Israel loses the 1973 war

None of these necessitate delays on the order of multiple days,

With the exception of the northern sector, the Syrians broke through by the 7th--less than one day. Technically they never broke through red ridge, though the 7th armored was ultimately down to a handful of tanks.


particularly given the weak Israelis forces covering them. Mines, obstacles, and the AT ditches could have all been dealt with by engineering units protected by covering fire and smokescreens suppressing or obscuring the firing positions.

Of course there was covering fire; dunno why the Syrians didn't use smokescreens. The Egyptians used plenty; maybe they hogged the quantity of smoke shells the Soviets were willing to provide.


Pollack says they weren’t bad at handling their vehicles by Arab standards, but if NATO’s a “10”, then they definitely were not an “8”. Probably more like a 4 compared to NATO or WarPac... or the Israelis.

Where did Pollack say they were only good at handling their vehicles by arab standards? I have his book here I could check.

Addendum, see page 506. A foremost Israeli authority on armored warfare who fought on Golan in 1973, General Peled, rated Syrian crews at "8" whereas Israeli and US ones were "10." But I presume Syrian officer quality was relatively poorer.

Consider what happened three years earlier in a situation where both the skill and numbers were vastly more even but the equipment being used by the respective sides and their respective tactical situation were the same. In 1970, the Syrian 5th Division slammed into the Jordanian 40th Armoured Brigade near ar-Ramtha during a brief conflict between the two countries. After a day of fighting the Jordanians were forced to fall back, having lost 19 Centurions while the Syrians lost 10 T-55s.

Jordanian skills must have deteriorated greatly since the '40s or even '67. Or maybe they were reluctant to fight hard against other arabs (I strongly suspect this also explains poor Egyptian performance in 1991). They did much better fighting Israeli armor from a defensive position in '67, as Pollack relates.


Likewise the accounts of Syrian handling of their vehicles at the Golan do not paint a picture of decent handling. The Syrians just blundered forward in a straight line until the Israelis killed them. There was no use of stalking, no use of fire and maneuver,

But the terrain was not well suited to maneuver--the Syrians attacked through a Kudne gap and a Rafid gap--a situation compounded by Israeli obstacles which channeled attackers into kill zones. Add to that the ditch and minefield...Btw did you see Katz Israeli Tank Battles? Although basically slanted toward Israel he mentioned the courage and dedication of Syrian combat engineers, who managed to get bridges across the ditch despite heavy fire. Considering what they faced the Syrians didn't perform so badly.


But the Syrian plan wasn’t to stop at the Golan. They weren’t going for a measured and scripted advance as the Egyptians were. They were aiming for a breakthrough-exploitation into Israel’s heartland.

Says who?? That would've been foolhardy from both a military and political point of view. Page 481 of Arabs at War indicates the Syrians only contemplated retaking the Golan--a daunting enough challenge for them....


Had they intended to just seize the Golan as the Egyptians did the Suez, they would have mimicked the Egyptians meticulous planning, scripting, and rehearsel.

Of course the Syrians did that. They constructed mockups of the terrain in which they'd be fighting and practiced repeatedly. See Arabs at War page 482, where Pollack makes this clear.

“Inferior” Soviet equipment, which wasn’t remotely inferior,

Of course it was inferior. The MIG-21 had a single 23mm gun--some variants had none--and crummy atolls, whereas the Israeli Mirage had two 30mm guns and much better Shafrir air to air missiles.

bears no responsibility at all, as can be seen by the fact that Arab states have suffered just as badly when flying Western aircraft.

Iraqi and Jordanian pilots flying Hunters performed much better than other arabs flying MIGs or SUs.


Vietnamese flying the same MiG-21s against the Americans over North Vietnam scored almost 1:1 against the same F-4s the Israelis were flying for most of the Vietnam War.


But the Americans in Vietnam at first weren't well prepared and had to improve their skills in air to air combat. The Israelis always emphasized that.


It is a poor user who blames their tools and the historical rule, proven over and over in every major air war, has been that skill decides with technology only tipping the scales when all else is equal.


Of course there's no suggestion technology is everything. But it's important.
 
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With the exception of the northern sector, the Syrians broke through by the 7th--less than one day. Technically they never broke through red ridge, though the 7th armored was ultimately down to a handful of tanks.

A day more then managed by the Syrians against the Jordanians.

Of course there was covering fire; dunno why the Syrians didn't use smokescreens. The Egyptians used plenty; maybe they hogged the quantity of smoke shells the Soviets were willing to provide.

Not much covering fire and Syrian gunnery reportedly sucked. Why the Syrians, but given that they didn't appear to lack for anything else the Egyptians also had it's much more likely that they failed to incorporate it into their battle plan rather then they lacked it.

Where did Pollack say they were only good at handling their vehicles by arab standards? I have his book here I could check.

Addendum, see page 506. A foremost Israeli authority on armored warfare who fought on Golan in 1973, General Peled, rated Syrian crews at "8" whereas Israeli and US ones were "10." But I presume Syrian officer quality was relatively poorer.

The Israelis consistently overrated their opposition to pump themselves up. It wasn't until experiences in Iraq and in association with (trying to) train the armies of Saudi Arabia that caused us to realize that they were really just competent who were fighting scrubs.

Jordanian skills must have deteriorated greatly since the '40s or even '67. Or maybe they were reluctant to fight hard against other arabs (I strongly suspect this also explains poor Egyptian performance in 1991). They did much better fighting Israeli armor from a defensive position in '67, as Pollack relates.

From 1921 to 1956 the Jordanian Army was the Arab Legion, and was staffed by actual serving British Officers and NCOs, as well as British trained Jordanians. The commanding General of the Arab Legion from 1939 until he was dismissed in 1956 was John Glubb, a retired British Army officer. The competence of the Jordanian Army was tied to Glubb, the British soldiers under his command, and the system they entrenched over three and a half decades of command. Following their departure the quality of the Jordanian military steadily declined, going from fighting the Israelis to a draw, and even outfighting them tactically in many instances, in 1948 to getting increasingly badly thumped by them in successive conflicts. In 1967 the Jordanians did fight better than any other Arab army, but they still weren't the equal of the Israelis, despite having better tanks (M48s against Super Shermans). Even by then, they showed numerous tactical flaws and had serious trouble coordinating tanks, infantry, and artillery.

The best Jordanian Tank Brigade, fought well, but only as well as an average Israeli unit. The 40th also benefited from the fact than in its major battles it was defending on excellent terrain with a numerical and technical advantage. By the standard military calculus it should have won, which it did. However other Jordanian units with similar advantages were thrown back by Israeli attacks they should have been able to defeat and thus that brigade was very much the exception. Needless to say, the decline of the Jordanian Army continued over the succeeding years.

It's worth noting that, for whatever reason, the Jordanian Air Force didn't suffer this problem. They seem to have paid more attention to securing their system and actually dealing with the "meat-and-potatoes" of warfare instead of getting all focused on shiny toys.

Enthusiasm probably didn't have much to do with it. That's one area that Arab armies have generally proved quite good at: they've generally been willing to fight, regardless of their ability to do so.

But the terrain was not well suited to maneuver--the Syrians attacked through a Kudne gap and a Rafid gap--a situation compounded by Israeli obstacles which channeled attackers into kill zones. Add to that the ditch and minefield...Btw did you see Katz Israeli Tank Battles? Although basically slanted toward Israel he mentioned the courage and dedication of Syrian combat engineers, who managed to get bridges across the ditch despite heavy fire. Considering what they faced the Syrians didn't perform so badly.

In 2008, in a narrow mountain valley with the equivalent of a enemy brigade packed into a frontage of about 2km, Russian forces were still able to find space to maneuver aggressively and throw the Georgians off balance. The suggestion that there wouldn't be room to maneuver on a front 32 times that size against an enemy only twice as numerous is absurd. As if to prove the point, the Israelis had little trouble in maneuvering when they went the other despite being outnumbered by the Syrians and facing similar terrain challenges. And while Arab troops have certainly been brave, something I've never questioned, their competence and in particular their leadership generally left a lot to be desired.

Says who?? That would've been foolhardy from both a military and political point of view. Page 481 of Arabs at War indicates the Syrians only contemplated retaking the Golan--a daunting enough challenge for them....

Nobody can say for certain either way, since Syrian planning documents on this point are still largely hush-hush, but some circumstantial evidence does support it. From a conventional military point of view, it would only be foolhardy if the Syrians took into account their own forces failings. Which they obviously did not. But on paper, they certainly had the numbers and material to do it... they just didn't have the men. Politically, being the conqueror of at least some of the Israelis homeland on even a temporary basis would have earned Syria tremendous prestige in the Arab world, far outstripping what the Egyptians gained, even if (as is likely) they were subsequently forced to relinquish it by the superpowers... which makes it rather the opposite of foolhardy. The nuclear issue (which is half political, half military) is rather the real crowbar in that, but it's not clear how aware the Syrians (or Egyptians, for that matter) were of Israelis nuclear capabilities. I've even seen it speculated that one of the reasons the Egyptians and Syrians attacked is because they erroneously believed it was their last chance to wage a conventional war before Israel acquired atomic arms. Another possibility is that, given that Israel only had a handful of nuclear gravity bombs and the effectiveness of Arab IADS early in the war, they may have placed expectations in that working to neutralize any Israelis nuclear counter-attack. In any case, the kind of attack the Syrians mounted was a far cry from the sort of "bite-and-hold" the Egyptians launched at the Suez and that they would have executed if they were limiting their ambitions to the Suez (and which probably would have worked out better for their men).

The Golan Heights was only a daunting challenge for incompetents. Other armies with the numerical and material advantages the Syrians had would have gone through it like a knife-through-butter.

Of course the Syrians did that. They constructed mockups of the terrain in which they'd be fighting and practiced repeatedly. See Arabs at War page 482, where Pollack makes this clear.

Compared to what the Egyptians did, the scale, thoroughness, scripting, and intensity of the planning and practicing was grossly inferior. The Egyptians also gave uber-specific orders to their troops that covered all eventualities, which they could only do for 48 hours (in the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis managed to get this up to 72 hours... but no more). The Syrians failed to do this.

Of course it was inferior. The MIG-21 had a single 23mm gun--some variants had none--and crummy atolls, whereas the Israeli Mirage had two 30mm guns and much better Shafrir air to air missiles.

The two aircraft were roughly even. The 23mm was a perfectly adequate gun for the MiG-21s job and the Atoll's available by the 1970s were not any more inferior then the Shafrir or the Sidewinders of the same period, in addition to not being the only missiles the MiG-21 was outfitted with as well. The MiG-21 even proved to be superior to the MiG-23, which was supposed to be it's replacement. In any case, the Mirage wasn't the main fighter of the Israelis air force at the time: the F-4 was.

Iraqi and Jordanian pilots flying Hunters performed much better than other arabs flying MIGs or SUs.

No, the Iraqis were not. Both their pilots and organization were pitiful against the Iranians despite overwhelming numerical, material, and technological advantages and even against the Americans they did not remotely do as well as they could have given what they were flying (although it's doubtful they could have ever won, obviously). The Jordanians were, but then as noted above their air force actually paid attention to meat and potatoes rather then shiny kit, so it can't be attributed to flying western aircraft.

But the Americans in Vietnam at first weren't well prepared and had to improve their skills in air to air combat. The Israelis always emphasized that.

Sure, the Americans pulled ahead after they revamped their training programs, which involved throwing in more resources then the Vietnamese could even hope to possess in doing so. But that only further proves my point: technology is secondary next to skill. Even then, the ratios weren't on the order of 10:1 like they frequently were in the Israelis vs Arab match-ups... more like 2:1, ignoring that there were several cases of the US assigning losses to ground fire that may have been air-air kills. They actually did better then Korean and Chinese pilots in the Korean War, who managed 3:1. Had they been flown by Russians, they probably would have been 1:1 like was the case in Korea.

Of course there's no suggestion technology is everything. But it's important.

It really isn't. In the examples we do have where technology could be singled out as being the only influence on the kill ratios, the difference was only a few percentage points... not 10+:1 like has been seen with in Arab vs non-Arab fights.
 
Not much covering fire and Syrian gunnery reportedly sucked. Why the Syrians, but given that they didn't appear to lack for anything else the Egyptians also had it's much more likely that they failed to incorporate it into their battle plan rather then they lacked it.

The Syrians used plenty of artillery at the start but arab gunners were said to be able to hit only things they had originally targets.


From 1921 to 1956 the Jordanian Army was the Arab Legion, and was staffed by actual serving British Officers and NCOs, as well as British trained Jordanians. The commanding General of the Arab Legion from 1939 until he was dismissed in 1956 was John Glubb, a retired British Army officer.The competence of the Jordanian Army was tied to Glubb, the British soldiers under his command, and the system they entrenched over three and a half decades of command. Following their departure the quality of the Jordanian military steadily declined, going from fighting the Israelis to a draw, and even outfighting them tactically in many instances, in 1948 to getting increasingly badly thumped by them in successive conflicts.

Yes I read that too...



In 1967 the Jordanians did fight better than any other Arab army, but they still weren't the equal of the Israelis, despite having better tanks (M48s against Super Shermans). Even by then, they showed numerous tactical flaws and had serious trouble coordinating tanks, infantry, and artillery.

The worst problem for the Jordanian armor was Israeli air superiority--something largely beyond their ability to deal with.

Enthusiasm probably didn't have much to do with it. That's one area that Arab armies have generally proved quite good at: they've generally been willing to fight, regardless of their ability to do so.


Fight against Israel yes.



In 2008, in a narrow mountain valley with the equivalent of a enemy brigade packed into a frontage of about 2km, Russian forces were still able to find space to maneuver aggressively and throw the Georgians off balance. The suggestion that there wouldn't be room to maneuver on a front 32 times that size against an enemy only twice as numerous is absurd. As if to prove the point, the Israelis had little trouble in maneuvering when they went the other despite being outnumbered by the Syrians and facing similar terrain challenges.

The Syrian army had been largely demolished during its initial offensive operations (in which the Syrians had to overcome a minefield, obstacles, and a ditch) so the Israelis didn't face very much going the other way, toward Damascus.

And while Arab troops have certainly been brave, something I've never questioned, their competence and in particular their leadership generally left a lot to be desired.

That's true.

Nobody can say for certain either way, since Syrian planning documents on this point are still largely hush-hush, but some circumstantial evidence does support it. From a conventional military point of view, it would only be foolhardy if the Syrians took into account their own forces failings. Which they obviously did not. But on paper, they certainly had the numbers and material to do it... they just didn't have the men. Politically, being the conqueror of at least some of the Israelis homeland on even a temporary basis would have earned Syria tremendous prestige in the Arab world, far outstripping what the Egyptians gained, even if (as is likely) they were subsequently forced to relinquish it by the superpowers... which makes it rather the opposite of foolhardy.

By this time, '73, the arabs claimed to only want to regain their own territory. Taking even a tiny bit of pre-67 territory would've been a propaganda boon for Israel. ("Proof they seek to destroy us.") I suppose it would've been reasonable to take a bit if necessary to establish a better defense line.
The Syrians were well aware of the greater tactical competence of their enemy. That's why they built up a big numerical superiority before attacking. In light of obvious Israeli superiority--obvious because of repeated, bitter experience--taking just the Golan was tough enough. Going for Haifa would've been crazy.

The nuclear issue (which is half political, half military) is rather the real crowbar in that, but it's not clear how aware the Syrians (or Egyptians, for that matter) were of Israelis nuclear capabilities.

Lol, they had to have been aware. Even laymen were aware. Israel was widely suspected of having nukes in early 1973, probably before then. During an interview on "Face the Nation" or some such program around the spring of '73 Golda naturally denied it--she had to. But it's inconceivable that leaders of frontline arab states wouldn't have known this. Any prudent leader would certainly take it into consideration (i.e. while going to war with limited objectives is OK, don't go too far......).


I've even seen it speculated that one of the reasons the Egyptians and Syrians attacked is because they erroneously believed it was their last chance to wage a conventional war before Israel acquired atomic arms.

Very dubious. Just because a nation has nuclear arms doesn't mean nobody will fight it or attack it. If North Vietnam fought for years, confident its Soviet backers would deter US use of nukes against it, I'd assume the arabs would feel the same way.


Another possibility is that, given that Israel only had a handful of nuclear gravity bombs and the effectiveness of Arab IADS early in the war, they may have placed expectations in that working to neutralize any Israelis nuclear counter-attack.

Again very dubious.


In any case, the kind of attack the Syrians mounted was a far cry from the sort of "bite-and-hold" the Egyptians launched at the Suez and that they would have executed if they were limiting their ambitions to the Suez (and which probably would have worked out better for their men).

But the Egyptians knew from the start they'd never recapture all of Sinai militarily, whereas Syria stood a chance of getting back all of Golan, if it launched a massive armored assault.

The Golan Heights was only a daunting challenge for incompetents.

Right, and the Syrians knew their limitations vis a vis their enemy.


Compared to what the Egyptians did, the scale, thoroughness, scripting, and intensity of the planning and practicing was grossly inferior. The Egyptians also gave uber-specific orders to their troops that covered all eventualities, which they could only do for 48 hours (in the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis managed to get this up to 72 hours... but no more). The Syrians failed to do this.

Well, considering that many Syrian officers were eliminated in coups and purges, and minority alawite rule caused officers to be selected from a rather small pool of talent, Syrian planning was not likely to be quite up to Egyptian standards.


The two aircraft were roughly even. The 23mm was a perfectly adequate gun for the MiG-21s job

At least one Egyptian pilot would've begged to differ. Among his suggestions for improving the plane were two guns, like Mirages had. I've also read the Gsh 23mm "lacked the punch of comparable western weapons."


and the Atoll's available by the 1970s were not any more inferior then the Shafrir or the Sidewinders of the same period

But the atoll was said to have only a 15% chance of killing or hitting a jet, the same as early model sidewinders, i.e. not those available in '73.

The MiG-21 even proved to be superior to the MiG-23, which was supposed to be it's replacement.

It was better than the MIG-23MS and MF but not the later MLs.

In any case, the Mirage wasn't the main fighter of the Israelis air force at the time: the F-4 was.

Phantoms were used mainly for ground attack; Mirages specialized in interception.



No, the Iraqis were not. Both their pilots and organization were pitiful against the Iranians despite overwhelming numerical, material, and technological advantages and even against the Americans ...

I was referring to Iraqi Hawker Hunter pilots.
 

Lusitania

Donor
Was it not said that soviet leader were woken up repeatedly by both Egyptian and Syrian leaders requested their intervention.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Long-short answer: Expect Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Riyadh, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Khartoum, Rabat, Sanaa, Mascat and Aden to be nuked.
Golda Meir basically told Nixon that she would nuke 13 Arab capitals if they didn't receive military aid from the US.

Had a novel a few years back where Israel is subject of a biological attack of smallpox. They nuked Tehran or Baghdad in retaliation. When preparations to use their whole nuclear arsenal to take down as many Arab cities with them as they could, it was the US that took out the Israelis on the basis it was saving more lives. Strange ending!
 
One of the problems in the Arab armies, in general, was that "bad" news was not likely to be reported up the chain rapidly if at all. Lots of reasons for this, and worse in some armies compared to others. Without decent information even the best generals can't make correct decisions. At a minimum this sort of thing widened the Arabs OODA loop, which gave another advantage to the Israelis - as Boyd makes clear, get inside your opponents OODA loop and you should win.

However a lot of this discussion has wandered off topic I think. While the Egyptians and the Syrains advancing in to part of the Sinai or just the Golan and stopping and calling for a cease fire would represnt "losing" in one sense, I think the POD was the Israelis lose-lose. I agree this may not have been the goal of the Arabs, or even possible, but the question is had the Arabs broken the Israeli defense and kept going then what.
 
One of the problems in the Arab armies, in general, was that "bad" news was not likely to be reported up the chain rapidly if at all.

As Pollack wrote, the arabs worked their way around this difficulty, simply by eavesdropping on Israeli communications, via the Ataka facility.

... I think the POD was the Israelis lose-lose. I agree this may not have been the goal of the Arabs, or even possible, but the question is had the Arabs broken the Israeli defense and kept going then what.

US intervention if not nuking. I think if the Egyptians had known of the IDF crossing plan well in advance, they might've set a trap which could've degraded IDF strength--conceivably to the point where a successful defense (even along the line of the defiles) was no longer possible. But even then, advancing across Sinai toward Israel would've been ill-advised, assuming Israel retained its qualitative edge in the air. The Egyptian logistical tether would've been a prime target in the open desert.
 
I get the impression that a lot of people do not fully get A) How over-the-top the Anti-Zionist rhetoric was and B) How seriously both the Israeli populace and leadership took this rhetoric.

If defeat were not seen as an existential matter but rather a loss of face and perhaps wealth/perceived status/border territory, far fewer would see the Sampson Option as anything but nuts.

For real. A significant portion of the leadership had a string of numbers on one arm, as a permanent everyday reminder of what happened last time around when their enemies made rhetoric about killing all the jews. They will nuke the Arabs with every bomb in their arsenal and not one leader will lose a minute of sleep over it.
 
For real. A significant portion of the leadership had a string of numbers on one arm, as a permanent everyday reminder of what happened last time around when their enemies made rhetoric about killing all the jews. They will nuke the Arabs with every bomb in their arsenal and not one leader will lose a minute of sleep over it.

By 1973, or earlier, most arab states had abandoned rhetoric about wiping out Israel. And it was common knowledge that they had nowhere near the capability to do that anyway. Israel preferred to fight with conventional weapons, and did not use nukes even after initial reverses from October 6-8.
 
The Jordanians and the Egyptians by 1973 had stopped the "Israel has to go" rhetoric from official government organs. Lots of commentators, preachers, etc still continued that line and it was popular "on the street". Most of the rest of the Arab governments continued the "Israel has to go" rhetoric in one way or another (as far as the Israelis were concerned demands to return to the pre-1967 lines, or even the 1948 partition lines, and return of all who claimed that they or their ancestors left pre-1967 Israel after 1948, amounted to Israel going away as a Jewish state). Additionally the various Arab/Palestinian resistance groups such as Fatah, Hamas, PFLP, and others all called for the "elimination" of Israel and were either supported openly by most of the Arab governments or supported quietly in many ways.

In 1973 Morocco and some of the other Arab states of the far Maghreb had more moderate policies vis a vis Israel, distance being a moderating influence.

As far as I recall, no Arab state/leader prior to the wart in 1973 was willing to openly offer a final/formal peace treaty with Israel even on the basis of a return to the 1967 lines with some adjustments which Israel would have accepted most likely. Minimum demands were withdrawal to 1967 lines, no adjustments, and full "return", maximal demands were much more. There was really no realistic way for the Israeli leadership to believe that should the Arabs achieve the breakthrough we all agree was ASB or close to it.

FWIW it needs to be noted that 800,000+ Mizrahi (Jews from Arab countries) were formally expelled or "encouraged" to leave Arab countries following 1948, in many cases with a suitcase and nothing else.
 

Lusitania

Donor
It is fine for people today stating that they would not of entered Israel or did not have means to do so but that not the way they thought or believed on both sides.

What would egypt had done if they had crushed the Israelis in central Sinai would they say stop we gone enough or the temptation too big to stop? What happens if they get to border and Syrians pouring into galilea would they stop or pride and ego order the Egyptian army into Israel proper?

How many of these Arab countries recognized Israel right to exist in 1973?
 
As far as I recall, no Arab state/leader prior to the wart in 1973 was willing to openly offer a final/formal peace treaty with Israel

Sadat was. There were talks prior to '73 but they didn't get anywhere. Sadat said the intermediaries wrung one concession after another out of him but not one from the Israelis, because the latter thought Egypt was, after '67, a "motionless corpse." Sadat concluded only war could really get a dynamic started.

even on the basis of a return to the 1967 lines with some adjustments which Israel would have accepted most likely.

No, many Israelis wanted to keep the West Bank; the Golan (in whole or in part) was considered essential for security and even parts of Egypt were to be retained.
 
It is fine for people today stating that they would not of entered Israel or did not have means to do so but that not the way they thought or believed on both sides.

You mean the Egyptians thought they could advance all the way to Tel Aviv? :) To Shazly, establishing a bridgehead on the east bank of the canal, under SAM cover, was Egypt's only realistic military option.

What would egypt had done if they had crushed the Israelis in central Sinai would they say stop we gone enough or the temptation too big to stop?

In The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War there is a map showing a hypothetical Egyptian plan for retaking all of Sinai. It was not meant to be attempted, as it was beyond the country's capacity. I never heard of a plan for entering Israel proper--and remember, the Israelis captured quite a few documents late in the war.


What happens if they get to border and Syrians pouring into galilea would they stop or pride and ego order the Egyptian army into Israel proper?

Fear of US intervention and nuking would've stopped them.

How many of these Arab countries recognized Israel right to exist in 1973?

Egypt, probably Syria too, was certainly prepared to do so in exchange for its turf back.
 
The Jordanians and the Egyptians by 1973 had stopped the "Israel has to go" rhetoric from official government organs. Lots of commentators, preachers, etc still continued that line and it was popular "on the street".

Yeah, but as 1970s peace deals and the '91 war showed, the arab street was largely irrelevant. The US did restrain Israel from retaliating for SCUD attacks, since arab regimes then fighting Iraq feared the adverse local reaction to them appearing to be on the same side as Israel. But for the most part, sympathy for Iraq on the street (as opposed to wealthy gulf monarchies) counted for nothing.


In 1973 Morocco and some of the other Arab states of the far Maghreb had more moderate policies vis a vis Israel, distance being a moderating influence.

Generally I think the reverse was true, at least by c 1973. Libya, Iraq etc were vehemently anti-Israel whereas Egypt, Jordan, even Syria were more moderate or willing to achieve a political settlement.
 

Lusitania

Donor
Yeah, but as 1970s peace deals and the '91 war showed, the arab street was largely irrelevant. The US did restrain Israel from retaliating for SCUD attacks, since arab regimes then fighting Iraq feared the adverse local reaction to them appearing to be on the same side as Israel. But for the most part, sympathy for Iraq on the street (as opposed to wealthy gulf monarchies) counted for nothing.




Generally I think the reverse was true, at least by c 1973. Libya, Iraq etc were vehemently anti-Israel whereas Egypt, Jordan, even Syria were more moderate or willing to achieve a political settlement.
Syria?? I think we have been reading different history books. Syrian government has not till today recognized Israel right to exist.
 
Syria?? I think we have been reading different history books. Syrian government has not till today recognized Israel right to exist.

Syria's official position is that if the Palestinians reach a deal they can live with, they will accept such a deal (as long as they regain the Golan)
 
Syria's official position is that if the Palestinians reach a deal they can live with, they will accept such a deal (as long as they regain the Golan)


Right back around '96 Syria and Israel appeared to be on the verge of a peace settlement which IIRC fell through because Israel wouldn't give back all of Golan.
 

Lusitania

Donor
Right back around '96 Syria and Israel appeared to be on the verge of a peace settlement which IIRC fell through because Israel wouldn't give back all of Golan.

So let’s put things into perspective. Syria prior to 1990 had no desire to negotiate with Israel and refused to recognize it. It was only in the 1990s during negotiations that Syria fist attempted to negotiate. But Syria demanded its border be set to pre 1967 border which was west of the British mandate for Syrian border.

So while discussions about current Syrian attitudes or Syria recognition is interesting it has no bearing on pre 1973 Syrian government policy which was that Golan Heights could only be gotten back through war.
 
So let’s put things into perspective. Syria prior to 1990 had no desire to negotiate with Israel and refused to recognize it.

Syria had nothing against a negotiated settlement provided it got back what it lost in '67. Syria negotiated via Kissinger in '74 to get a disengagement agreement and recognized Israel.

It was only in the 1990s during negotiations that Syria fist attempted to negotiate. But Syria demanded its border be set to pre 1967 border which was west of the British mandate for Syrian border.

I don't know of any complaints or claims prior to the '67 war.

So while discussions about current Syrian attitudes or Syria recognition is interesting it has no bearing on pre 1973 Syrian government policy which was that Golan Heights could only be gotten back through war.

I'm sure they would've had no problem getting it back--all back--via a political process. The key problem was Israeli unwillingness to return the Golan.
 
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