marathag
Banned
Whatever Axis Power remains by August, 1945, will get those buckets of Instant Sunshine.
Italy remains neutral in World War II. What happens to its territories and colonies?
- Thread starter Ricardolindo
- Start date
Whatever Axis Power remains by August, 1945, will get those buckets of Instant Sunshine.
I think it is important to look at how the war plays out with a neutral Italy. It changes quite a lot of things, even if we can easily assume that the Allies win in the end.
The events of the war will shape Italian perceptions and choices, and define on what grounds it enters the postwar order. An important player of course (probably more so than in 1940, just because of the intact industrial base) but not top tier.
I think it is important to stress how the Fascist leadership viewed the Italian position in 1940: they were dissatisfied with it. They were nowhere near the mood of even considering letting anything slip from their grasp. Rather, they were quite determined to expand that grasp. Which is why, of course, Mussolini chose to enter the war IOTL, which of course proved a disaster in hindsight for their goals.
The logic of declaring war was quite compelling from a Fascist standpoint in mid-1940. There were disagreements, but those who voiced them (notably Ciano) were still very much in favor of wars of aggression, simply not convinced (rightly so, it turned out) that conditions were as favorable as Mussolini thought they were in that particular circumstance. The Fascist leadership broadly agreed that Italy should take more turf if opportunity presented itself. WWII would present opportunity even if they are not joining in with Germany (which however had become the default alignment by 1940).
They also had a target list, which pointedly included French territory (both metropolitan and colonial) and some British possessions/sphere of influence. Then there were Yugoslavia and Greece. An Italy that opts not to enter the war against the Entente is still likely to go after the latter two, in whichever order they find suitable, and seek alliances with Hungary and Bulgaria, and perhaps also Romania, in the process. Which still works on the lines of cooperation with Berlin (who's courting at least Romania and Hungary).
Another point worth noting is the deep-rooted hostility with the Soviets, which may translate into a volunteer Italian division in *Barbarossa. Which will sell not well post-war.
Even before that, how does no Italian DOW impact the French front in 1940, and the subsequent Franco-British relations, for instance? Fall of France probably still happens, but it is delayed. Britain has more resources at hand (not having to worry about Africa) and might not be as worried about the French navy without an active Med front. Does this impact the Free French and how many French colonies they have at start? What about Vichy? Hitler will have room to try harder to bring it in full into the Axis fold, however successful it is likely to be (very little I suspect).
Clearly, if we have something like a French Civil War of sorts within WWII, Italy will be extremely tempted to interfere and perhaps try some landgrab. But that would be risky, and is probably not compatible with Italian continued neutrality.
Honestly, I wonder if the Fascist mindset is really compatible with Italian neutrality throughout the war.
The events of the war will shape Italian perceptions and choices, and define on what grounds it enters the postwar order. An important player of course (probably more so than in 1940, just because of the intact industrial base) but not top tier.
I think it is important to stress how the Fascist leadership viewed the Italian position in 1940: they were dissatisfied with it. They were nowhere near the mood of even considering letting anything slip from their grasp. Rather, they were quite determined to expand that grasp. Which is why, of course, Mussolini chose to enter the war IOTL, which of course proved a disaster in hindsight for their goals.
The logic of declaring war was quite compelling from a Fascist standpoint in mid-1940. There were disagreements, but those who voiced them (notably Ciano) were still very much in favor of wars of aggression, simply not convinced (rightly so, it turned out) that conditions were as favorable as Mussolini thought they were in that particular circumstance. The Fascist leadership broadly agreed that Italy should take more turf if opportunity presented itself. WWII would present opportunity even if they are not joining in with Germany (which however had become the default alignment by 1940).
They also had a target list, which pointedly included French territory (both metropolitan and colonial) and some British possessions/sphere of influence. Then there were Yugoslavia and Greece. An Italy that opts not to enter the war against the Entente is still likely to go after the latter two, in whichever order they find suitable, and seek alliances with Hungary and Bulgaria, and perhaps also Romania, in the process. Which still works on the lines of cooperation with Berlin (who's courting at least Romania and Hungary).
Another point worth noting is the deep-rooted hostility with the Soviets, which may translate into a volunteer Italian division in *Barbarossa. Which will sell not well post-war.
Even before that, how does no Italian DOW impact the French front in 1940, and the subsequent Franco-British relations, for instance? Fall of France probably still happens, but it is delayed. Britain has more resources at hand (not having to worry about Africa) and might not be as worried about the French navy without an active Med front. Does this impact the Free French and how many French colonies they have at start? What about Vichy? Hitler will have room to try harder to bring it in full into the Axis fold, however successful it is likely to be (very little I suspect).
Clearly, if we have something like a French Civil War of sorts within WWII, Italy will be extremely tempted to interfere and perhaps try some landgrab. But that would be risky, and is probably not compatible with Italian continued neutrality.
Honestly, I wonder if the Fascist mindset is really compatible with Italian neutrality throughout the war.
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marathag
Banned
Not so deep rooted to me
From the wiki
The governments of Benito Mussolini's Italy and Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union recognised each other as de jure governments of their respective countries and established diplomatic relations on 7 February 1924 (shortly after the death of Vladimir Lenin). A preliminary agreement had been made on 26 December 1921, de facto recognising the Soviet Union. The two states signed a Treaty on Friendship, Non-Aggression and Neutrality on 2 September 1933, and although the treaty formally remained in effect until the Italian declaration of war against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, relations had already degraded with the advent of the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War.[4]
Even during World War II, when Italy was on Germany's side fighting against USSR, Italian troops were known for treating Soviet civilians much better than the Germans did. After the Italians signed an act of surrender to the Allied powers of World War II on 29 September 1943, at the Three Powers Conference in Moscow, the Soviets, Americans and British adopted the Declaration Regarding Italy, within which they agreed to the overthrow of Fascism in Italy, the barring of Fascists from public life and setting up "democratic organs." The Soviet Union restored full diplomatic relations with Italy on 25 October 1944.
Note the "relations had already degraded" bit. It is true, however, that Fascist Italy had a decent diplomatic relationship with Moscow in general during the twenties, despite staunch anti-Communism.
Good insights. A few remarks.
- An Italian volunteer division or a corps in the invasion of the SU makes Italy less good-looking post-war... to the SU. That's the same situation of Spain. OTOH, there are powers, say, the USA, who by then will like anti-Communism. The overall Italian position wouldn't be all too different from that of Spain: not immediately in the UN, but eventually, yes; not immediately in NATO/OTAN, but eventually, yes.
- An Italian separate war against Yugoslavia or Grece might sell well with the internal Italian public opinion and with the Fascist power base. I disagree it would be a form of cooperation with Germany. Germany wanted the Southern Balkans to remain neutral, if friendly, so as to provide an uncrossable buffer zone covering the Southern flank of Barbarossa. They did not want the British to meddle in there from the Med, in particular they did not want British bombers flying in.
- The ideal solution for Italy would be, for instance, the following series of moves. Mind you, it requires a very intelligent leadership and lots of luck, so there's an impolite word on these forums for such a winning streak:
* in 1940, drive a hard bargain with France. Italy will remain neutral and not stab them in the back if France gives up... no homeland territories, that would be a non-starter, and no Tunisia (also impossible). But something to show the Italian crowd-filled squares, if not colonial territories, some other advantage. See, I'm taking care of Italian interests without having to spill one drop of Italian blood, cheer me.
* in 1941, find a casus belli and attack Yugoslavia, rather than Greece. Less logistical problems than with Greece, a possibility of isolating the target diplomatically, and Yugoslavia, unlike Greece, is a patchwork country. Germany won't like it, but Greece and Bulgaria still make for that neutral buffer. Don't try to invade and conquer all of Yugoslavia, rather make sure you take border regions where there still are Italian minorities, and do what's possible to set up a friendly Croatian state. If Yugoslavia collapses and fragments, so much the better. Demand basing rights on the other shore of the Adriatic, then call it a day before the British can push themselves to intervene. See, we have had our war for our interests at our terms.
* in 1942-43, let volunteers form an Italian division for the Germans fighting in the SU. Get rid of extremist Fascists there. Also, try to draw a profit by trading with both sides. This will keep Germany off Italy's back. The Allies won't like it, but so be it.
* in 1944, withdraw the remnants of the Italian volunteers and sweep them under the carpet in some backwater (say in AOI). Keep trading with both sides, but now favoring the Allies. Start presenting diplomatic protests for the cargo ships sunk by U-Boote.
* in 1945, declare war on Germany for the above, and carry out a well-prepared invasion of the Austrian border regions.
Italy can then be a founding member of the UN, and most likely of the NATO/OTAN. It will still have a bad reputation as a fair-weather ally, a dictatorship ("but he's our SOB!"), and a one-time contributor to the Axis' manpower pool for that division... buth nothing that cannot be conveniently forgotten by 1955.
No permanent SC seat, though, I'd say, no matter if they are a somewhat-great power.
Why so? Mussolini loathed Hitler. He got into Germany's arms in a fit of rage at the Abyssinia War embargo, but he had, up to that point, opposed Germany at every turn. Hell, even after joining the war Mussolini showed a pretty deep distaste for the Austrian Corporal, which only made worse the self-esteem issues he developed on Italy's behalf as Germany went from victory to victory. As late as '43 he showed a lot more fear than sympathy for Hitler, discussing an armistice in terms of "Germany will skin us alive if we try".
The problem, if anything, is that an Italy not in the Nazi camp might be too quick to fall into the Allied camp, negating the "neutral" conditions.
It's more that Libya's population was awfully small and there were some sizeable Italian communities in there since the end of the 1800s, which made flipping its demographics pretty easy. It had less than 900,000 inhabitants in 1939, and around 120,000 of those were Italian; and this before the start of an actual colonial effort, which was planned to bring approximately half a million Italians. Together with at least a sliver of equality for the Arabic population (including a special citizenship that gave them full rights within the colony itself and some respect for their Islamic religion), Italy's hold on Libya could have been pretty solid.
Technically Italy did that IOTL, even if they had been in the Nazi camp for quite a while.
In practical terms gifts, of US made modern weapons would be more valuable. P51 fighters, A26 bombers, M10 Tank destroyers, Italy had some good weapons, but some were really bad, and most obsolescent. From 1943 The US armed outright 22 non US Army ground combat divisions, and the equivalent of a dozen more, plus equipment for corps and army level support units. Adding another ten infantry divisions worth of arms and several hundred aircraft for modern tactical and operational air support would not be a overreach.
Post war access to US capitol on favorable terms would be valuable as well for taking best advantage of Italies intact industrial plant. The italian Facist government can play the anti Communist card and be included in whatever sort of 'Marshal Plan' equivalent there is post war. Slices of distant African country side look less desirable in comparison to replacing antiquated tanks, or cosy deals developing the Lybian littoral.
This sounds sensible, but "sensible" is not exactly the word I would use to describe the collective mind of the Italian Fascist regime, or Fascism in general.
While they certainly appreciated good shiny new military toys, they were quite serious about the map coloring thing.
Again, a very big part of the point why Fascism was in power in Italy was precisely that Italy had less than it "deserved" on the world stage, and that thinking went largely in territorial terms. Slices of distant African country were quite high priority to them (though slices of somewhat less distant Yugoslav country were supposedly much higher, with other places in Europe, primarily French territory, also being a strong desideratum).
Fascism, almost by default, puts valor and glory above "soulless" technical strength and such other material trivialities.
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True, Mussolini cant be described as 'sensible', but this scale of bribe is a large shiny object that might catch his attention.
Too shiny an object. Those are top of line mid-war US weapons. That is what the Brits get. More likely they get Stuart tanks, Airacobras and M3 Gun Motor Carriages. Those are still well ahead of anything the Italians had with a possible exception of the TD.
thaddeus
Donor
there was a thread posted not too long ago about an early Italian invasion of Yugoslavia (during the 1930's) which seems a good POD as to Italian neutrality?
my speculation was that Germany obtained an earlier Anschluss to side with Italy, which opportunism poisons their relations.
so somewhat recognizable events leading up to 1939? but with Italy exhausted from adventures in Africa, Balkans, and Spanish Civil War? and poorer relations with Germany?
We had a decent thread on this very question just last year...
Italy neutral in WWII: post-war effects?
Italy neutral in WWII: post-war effects?
Yeah, exactly.
It's not like the Maghreb - the indigenous population is just a whole lot smaller.
So an aggressive European settlement regime like the one Moose was starting to mount could actually have a shot of creating a majority Italian Libya by some point mid-century, if it was sustained.
And once the oil reserves are discovered there...they could help bootstrap the modernization the Italian economy will desperately need (more than offsetting reduced postwar Marshall Plan aid), though it could introduce unwelcome distortions, too...
Yes, it's very hard to see how Italy in this scenario could keep Ethiopia long-term. I mean, more than a generation.
Eritrea, on the other hand...
As I said last year on this: There's actually a good chance that the Italians might be able to do something with Eritrea, which by the late 1930's also had a significant European population, lots of regime investment, and significant local support for the regime (and much less for any union with the Amhara), especially among Christians (who accounted for something close to half the population, let us not forget); perhaps some kind of commonwealth status, eventually - something like Ivory Coast's (or heck Djibouti's) relationship with France, at worst. Ethiopia, on the other hand, will get its own insurgency once decolonization kicks in for Africa in earnest in the 50's and 60's (most likely a left-wing one party state rather than a return of Haile Selassie, with a strong chance of ethnic civil war afterward). Eventually, a post-Mussolini government will look for an exit door.
Eritrea was different from Ethiopia; Italy had been there already for at least three generations previously; it had made a major investment there; and it's small enough - only a million people in 1940, with about 100,000 Italians - that they could have a much greater social, economic and cultural impact there, and it had a greater exposure to modernity than most of Ethiopia had by 1940. Not impossible it could end up like New Caledonia or Reunion - a stable, overseas department of the Italian polity.
Pretty much. Ethiopia is a lost cause, Somalia is not great, but I can see Eritrea becoming an Italian French Guiana.