Italico Valore - A more successful 1848 revolution in Italy - a TL

[Vinization]

How's the Austrian Navy doing? Weren't most of its sailors Italians? If they mutiny, Dalmatia might be screwed.

Also, great TL! Carlo Alberto is such a strange character, it's interesting to think about what could've happened if he grew a spine at the decisive moment. Here's to a decisive imperial defeat somewhere in Veneto!

 

[Vinization]

Also, I strongly advise you use threadmarks.

 

[LordKalvan]

Yeah, had Manin been replaced by a more revolutionary leader, Italy could have well grabbed the whole Dalmatian coast.

The problem is that there was not a more effective (and ruthless) potential leader, not in Venice and not in all of Italy, most likely. At least, no one comes to my mind, and please don't suggest Garibaldi

 

[Vinization]

Speaking of Garibaldi, will he be able to defeat the French siege of Rome? I would pay to see him and CA trying to have a civilized conversation, considering their colorful (what an understatement!) history. Two men who would probably kill each other in any other circumstance (Garibaldi was sentenced to death during the king's reactionary period) uniting against a common enemy (in this case the Austrians/Sicilians/reactionaries, of course, not the French).

 

[Thomas1195]

Speaking of Garibaldi, will he be able to defeat the French siege of Rome? I would pay to see him and CA trying to have a civilized conversation, considering their colorful (what an understatement!) history. Two men who would probably kill each other in any other circumstance (Garibaldi was sentenced to death during the king's reactionary period) uniting against a common enemy (in this case the Austrians/Sicilians/reactionaries, of course, not the French).

And for France, you can simply have Bonaparte pretenders banned from running for Presidency - in fact that legislation came close to be passed IOTL.

 

[Thomas1195]

The problem is that there was not a more effective (and ruthless) potential leader, not in Venice and not in all of Italy, most likely. At least, no one comes to my mind, and please don't suggest Garibaldi

But, even someone who was less "old Venetian" like Tommaseo would be better, especially in integrating the Terrafirma and inciting revolutions in Dalmatia.

 

[Deleted member 147289]

Chapter 7 has been changed to add more historical plausibility to the events

 

[Deleted member 147289]

8. THE SITUATION IN EUROPE

The revolts of 1848 were not confined to the Italian peninsula and the empire of Austria, but overwhelmed the entire continent except for Russia. In France, the July monarchy had been overthrown by a republican liberal insurgency that the king had not felt he could repress with force, leading to his fall. From the first moment the republic was divided between its liberal and conservative factions, between those who favored a new monarchy and those who were in favor of the continuation of the republican experiment, those who wanted to "isolate themselves" to build a stronger state and those who wanted to export the revolution as in 1789, in Belgium and Germany. The power of the lower classes frightened the French elites, bringing them former supporters of the monarchy to organize a conservative network, aimed at keeping the populace under control and countering every move aimed at reducing too much the traditional power of the upper classes. In doing so, French society became even more polarized, leading to ever higher social tensions which risked exploding into a new revolution.

Germany was also going through its revolutionary period, starting with the liberal riots of Vienna which spread throughout the German Confederation throwing the absolute monarchies of Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria into chaos. The people demanded more political rights, an end to censorship and freedom of assembly, with more radical voices calling for German unification. In the past 8 years, German territory had been affected by "liberal" revolts and similarly-shaped movements, such as the Gottingen Seven and the weavers' uprising. Now, with chaos in Italy, France, Austria and Prussia, nationalist leaders realized that this was too good a chance to be wasted and, meeting in the parliament of Frankfurt, they summoned elected representatives from all over Germany for May 12th to discuss the future of the region. The call created many problems in Austria, inflamed by the riots, but also divided on the issue of the vote, with those who wanted to confine it to Austria proper and others who wanted to extend it at least in Bohemia while in Prussia, still fresh from the attempted revolt in march, the king and Junkers accepted the call of parliament but managed to send pro-Prussian conservative delegates instead of pro Germany. The parliament had not yet met but future fractures were already visible inside it, although many hoped that this time in 1848 things would be different.

The Frankfurt Parliement was the greatest assembly of German minds, keen on finding a solution to their national dilemma​

The Russian Empire remained impassive to the rebellions: the Napoleonic invasion had lasted much less than the rest of the continent and together with it the diffusion of Enlightenment ideas was limited, the illiterate population was chained with serfdom. Russia was not a feudal state, but it was very close and the elites who could educate themselves and "express" their thoughts were strongly hostile to the liberal ideas that were being propagated in the rest of the continent. The nobility and the army were the two conservative pillars of Russia on which the Tsar leaned to reach his vast empire, a bastion of stability and reaction in this increasingly dangerous world. The Okhrana was very efficient and managed to isolate and break the rebel movements especially in areas inhabited by minorities such as Poland and the Caucasus. The insurrection in Hungary worried the Tsar who was unwilling to witness the collapse of the Austrian empire with impunity which had seemed so stable with Metternich but which had now proved to be a house of cards but Russia could do little at the moment: it was not certainly ready for a foreign operation and had to find resources and materials as well as a call to arms by Austria, with which was allied through the Holy Alliance.

England was the nation that suffered less from the uprisings of 1848: having granted its inhabitants a great deal of political power since the 1215 Magna Carta, the United Kingdom was much more liberal than its peers on the continent and , apart from a few riots in Ireland that did nothing but reduce the population even further after the famine and the flight of millions of people overseas, leaving room for future waves of Scottish and English settlers. More than worrying about its domestic policy, the UK looked outside according to the concept of the balance of power it had held up to then. Republican France posed a great danger to balance, after all the last time France had become a republic Napoleon had appeared shortly after and he had destroyed the continent. Currently the divisions within the national assembly represented a block to potential French destructive behavior but in London one wondered how much would have taken for a leader to emerge in that chaos. The other British dilemma was the imploding Austrian empire: the sudden end of a central European giant and the need to keep Prussia and Russia balanced was not something that British diplomacy was willing to see and overtures were made to the court in exile by offering money and loans to suppress rebellions and restore order. Not that England was a reactionary power, but they preferred the continent as they knew it than a radically new one.

Having seen how the first revolution turned out, the Brtitish were wary of a new Napoleon rising from the chaos​

Regarding the Italian question, it represented one of the many moments of 1848 and therefore the great powers were either involved in their very own insurrection or too far away to worry about it and take a position on it. The only nation that seemed interested in it was Great Britain: one of the first Napoleonic campaigns had been in Italy which, disunited, had not been able to resist him and had been seduced by his nationalism then, the creation of a state in the north that would act as a buffer between France and Austria just as Belgium separated France from Prussia, it could have reduced British fears of a new revolutionary campaign in northern Italy. Therefore, with the blessing of Queen Victoria, British diplomats began to make contact with the Savoy court, feeling the ground for a negotiated solution.

 

[FranzAncheNo]

The problem is that there was not a more effective (and ruthless) potential leader, not in Venice and not in all of Italy, most likely. At least, no one comes to my mind, and please don't suggest Garibaldi

That's something I never thought about.
Any ideas on why?

 

[LordKalvan]

But, even someone who was less "old Venetian" like Tommaseo would be better, especially in integrating the Terrafirma and inciting revolutions in Dalmatia.

Tommaseo was a peculiar individual, certainly very well learned and a convinced republican and federalist, with a strong attachment to his Dalmatian roots. What he missed was being a people's man or being flexible enough to understand that he could not just look at the past to find solutions, the world was changing too fast. This attitude did not really change even later on in his life. After the fall of the republic of San Marco, he went in exile to Corfu (at the time in British hands), and by the middle 1850s emigrated to Turin. While most of the 1848 republicans changed their position with time and came to accept that an Italian unification could only happen under a Savoy, he never did and never tried to get into parliament (after 1860, he even refused the appointment to the senate. He never accepted Cavour's unitarian approach, and fought against his politics to reduce the influence of the church (although he was staunchly against the temporal power of the popes).
To go back to your post, I can see Tommaseo going to Dalmatia to agitate against Austria (he himself argued for this in more than one occasion), but I cannot see him masterminding the co-operation with Terra Firma being too Venetian for understanding the need and the opportunity. Putting such a rigid man in charge of the Provisional Government of the republic would never work.

That's something I never thought about.
Any ideas on why?

Probably the easiest explanation is that Venice was a shadow of its former self, a smallish city stifled by the oppressive Austrian administration and by being an economic backwater.
By comparison, Milan was much more active in political and intellectual terms (even if police and censorship were not different from Venice, Lombardy was bordering with Piedmont and Switzerland.
In general Italian terms, the bloody failure of the insurrections of the early 1830s had resulted in a decade of oppression all over the peninsula, not just in Habsburg dominions or their semi-protectorates. The worst case was certainly in the Papal States, under the reactionary Gregory XVI (even Metternich was angered by the reluctance of the Papal States in implementing necessary reforms), but CA too was pretty hard-nosed in his politics toward the liberals; strangely enough, Ferdinand II was probably the most lenient of the Italian monarchs.
The other (and possibly equally significant) problem was the issue of the temporal power of the popes, together with the deep influence of the Catholic church. The temporal power was a peculiar Italian problem, unfortunately, and its effects are still felt nowadays.

 

[Tarabas]

The worst case was certainly in the Papal States, under the reactionary Gregory XVI (even Metternich was angered by the reluctance of the Papal States in implementing necessary reforms), but CA too was pretty hard-nosed in his politics toward the liberals; strangely enough, Ferdinand II was probably the most lenient of the Italian monarchs.
The other (and possibly equally significant) problem was the issue of the temporal power of the popes, together with the deep influence of the Catholic church. The temporal power was a peculiar Italian problem, unfortunately, and its effects are still felt nowadays.

I wonder how much this different 1848 will mean for Pius IX and Ferdinand. Admittedly the last ten years of Ferdinand's reign were at least a missed opportunity. If TTL CA has neo-welf sympathies, he will need a Pope that is willing to take the nominal leadership of whatever Italian (Con)Federation will arise.

 

[Deleted member 147289]

I wonder how much this different 1848 will mean for Pius IX and Ferdinand. Admittedly the last ten years of Ferdinand's reign were at least a missed opportunity. If TTL CA has neo-welf sympathies, he will need a Pope that is willing to take the nominal leadership of whatever Italian (Con)Federation will arise.

CA's liberal period is lasting longer in a certain way so he's the more "moderate" monarch, especially with the, for now, victorious war that he's waging.

I see no way of changing the current pope, except death (which is unlikely), so we'll have to go with the current one but with a Sardinian victory in the North there could be interesting developments in the Papal states.

 

[Tarabas]

CA's liberal period is lasting longer in a certain way so he's the more "moderate" monarch, especially with the, for now, victorious war that he's waging.

I see no way of changing the current pope, except death (which is unlikely), so we'll have to go with the current one but with a Sardinian victory in the North there could be interesting developments in the Papal states.

Yes, what I meant is a different attitude from Pius IX. I don't know your intentions, but if from this war a liberal Northern Italian Kingdom arises (like it seems likely) both Pius and Ferdinand will be forced to follow suit or face serious internal opposition.

 

[Deleted member 147289]

9. THE WAR COUNCIL

On April 13th the first war council of the Italian General Staff was held with members from all over the peninsula. The first instance was to choose a name for the army and the choice fell on "Army of Italy" unanimously. Once the name problem was solved, the organizational problems were addressed: the Piedmontese army was the largest and best trained of those present, making it the spearhead of the Army; so it was that Carlo Alberto was appointed commander in chief of the Italian Army and general Bava chief of staff, while the Italian allies were, on paper, treated on a par with the Piedmontese even though it was not always the case, being treated as secondary actors in a campaign which, although animated by the nationalist spirit, was mainly a Piedmontese affair.

Once the initial questions had been resolved, planning started. The situation was clear: the Italians controlled the territory from Vicenza to Venice and the rest of the Venetian plain appeared ready for rebellion. Not much was known about the Austrians except that they had withdrawn and were concentrating their forces between Castelfranco and Treviso awaiting reinforcements from Illyria which, however, had been delayed by the insurrection in Pula, which had led to the self-sinking of numerous ships by of sailors surrounded by soldiers. A contingent of about 35,000 men was in command of Von Westmeath and annihilating it was the only way to take control of the plain, and then take the citadels of Verona and Mantua.

General Bava, who until then had coordinated the occupation of Lombardy, leaving the front line to De Sonnaz, was anxious to fight, as was Carlo Alberto, who came specifically from Milan looking for that great victory that would crown his dreams of military glory. The king immediately announced that the army would seek confrontation and beat the enemy in a pitched battle. Bava announced his support for the king's idea, suggesting to capitalize on the Savoy numerical advantage to overwhelm the enemy before they could retire again or meet the reinforcements. De Sonnaz very gently expressed his opposition: for him the best strategy was an encirclement of the enemy army near Treviso, taking advantage of the passage along the Adriatic offered by the Venetians and a second route towards Bassano del Grappa, from which it would have curved towards Treviso closing Von Westmeath in a pocket, forcing him to surrender or in a battle that he could not win.

Ettore DeSonnaz and Eusebio Bava were the best commanders of the Piedemontese army, but they had different ideas on how to expel the Austrians from Veneto​

Both plans had their pros and cons but in the end the king weighed his desire for a big victory to the point that De Sonnaz could not help but consent to the wishes of his king. Bava was commissioned to formulate the plan for the advance which, in its final form, was like this: The Italian army would advance directly on Castelfranco quickly to catch the enemy by surprise and chase or force them into a battle. The main force would have been covered on the south flank by De Sonnaz and the Venetian allies while a division was sent to the north to screen the area. At the center, together with 30,000 Piedmontese led by Bava and Carlo Alberto, there would have been about 15,000 troops from Tuscany, the Papal States and Emilia, led by Luigi Durando.

Von Westmeath was confused in the meantime. The loss of Milan, Radetzky, the Quadrilateral and the insurrection in Pula had begun to weigh on the shoulders of the general who for the moment had not been able to cope with the Piedmontese. The loss of his commander during the Five Days had been a severe blow and his men continued to decline and the reinforcements that were arriving were less and less, sucked by the court for the attack on Vienna or dispersed to suppress rebellions that now seemed the norm in Austria. His forces were camped between Castelfranco and Caposanpiero, 35,000 men and still had cannons, horses and a fair amount of ammunition. Together with his lieutenants, the general decided to create a strategy to fight the Sardinians. The best way would have been to concentrate his forces against small Piedmontese detachments and beat them, the problem was to divide the Italian forces which now amounted to more than double his. The city of Fontanaviva had an important bridge over the Brenta and it was decided to take advantage of this bottleneck: the Piedmontese would slow down their advance and reduce their strength in crossing the river, leading the general to order to place forces around the village of Cittadella, from which the Piedmontese would attack and throw them back behind the Brenta.

 

[LordKalvan]

I wonder how much this different 1848 will mean for Pius IX and Ferdinand. Admittedly the last ten years of Ferdinand's reign were at least a missed opportunity. If TTL CA has neo-welf sympathies, he will need a Pope that is willing to take the nominal leadership of whatever Italian (Con)Federation will arise.

I have serious doubts that either Ferdinand or Pius IX will truly embrace liberal leanings.
As regards the former, his relatively lenient period towards the liberals petered out quickly enough, and even when he was forced to grant a statute he never sounded sincere enough in his commitment. His aim was to set up a three legged structure, where parliament, chamber of pairs and king would be the legs of the tripod, and the powers of the king would anyway dominate (parliament was not allowed to legislate on a number of topics, for example). On top of this, there was always the problem of Sicily, which he was never able to solve in a satisfactory way (the insurrection of Palermo in January 1848 is but the last example of such a difficulty). With age, the young king of 1826 turned more and more into a recluse, hating the idea of leaving his palace in Caserta, for example, and always afraid not only of revolution (be it originated in the kingdom or suborned by external powers) but also of plots masterminded by one or the other of his many siblings.
Pius IX's political trajectory is also well known: while he notionally was considered a liberal, his upbringing and his education were more close to conservative doctrine, both in temporal and in religious affairs, and the reforms that he implemented during the first years of the pontificate were undertaken mostly because the economical and political situation in the Papal states had deteriorated almost to a non-return point.

CA's liberal period is lasting longer in a certain way so he's the more "moderate" monarch, especially with the, for now, victorious war that he's waging.

I see no way of changing the current pope, except death (which is unlikely), so we'll have to go with the current one but with a Sardinian victory in the North there could be interesting developments in the Papal states.

IOTL CA died in Portugal in July 1849, notionally because of heart attack (the third in about six weeks), but the king's health had always been frail and a liver failure was considered the main reason for his death. It might be argued that the stress of the lost war, and his guilt for the failure, might have contributed to further weakening him, but it is unlikely that he might have lived beyond 1850.
We also don't really know how he would have dealt with parliament and with a government answering to that organ, after all he had just a few months of constitutional rule, from the elections at the end of April 1848 to his abdication in March 1849, but it is reasonable to assume that it would not been exactly a honeymoon. This would have been another significant stress for CA, who had ruled as an absolute king for 17 years.
Sometimes I think that the best end for CA would have been to die on a victorious field of battle somewhere in Northern Italy: his sainthood would have been guaranteed, and he wouldn't have a chance to mar his image.

 

[Tarabas]

I have serious doubts that either Ferdinand or Pius IX will truly embrace liberal leanings.
As regards the former, his relatively lenient period towards the liberals petered out quickly enough, and even when he was forced to grant a statute he never sounded sincere enough in his commitment. His aim was to set up a three legged structure, where parliament, chamber of pairs and king would be the legs of the tripod, and the powers of the king would anyway dominate (parliament was not allowed to legislate on a number of topics, for example). On top of this, there was always the problem of Sicily, which he was never able to solve in a satisfactory way (the insurrection of Palermo in January 1848 is but the last example of such a difficulty). With age, the young king of 1826 turned more and more into a recluse, hating the idea of leaving his palace in Caserta, for example, and always afraid not only of revolution (be it originated in the kingdom or suborned by external powers) but also of plots masterminded by one or the other of his many siblings.
Pius IX's political trajectory is also well known: while he notionally was considered a liberal, his upbringing and his education were more close to conservative doctrine, both in temporal and in religious affairs, and the reforms that he implemented during the first years of the pontificate were undertaken mostly because the economical and political situation in the Papal states had deteriorated almost to a non-return point.

They don't need to sincerely embrace those leanings. Not restraining them would be enough. Do they do it just out fear of rebellion? I still call it a victory. Sicily is a hard problem for everybody, though. If the Sicilians offer the crown to Ferdinand of Savoy like OTL (and TTL he might well accept) we have the stage set for at least a huge crisis in the pan-Italian movement.

 

[LordKalvan]

They don't need to sincerely embrace those leanings. Not restraining them would be enough. Do they do it just out fear of rebellion? I still call it a victory. Sicily is a hard problem for everybody, though. If the Sicilians offer the crown to Ferdinand of Savoy like OTL (and TTL he might well accept) we have the stage set for at least a huge crisis in the pan-Italian movement.

Obviously if by hook or by crook Ferdinand accepts to bow to the spirit and the letter of the Neapolitan constitution it will be a huge victory for the liberals. Equally obviously, he will have also accepted that the absolute monarchy is over in Naples, and his remaining privileges will be nibbled away pretty soon. I don't think he will go down without fighting though, and there is also the problem of Sicily (which IOTL was temporarily solved with a very heavy hand, gaining for him the nickname of King Bomb, following the destructive bombardment he ordered to cow Messina insurgents), which is another thing it's not going away. The Sicilians are pretty fed up, and don't believe his promises anymore. I would point out that IOTL he remained adamant in opposing meaningful concessions even in the late 1850s, which means that he was not understanding that the world was changing.
Pius IX is as much obdurate, prideful and blind as Ferdinand is, and the Papal States are possibly in a worse condition than Two Sicilies. Once again, look at his behaviour - as Pope as well as a ruler - during the 30 years between 1848 and his death, if you have any lingering doubt.

 

[Vinization]

Something tells me the Italians will either be defeated or score a very costly victory. Having to cross a river and fight a battle at the same time is a nightmare scenario to any attacking army.

 

[Deleted member 147289]

Something tells me the Italians will either be defeated or score a very costly victory. Having to cross a river and fight a battle at the same time is a nightmare scenario to any attacking army.

A bloody battle is just what CA needs to reap glory, but it's also what Von Westmeath needs: attacking a larger army when it's distracted and defeat them. Needless to say, this battle is going to be important

 

[LordKalvan]

A bloody battle is just what CA needs to reap glory, but it's also what Von Westmeath needs: attacking a larger army when it's distracted and defeat them. Needless to say, this battle is going to be important

IOTL, the Austrian government in Linz ordered Radetzky not to accept any field battle, because if the army of Italy was lost, the empire was lost (and in any case they were negotiating in London to give Lombardy to CA). Radetzky refused and defeated the Piedmontese at Custoza to become a hero, but if he had lost would have been recorded in history as the disobedient general who singlehandedly lost the empire. The strategic position is even worse for the Austrians ITTL and Nugent has a lot of tactical disadvantages (he doesn't have parity with his opponents, doesn't have a handy fortress at his back in case the things go pear-shape and his troops are much less confident and well supplied). Add to this that Nugent army had to get to Veneto by forced march (and I frankly cannot understand how he could get there so early, since he could not leave the fortress of Palmanova, Udine and Belluno at his back without leaving a blocking force to protect his shaky supply line and this would reduce his available troops), and then integrate the shaky remnants of the army of Italy into his smaller force. The cherry on the top is that Nugent was not a spring chicken (he was born in 1777) and his health was poor (IOTL, after taking Belluno he had to hand over command to his deputy). Does this man truly goes after a decisive field battle against orders in these conditions?