I'm not sure about that. When Golda Meir came to Moscow in '48 as the first Israeli ambassador, she was basically mobbed by Soviet Jews, and thousands of them cheered for her. But when Stalin started pushing antisemitism, and when events like the Night of Murdered Poets and the Doctor's Plot conspiracy theory occurred, these helped create a new atmosphere of antisemitism within the USSR. If the Soviets accepted Zionism as a form of self-determination rather than "bourgeois nationalism", or if Stalin drops dead sooner and the Soviet leadership decries antisemitism while taking steps to actually stop it in Soviet society, maybe the situation could improve.
Your idea of a USSR-Israeli alliance, though, I think would work. The Arab-Israeli conflict continues - the War of Independence, the Six-Days War, the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War - but I think that by an alt-Yom Kippur War, Israel would have decisively won and ended any future conflicts. It should be worth noting though that even in OTL the Arab states were pro-American until around the 1960s and then migrated over to the USSR anyways
Actually, the line of thought that prompted me to start this thread was considering what might happen if Stalin died in 1946.
The sequence of events I am imagining is that Andrei Zhdanov and Beria emerge as the front-runners to succeed Stalin by '47, Zhdanov recalls Zhukov (who was out of favor with Stalin in '46) who helps Zhdanov purge Beria, Zhdanov then dies as per OTL in '48, leaving Zhukov the heir of Zhdanov. Zhukov then spends '49 and '50 fighting off the challenge of Malenkov, who, while politically weak at this point still gathers support as an "anti-Bonapartist" candidate.
Which leaves the Soviet Union muddling along through the remainder of the '40s with no clear direction, and then, when a paramount leader does emerge in the '50s, he is a man who, so far as I can make out from his biographies, was not likely to be much of a cold warrior.
As far as I can figure, this would likely mean a USSR whose foreign policy is less interested in alliances with 3rd World countries, and whose external affairs ideology was more sympathetic towards groups it saw as "antifascist" (in particular, a more positive view of Social Democratic parties) - hence less interest in humoring Nasser and a warmer attitude to Israel in the '50s.
I think that Egypt would likely stay a US ally - in OTL the US had a strong interest in having Egypt in their corner and I don't see that changing without some really, really big upset happening either in US politics or in the Middle East. The shift of some Arab states to closer relations with the USSR was, in OTL, very much driven by the perceived betrayal by Egypt of the Arab cause after Camp David on top of the other tensions that had been growing between Egypt and the other Arab states. I think that whether the other Arab states switch sides in TTL depends very much on what Egypt does. I suspect that in the absence of Egypt making an accommodation with the US and Israel like that in OTL, Syria, Jordan and Iraq at least split from Egypt later.
It would be interesting to have a situation where Syria and Iraq filled the role Egypt did in OTL though.
fasquardon
I agree that the Arab states will look to Egypt for guidance, but I think feel they'll migrate over to the Soviets by the mid-60s.
That being said, Iraq/Syria filling Egypt's position would be very interesting.
Interesting. I didn't know Zhdanov and Zhukov were less anti-Semitic.
What is it you think would drive this change of allegiance? The histories I've read very much emphasized the shift as being driven by the breakup of the common front against Israel and (on the Soviet side) the loss of Egypt as an ally against the West.
I suspect that an accommodation with Syria & Iraq would likely see strong Soviet & Israeli support for the Kurds being traded away as part of the deal. Which is appropriately symmetrical, seeing as how IOTL the Kurds got shafted with each re-alignment too.
Which histories have you read? You can just PM me them if you want. I've always thought it was because the Soviets were more willing to bankroll more projects while the Americans, at least in OTL, were more reluctant to do so. When the Syrian Ba'ath Party took over in the mid-60s, it basically solidified a Soviet hold in the Middle East, and the USSR started putting a lot more economic and military aid (Soviet MiGs, artillery, weapons, etc) as well as strong political support. Couple with the rise in Arab nationalism, especially in Syria, and the Soviets were willing to support that to fight the West.
Syria and the USSR becoming close had much more to do with both of them being abandoned by Egypt and for both Syria and Iraq, the "strong Soviet hold" on both seems to have been mostly an artifact of them being rejected by everyone else.
Most of my understanding comes from these two books:
The Origins of Alliance:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EuwgR-ogAHwC&printsec=frontcover
Soviet Policies in the Middle East:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9jY4AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover
I've also read innumerable foreign policy papers, newspaper articles and other miscellaneous sources which have shaped my understanding as well.
fasquardon