Islam-wank #1 - 1st Crusade defeated

Deleted member 97083

If the First Crusade fails or never happens, and this leads to a Seljuk conquest of Greece or complete collapse of Byzantium, then the likely result IMHO is either Norman Sicily conquering most of Southern Greece and/or a successful Crusade to re-establish the Byzantine Empire in Greece or Asia Minor. This in turn implies that the Great Schism is eliminated right from the beginning.
Seljuks didn't have the strong navy required to conquer Greece. If they got really lucky though they could probably take Constantinople 1204-style.
 
I agree with that, but given the massive amount of time we're talking about maybe these policies could decline over the centuries like they did in the West? I've also read that after the Latin Kingdom was replaced by Greeks again the efficient system of taxation of the Byz continued, which set them apart from other states they dealt with to some extent.

I wonder if without the 4th Crusade the introduction of canon in the 1300s (the last argument of Kings) placing a premium on cash and reducing the power of feudal lords in their castles, might lead to trends toward re-centralisation of the state.

You somewhat misread my issues on Byzantium. I find the centralized state of Byzantium an issue. It was a centralized state that oddly co-opted the feudal elite of Anatolia. Though I admit my bias to a degree, I have no love for large centralized states.
 
Seljuks didn't have the strong navy required to conquer Greece. If they got really lucky though they could probably take Constantinople 1204-style.

Without a navy or gunpowder they won't do any better than the Arabs or Persians.

Long term neither steppe empires nor Persia were especially stable; add to this that Anatolia is chock-full of Greeks, and vulnerable as well to attacks along the coast.

I think the Crusades get too easily overlooked. Yes they had exceptional luck, but the Franks nevertheless managed, despite considerable obstacles, to sustain the Kingdom of Jerusalem for a century on essentially religious fervor, Italian merchant interests and raw military muscle. The 11th and 12th century is marked by the precipitous rise of the Latins in Italy, France etc, and the equally rapid decline of the Arabs and Byzantines, the traditional powers in the Mediterranean until that time; Crusade or no Crusade, the West is on the ascendant.

TBH I think what would happen is the Byzantines get partitioned between the Slavs in the north, and the Italians in the south; the merchant cities and/or Normans probably set up "crusader Kingdoms" in Asia Minor, Cilicia, Syria, etc. after the Seljuks inevitably start to splinter. In the long term the early fall of Byzantium could end up worse for Islam in the Mediterranean, east and west, as it creates something of a power vacuum and mitigates the existing religious-political tensions that in OTL ended so dramatically in 1204; I would not, for instance, be surprised to see TTL's Roger II, king of Sicily, Africa, Valencia, and Greece, snipe away Egypt from either the Fatimids or the Seljuks themselves.
 
Without a navy or gunpowder they won't do any better than the Arabs or Persians.

Long term neither steppe empires nor Persia were especially stable; add to this that Anatolia is chock-full of Greeks, and vulnerable as well to attacks along the coast.

I think the Crusades get too easily overlooked. Yes they had exceptional luck, but the Franks nevertheless managed, despite considerable obstacles, to sustain the Kingdom of Jerusalem for a century on essentially religious fervor, Italian merchant interests and raw military muscle. The 11th and 12th century is marked by the precipitous rise of the Latins in Italy, France etc, and the equally rapid decline of the Arabs and Byzantines, the traditional powers in the Mediterranean until that time; Crusade or no Crusade, the West is on the ascendant.

TBH I think what would happen is the Byzantines get partitioned between the Slavs in the north, and the Italians in the south; the merchant cities and/or Normans probably set up "crusader Kingdoms" in Asia Minor, Cilicia, Syria, etc. after the Seljuks inevitably start to splinter. In the long term the early fall of Byzantium could end up worse for Islam in the Mediterranean, east and west, as it creates something of a power vacuum and mitigates the existing religious-political tensions that in OTL ended so dramatically in 1204; I would not, for instance, be surprised to see TTL's Roger II, king of Sicily, Africa, Valencia, and Greece, snipe away Egypt from either the Fatimids or the Seljuks themselves.

I agree with everything except taking the city of the world's desire. Any city can be taken, especially if the emperor is exceptionally weak and this leads to defections and betrayals. Do not be naive and assume the Saljuqs will not extend offers of vast sums to any who would betray their rulers, surely they would gain the entire wealth the lands of Islam can offer.

That being said, the Saljuqs will be woefully overextended.
 

Deleted member 97083

Do not be naive and assume the Saljuqs will not extend offers of vast sums to any who would betray their rulers, surely they would gain the entire wealth the lands of Islam can offer.
That said, the Seljuqs were sufficiently decentralized that the Sultan of Rum, usually being a different person than the Sultan of the Seljuq Empire, probably wouldn't have access to the treasury of the whole Seljuq empire.
 
I agree with everything except taking the city of the world's desire. Any city can be taken, especially if the emperor is exceptionally weak and this leads to defections and betrayals. Do not be naive and assume the Saljuqs will not extend offers of vast sums to any who would betray their rulers, surely they would gain the entire wealth the lands of Islam can offer.

That being said, the Saljuqs will be woefully overextended.

Any city can be taken, if you have a blank check and infinite time.

Constantinople cannot be taken without naval supremacy or traitors on the inside and even then, it can be a hell of a challenge. That is an established fact, insofar as the historical record is concerned. I am also highly skeptical that the Seljuks could convince someone to let them in- it didn't happen with the Ottomans, it didn't happen with the Arabs, it didn't happen with the Bulgars, it didn't happen with the Crusaders, and I don't see why it would happen with the Seljuks. Don't underestimate religion- this is Constantinople, the New Rome, and bastion of orthodoxy. Would the good, god-fearing citizens betray their home town to heathen barbarians while the city is still openly resupplied and the empire still controls substantial territory?
 
Was not a large portion of that reconquest in Anatolia due in part to the crusaders defeating the Saljuq in the field and Byzantium sweeping from behind? I believe so. Byzantium was in no place able to launch a serious war against the Saljuq at that point in time.
The crusaders helped retake western Anatolia ,but the ERE could have done it on their own without the crusader’s help considering that the ERE already rebuilt their army around that time and that the Turks were seriously overstretched given there simply wasn’t enough Turks in Anatolia at the time and that they are mostly surrounded by Greek subjects.
 
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Deleted member 97083

The crusaders helped retake western Anatolia ,but the ERE could have done it on their own without the crusader’s help considering that the ERE already rebuilt their army around that time and that the Turks were seriously overstretched given there simply wasn’t enough Turks in Anatolia at the time and that they are mostly surrounded by Greek subjects.
Yeah, we also shouldn't underestimate the recovery of the ERE after Alexios Komnenos' reforms. It's not like the call for Crusade was made instantaneously after the loss of Anatolia; Alexios had been in power for 15 years, minimizing damage and revitalizing the state bureaucracy and the military.
 
Yeah, we also shouldn't underestimate the recovery of the ERE after Alexios Komnenos' reforms. It's not like the call for Crusade was made instantaneously after the loss of Anatolia; Alexios had been in power for 15 years, minimizing damage and revitalizing the state bureaucracy and the military.
Though to be honest,I think the state of bureaucracy’s actually worst after his ‘reforms’ considering he kicked out meritocracy in favour of big families dominating the government.
 

Deleted member 97083

Though to be honest,I think the state of bureaucracy’s actually worst after his ‘reforms’ considering he kicked out meritocracy in favour of big families dominating the government.
True, but it's not like Byzantium wasn't dominated by big dynastic families beforehand. Alexios increased feudal aspects but these were already appearing before his reign.
 
Though to be honest,I think the state of bureaucracy’s actually worst after his ‘reforms’ considering he kicked out meritocracy in favour of big families dominating the government.

That meritocratic bureaucracy had ran Byzantium into the ground prior to Alexios. He was justified in most of his reforms.
 
That meritocratic bureaucracy had ran Byzantium into the ground prior to Alexios. He was justified in most of his reforms.
The bureaucracy didn’t run the state to the ground,the aristocracy,the very people who benefited from Alexios’ reforms did.After Basil II died,the landed elite started consolidating land from the themes and the weak emperors that followed Basil had to buy their support by giving them vast pensions and tax exemptions.The result was the state being bankrupt and the army in an abysmal state.
 
The bureaucracy didn’t run the state to the ground,the aristocracy,the very people who benefited from Alexios’ reforms did.After Basil II died,the landed elite started consolidating land from the themes and the weak emperors that followed Basil had to buy their support by giving them vast pensions and tax exemptions.The result was the state being bankrupt and the army in an abysmal state.

I disagree. It was a combination of both sides.

"Once again the bureaucracy was all powerful, operating on a scale unmatched anywhere else (with the possible exception of China) for several centuries; for it has to be remembered that the Byzantine Empire, absolute monarchy though it might be, rabbits economy on distinctly socialist lines. Capitalism was allowed, but rigidly controlled at every stage; production, labour, consumption, foreign trade, public welfare and even the movement of population were firmly in the hands of the state. The consequence was a vast army of civil servants, taking its orders theoretically from Psellus {[famous bureaucrat and scholar of the period]}- and inspired, so far as one can see, by one overriding principle: to curb- if not actually to destroy - the power of the army. In the past seventeen years, they might have argued, the Empire had experienced three military insurrections: two had been quelled by more luck than anything else , the third had succeeded. It followed that the army must be humbled, and reduced to a proper state of subordination. It must be starved of funds, the authority of the generals must be limited, the former peasant-soldiers - many of whom had followed government advice and bought their exemption from military service - must be progressively replaced by foreign mercenary." - Byzantium: The Apogee (800-1072) page 383 by John Julius Norwich.

"What Constantine X and his government of intellectuals could never apparently understand was, first, that these were the very measures most likely to provoke further coups; second, that mercenary were by their very nature unreliable, being loyal to their paymasters only for as long as they received their pay, or until someone else offered them more; third, and most important of all, that the enemy- most formidable enemy that Byzantium had seen since the appearance of Islam four hundred years before - was at the gates." -same book ^

With this in mind, the size of feudal estates or simply the power of nobility is a lesser one. It was in essence at least subordinate to the more fatal issue of the bloated bureaucracy. It was for instance, not the nobility which caused the disarmament of the Armenian populace in the late XI, it was the critical error of the central Byzantine state. Who, saw it within their interests to disarm an invaluable line of defense against the powers to the south and east. Had the Armenian statelets not been forcibly disarmed and infringed upon, Byzantium could well have held back the Saljuqs simply by allowing the Armenians to hold their mountain fortresses and launch controlled war with the Saljuq raiders.
 
I once read that the salaried bureaucracy in Byzantium was only about 600 people, but compared to feudal systems this was a hell of a lot.
 

raharris1973

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When did the Anatolian Sultanate of Rum split from the the Saljuq Sultanate of the rest of southwest Asia anyway?
 

Deleted member 97083

When did the Anatolian Sultanate of Rum split from the the Saljuq Sultanate of the rest of southwest Asia anyway?
Practically instantaneously. The Sultanate of Rum had a separate ruler from its foundation. Suleiman ibn Qutulmish, the first Sultan of Rum, was not the Sultan of the Seljuk Empire.
 
I disagree. It was a combination of both sides.

"Once again the bureaucracy was all powerful, operating on a scale unmatched anywhere else (with the possible exception of China) for several centuries; for it has to be remembered that the Byzantine Empire, absolute monarchy though it might be, rabbits economy on distinctly socialist lines. Capitalism was allowed, but rigidly controlled at every stage; production, labour, consumption, foreign trade, public welfare and even the movement of population were firmly in the hands of the state. The consequence was a vast army of civil servants, taking its orders theoretically from Psellus {[famous bureaucrat and scholar of the period]}- and inspired, so far as one can see, by one overriding principle: to curb- if not actually to destroy - the power of the army. In the past seventeen years, they might have argued, the Empire had experienced three military insurrections: two had been quelled by more luck than anything else , the third had succeeded. It followed that the army must be humbled, and reduced to a proper state of subordination. It must be starved of funds, the authority of the generals must be limited, the former peasant-soldiers - many of whom had followed government advice and bought their exemption from military service - must be progressively replaced by foreign mercenary." - Byzantium: The Apogee (800-1072) page 383 by John Julius Norwich.

"What Constantine X and his government of intellectuals could never apparently understand was, first, that these were the very measures most likely to provoke further coups; second, that mercenary were by their very nature unreliable, being loyal to their paymasters only for as long as they received their pay, or until someone else offered them more; third, and most important of all, that the enemy- most formidable enemy that Byzantium had seen since the appearance of Islam four hundred years before - was at the gates." -same book ^

With this in mind, the size of feudal estates or simply the power of nobility is a lesser one. It was in essence at least subordinate to the more fatal issue of the bloated bureaucracy. It was for instance, not the nobility which caused the disarmament of the Armenian populace in the late XI, it was the critical error of the central Byzantine state. Who, saw it within their interests to disarm an invaluable line of defense against the powers to the south and east. Had the Armenian statelets not been forcibly disarmed and infringed upon, Byzantium could well have held back the Saljuqs simply by allowing the Armenians to hold their mountain fortresses and launch controlled war with the Saljuq raiders.
Starving the army of funds was a symptom rather than the problem at the core.The empire was already in deep financial straits prior to Constantine X’s predecessor Isaac.If it’s a matter of reallocating funds to the army,Romanos VII could have done it reasonably well.The problem was that there simply was no such money.The entire Manzikert campaign even happened because Romanos could barely scrap enough funds to support his army and that he needed a decisive battle otherwise he won’t be able to fund any further military campaigns.

As for disarming the Armenians,there’s a good reason for that,they are a new addition to the empire and were prone to rebelling against the empire.
 
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