Italy honors triple alliance in 1914

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In the end, a secret protocol is signed to the Triple Alliance pact whereby Austria promises to cede Trento, Gorizia, and western Istria (but not Trieste) in case of Italian partecipation to a general war on the side of Austria. Moreover, the protocol ensures the allies' support for Italian claims on French possessions in case of war.

Eurofed, I know you are enthusiastic about Italian gains in the region, but giving western Istria to Italy is pointless if they dont get Trieste. Trentino and Gorizia-Gradiscia is about as much as the Austrians would be willing to give when they get to keep Trieste. Wait a decade or two for anything else.;)

Moreover, Germany signs a naval pact with Britain, agreeing to limit the rate of its dreadnought-class battleship construction to parity with France or Russia. In exchange, Britain gives a secret guarantee of neutrality if Germany or its allies were to be attacked by a third great power.

You need to alienate France and Britain to achieve this. The HSF and Belgium were mere excuses for them to join the war.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Eurofed, I know you are enthusiastic about Italian gains in the region, but giving western Istria to Italy is pointless if they dont get Trieste. Trentino and Gorizia-Gradiscia is about as much as the Austrians would be willing to give when they get to keep Trieste. Wait a decade or two for anything else.;)

Actually, I'm enthusiastic about the whole concept of German-Italian-Hungarian partition of the Habsburg corpse, to give a more stableish settlment to the region (as two nationally-compact great powers on a rise and a regional multinational but less so power take the place of a decaying multinational dynastic great power to keep order in the region), and because it makes the German-Italian partnership solid for the ages, which I fancy a lot, in combination with another great power, to provide a realatively stable and, in 1866-1914, sane and decent hegemony to Europe. As it concerns the Balkans, partition is IMO a rather more sensible and realistic solution than waiting for the Habsburg to provide that federal reform of the empire they fought tooth and claw against for 100 years.

But I wholly agree that in this specific TL, the Italian bill can be safely toned down to Trento and Gorizia-Gradisca. For the rest, Italy can wait that Germany tires of doing CPR to the Habsburg terminal case and sees the sense of completing its national unification. Time is on Rome's side. :D I've edited the TL to drop the guarantee on western Istria.

You need to alienate France and Britain to achieve this. The HSF and Belgium were mere excuses for them to join the war.

I utterly disagree. Belgium was the whole casus belli that Britain politically needed to join the war in 1914 (the British government would have fallen if they had tried to enter the war without it), and the naval antagonism was pretty much the whole point why Britain joined the Entente at all. Before the naval scare, Russia and France were the designated enemies of Britain and Germany was a friendly-to-true neutral.
 
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I utterly disagree. Belgium was the whole casus belli that Britain politically needed to join the war in 1914 (the British government would have fallen if they had tried to enter the war without it), and the naval antagonism was pretty much the whole point why Britain joined the Entente at all. Before the naval scare, Russia and Farnce were the designated enemies of Britain and Germany was a friendly-to-true neutral.

WWII taught us a causus belli can be fabricated, and one of Britain`s longstanding policies was to prevent continental hegemony.

Besides, WWI without the Brits is just... wrong.;) Especially if they end up on the losing side.:D
 
It is true that sections of the British establishment wanted to join France in any event.

I do not see the tripple Alliance holding as actually changing German strategy.

However had Germany decided to fight defensively in the West (and respect Belguim neutrality) I do not think British public and Parliamentary opinion would have allowed a declaration of war.

Assuming the premise of this OTL (I appreciate problems with Trieste but maybe Austria is going to get enough ports out of other parts of the East Adriatic coast)

Well France has to send some troops to defend in the South East. I do not think that any Italian invasion would be very effective but I think it weakens other French forces enough to see Paris fall.

I anticipate a Peace in which France loses some colonies to Germany (as well as Nice and Savoy to Italy).

I think Russia will accept the reality of the loss of Serbia.

There would not be much Britain could do about this.
 
I think that if Italy joined with Austria and Germany, Britain would be even more likely to join the war on the side of the French and Russians. Britain at this point was still emerging from its period of Splendid Isolation, and had informal defence agreements with France primarily aimed at Germany. The primary reason that the British moved out of their isolation was that it had been predicated on there not being a potential for hegemony on the continent, and the formation of Germany had profoundly threatened that. An alliance of Italy, Austria and Germany which is victorious over France and Russia is virtually unassailable by Britain alone, and British interests would demand that Britain intervene on the side of the lesser power. The expansion of the war to the Mediterranean threatens British holdings in Malta, Cyprus and Egypt, and also threatens the vital communications line with the Empire through the Suez canal. The British political heavyweights would not have stood idly by as Europe fell under Berlin's hegemony.
 
With Britain's navy so thinly spread out, having to cover both the Mediterranian and counter the High Seas Fleet, don't forget ever oppurtunistic Japan may see this as a perfect chance to jump on Britain's holdings in the Far East.
No, that can't happen unless there's an much earlier POD. The Japanese-Anglo Alliance was already established, and Japan honored it right after Great Britain asked for help just a month after hostilites broke out in Europe.
 

Eurofed

Banned
I think that if Italy joined with Austria and Germany, Britain would be even more likely to join the war on the side of the French and Russians. Britain at this point was still emerging from its period of Splendid Isolation, and had informal defence agreements with France primarily aimed at Germany. The primary reason that the British moved out of their isolation was that it had been predicated on there not being a potential for hegemony on the continent, and the formation of Germany had profoundly threatened that. An alliance of Italy, Austria and Germany which is victorious over France and Russia is virtually unassailable by Britain alone, and British interests would demand that Britain intervene on the side of the lesser power. The expansion of the war to the Mediterranean threatens British holdings in Malta, Cyprus and Egypt, and also threatens the vital communications line with the Empire through the Suez canal. The British political heavyweights would not have stood idly by as Europe fell under Berlin's hegemony.

Abstract geopolitical concerns about the balance of powers may be well and good for think-tanks and hawkish segments of the ruling classes, but in liberal democracies, legislatures and public opinions ar large generally require a casus belli rather more meaningful than abstract geopolitics, even in Britain, before they let the country spill its blood in a war. They Cfr. OTL WWI: German invasion of Belgium; WWII: German invasion of Czechia and Poland; Korean War: invasion of South Korea; Falklands/Malvinas War: Argentine's invasion of namesake; Kosovo War: Serbian human rights mass abuses; 1st Gulf War: Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 2nd Gulf War: bogus Iraqi WMDs.

What is the casus belli for Britain in the German Goes East WWI starting sequence ? Austria declared war to Serbia because it harbored a terrorist organization that killed its royalty; Russia first escalated that local conflict to a great-power war by attacking Austria and Germany and Italy are figthing to defend an ally from Entente attack. They are not directly threatening any neutral or British territory or strategic interest, and Britain has no alliance committment to fight on the side of France and Russia in an offensive war. Even IOTL, British entry was far from uncontroversial, and it is historical consensus that the UK government would have fallen if it had tried to make the country join the war without Belgium.

The Entente committment was still a new and shaky thing, a tentative realignment to the side of centuries-long traditional enemies, only based on recent German challenge to UK naval hegemony. And as it concerns the balance of power, a Franco-Russian hegemony on the continent and in the Mediterranean would be as unpleasant as a German-Italian one. There were surely some Germanophobe segments of the British ruling classes, but there were not in control of their peers, the Parliament, or the public opinion. Removing German invasion of Belgium steals the only really good argument they have for joining the Entente, even more so without the naval arms race with Germany. Germanophobe lobbies can certainly try to concoct another casus belli, but not in August 1914, they need time. And it is far from guaranteed that the government at large, Parliament, and public opinion will buy it, especially when the witness the harsh realities of trench warfare, and Ireland explodes.

If Britain doesn't go at war immediately, the Irish Home Rule bill goes into force, Ulster shall explode in rebellion against it, which shall soon extend the unrest to southern Ireland, the British Army shall be busy restoring order in the Emerald Isle, the appetite of the public opinion for imperialistic adventures on the continent shall plummet.
 
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The public at large doesn't need to be convinced of the need for war, in this period - just the cabinet, a majority of the parliament, and the King. Britain had managed to put itself in a sticky situation in that they had given assurances to France, and engaged in military consultations, without actually making a definite policy choice to ally. If Britain doesn't join the French, they're effectively betraying them, even if there aren't any concrete treaties being violated.

Germany and the Kaiser had gone out of their way to alienate Britain in the past decade or so, and so were seen by the British politicians and public as being menacing to the Empire. France had done a lot to smooth over difficulties, and was starting to be seen in a fairly favourable light. Additionally, the British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, who had substantial power of his own and was historically a major influence on the cabinet teetering on declaring war even prior to the news of Belgium's violation, saw Germany as Britain's major threat in Europe and believed that allying with France and Russia was the only way to counterbalance it. In the cabinet discussions, Belgium was seen by about half as being a way to sell war to the public, rather than being a reason for actually going to war. I am not aware of any historical consensus on the potential fall of the British government, and Massie's books argue against it.

I disagree with your sequence of events, too. A Serbian-backed terrorist kills the heir apparent to the Austrian throne. The Austrians eventually send a list of demands which effectively strip Serbia of its sovereignty. Serbia, on the advice of Russia, acquiesces to all but one of the demands, leading to governments around Europe breathing a sigh of relief that war has been averted. Historically Austria, undeterred, declared war. Your change at this point must be to have either Russia or Serbia start the war, but I don't see how. Russia was not particularly interested in going to war over Serbia, but was bound by its treaty to support Serbia if it was attacked - if Serbia suicidally attacks Austria, Russia is not obliged to intervene and the most likely outcome IMO is the conquest of Serbia by the Austrians and a peace conference with all the Great Powers invited. Russia isn't going to declare war on Austria unless they are assured that Germany isn't going to get involved, and Germany isn't going to leave Austria in the lurch. How does your war start?
 

Eurofed

Banned
Britain had managed to put itself in a sticky situation in that they had given assurances to France, and engaged in military consultations, without actually making a definite policy choice to ally. If Britain doesn't join the French, they're effectively betraying them, even if there aren't any concrete treaties being violated.

As you acknowledge, these half-step fuzzy committments have nowhere the binding value of a concrete alliance treaty or military guarantee and take little loss of face if cobelligerance doesn't follow. Moreover, my scenario assumes that Germany offers to limit its battleship building rate if Britain agrees to a non-aggression pact. This is an offer that Britain would have surely taken, and such a pact would butterfly away or trump any such informal "assurances", since the naval arms race was the whole point of Anglo-German antagonism.

Germany and the Kaiser had gone out of their way to alienate Britain in the past decade or so, and so were seen by the British politicians and public as being menacing to the Empire.

Yup, but the whole point of such Anglo-German alienation was the dreadnought arms race. If Germany sees the inevitability of a Russia First strategy, and therefore the necessity of keeping Italy a loyal ally and Britain a friendly neutral, and takes the necessary diplomatic steps (giving guarantees of territorial compensations to Italy and a naval limitation pact to Britain), then such antagonism shall evaporate. Britain and Germany had no other serious motive of enimity besides the naval arms race, and without it, shall remain in or return to a state of friendly neutrality as in mid-late 1800s.

the British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, who had substantial power of his own and was historically a major influence on the cabinet teetering on declaring war even prior to the news of Belgium's violation, saw Germany as Britain's major threat in Europe and believed that allying with France and Russia was the only way to counterbalance it. In the cabinet discussions, Belgium was seen by about half as being a way to sell war to the public, rather than being a reason for actually going to war. I am not aware of any historical consensus on the potential fall of the British government, and Massie's books argue against it.

Well, Ferguson's books argue in favor of it. :D Moreover, even without taking the naval pact into consideration, which changes everything, the other half of the cabinet deemed Belgium as the reason for going to war, so in the lack of it would strongly oppose a declaration of war, and it is much less probable that Grey and the Germanophobe war hawks would be able to force through a declaration of war in the cabinet and the Parliament. Moreover, if the naval pact is in place, the main cause of antagonism with Germany would not exist, and Britain would indeed be committed to neutrality. In such a situation, even assuming that Grey himself still remains a Germanophobe war hawk, he would absolutely lack any strong following in the country, parliament, and cabinet.

I disagree with your sequence of events, too. A Serbian-backed terrorist kills the heir apparent to the Austrian throne. The Austrians eventually send a list of demands which effectively strip Serbia of its sovereignty. Serbia, on the advice of Russia, acquiesces to all but one of the demands, leading to governments around Europe breathing a sigh of relief that war has been averted. Historically Austria, undeterred, declared war. Your change at this point must be to have either Russia or Serbia start the war, but I don't see how. Russia was not particularly interested in going to war over Serbia, but was bound by its treaty to support Serbia if it was attacked - if Serbia suicidally attacks Austria, Russia is not obliged to intervene and the most likely outcome IMO is the conquest of Serbia by the Austrians and a peace conference with all the Great Powers invited. Russia isn't going to declare war on Austria unless they are assured that Germany isn't going to get involved, and Germany isn't going to leave Austria in the lurch. How does your war start?

Well, then I suppose we have to assume that in order to have a general war, we need a butterfly that makes Russia more belligerant. If Germany has been gearing its war machine towards a Russia first strategy in a Triple Alliance vs. Dual Entente general war for almost a decade, it is not difficult to assume that Russia as a reaction may become more antagonistic to the CPs than OTL. Moreover, Russian foreign policy often swung between phases of relative pacifism and of imperialistic belligerance. Therefore in this scenario, it may be butterflied in a militant phase as the Austrian ultimatum happens. This month, Tsar Nichy sees protection of Orthodox Serb kindred as his religious duty. Maybe they suggest Serbia to refuse most of the ultimatum, and pressure Austria to back down, and when Austria doesn't budge, they react with an ultimatum of theirs.
 
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Germany and Britain both offered naval agreements from time to time from the turn of the century until the outbreak of war, and they were all undermined by Germany. Anglo-German relations were actually on the mend when war broke out, as there hadn't been a serious issue for a while. Anglo-German tension wasn't solely caused by the Naval race, although that was a major contributor. Germany's quest for a "place in the sun" coupled with a consistent lack of understanding of British goals, objectives, desires, interests and policies meant that Germany tread on British toes time and time again. The fundamental issue, as I see it, was that the German foreign ministry and leadership believed that Britain needed an alliance with Germany as a fundamental element of policy, whereas British policy was that they needed to end their isolation and reach out towards a continental alliance, but that who is was was not vitally important so much as ensuring the balance of power remained intact. This was, of course, a multi-decade process, so depending how far back your naval assurances are the timeline could be substantially changed. By the 1911 crisis, Britain had picked a side between France and Germany, and it was just a matter of degrees - a naval agreement after this is not going to change anything, and an alignment before that would mean British support for, or at least not British opposition to, Germany's claims. Three-plus years of difference is going to put the whole situation out, and would almost certainly butterfly the Archduke's assassination. Germany and Britain cannot return to their previous diplomatic state due to substantial changes in diplomatic goals from both parties. Britain abandoned isolation as being no longer in its interest.

If one argues in favour and one against, there isn't really a consensus. IIRC there were some who stated they would resign if Britain went to war prior to Belgium's territorial violation, but they were not a majority of the cabinet, and the Prime Minister's vote would have been decisive.

I cannot see Russia starting anything with the same actors in place. Nicholas was enormously worried about war with Germany, particularly if coupled with Austria. Wilhelm had a tendency to agree with whomever he spoke to, and the German military establishment was quite aggressive and the Austrian extremely so, which points towards one of those two starting the ball rolling. If you want different actors, you'd probably need to look at a PoD prior to the Anglo-French alignment, but sufficient butterflies to cause a different mindset in Russia could also affect leadership in France, Italy, Germany, Austria and Britain. Historically, Russia felt capable of taking a strong stand in favour of Serbia against Germany and Austria because they had definite French support and probable British support, while Germany felt able to be aggressive because they believed that Britain had assured them of its neutrality.
 

Eurofed

Banned
By the 1911 crisis, Britain had picked a side between France and Germany, and it was just a matter of degrees - a naval agreement after this is not going to change anything, and an alignment before that would mean British support for, or at least not British opposition to, Germany's claims.

Well, the PoD I've devised involves Germany realizing they really need Italian loyalty and British neutrality (at least) as soon as ca. 1906 (when they choose Russia First as the strategic plan option). So the territorial guarantees to Italy and the naval pact with Britain occur in 1908-1909 (soon after the Bosnian crisis). The apex of the naval scare would be defused. And indeed I expect that this would cause Britain to be sympathetic to, or at least neutral towards, German claims during the Second Moroccan Crisis. With only Russia backing them, I expect that France would be forced to give a rather more balanced compromise than OTL. I expect this would mean that France has to cede Middle Congo and Gabon (and its right to the preemption of Belgian Congo) in exchange for a protectorate on Morocco.

Three-plus years of difference is going to put the whole situation out, and would almost certainly butterfly the Archduke's assassination.

I'm not convinced about that. I don't see how Anglo-German-Italian realignment in the Agadir Crisis would butterfly away the Italo-Ottoman war, and the Balkan Wars. The specific assassination event may or may not be butterflied away, but the possibility of a flashpoint in the Balkans during or after the Balkan Wars remains very high, give or take a couple years.

Germany and Britain cannot return to their previous diplomatic state due to substantial changes in diplomatic goals from both parties. Britain abandoned isolation as being no longer in its interest.

Well, they could switch from being a quasi-ally of France to be a quasi-ally of Germany, which nonetheless reserves the right (and is likely) to remain neutral in any general European conflict that does not affect its strategic interests. If France and Russia think Britain is going to remain neutral, they may easily still be willing to fight the Triple Alliance in a phase of nationalist militancy.

IIRC there were some who stated they would resign if Britain went to war prior to Belgium's territorial violation, but they were not a majority of the cabinet, and the Prime Minister's vote would have been decisive.

Asquith was not exactly a war hawk.

I cannot see Russia starting anything with the same actors in place. Nicholas was enormously worried about war with Germany, particularly if coupled with Austria. Wilhelm had a tendency to agree with whomever he spoke to, and the German military establishment was quite aggressive and the Austrian extremely so, which points towards one of those two starting the ball rolling. If you want different actors, you'd probably need to look at a PoD prior to the Anglo-French alignment, but sufficient butterflies to cause a different mindset in Russia could also affect leadership in France, Italy, Germany, Austria and Britain. Historically, Russia felt capable of taking a strong stand in favour of Serbia against Germany and Austria because they had definite French support and probable British support, while Germany felt able to be aggressive because they believed that Britain had assured them of its neutrality.

I assume that Russia would still feel capable of that if they have strong French support and they believe that Britain has assured them of its neutrlaity. But let's assume that you may be right and in order to have a war, we need for Germany and Austria to declare war to Russia first. It may be reasonable even under the Russia First plan if they expect to use their faster mobilization to gain a substantial strategic advantage (even if they cannot reasonably expect to vanquish Russia in a few weeks). With its territorial guarantees in place for years, and Britain expected to be a CP-friendly neutral, Italy is going to join the war immediately even if Germany or Austria declare war first. As it concerns Britain, with the realignment towards the Alliance caused by the naval pact, and belgium left alone, they are surely going to be CP-friendly neutrals, but I would not expect them to enter the war for the CPs with this casus belli.

Does this sequence looks more plausible to you ? This way, we may still have a WWI with CP Italy and neutral Britain. IMO Russia would not back down and let Serbia be conquered unless they have strong expectations that Britain would enter the war for the CPs.
 
If Britain is diplomatically in Germany's corner from around the Bosnian crisis, then I would expect that France would not be nearly so confident as she was historically. I recall reading that the biggest problem the British diplomats had was not keeping Germany in check but putting some backbone into the French. If they are left without significant support, IMO they'd probably end up being willing to concede quite a bit in order to avoid war.

If Italy has the full support of Germany, and some support from Austria and Britain, then they may feel less pressed to expand militarily. They'd likely have support for a diplomatic solution in their favour in Tunisia, which would assuage their need for a North African possession. As noted in the other thread, I agree that the Balkans would continue its fine tradition of causing problems, but I'm not sure that they would cause a Great Power military confrontation. If France and Russia are alone, facing Germany, Austria, Italy and possibly Britain, they would try to avoid war, as it would almost certainly be suicide.

Asquith was not a war hawk, but such a different alignment of British politics would mean that it is unlikely that he won the Prime Ministership. Indeed, British politics could be substantially different.

Each of your steps is individually plausible, I just feel that taken together they would not lead to a war between Great Powers. Ultimately, it's your timeline, so it's up to you.
 
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