eastern offensive, despite its costs and chances of backfiring, because it will at least weaken the Soviets, and the Poles can hope the west wraps up the Japan war, ends up stronger and eventually helps prevent Poland from being totally at Germany’s mercy forever?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Somebody mentioned Britain going to a total war footing. Britain will have to fight an expensive war to project power to defend and redeem its interests in the Far East as far as Singapore, Borneo, Rabaul, Hong Kong, and the Chinese concessions- but against a weaker industrial power like Japan that cannot bomb, sub blockade or invade the homeland, is a total all-out war effort on the level of WWII considered necessary, or affordable? Britain’s honor is offended, and it wants everything back, but what does it’s pounds and pence chancellor of the exchequer prime minister think a realist and affordable endgame for the Japanese war is?
 
Problem is British industry needs the resources out each both in terms of mineral wealth and the fact of the oil and rubber that comes out of Burma and Malaysia to keep the wheels on British Industry turning.
 
and shout at the Balkans “King Kong ain’t got nothing on me! I am the sheriff here bitches”
Thanks for that mental image. :D

If Hitler hasn't taken out France, the Balkan powers will still be looking to France as a counterbalance to Germany and a guarantor of their security against Italian and Soviet interference (and France would be helped in this by pre-existing relationships and alliances. (Though Greece will be looking more towards the UK than France.)

Worth noting that with France in play, the Poles will also be seeking French support to avoid falling too deeply into German peonage.

I f Hitler thinks it’s time to conquer East, how patient would he be with Polish reluctance? Would he put off plans and spend time trying to persuade, negotiate, and sweeten the deal?
While Hitler personally had relatively flexible attitudes towards Poland (relative to an extremely low bar) there are still a large number of officers, civil servants and Party Faithful with entrenched Polonophobic views. I suspect this would make the German regime very impatient towards Poland. And since Poland knew very well just how much German moderates and conservatives wanted to destroy their country, I don't think they'd be very willing to be particularly helpful, since allowing German troops to base themselves in Poland ostensibly in preparation to attack the Soviets could easily lead to those same German troops overthrowing the Polish government and making the country a vassal or a province of Greater Germania.

Most likely, a Poland that allied with Nazi Germany would be as trusting of the Germans as the Soviets were between '39 and '41 - in other words hoping for the best, but fairly sure that the worst would happen eventually and the best use of the alliance would be to use the time to better prepare for war with Germany. So there'd be regular crises in relations, trade would be stopped for weeks and months of hostility, there'd be clashes on the border every so often and both sides would be frantically preparing for war.

The Poles in the late 30s certainly hated and feared the Soviets, but they were equally as distrustful of Germany. While the rise of the Nazis initially warmed relations (for example Hitler ended the German trade war against Poland that had lasted from 1925 in 1934) they still didn't trust the Germans as far as they could throw them. Even a defensive alliance with Germany would have been an act of desperation by Poland and that alliance becoming an offensive one requires major shifts in the balance of power and German-Polish relations.

But that's my take on what the Santation regime would do, @SealTheRealDeal may have other ideas for this timeline.

fasquardon
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Is this:
Problem is British industry needs the resources out each both in terms of mineral wealth and the fact of the oil and rubber that comes out of Burma and Malaysia to keep the wheels on British Industry turning.

A reply to me here:

Somebody mentioned Britain going to a total war footing. Britain will have to fight an expensive war to project power to defend and redeem its interests in the Far East as far as Singapore, Borneo, Rabaul, Hong Kong, and the Chinese concessions- but against a weaker industrial power like Japan that cannot bomb, sub blockade or invade the homeland, is a total all-out war effort on the level of WWII considered necessary, or affordable? Britain’s honor is offended, and it wants everything back, but what does it’s pounds and pence chancellor of the exchequer prime minister think a realist and affordable endgame for the Japanese war is?

I think surely Britain will fight to defend....and reclaim its colonies. So no disagreement there. It's just that I don't know if they would spend every penny they spent fighting all three Axis powers on fighting Japan, or if they would really have to. But if they really did want to drive the Japanese well and truly out of China, or take any pre-war Japanese islands in Micronesia or Taiwan or Okinawa, or horrors, invade Japan, they would surely have to spend all that and more.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Thanks for that mental image. :D

If Hitler hasn't taken out France, the Balkan powers will still be looking to France as a counterbalance to Germany and a guarantor of their security against Italian and Soviet interference (and France would be helped in this by pre-existing relationships and alliances. (Though Greece will be looking more towards the UK than France.)

Worth noting that with France in play, the Poles will also be seeking French support to avoid falling too deeply into German peonage.


While Hitler personally had relatively flexible attitudes towards Poland (relative to an extremely low bar) there are still a large number of officers, civil servants and Party Faithful with entrenched Polonophobic views. I suspect this would make the German regime very impatient towards Poland. And since Poland knew very well just how much German moderates and conservatives wanted to destroy their country, I don't think they'd be very willing to be particularly helpful, since allowing German troops to base themselves in Poland ostensibly in preparation to attack the Soviets could easily lead to those same German troops overthrowing the Polish government and making the country a vassal or a province of Greater Germania.

Most likely, a Poland that allied with Nazi Germany would be as trusting of the Germans as the Soviets were between '39 and '41 - in other words hoping for the best, but fairly sure that the worst would happen eventually and the best use of the alliance would be to use the time to better prepare for war with Germany. So there'd be regular crises in relations, trade would be stopped for weeks and months of hostility, there'd be clashes on the border every so often and both sides would be frantically preparing for war.

The Poles in the late 30s certainly hated and feared the Soviets, but they were equally as distrustful of Germany. While the rise of the Nazis initially warmed relations (for example Hitler ended the German trade war against Poland that had lasted from 1925 in 1934) they still didn't trust the Germans as far as they could throw them. Even a defensive alliance with Germany would have been an act of desperation by Poland and that alliance becoming an offensive one requires major shifts in the balance of power and German-Polish relations.

But that's my take on what the Santation regime would do, @SealTheRealDeal may have other ideas for this timeline.

fasquardon

We will see what @SealTheRealDeal gives us when he finally posts the Germany update - which is probably at least halfway written and almost all planned out by now. But based on what he's had happen with Germany and the Lwow wargames, he's telegraphed the Poles being more willing to be an active anti-Soviet ally.

I tend to agree with your take, that Poland would limit cooperation to a minimum and not expect it to last and hope for alternatives to emerge. I think they would balk at an offensive war, or a defensive structure that amounts to a peaceful full German occupation. I think you would too. So that would mean ultimately from Adolf's point of view, a war on Poland would still have to proceed any war on the USSR. And it would probably also mean that if Poland is this much looking for the exits, that if Germany suddenly massed in the west for an attack on France, that Poland would do an insta-pivot and leap into the war on France's side and hope it works as the only way to escape their "ally"/captor.

Adolf and the Nazi govt beyond him would probably be on the lookout for this, so it probably makes matters coming to a head for a breakdown from German-Polish "alliance" to German sudden aggression on Poland pretty probable at some point in 1939 or 1940. Adolf may figure the time to do it is when the French are being a bit passive in the west and unsure of themselves with the British being busy in the Pacific.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Correct me if I missed anything, but British politics here:

Neville Chamberlain is PM here.

And with the advent of the Pacific War, he's never become a zero. He's a hero.

Sure, the Japanese invade Hong Kong after Munich has happened, and *some* people had doubts about that when he came back. But the Japanese attack unites the country, and Empire around war, with *Japan*.

Somebody while drinking a pint or having cigar might say that Chamberlain hankering for peace and giving in to Hitler gave the Japanese ideas, but if any politician says that, they're going to look like a blowhard and an arsehole.

It won't look good when Hitler occupies Bohemia. But with the Empire fighting for its life in the Far East, there isn''t going to be a demand for war over Central Europe. And diplomatic historians will debate whether Hitler was definitely going to do it anyway, or whether it was just an opportunistic move he couldn't pass up because Britain suddenly got busy.

In any case, Chamberlain is now a brave wartime leader. His health is going to give out in 1940 and then he'll die, so he'll be a martyr of war. Succession?

Whenever he *does* look at the financial books during this war, he will be horrified. Likewise when he hears the service chiefs estimates of what they need to prevail against Japan in the Far East, but also to maintain a reserve capacity to handle Germany, Italy or the Soviet Union....and then looks at the books and foreign exchange reserves.
 
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24. Die Hölle Ist Leer, Alle Teufel Sind Hier
Corridor to Crisis: The Frick Affair

The Hitler government was not idle as Britain and Japan swatted at each other from the ends of their logistical tethers. In Europe, it schemed and maneuvered to secure Danzig. This was to be a real stress test for German-Polish cooperation. Ribbentrop grew frustrated with his Polish counterparts. They were very good at maintaining the illusion of progress and flexibility, but in real terms the discussions wouldn’t progress at all. The Polish diplomats maintained their grace, they were always open to further discussion, and conceded that the German desires were reasonable and could be accommodated. Yet when it came to the “meat and potatoes” of the conferences, the Polish talking points, without fail, railroaded conversations right back to where they began. Even where the Poles did give ground, it was only to bog discussion down in the minutiae of how exactly things would be done.

As the diplomatic threads of Danzig tied themselves into a highly visible Gordian Knot, the knots holding the Nazi Party together began to come undone. As Ribbentrop floundered in full view of the press, Deputy Fuehrer Rudolf Hess, who had previously held the foreign affairs portfolio, suggested that this matter warranted the intervention of his office.[1] Shortly thereafter, he received further endorsement from Ernst Wilhelm Bohle’s foreign organization. As this was a matter concerning Germans beyond German borders, this also lent a particularly potent angle of attack to Alfred Rosenberg, whose stalling political career had recently received a shot in the arm from the Heer. Even Konstantin von Neurath made a go of it, though he quickly returned to minding his post in Bohemia.

As the brewing confrontation was largely a who’s who of Germany’s convoluted foreign policy system, the primary figure in the Frick Affair, Reichsminister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, would seem to come out of left field. How did a man with no official links to the world of German foreign policy end up at the centre of a foreign affairs controversy? In truth, whether or not he did remains a subject of intense debate. Very little is known of the Frick Affair, and at this point anyone who claims to know the truth of it can be dismissed out of hand. The Frick Affair is less a matter of historical fact and more a collection of questions and implications. It might be best described as historical space-negative.


Wilhelm Frick during the Sudeten Crisis of the previous year.

The concrete facts of the Frick Affair are as follows: The body of Wilhelm Frick washed up on the shores of the Langer See and was discovered by a family picnicking in the area after morning mass on the 13th of October. The death of Wilhelm Frick remains a cold case, as the Kripo and Gestapo did not cooperate well during their joint investigation and failed to produce an official ruling before later developments prevented further investigation. The death of Frick, a Reichsminister and Old Fighter, put the Nazi Party’s upper echelons even more on edge than they already were. That’s it. That’s all that can be said with certainty. It is not even known where the body ended up, if it still exists in any form at all.

There is more “information” that comes by way of third or fourth hand “knowledge”, and biased or otherwise unreliable sources. The official material either no longer exists, has never been made accessible, or was contained within the infamous “black pages”[2] that the German government “declassified” during the 70s. What we do have are a series of highly speculatory and contradictory articles from Germany’s remaining newspapers, which managed to get archived despite the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda preventing their actual publication. Two common features of these unpublished articles were, first,a severe argument at one of Hitler’s Table Talks during the evening of the 12th, and that Frick was last seen storming out the meeting. However, the accounts of what the argument was over differ wildly:
-Frick unveiled Himmler’s plot to conduct a false flag operation in Danzig
-Frick and Himmler found themselves on opposing sides of the foreign affairs row
-Himmler unveiled Frick’s plot to to conduct a false flag operation in Danzig
-Hitler had suggested transferring the Gestapo to the SS chain of command
-Hitler had shot down a proposal to elevate Himmler to Frick’s ministerial portfolio
-Frick sought jurisdiction over the Feldgendarmerie
-Himmler sought jurisdiction over the rump SA
-Frick had accused Robert Ley and the German Labour Front of spreading “ersatz Marxism”
They also differ with regard to who murdered Frick, how Frick was killed, or if it was a suicide. Needless to say, no such meeting transcript has been found, and there may not have even been a meeting that night.[3]

Then there is the absolute mess of “accounts” from Nazi Party insiders. In 1946, Hess would tell a Times correspondent that he believed Reinhard Heydrich had organized the killing without Himmler’s approval or knowledge. Amusingly, he believed Heydrich accomplished this by rearranging the furniture in Frick’s office to create “a malignant feng shui”. Harald Quandt, step son to Joseph Goebbels, claimed that his step father believed that Frick had dismissed his SS bodyguard after an argument with Himmler and thus created an opportunity for either a common criminal or a member of the anti-Nazi resistance. Given the weak state of the anti-Nazi resistance in late 1939 one might write off the latter of the two, though while organized anti-Nazism was at an all time low one can never discount the possibility of a lone wolf.


An Evening in Munich: The Final Hours of Adolf Hitler

Hitler was an active leader. He did not have the physicality of Mussolini, but he was nowhere near as reclusive as Stalin. He travelled the country, he stuck his nose in the business of his subordinates, and he liked the office space provided by his personal train. This style of rule made him hard to pin down. Further, most of the places he did visit at predictable times were party and government offices with ample security. There was one place Hitler reliably visited, for a fixed period of time on a fixed date, which for most of the year was just an unusually large pub. The Bürgerbräukeller was the starting point for the famous “Beer Hall Putsch,” which had nearly ended in Hitler’s death. Perhaps returning every year on the 8th of November to give a speech was tempting fate.

In Hitler’s final hours, he met with old friends, reminisced about the early days of the NSDAP, had some horrible vegan meal, and gave a speech which by most accounts was half eulogy for Wilhelm Frick, a fellow survivor of the Beer Hall Putsch (who was apparently to be buried at the Ehrentempel with the blood-witnesses who died during the failed putsch).[4] Around 9:15 PM, his speech shifted topic to the Putsch and the inspirational service of the blood-witnesses. He was only a few minutes in when an explosion behind and below the speaker’s rostrum brought down the roof. When the dust cleared and people rushed to aid their Fuehrer, they found his remains crushed beneath an I-beam.


The collapsed ceiling of the Bürgerbräukeller.

Unknown to the rest of the world, his killer had escaped across the border into Switzerland a mere 40 minutes earlier. His killer’s identity and motive would remain a mystery until the body and “smoking gun” was found by Swiss police in 1943 while clearing out an illegal forest settlement. His killer was George Elser, a “literally who?” lone wolf. Despite being a trade unionist and an opponent of the Hitler government since its inception, he had avoided falling in with either the KPD or SPD aligned resistance organizations, and accordingly had stayed off the SecPo’s radar.

This man had, over a number of nights in the lead up to Hitler’s engagement, managed to plant a bomb in the structural collum behind the speaker’s rostrum. Having set the timing device, he then boarded a train for Konstanz and from there hopped the fence across to Switzerland where, after a number of years living a transient lifestyle, he succumbed to tuberculosis.[5] This was a rather unremarkable fate for someone who initiated one of the defining moments of 20th century Europe.


The Long Knife Fight: Hess and Goering Square Up

The first man to Hitler’s crushed side was Deputy Fuehrer Hess, who went to the washroom prior to Hitler’s speech and failed to re-emerge until after the blast on account of bowel issues. This ailment turned out to be a blessing as he ended up being the one member of Hitler’s inner circle in attendance that evening who was not harmed in any way. The same could not be said for the 11 people, in addition to Hitler, who died from the blast and subsequent ceiling collapse, the most notable of whom were Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, and Hess’ chief of staff Martin Borman.

In his initial shell shocked state, Hess’ mind made a connection, one that only grew stronger as he recovered. Herman Goering was the most notable absence from the night at the beer hall. In Hess’ paranoid mind that made Goering, already his principal rival within the Nazi Party, suspect number one.

Convincing a still shaken Himmler to issue an arrest warrant for the likely culprit proved easier than might have been expected. Instead, the hangup occurred when the Berlin Police refused the warrant for their Minister President, and alerted Goering. The Gestapo detachment that arrived at the Goering residence to execute the warrant was turned away by an impromptu honor guard of Fallschirmjaegers.

From there, the situation continued to deteriorate. On the morning of the 9th, Goering went on the air to state that Deputy Fuehrer Hess was either mentally unfit to conduct his duties as Deputy Fuehrer, or was knowingly exploiting the recent tragedy to make a power grab. From distant Berlin, the mourning party in Munich must have appeared to be a great conspiracy. Goering’s rhetoric would soon escalate to accusing Himmler of murdering Frick as part of a grand Hessite scheme for the total partization of the country.

The line being drawn was shaky and sloppy. Pinning a date to the start of of the German Civil War is difficult as for the first two weeks, it looked more like a mixture of clique formation, political jockeying, and sporadic assassination. Both sides were trying to purge the other with minimal disruption, but both sides knew the Night of the Long Knives playbook well enough to frustrate all attempts at a quick and clean power grab.

As Hess and Goering gained supporters to their factions, they also amassed considerable forces loyal to them. Hess’ alliances with Himmler and Neurath brought him the service of the SS and Government Army,[6] though the latter was deemed too politically unreliable to actually be deployed outside of a training role. Goering had the Luftwaffe[7] at his beck and call, and the SA flocked to him if only for a chance to fight the SS. The loyalties of the police forces is often briefly summarized as “the Prussian Police backed Goering while the rest backed Hess through Himmler” but the reality was much more granular with loyalties being decided at the precinct level if not even lower. The result was that both sides had about a division worth of well trained and politically reliable troops, a somewhat larger number of Heer deserters, and a vast array of police and paramilitary forces.


The SS-VT, the military trained party troops of Himmler's SS constituted the nucleus of the Hessite forces.

As such, the Heer remained by far the strongest force in Germany, and many hoped it would step in and impose a settlement before things could get worse: declare a winner, declare martial law, declare anything. Yet the king-makers sat silent, sequestered in their barracks, its only public declaration being that any Heer personnel, even reservists and those on leave, would be punished severely for participating in “street fights”.

This is not to say the Heer was entirely above what was going on. A number of officers, including Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian, and even Wilhelm Keitel turned up dead in relation to the on-going crisis. Ominously, Walther von Brauchitsch’s internal memo to the Heer’s officers referred to these instances as “the anticipated fates of those who strayed from the Heer’s traditions to get closer to the fire.”

Admiral Raeder, in contrast, made no secret of his desire to intervene. However, he had a grand total of two platoons of infantry at his disposal and all the relevant centers of power lay far beyond the reach of his ships’ guns. As a result, his statements accomplished little more than expedite his quasi exile from the country, as he relocated as much of the navy as he could to Heligoland for safekeeping.

The crisis would only spiral further out of control. The first battle of the war occured on the 24th of November, when a convoy of National Socialist Motor Corps vehicles ferrying a number of SA men and other Goering supporters out of Hessite dominated Bavaria was halted by a regiment of the SS-Verfügungstruppe. The Goeringites only resisted for about ten minutes before surrendering to the army-trained party troops, but the SS-VT didn’t heed the white flag.

This set the tone for what was to come.



[1] Which was, officially, the second highest office in the Reich, even if Goering had by then eclipsed him in real power.

[2] Documents “redacted” by being put in a can of black paint which was then mailed to the sender of the Freedom of Information Request.

[3] and yet all these articles are still more cohesive than the popular online narrative that Frick was the Hinterkaifeck killer and that a relative of the victims killed him…

[4] This was a courtesy that had not been extended to the other Beer Hall Putsch survivors who had since passed, though most of those, like Rohm, had been purged in the Night of the Long Knives

[5] Yes, he died of TB. The popular myth that he was cannibalized by other transients is based on a misreading of the Globe article which said he “died of consumption”. That turn of phrase means TB, not that he was eaten.

[6] the 6,000 or so Czech soldiers retained by the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

[7] grounded by desertions as it was, it still had a substantial number of ground personnel, notably the elite Fallshimjaeger.

A/N:
The fact that Hitler iOTL waited till the start of the war to clarify his order of succession meant that the rule of cool 100% dictated that I have a medieval succession war in the 20th century :p

Now I have quite enjoyed the recent discussion of WWII still happening iTTL. I was worried I’d foreshadowed too much what with always referring to WWI as “the Great War”. It is a neat idea though, a Triple Blind What If about it could make for a fun Shared Worlds thread.
 
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Ramontxo

Donor
The question here is not if the Heer is going to interven but when. And IMHO it will be after the Nazi party has devoured itself. It couldn't happen to a nicer people
 
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