Well, Dale, I can see why Snake is getting frustrated (not that it's particularly difficult to achieve...but).
I brought up diplomacy, I brought up intelligence, you're still gunning for a narrow, not particularly likely scenario and don't want to talk about anything else except how for a want of a nail the kingdom fell. Fine.
Here's some questions:
Okay so.
1. How much time passed between "Summer 1941 (when is that?)" and "July 1941"
2. The navy and the high command were already planning to go South since early '41 before there was an oil embargo. In fact, they did go south. So they are pretty committed and redirecting assets will take time.
Whatever the time period is, July 1941 is a very early date. Based on that, I will basically assume no real preparations have been made (since they're undetectable to Soviet intelligence and a sudden change of direction).
3. Since the Americans already put sanctions on Japan repeatedly, and they clearly failed, and that the last set of sanctions they passed (but not the oil embargo to show leniency) only resulted in immediate slap to the face, what are the chances of America continuing business as usual, instead of following up with a total embargo of everything?
Navy: Red navy is probably irrelevant to the war at large, but because of that it won't be "mopped up". The guns will be taken off to fortify Vladivostok or whatever, the personnel will be trained as naval infantry. The Soviets have no qualms doing that. The navy OTL was used to supply troops for the Lake Khasan operation, and that's pretty much it before August Storm.
The Japanese navy has literally nothing to do up north, in return for abandoning its ambitions south.
Airforce: unless the IJN airforce gets involved, I wouldn't even grant that much. The skies will be contested, and the further from the coast the more contested they will be. I also don't see initial advantages continuing all that long.
So...at this point, Japan has accomplished nothing, wasted a lot of resources, America is still building up for war, and the navy has nothing to do except lose pilots over land missions. They're also pulling back in China. Splendid.
So let's think back to when I suggested that Stalin offers half of Sakhalin for peace, and estimate the chances of a navy-led counter-coup.
1. The only numbers they're realistically missing are the Pacific naval infantry, somewhat close to 30,000 men over the war. They are at this point very green.
Actually, you can see the movement of nearly every formation to pretty serious detail in these files: http://www.rkka.ru/ihandbook.htm or here http://www.tashv.nm.ru/BoevojSostavSA/BoevojSostavSA.html but it's a lot of work to go through them and summarise. I guess we can try to quantify all this in some indefinite future when I have a lot of time.

Consider this a conversation for the future.
In general though, I have a feeling that a simple answer is "not enough", "not enough" almost to the point where there's no real tactical effect.
Here's some questions from me to consider even for your scenario that are less dry and more open to people participating:
1. Stalin tries to buy peace with Japan (very probable):
1a. before Kwantung army proves incapable
1b. after Kwantung army proves incapable
Does Japan accept? If yes, how does that affect the attitude of the Americans (do they give up on China? Do they give LL? Do they let Japan do whatever they want? What does Japan do next?).
If Japan refuses an offer, and the Americans know, and Stalin asks for help, will America get involved earlier?
2. What is, Far Eastern front and Trans-Baikal reserves, instead of sitting back and surviving, actually actively engage Kwantung army and have it in a serious mess (not routing, but certainly not making much progress) even before IJA/IJN's assets are pulled up in full. These are tangible victories in a grim time. It definitely affects morale at home.
How does this affect British and American estimates of the Soviet chances (they thought them pretty low, I think)? Will they:
2a. think they have enough assets to let the enemies bleed while the WAllies get ready and thus ignore it,
2b. or do they specifically give it assistance to finish Japan off earlier in one case, and resist Germany in the other case?
This also partially answers your starvation questions. If America is supplying the Soviets, they won't starve even if Germany does a little better in '41/42.
I brought up diplomacy, I brought up intelligence, you're still gunning for a narrow, not particularly likely scenario and don't want to talk about anything else except how for a want of a nail the kingdom fell. Fine.
Here's some questions:
Step one: The US imposes some sanctions on the Japanese after their occupation of Southern IndoChina in the summer of 1941, but does not permanently cut off oil shipments. That means that the Japanese don't necessarily have to go south to keep from running out of oil.
Step two: As a result, the ongoing Japanese debate about whether to go North (the preferred army strategy) or South (the preferred navy strategy) remains unsettled.
Step three: In late July 1941, the Kwantung army, along with pro-Go North factions inside the Japanese army, conspire to and succeed in, precipitating a war with the Soviets, much as they did in the Manchurian incident and the China incident....
Okay so.
1. How much time passed between "Summer 1941 (when is that?)" and "July 1941"
2. The navy and the high command were already planning to go South since early '41 before there was an oil embargo. In fact, they did go south. So they are pretty committed and redirecting assets will take time.
Whatever the time period is, July 1941 is a very early date. Based on that, I will basically assume no real preparations have been made (since they're undetectable to Soviet intelligence and a sudden change of direction).
3. Since the Americans already put sanctions on Japan repeatedly, and they clearly failed, and that the last set of sanctions they passed (but not the oil embargo to show leniency) only resulted in immediate slap to the face, what are the chances of America continuing business as usual, instead of following up with a total embargo of everything?
Unlike those wars, the Japanese are not up against inept opponents, though the quality of the Soviet forces is highly variable, just as it was in Finland and in the first part of the German attack on the Soviets.
It quickly becomes apparent that the Kwantung has bitten off more than it can handle, though the Japanese navy quickly mops up the local Soviet navy and the Japanese airforce temporarily takes control of the skies.
Navy: Red navy is probably irrelevant to the war at large, but because of that it won't be "mopped up". The guns will be taken off to fortify Vladivostok or whatever, the personnel will be trained as naval infantry. The Soviets have no qualms doing that. The navy OTL was used to supply troops for the Lake Khasan operation, and that's pretty much it before August Storm.
The Japanese navy has literally nothing to do up north, in return for abandoning its ambitions south.
Airforce: unless the IJN airforce gets involved, I wouldn't even grant that much. The skies will be contested, and the further from the coast the more contested they will be. I also don't see initial advantages continuing all that long.
Step four: As a result, Japanese national resources are pulled into the fighting along the Manchurian border. The Japanese are forced to go on the defensive in China and even pull back exposed garrisons to economize force there. Resources (steel, rubber, labor) that would have gone into ship-building flow into building trucks, tanks and artillery for this Japan/Soviet war.
So...at this point, Japan has accomplished nothing, wasted a lot of resources, America is still building up for war, and the navy has nothing to do except lose pilots over land missions. They're also pulling back in China. Splendid.
So let's think back to when I suggested that Stalin offers half of Sakhalin for peace, and estimate the chances of a navy-led counter-coup.
Step six: As a result, the Soviet response in the west is somewhat less powerful, mainly in the autumn 1941 to autumn 1942 time-frame. Now we're at the crucial questions: (1) How much less powerful are the Soviets in the west during that period? (2) How does that lessened power impact the course of the war in late summer/fall 1941? (3) What territories do the two armies end up controlling by summer 1942? (4) Most crucially, do the Germans end up with significantly greater amounts of good farmland or grain stocks under their control?
1. The only numbers they're realistically missing are the Pacific naval infantry, somewhat close to 30,000 men over the war. They are at this point very green.
Actually, you can see the movement of nearly every formation to pretty serious detail in these files: http://www.rkka.ru/ihandbook.htm or here http://www.tashv.nm.ru/BoevojSostavSA/BoevojSostavSA.html but it's a lot of work to go through them and summarise. I guess we can try to quantify all this in some indefinite future when I have a lot of time.
Consider this a conversation for the future.
In general though, I have a feeling that a simple answer is "not enough", "not enough" almost to the point where there's no real tactical effect.
Here's some questions from me to consider even for your scenario that are less dry and more open to people participating:
1. Stalin tries to buy peace with Japan (very probable):
1a. before Kwantung army proves incapable
1b. after Kwantung army proves incapable
Does Japan accept? If yes, how does that affect the attitude of the Americans (do they give up on China? Do they give LL? Do they let Japan do whatever they want? What does Japan do next?).
If Japan refuses an offer, and the Americans know, and Stalin asks for help, will America get involved earlier?
2. What is, Far Eastern front and Trans-Baikal reserves, instead of sitting back and surviving, actually actively engage Kwantung army and have it in a serious mess (not routing, but certainly not making much progress) even before IJA/IJN's assets are pulled up in full. These are tangible victories in a grim time. It definitely affects morale at home.
How does this affect British and American estimates of the Soviet chances (they thought them pretty low, I think)? Will they:
2a. think they have enough assets to let the enemies bleed while the WAllies get ready and thus ignore it,
2b. or do they specifically give it assistance to finish Japan off earlier in one case, and resist Germany in the other case?
This also partially answers your starvation questions. If America is supplying the Soviets, they won't starve even if Germany does a little better in '41/42.
Last edited: