I understand that Austria-Hungary had war plans against Italy they could dust off when Italy entered WW1. Hell, the USA had war plans against Britain! But my question revolves around the time required in 1914 to mobilize and get forces positioned for war. Germany's plans involved a quick offensive against France, so Germany would already be fully committed to its invasion of Belgium and France by the time Italy entered the war on the Allied side. Similarly, German and Austrial plans had to mobilize and position forces against Russia. By 1915, Both Germany and Austria-Hungary were deeply involved with major campaigns elsewhere. By then, its hard to imagine the CP making a major switch to completely defeat Italy, which was not the threat France, the BEF, and Russia were.
Italy first strategy
- Thread starter Sapiento
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I understand that Austria-Hungary had war plans against Italy they could dust off when Italy entered WW1. Hell, the USA had war plans against Britain! But my question revolves around the time required in 1914 to mobilize and get forces positioned for war. Germany's plans involved a quick offensive against France, so Germany would already be fully committed to its invasion of Belgium and France by the time Italy entered the war on the Allied side. Similarly, German and Austrial plans had to mobilize and position forces against Russia. By 1915, Both Germany and Austria-Hungary were deeply involved with major campaigns elsewhere. By then, its hard to imagine the CP making a major switch to completely defeat Italy, which was not the threat France, the BEF, and Russia were.
As zoomar correctly points out, any nation with a general staff worth their salaries has plans to attack anything and everything you care to name. The US has plans to attack Canada, plans to counter extraterrestrial invasions, and plans to even "attack" portions of the US. The fact that those plans exist doesn't mean any of the events foreseen in those plans are in any way plausible however.
What this thread has so far failed to do is answer the central question of Why.
Why would Germany and Austro-Hungary feel the need to attack Italy first? Why are the military threats posed by France and Russia not seen as more important? Why is the defeat of Italy seen as desirable? What gains can Germany and Austro-Hungary hope to see? What must be changed between the OTL's 1914 and TTL's 1914 to answer all the questions I've posed and the many others I haven't?
Until the initial "Whys" have been settled on, attempting to discuss the subsequent "Whats" will be fruitless.
The best way to 'knock Italy out' is to render them useless, not attack like A-H did in Asiago and maintain the bare minimum of troops possible. The Alps were probably the best defensive territory possible during WWI, might as well take advantage of it!
Either that or take an 'Italy first' position during pre-war negotiations, either to keep them out of the war or with post-war promises.
Either that or take an 'Italy first' position during pre-war negotiations, either to keep them out of the war or with post-war promises.
1914?
I always had the impression that the opening post didn't refer to a 1914-offensive, because nothing would be sillier in the light of already having to work on three fronts.
I am quite sure the question refers to a point later in the war when Italy already had attacked Austria and the CP might have ressources to spare.
I.e. either as an alternative to Verdun, or later on instead of the "Kaiserschlacht" of 1918.
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On terrain, the advantage is slightly on the Austrian side. The Italians can basically not go anywhere as after each Mountain Range, another one would come. Splendid.
The Austrians would at least in a handful of places be within range of a breakthrough into the open, flat terrain of Venetia.
I always had the impression that the opening post didn't refer to a 1914-offensive, because nothing would be sillier in the light of already having to work on three fronts.
I am quite sure the question refers to a point later in the war when Italy already had attacked Austria and the CP might have ressources to spare.
I.e. either as an alternative to Verdun, or later on instead of the "Kaiserschlacht" of 1918.
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On terrain, the advantage is slightly on the Austrian side. The Italians can basically not go anywhere as after each Mountain Range, another one would come. Splendid.
The Austrians would at least in a handful of places be within range of a breakthrough into the open, flat terrain of Venetia.
Pre-1914 or post-1914 the question of why still needs to be answered.
Why would the Central Powers concentrate on Italy? What benefits would they gain from doing so?
The benefits are only there if this scenario works insofar as to put Italy out of the war. Whether this can be achieved is, IMHO a matter of belief.
And, there is a lot of hindsight-thinking involved. Because we KNOW that the concentration on France in OTL didn't work out so well over the course of 1918, the Italian alternative arises in CP-wins resp. CP-stalemate-scenarios.
For Austria-Hungary, the benefits are not only quite at hand, but what other front should they concentrate on after Russia had been defeated? With Italy out as well, they wouldn't be out of the war (as Karl would have wished), but would have gotten a bit of time to breathe.
If Italy still fights on (and in no way would they lose a lot more than Venetia) and agrees to no armistice, I agree that the benefits are close to nil. Therefore, the decision to seek the decision in 1918 on the crucial French battelfields is quite understandable.
The most critical front of all: the home front.
Launching a huge series of offensives which will feed the casualty lists much faster and inflict more stress on Austria-Hungary than standing in the defensive while Cardona et. al. needlessly and incompetently sent Italian troops forward to be butchered against the Central Powers alpine defenses would.
The A-H is already coming apart at the seams in 1917. Standing on the defensive in the various fronts the A-H is engaged in will give Germany a better chance that a stable ally exists to her south.
Ok, I might try to answer some of these questions:
Why Italy first: it would free A-H troops for the east and west front, and would - to a certain degree - improve the resources situation for the CP. German submarines could operate from Italian ports like Genua. Additionally, the moral boost for CP troops and population could be used for propaganda. Additionally, it would take out 5 mio Italian soldiers from the equation.
Why F and R not more important: relation to answer above. F and R are not less important. To defeat Italy is a way to gain more strategic flexibility against France and Russia.
Why is Italy's defeat desirable: see above.
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Yes, I meant a later date, not 1914, but after Italy's entry into the war.
We certainly agree on the mean of any kind of Anti-Italian strategy. That's why my proposals always include the political need to entice Italy to the negotiating table and to reach an armistice as soon as possible.
But I would argue that if Austria-Hungary can harness the much more powerful German military machine for a "Caporeto II", there results are much more promising than standing on the defensive alone (or attacking alone as in OTL).
The Italian army and leadership in 1918 had undergone massive changes which cancelled out some of the folly and flaws of the previous years. Even on the defensive, AH alone would have a hard time dealing with them as soon as the Italians are geared for attack in the second half of the year. There would be hardly any stress-relief when compared to OTL. A retreat into the Alps might be a different thing and avoid a Vittorio Veneto. On the other hand, this frontline would again be much longer than the one achieved on the Piave.
Additionally, whereas the Germans were lacking, the Italian got some reinforcements from their Entente partners, turning the balance without more CP-emphasis on the theatre against Austria-Hungary.
By the way, I did a quick Wikipedia-check
eek on the number of casualties during the notorious Isonzo battles. Though Italians numbers were usually higher, the difference is not as big as I had expected. The k.k.-Army "coming apart at the seams" on the defensive would still be under massive stress, suffering from low morale as being on the withdrawal and see its time running off. I am simply afraid that this would not be enough. Italy has to be out for Austria-Hungary to come out of the war halfway in one piece.
However, in the end it comes down to what I always preach when it comes to the CP in 1917/18: diplomacy and territorial flexibility! In Italy, the same counts as on the Western Front. If anything is doable for the Central Powers, than the military side has to prove successful - and the diplomatic advances have to be loud and seductive. [It would be very interesting to know from someone with a good deal of knowledge of the situation in these place how plebiscites might have run in Trieste etc].
And if an emphasis on Italy (with a clear and limited aim, i.e. a Garda/Adige-front) prevents the Germans from launching the va-banque-game of the Great Offensives on the Western Front, the cards would be mixed differently there as well.
In the end, France is the decisive battlefield.
Going for an Italy first strategy would be gearing the CPs towards an impasse, methinks. Neither France nor Russia nor Britain are going to sit idly by, and if WW2 is any example this front would consume a lot of CP troops for little gain.
Which still won't work. Knocking Italy out via direct military defeat or a military catastrophe leading to an Italian Brest-Litovsk provides the CP with little in return. Leaving the casualties aside for the moment, the materials extorted or requisitioned from a now-neutral Italy will come nowhere near to making up for the materials expended in knocking Italy out.
As you note, simply standing on the defensive was becoming more than the A-H could handle. Shutting down the Italian front won't mean A-H troops are suddenly available for the Western Front or less stressful occupation duties in the east.
Winning the game in Italy isn't worth the candle.
Exactly, and pissing away Germany's increasingly waning strength in OTL sideshows like the OTL's occupation of the Ukraine and Baltics or this ATL's knock out blow on Italy prevents a telling blow or blows being made where they truly count: France.
I see this thread now seems to be asking what would have happened if Austria-Hungary planned from the get-go to backstab its nominal Italian ally and mobilized in the summer if 1914 for a massive invasion of Italy. That addresses my timing and mobilization comments, but as mentioned by Don Lardo, I still don't get the "why". Italy was not nearly the threat to the CP as France and Russia. I'm not all that sure the "Hungary" part of Austro-Hungary would be all that thrilled to see the Dual Monarchy pour massive forces into an invasion of Italy when huge Russian armies loomed just across the border to the east. And as mentioned...mountains. Quck invasions can work to knock people out of wars when your army can speed along low plains to easily reached strategic objectives like Paris. This almost worked in 1914 and did work in 1941. To knock Italy out, AH would have to visibly threaten Rome, and to get there they have to fight through easily defended terrain that even Italians could defend. I don't consider the situation in 1943 remotely equivalent. In WW2 the Italian people and many in the government were tired of 3 years of fighting and disillusioned with Mussolini. They saw the handwriting on the wall that the options were either quick surrender or fighting on and slowly becoming a Nazi-occupied territory - even something many fascists opposed. As things turned out that pretty much happened anyway, but hey. This would not apply in 1914.
. I don't consider the situation in 1943 remotely equivalent. In WW2 the Italian people and many in the government were tired of 3 years of fighting and disillusioned with Mussolini. They saw the handwriting on the wall that the options were either quick surrender or fighting on and slowly becoming a Nazi-occupied territory - even something many fascists opposed. As things turned out that pretty much happened anyway, but hey. This would not apply in 1914.Before or after Italy entering in the war?
Up to May 1915 Italy was neutral, and technically (but nobody believed it much) allied of germany-AH.
Are you planning
a) a Belgium-like attack on a neutral
or
b) having armies to sit down for a year
or
c) re-deploying the main bulk of CP armies countermanding previus orders (a.k.a. 'chaos') while the froggies are distracted frying slugs?
Probably not. But it might still work better than OTL for the CP.
What is the difference?
An Italian Brest-Litovsk is simply not doable. Unless the other Entente powers don't give up and if we assume that the US are in the war (nothing in the OP hints that not), it is far beyond the CP capabilities to conquer and hold enough Italian territory to push them that far.
Even with a successful offensive, territorial concessions or the promise of plebiscitess would still be necessary to lure Italy to the table - if at all.
Again, it is not as if fighting on the defensive comes for free, especially not as soon as the Italians start their own offensives. In my assumptions I do not even assume that a single nail is extorted from Italy.
I assume that a successful offensive would last two months (double the time of the main thrust of the Caporetto offensive), probably April/May 1918, would that be more costly than seven months defending against attacking Entente armies? Or even longer, assuming Austria-Hungary for some reasons hold out beyond October 1918?
If you take everything into account, there is still a net gain for the Austrians.
Absolutely. I do not expect Austrian troops in any kind to show up on the Western Front. Maybe a token force of half a handful of Divisions to sit in the Vosges plus a few more on the Salonika front. The latter should have some butterflies!
Well, pissing nor blowing in France did work too well either, OTL. If a point can be made for sitting on the strategical defensive, it should be France.
Besides, German contribution does not and cannot mean that the Western Front is significantly weakened. The maximum of troops contributed is limited by the logistical connections across the Alps. This would probably not mean many more German divisions used than during Caporetto.
Frankly i agree that a Italy first strategy is a good thing only if is done in 1914, Austria attack italy trough the Alps, when the bulk of the army is on the France border and the possibility of victory are higher and hold a defensive position in the east and begin the attack on Russia only after eliminate Italy. The only problem is...why do that? Except for extreme foresight or simple for extreme hate of Italy i don't see a reason to make Italy another Belgium or Russia, an early victory of A-H will probably bring a analog treaty of Russia and will make the italian refuse a peace.
An April/May 1918 offensive even with German help is not a sure knock-out, the last AH offensive is in June 1918 and was a total failure with that army stopped at the Piave in a manner that basically destroyed him and paved the way for the final offensive of Vittorio Veneto, but even if succesfull in bring an armistice with Italy the CP are still bound to lose in the field of France (the only that count in wwI) so the only gain obtained are maybe something to Versailles, maybe South Tyrol remain Austrian or other concession.
An April/May 1918 offensive even with German help is not a sure knock-out, the last AH offensive is in June 1918 and was a total failure with that army stopped at the Piave in a manner that basically destroyed him and paved the way for the final offensive of Vittorio Veneto, but even if succesfull in bring an armistice with Italy the CP are still bound to lose in the field of France (the only that count in wwI) so the only gain obtained are maybe something to Versailles, maybe South Tyrol remain Austrian or other concession.