Chiang’s China: It’s Good to have Allies
China’s position had improved little since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. The loss of Canton had eliminated one of the main entreports for western military aid. The South China Sea becoming an active war zone had also reduced the flow through Indochina to Kunming. While the British had promised arms to China so far there had only been a trickle along the Burma Road.
There had however been one major benefit to the start of the Anglo-Japanese War, the security of knowing that China at long last had allies fighting the Japanese. The many foreign language newspapers published within the Shanghai International Settlement covered the Anglo-Japanese War in some detail, and the local Chinese language news papers, such as Shen Bao, made this news more widely known. Major events, like the Battle Off Borneo,[1] were also propagandized by the KMT government. The idea that another powerful state was beating Japan elsewhere gave even the most pessimistic Chinese hope that the war could be won, regardless of the KMT’s wanton corruption and inefficiency.
The alliance with Britain also bolstered the stature of Chiang Kai Shek. While some of the warlords and the Communists may have achieved some local successes that raised their stature vis-a-vis the central government, they weren’t internationally recognized entities. Only Chiang’s government was, and that gave him a monopoly on official communications with China’s only allies.
Chiang Kai Shek and one of his most precarious "allies", the charismatic leader of China's Communists, Mao Zedong.
Trouble In Chinatown: Stalemate
During the battle for Wuhan elements of the 11th Army had attempted to take Nanchang on the march but had been repelled by Chinese defenders along the Xiushui River. Almost immediately after the battle the 6th and 16th Divisions had been pulled from the line to provide their expertise to the Eastern and Western pincers respectively. This left the bloodied soldiers of the 11th in no position to take any offensive actions following their victory at Wuhan.
This immediate lull in Japanese activity gave the Chinese some much needed breathing room. For the city of Changsha, which was struggling to function after having received the bulk of Wuhan’s refugees, this lull had allowed some sort of normalcy to be regained. Following its failed efforts to relieve Hong Kong, a number of additional NRA units were shifted north to reinforce the cities of Nanchang and Changsha.
Over the winter Chiang Kai Shek grew restless. His armies were too vast for mere defensive operations, and with the Japanese distracted further south it seemed opportune to conduct a grand counter attack. A grand offensive was drawn up for March. Half a million men sweep north in two huge pincers encircling the Japanese concentration at Wuhan. The 9th Military Region’s preparations began right away. And the Japanese knew just as soon.
Despite being governor of Hong Kong, Kenji Doihara still had time for his narcotics empire. In addition to reducing the combat effectiveness and work ethic of the Chinese citizenry, Doihara’s massive network of dealers, smugglers, brothels, and crooked KMT officials also gave him an ideal intelligence network. Nothing major could happen in China, on either side of the frontlines, without Doihara having had forewarning. The massive infusion of NRA forces into the region was noted, but hadn’t been unexpected.
Officers in brothels tend to have loose lips, and there were quite a few brothels in and around Changsha following the evacuation of Wuhan. It was only a matter of time before Diohara caught wind of Chiang’s planned Spring Offensive. Normally he was one to share information[2] when it suited his career advancement, but his career would mean little if the Central China Expeditionary Army was wiped out, a loss from which Japan would be unable to recover.
The news quickly went up the grapevine to Tokyo, then back down to Lieutenant General Otozō Yamada of the Central China Expeditionary Army. The news was not entirely surprising, forward observers had long since noticed the Chinese buildup, however this had been assumed to be defensive in nature.[3]
Now the exact records of the IJA’s discussions on what to do have been lost, as unfortunately much of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office’s documents have been. However, Liaison Conference notes indicate that the IJA had settled on an offensive-based solution by the 20th of January.
The actual offensive began on the 12th of February with a belaboured Japanese crossing of the Xiushui River. The crossing was hard for the same reason why it was successful. By this point the spring thaw was already underway in central China and the river’s banks were greatly swollen with melt water. The Chinese had assumed this would be enough to discourage the Japanese and had only a minimal picket defence along the river while the bulk of their forces drilled further back.
The pontoon bridge across the river proved too unstable for Japan's medium tanks to cross, forcing them to sit out the battle.
The initial Chinese response, launched on the assumption that this was merely a raiding force, was too small to dislodge the initial toehold. Which meant the Japanese bridgehead was able to consolidate and dig in.
Having been alerted of the situation, 9th Military Region head, Xue Yue took over direction of the battle and funnelled in additional reinforcements to besiege the Japanese bridgehead. A furious artillery duel also erupted along the length of the river.
By the 18th the Xue Yue had arrayed the entire 19th Group Army[4] against the Bridgehead, and was leveraging this numerical advantage. On the 3rd of March the last Japanese holdout on the south bank of the river was finally overrun by NRA forces, with sporadic artillery exchanges continuing for the rest of the month.
China at last had a real victory under its belt.
Historiography Time: The “Early Thaw” debate
The importance of this victory has been called into question.
Supposedly based on POW testimony from the time of the battle, the KMT government has widely propagated the idea that they had halted and turned back a major operation intended to seize Nanchang. Supposedly this was “Operation Early Thaw”
However, post war testimony of high ranking IJA officers in British custody indicates that the operation was only ever intended to be a spoiling maneuver. Which succeeded in forcing the Chinese to abandon their plans for a spring offensive.
Proponents of Operation Early Thaw tend to dismiss the post war testimonial as retroactive justification for an earlier defeat. Proponents of the spoiling attack theory point out that the KMT had every reason to elevate the victory and explain away the disproportionate casualties suffered by the NRA during the campaign.
In either case the documents to prove one way or another no longer exist.
The testimony of Otozō Yamada, commander of the Central China Expeditionary Army at the time of the battle, is central to the spoiling attack theory.
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[1] one poster “depicting” the Battle Off Borneo notably featured Japanese battleships erupting into flames as though it was a repeat of Jutland.
[2] and his sister!
[3] which it initially had been.
[4] and a “group army” in western parlance would be just an army, not an army group. They are facing off against an IJA army, which I’ll remind you is a corps-level formation. God these non standard terminologies make me want to pull my hair out. HERE’S HOPING I CAN BUTTERFLY AWAY THE SOVIET’S STUPID BRIGADE SIZED DIVISION, DIVISION SIZED CORPS, CORPS SIZED ARMY, AND ARMY SIZED FRONT BEFORE I HAVE TO DEAL WITH THAT BULLSH*T!
And now to touch up the Dutch section...