Italy out of WWI by 1917

[Redbeard]

In OTL the Italians suffered a big defeat at Capporetto/Karfreit in autumn of 1917 at the hand of the Austro-Hungarians with German assistance. The defeat can best be described as a collapse of the front, but by hairsbreadth Italy was saved from total collapse as a new defensive line was established at the Piave. The chief of the Italian Army Cadorna was sacked, but Italy stayed in the war.

But what if the panic spreads to Rome and Italy sues for an armistice?

Would the central powers go for occupying all of Northern Italy and open a southern front on France?

Or would both Germany and Austria-Hungary concentrate all efforts on the Western Front in spring 1918?

In WWI the A-H Army was some 70+ Divisions, and although not all were that reliable, there was a core of very tough troops and it would not be hard to find a large number of dependable Divisions at least as good as the German non-stormtropper Divisions of 1918. Would the Austro-Hungarians deployed against the French in 1918 be the drop that has the Entente cup flow over?

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Melvin Loh]

Then wouldn't the British, French and US, as happened OTL post-Caporetto in northern Italy, have still deployed their combat divs to counter as possible German-Austrian offensive in southern France ?

Oh, another factor re the A-H army of 1917- wasn't the rank and file seriously affected by problems of ethnic rivalry and distrust by Slavic conscripts with their Hapsburg overlords (hence the Czech Legion's formation from among captured A-H troops in Russian hands) ? Therefore, wouldn't the Austrian army's quality, if committed to the Western Front, have been compromised by disloyal, untrustworthy (to the Austrians) Poles, Czechs, Ruthenes, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, etc ?

 

[Redbeard]

The foreign troops only arrived after the front had settled again at the Piave 30km North of Venice in November. I believe most arrived in 1918 only and because it was feared that the Italians would collapse again (10-12 Divisions max, of which five British).

The A-H army sure had a lot of problems with nationalist sentiments among mainly Slav groups, but it should not be discounted as a fighting force. The A-H forces at Caporetto actually used infiltration tactics as skilfully as the German stormtroopers, and in general I think the regiments recruited in Slav areas would be less discontented about fighting French and British than Russian "Slav brothers". The German speaking regiments, which accounted for about a quarter, were as loyal as any from Germany proper, and the 20% Hungarians could no way be counted on the Slav side (but not 100% on the German/Austrian either). The 6 German and 9 A-H Divisions that took part at Caporetto were of high quality so an Italian collapse would provide at least 15 extra good Divisions for the spring offensive. If counting the German speaking part of the A-H army 15-20 A-H Divisions of good loyalty should be available.

I know that the British in early 1918 had a couple of hundred thousand men in UK in formed Divisions (Lloyd George wanted to prevent Haig from new offensives by keeping troops away from the front!), but if the initial German/A-H offensive has 15+ extra spearhead Divisions isn't there a chance of a genuine breakthrough and a political collapse. In such a scenario extra troops in UK or anywhere else than at the breakthrough will be of little comfort.

In such a TL the Entente much be politically shaken by both Russia and Italy knocked out in short order and with Communists smelling blood.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[LordKalvan]

WW1 in Italy was felt completely different from WW2 by the people. It was a war with a significant popular backing, and it was very very unlikely that Italy could have asked an armistice. The defensive line of Piave was not the last ditch. The real last ditch was at the Adige river, some 150 km to the rear.
I really doubt that the Central Powers could have done much better than what they did at Caporetto (exploit a breakthough and follow up to the next defensive position).
From a military point of view, an attack across the Adige river would have required troops the CP did not have available, as well as significant amounts of supplies (which again were missing, and in any case would have been difficult to move to the Adige).
WW1 was not a war of armistices: it was a slugging war, fought in the trenches, with minor movements. If we except the Eastern front, I believe that the major forward moving was the one at Caporetto.
Even Serbia, who finally was crushed, did not ask an armistice. The remaining portions of the Serbian army were evacuated by sea, and Serbia stayed in the fight.
Additionally, the civilian population was not as much "in the war" as it happened 25 years later. There were some bombings from aeroplanes, but overall they were not significant.
I agree that an Italian collapse (after Serbia and Russia) would have been a definitive blow for the Entente, but it is not in the cards. The only possible solution would be a Communist raising (coupled maybe with a mutiny at the front), but from that point of view France was much more in danger.

 

[Redbeard]

Hi LordKalvan

I don't agree about WWI being significantly more popular among the Italians than WWII, but I'm sure it has afterwards been viewed in a much more positive light; after all they were all the time on the winning side in WWI.

First the losses in the Italian Army were horrendous and not resulting in any gains. The Chief of the Army Cadorna was an extremely ruthless leader pressing for frontal attack after frontal attack and he didn't hesitate about widespread executions to scare soldiers to stay in line. In comparison Haig, Nivelle and the other guys from the west front appear both innovative and gentle. By 1917 communist and pacifist sentiments were strong among Italians, and although it probably was much owed to Cadorna’s harsh action that a new line was established at the Piave, the government just had to sack him if internal peace was to be kept. That Government BTW was a new one too, as the defeat at Caporetto also had the old government collapse. Apart from sacking Cadorna the new government also rounded up all the pacifists and communists they could find and in a way it was a kind of deal with the population: “OK you get Cadorna, we get the leading pacifists and communists!†(BTW Cadorna was “rehabilitated†by Mussolini later).

I agree that the central powers probably did not have the military/logistical capacity to make a very deep penetration, but my point is that the political crisis was only stemmed by a number of actions “just in timeâ€. It is not difficult to imagine something going wrong, or just a little late, in the 1917 Italian political system. And if panic reigns in Rome, it really doesn’t matter what the real potential of the Army is. And if the Central powers are a little smart diplomatically and offer a favourable peace, any Italian government would have serious difficulties if not accepting a chance to get out of the war. I guess something like Hitler’s surprisingly favourable peace offer to the French in 1940 eradicating any ideas of continuing the fight from the colonies.

I’m much more in doubt if extra Divisions on the west front will help. First the CP still have real trouble in truly exploiting a breakthrough, and the problem is probably more related to lacking mobility and logistics than the number of fresh Divisions. The only way they could win would be if the Entente panics politically. Both Italy and Russia out in late 1917 will for sure have shaken the Entente morally, but in OTL spring offensive of 1918 neither the French nor the British really wavered and uncommitted reserves were still there. Even if the CP breaks through to Paris it will not be over, as Paris was prepared for defence (like in 1870-71). In such a situation I believe the prospect of: “The Yanks are coming!†will be important. As long as the Entente can keep a bridgehead around a substantial port they can always hope of striking back. Imagine what difference it would have made if USA had been in the war in May 1940!

The big question is if a major setback will have the Entente armies/populations say: “it’s not worth itâ€. I can’t exclude that, and the French 1917 mutinies certainly make an impression, but on the other hand I also have an impression of the French being much underestimated (by anyone but the French).

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[LordKalvan]

Hi LordKalvan

I don't agree about WWI being significantly more popular among the Italians than WWII, but I'm sure it has afterwards been viewed in a much more positive light; after all they were all the time on the winning side in WWI.

First the losses in the Italian Army were horrendous and not resulting in any gains. The Chief of the Army Cadorna was an extremely ruthless leader pressing for frontal attack after frontal attack and he didn't hesitate about widespread executions to scare soldiers to stay in line. In comparison Haig, Nivelle and the other guys from the west front appear both innovative and gentle. By 1917 communist and pacifist sentiments were strong among Italians, and although it probably was much owed to Cadorna’s harsh action that a new line was established at the Piave, the government just had to sack him if internal peace was to be kept. That Government BTW was a new one too, as the defeat at Caporetto also had the old government collapse. Apart from sacking Cadorna the new government also rounded up all the pacifists and communists they could find and in a way it was a kind of deal with the population: “OK you get Cadorna, we get the leading pacifists and communists!†(BTW Cadorna was “rehabilitated†by Mussolini later).

I agree that the central powers probably did not have the military/logistical capacity to make a very deep penetration, but my point is that the political crisis was only stemmed by a number of actions “just in timeâ€. It is not difficult to imagine something going wrong, or just a little late, in the 1917 Italian political system. And if panic reigns in Rome, it really doesn’t matter what the real potential of the Army is. And if the Central powers are a little smart diplomatically and offer a favourable peace, any Italian government would have serious difficulties if not accepting a chance to get out of the war. I guess something like Hitler’s surprisingly favourable peace offer to the French in 1940 eradicating any ideas of continuing the fight from the colonies.

I’m much more in doubt if extra Divisions on the west front will help. First the CP still have real trouble in truly exploiting a breakthrough, and the problem is probably more related to lacking mobility and logistics than the number of fresh Divisions. The only way they could win would be if the Entente panics politically. Both Italy and Russia out in late 1917 will for sure have shaken the Entente morally, but in OTL spring offensive of 1918 neither the French nor the British really wavered and uncommitted reserves were still there. Even if the CP breaks through to Paris it will not be over, as Paris was prepared for defence (like in 1870-71). In such a situation I believe the prospect of: “The Yanks are coming!†will be important. As long as the Entente can keep a bridgehead around a substantial port they can always hope of striking back. Imagine what difference it would have made if USA had been in the war in May 1940!

The big question is if a major setback will have the Entente armies/populations say: “it’s not worth itâ€. I can’t exclude that, and the French 1917 mutinies certainly make an impression, but on the other hand I also have an impression of the French being much underestimated (by anyone but the French).

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

Hi, Redbeard.
I do not disagree with you on most points. WW1 was a butchers' war, where most generals did not even think before sending tens of thousands of men to die for no gain, or very small ones. Cadorna was certainly one of the worst, and the Isonzo battles are a good proof of that.
On the other hand, I am still convinced that the Caporetto offensive went beyond the wildest hopes of the CP, and also that by 1917 the war conclusions was already set out: the CP could not win.
Don't take me wrong: the communist and pacifist sentiments were there, but not strong enough to erupt into a revolution. Don't forget that at the time the Italians were mostly farmers (small tenants in the North down to Tuscany, laborers in the South), and in this class of population there was not a lot of pacifist sympathies: tipically, farmers have always been born soldiers, capable to take punishments that people used to a better lifestyle could not.
The war was seen as the end of the unification process, and Austria was always being depicted as a bug bear.
It was not difficult to send supplies to Italy: the Mediterranean was always an Entente lake, and AH never tried to force the Adriatic mouth (in a way, the thing I was never able to fully understand is why AH, without colonies and bottled up in the Adriatic, would need to keep up a significant (if not a major) fleet. They would have done better diverting those resources to the army, since they did not even have the German fig-leaf of the fleet-in-being theory).
It is true that the government lost a confidence vote, and was replaced. But in a way, this confirms the fact that Italy was strongly in the war. There was never a serious consideration given to requesting an armistice.
In WW1 the countries which went really down the drain were the big multi-national empires, Russia and AH (and in a lesser way the Ottomans). It was a time of nationalism, for good or bad.