They were using that route between June 1940 and at least July 1943 IOTL anyway.Well, I guess Britain would have to use the good old African route to access India until Egypt is recaptured.
It would take a POD of having the Italians ready to invade in June with sufficient transport and supplies built up in Cyrenacia while keeping sufficient force in Tripolitania to guard against the French. The Italians could have invaded with a smaller and more mobile army IOTL in July / August, but Marshal Graziani wanted a larger force which meant the advance had to be delayed to bring up more supplies as well as to only advance at the speed of their marching infantry through the Western Desert. Maybe if Marshal Balbo wasn't killed in late June the Italians would have advanced sooner and in a more forceful fashion.
I certainly agree the British would try, if still in the war, but if the Italians get this far, where would the commonwealth forces form up? Supply.That would require an incredible amount of POD for them to manage that but I would imagine that a large number of Commonwealth units will be forming up to kick them out again some time in early 41
The retention of the Suez would be secondary only to the security of the United Kingdom
Also for this to happen it has to happen in late 1940 at the latest so operations like the East African Campaign will be put on the back burner and adventures in the Battle for Greece would not happen here - I suspect that activities vs the Vichi French would be muted as well as the Commonwealth forces concentrate on the Suez / Egypt
I certainly agree the British would try, if still in the war, but if the Italians get this far, where would the commonwealth forces form up? Supply.
How could the Italians take Egypt with their "self propelled coffins" vs British Matildas?
For the Italians to capture the Suez, the POD needs to be early enough for some systemic changes to be made the Italian military and for the Italians to then act decisively when the time comes. The most obvious flaw in the Italian set-up is the tradition of maintaining excessive numbers of poorly equipped infantry, a tradition that pre-dates WW1. It would have been easy enough for the Italians to cull a dozen or more divisions and use the surplus equipment to fully upgrade/ equip a handful of 'elite' divisions - certainly sufficient numbers to take the Suez in 1940.
Given the Italian participation in the SCW alongside the Germans and well established Italian aeronautical and automotive traditions, it is remarkable how poorly the Italians were served in terms of effective manpower and equipment. Given the British situation in 1940, the Italian capture of the Suez should have been a formality - not mission impossible.
That was the route they used. It was also the route they used to access Egypt.Well, I guess Britain would have to use the good old African route to access India until Egypt is recaptured.
Agreed, but if Italy is fighting a battle of attrition to reach the Suez it has already lost.Italy's industry and military was ill prepared for WW2 - Mussoloini jumped in at what he thought was the last minute to get a seat at the Victors table - not to fight a number of long and hard campaigns
I said should have been a formality - 30,000 in the field is not a huge number and a handful of well equipped Italian divisions would still heavily outnumber what the British had available. Soon after Rommel made those British look very ordinary - again.IMO by reducing the number of divisions and making them individually stronger and more mobile and self sufficent (smaller overall force requiring less logistics) etc still does not answer how this Italian Africa Korps can over come Wavells 30,000 on the field - no mere formailty Im afraid.
Someone mentioned Matila IIs earlier but as far as I am aware and as has been pointed out they would not arrive till later but the 'British' when fighting the frontier campaign were using mostly refitted armoured cars and kitbashed armoured trucks with weapons no bigger than Bren guns and .55 calibre Bolt action Boys ATRs........and yet these performed better than the Italian Tankettes.
A good POD would be the 1937 "10 year plan" not started or significantly changed - as this had sought to prepare the Italian army for "Wars of Rapid Decision" actually made the army worse prepared for war by 1940 as it had only achieved the changing of Trianry divisions to Binary divisions and unnessisarily increased the number of Staff beyond what was required.
These changes might have created a more modern army in 10 years but after 3 the principle tactic of the Italian army was the frontal assault backed with heavy artillery support at the exclusion of all other tactics.
Agree, but with the limited scale of any early engagements, the Italians should be able to take the Suez with whatever supplies they have stockpiled east of Tobruk. If the Italians need to wait to be resupplied before they have reached the Suez, they have already lost.Also while the 'Italian Africa Korps' is smaller - than the force used OTL the Italians ability to provide logistics is still dire.
Yes, one does get the impression the Italian military was more suited for political purposes than combat.Coupled with this was the politisation of the officer class and the Blackshirt Militias further diluting the ability to supply quality weapons and equipment to the front line formations.
Yes, but there is a natural nexus between most of the Italian flaws (politicization, leadership, organization, training and equipment allocation). I think a successful military reorganization (vigorous hand wave), could have led to substantive improvements across all of those areas, without being contrived. However, I am sure there are probably very substantial reasons why this did not happen OTL.A lot has to change for this 'POD' to take effect