Is two weeks worth a fleet

In world war 1 naval minefields grew throughout the war. Early in the war the minefields were much smaller so there was more room for strategy and wild ideas.

So for a crazy idea at Sea happens, Germany commits the entire High Seas Fleet into the channel in August 1914. It gets sunk in its entirety but they manage to sink 12 predreadnoughts of the Second Fleet and 2 dreadnoughts and a battlecruiser of the Grand Fleet. They also manage to lay mines on a number of French channel ports.

The fleet splits into smaller squadrons when necessary to escape superior British forces.

End result at Sea the German navy is gone and the Royal Navy takes minor casualties.

End result on land the build up of the British Expeditionary force is delayed by two weeks.

Is this enough to change the fate of world war 1 on land in the early battles like the race to the sea.

I know Germany probably wouldn't do this for the simple fact that the Kaiser wouldn't want to throw away his ships. That said I'm curious as to the result on land.
 
End result on sea is.. no high seas fleet. No fleet sitting around in the north sea, never doing anything but keeping the british from doing things. Now, the british can land in northwestern germany without fear of naval interception. And, if france holds and things go like otl, the americans too.
And, the channel is pretty narrow. People can, and do swim it. No squadron of german warships is getting past the royal navy and the french navy (because that's a thing that exists) without getting roflstomped in the process.

Hell, even if the british never do land, the germans will have to keep more men in germany to prevent the british from landing, because of the now very real threat that they could. The reduced numbers from that might hamper the german offensive, making the loss of what is effectively the entire german navy (the ships in the baltic only served well against the russians, i'd hate to see them fight the royal navy. After all, brittania rules the waves.) pointless. In other words, I think this would be the worst decision made in the first world war, aside from starting it in the first place.
 
End result on sea is.. no high seas fleet. No fleet sitting around in the north sea, never doing anything but keeping the british from doing things. Now, the british can land in northwestern germany without fear of naval interception. And, if france holds and things go like otl, the americans too.
And, the channel is pretty narrow. People can, and do swim it. No squadron of german warships is getting past the royal navy and the french navy (because that's a thing that exists) without getting roflstomped in the process.
Well defensive minefields can still be laid (by fishing trawlers if need be) so the invasion of Northern Germany is still not really feasible.

French navy was almost exclusively in the Mediterranean at the out break of war. The British navy in home waters was split into two fleets , the Grand Fleet (sometimes called the 1st fleet) and the Channel Fleet (sometimes called the 2nd fleet) 35ish predreadnoughts deployed from 3 home ports. I gave the British 12 predreadnought losses to represent the functional ships of one the squadrons and some additional losses from when the channel fleet and the Grand Fleet manage to concentrate to defeat the German fleet.

The Royal Navy won't get from scapa to the English Channel before the German navy gets there from Wilhelsaven. If the Germans get a little head start.

I know the German fleet is gone. It's high risk. Hell high risk makes this look tame. It's a deathride. The question I have is, is there a potential realistic payoff on land from slowing the British build up by two weeks to make the destruction of the German fleet worth it.
 
Well, considering the BEF was almost certainly in france by august (they were at mons, wikipedia says they began heading to france on the ninth), i sincerely doubt that it will affect the situation on the ground. In addition, the blockade was already on by august. The hochseeflotte will have to smash its way through, and then try to make a rush for the channel with the grand fleet in pursuit. It'd take a miracle to actually succeed in what you've proposed, and it doesn't seem like it would affect much.

The emperor wouldn't want it, the navy sure as hell wouldn't want to committ their entire fleet into what is very obviously a suicide mission, and the army wouldn't want it because it doesn't help them.

Additionally, I don't think the germans could mine the channel ports. For one, they'd have to be mining the north-western coast, something fishing trawlers (to my
knowledge) are not suited for.

Atleast at jutland, the germans had a marginal chance at some success. This is just a waste of experienced men, good ships, and would be an utter disaster.
 
Well defensive minefields can still be laid (by fishing trawlers if need be) so the invasion of Northern Germany is still not really feasible.

French navy was almost exclusively in the Mediterranean at the out break of war. The British navy in home waters was split into two fleets , the Grand Fleet (sometimes called the 1st fleet) and the Channel Fleet (sometimes called the 2nd fleet) 35ish predreadnoughts deployed from 3 home ports. I gave the British 12 predreadnought losses to represent the functional ships of one the squadrons and some additional losses from when the channel fleet and the Grand Fleet manage to concentrate to defeat the German fleet.

The Royal Navy won't get from scapa to the English Channel before the German navy gets there from Wilhelsaven. If the Germans get a little head start.

I know the German fleet is gone. It's high risk. Hell high risk makes this look tame. It's a deathride. The question I have is, is there a potential realistic payoff on land from slowing the British build up by two weeks to make the destruction of the German fleet worth it.

Trawler vs DD good match up. Mines can be swept, especially if there is no covering force and the High Seas fleet is sailing into the home waters of one of if not the the largest submarine force in the world.

The sea distance is such that the High seas fleet has at best a day before the Grand Fleet is between it and its home bases.

Once again HOI rears its ugly head. The proposal is to kill off your fleet and several 10s of thousands of men for at best a brief advantage and allow the RN and Russian Navy to bombard any coastal town they feel like forever.
 
Anyone got any good sources on British logistics in 1914.

I am operating under the estimation that either due to not having troops in theater or through not having supplies a 1-2 week delay in shipping would be fatal for the ability of the bef to operate at the level that they did. Time this for the race to the sea or other early battles and it even be worth the loss of an entire fleet.

My goal here is to find out if I'm right. Guard's merchant navy claims that between August 9 and September 8th (93,000 tonnes of supplies (212,000 men 60,000 horses and equipment munitions etc) was shipped between Britain and France.

Let's say the delay is broken down as follows

4 days the Germans are in the channel
3 days sweep mines on channel ports
Half capacity for 1 week due to sunk and damaged merchant ships and Calais port facilities get shelled
Three quarter capacity for two weeks due to sunk and damaged merchant ships and Calais port facilities get shelled

That takes 2 weeks capacity out of the British Expeditionary force spread out over a month. You delay 46,000 tonnes of military supplies and 106,000 men reaching France.

Yes it's a sacrifice of the German fleet and yes unless it means a major difference on land it's a stupid decision for naval reasons. It's definitely a stupid decision for mora reasons just throwing away your fleet like this. I can see a major upside, a degradation in the ability of British troops to fight in the opening phase of the war. I cannot see if this could be a decisive upside in the race to the sea or other early battles.
 
Anyone got any good sources on British logistics in 1914.

....

Ammunition is the one critical item the French can't supply. Ordinarily a division would have had two days supply in the battery/battalion trains & two more in the division train. That's at the maximum expected battle consumption. What the BEF might have been sent with at army depot level I can't say. Four more days load would be a minimum in my guess. Possibly a lot more.
 
My goal here is to find out if I'm right. Gurd's merchant navy claims that between August 9 and September 8th (93,000 tonnes of supplies (212,000 men 60,000 horses and equipment munitions etc) was shipped between Britain and France.
One of the main field artierries early in ww1 British artillery was the 4.5 inch q.f howitzer.

This could fire 8 tonnes of ammunition an hour during an artillery bombardment.

The initial bef (as of September otl) consisted of 6 divisions each with 12 artillery batteries of 6 guns. So overall there's 432 guns capable of firing over 3450 tonnes an hour. If the entire supplies that made it across in the first month was used to fire artillery you have 27 hours of shooting. Obviously it wasn't the entire load but it's just a sign of how restricted the bef was early in the war.

You see how these supplies look thin too me.

How effective was the bef in the first few months of the war?

I suppose I'm curious if the bef was ineffective due to poor supplies early in the war or if it received just enough supplies to operate in combat effectively in the early battles. If it received just enough and you cut the flow of supplies can you force them to collapse.

Ammunition is the one critical item the French can't supply. Ordinarily a division would have had two days supply in the battery/battalion trains & two more in the division train. That's at the maximum expected battle consumption. What the BEF might have been sent with at army depot level I can't say. Four more days load would be a minimum in my guess. Possibly a lot more.

I would expect that the supplies available at army depot level would have been built up during the war. Not there in August or September.
 
How does the HSF get to the channel given the below

1) Brits are reading their mail so will already be at sea
2) Even if 1 fails , enough scouts etc are in place to pick up the HSF long before it reaches the channel
3) British mine fields restrict its path , massed submarines, night torpedo attacks etc will be waiting in place
Then
1) Laying enough mines to make a difference takes time and the minelayers in 1914 are not specialist fast ones so would slow the fleet to a crawl.
2) This is not HoI , the supply lines are a bit more robust , ships can be rerouted to Normandy and beyond , massive stores are already in place etc. It might stop the BEF attacking and force them to be defensive but only a small pause at most.
3)The HSF would last a day at most in the channel, WW1 Naval battles are short once the fleets met and there is no place to maneuver in the channel.
 
One of the main field artierries early in ww1 British artillery was the 4.5 inch q.f howitzer.

This could fire 8 tonnes of ammunition an hour during an artillery bombardment.

The initial bef (as of September otl) consisted of 6 divisions each with 12 artillery batteries of 6 guns. So overall there's 432 guns capable of firing over 3450 tonnes an hour. If the entire supplies that made it across in the first month was used to fire artillery you have 27 hours of shooting. Obviously it wasn't the entire load but it's just a sign of how restricted the bef was early in the war ...

The artillery ammo use weren't based on max ROF for a continual firing but on estimated quantity for effect on expected targets for X days of battle and Y days of skirmishing or no contact. The ammo carried by the battery was in theory sufficient for a day of normal full on battle.

I've seen references to a supply package, above the division or corps trains, that crossed the Channel with the BEF, but those lacked details on composition & quantity.

In 1914 every one was surprised by the demand for artillery ammunition. In the common view the allowances were far to small. I have my own thoughts on this, but would need to dig back through several hundred pages of references to form a argument.

Effectiveness of the BEF varied by unit. On description of the Mons battle accuses one of the Brit div arty commanders of deploying the batteries on forward slopes & having no effective fire plan. The other div in the same corps was described as deploying on reverse slopes, having clear priorities for target types and locations, and planned targets cooresponding to the infantry concept for the defense.
 
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The artillery ammo use weren't based on max ROF for a continual firing but on estimated quantity for effect on expected targets for X days of battle and Y days of skirmishing or no contact. The ammo carried by the battery was in theory sufficient for a day of normal full on battle..

I'm aware. I was just using it as an example for how quickly the artillery of the bef could burn through their supplies. That's assuming 100% of transport was artillery.

In 1914 every one was surprised buy the demand for artillery ammunition. In the common view the allowances were far to small. I have my own thoughts on this, but would need to dig back through several hundred pages of references to form a argument.

True. This common surprise is one of the main reasons that I believe a disruption to supply convoys in August 1914 could have a crushing effect on the fighting ability of the bef in the opening battles.
 
I'm aware. I was just using it as an example for how quickly the artillery of the bef could burn through their supplies. That's assuming 100% of transport was artillery.



True. This common surprise is one of the main reasons that I believe a disruption to supply convoys in August 1914 could have a crushing effect on the fighting ability of the bef in the opening battles.

To understand that we'd need to know actual use, what came over with the BEF initial lift, and subsequent delivery. This is not something I'd depend on guesswork for.

The Journal of Royal Artillery & US Artillery Journal have partial info on this in the volumes from the interwar period.
 
Just for reference the BEF/other British forces deployed to France on the following dates:

4 inf & 1 cav division 16 August.

1 inf division 24 August

RM Bde 27-31 August

1 inf division 10 September

RM Bde 19 September

Oxford Yeomanry bde 22 September

RND and 1 inf division 6 October

1 cav division 8 October (the cavalry having grown to 2 divisions before this )

So by the time the BEF concentrated in Flanders it was 10 divisions.
 
As for what that means on the battlefield if the BEF is delayed by 2 weeks, the BEF fought Mons on Aug 23 and Le Cateau on Aug 25, then disengaged and retreated until September 5: causing about 5000 casualties to the Germans and engaged them for 3 days. The Royal Marines also landed at Ostend for 3 days, before being evacuated without engaging the enemy.

So in effect the 1st Army will avoid 2 engagements for the loss of ~5000 troops but will likely face 5 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions of the BEF at full strength at about the Marne on about 1-4 September. I don't see any massive difference in the outcome of that battle, certainly not worth risking the fleet for.
 
If the Germans can't win in the west, they are fucked absolutely fucking fucked by the loss of the HSF I mean just look at the morale damage from the loss of a fleet Germany has spent years and billions of marks building the loss throw this on top of British ships bombarding German coastal towns with impunity and the ability of the Brits to do make a few raids capture a few towns before withdrawing and force the Germans to deploy troops back to coasts to guard against more British raids its a hail marry in 1914
 
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