Two problems with that. First of all, unlike in an attack on the Soviet heartland, the Soviets are not under substantial time pressure here. They can take a few days, or even longer, deciding how to respond. They can issue ultimatums and demands. They can negotiate with the United States and other interested parties. Similarly, if the USSR nukes Israel, the US can take its time deciding. There isn't the same sort of time pressure as you have when you need to decide before the warheads land.
Second, the Soviets, as far as I am aware, did not have a mutual defense treaty with the Egyptians or the Syrians. They have not put them under a nuclear umbrella, nor has the US put Israel under a nuclear umbrella. While the consequences of appearing weak are substantial, they are significantly less serious then accepting a strategic nuclear exchange, and both the US and Soviet leadership knows it.
There's a very, very wide gap between the nuclear robot and someone so panicky they reflexively push the button in response to a nuclear strike on a country they don't even have a mutual defense treaty with.
You keep saying that, but you have yet to provide sources. I have provided sources. I can provide more if you want them. I want to see some sources for this assertion.
The reason "preponderance of opinion" still favors his version is because the only people who still pay attention to these issues are scholars with an ideological commitment to the idea that accidental nuclear war is a serious threat. As far as I'm aware, nobody disputes the events that supposedly happened, what I would dispute is whether the Soviet Politburo would have actually launched their missiles in retaliation if he had reported it up the chain of command. Specifically, if the Soviet Union or the US really were on a launch-on-warning posture, we would all be dead, because stuff like the Petrov incident happened pretty regularly.