From what I gather, the Mechelen Incident is what prompted German High Command to switch to the Manstein Plan since they were spooked that the original Fall Gelb had fallen into Allied hands, and that had the incident not occurred they would have activated what amounted to Schlieffen 2.0 – which is exactly what Britain and France were expecting! Is this correct? If so, could the absence of a "sickle cut" behind Allied Lines have prevented the Fall of France? What would the implicatiions for this be around the world?
Is the Mechelen Incident key to the Fall of France?
- Thread starter Psmith
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mottajack
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What is sure is the Manstein plan / sickle cut was a strategic stroke of genius. The feint in Gembloux and Namur with only TWO panzer divisions, while all SEVEN others come from the Ardennes, was pure genius because, in anutshell, it conforted the Wallies opinion the Germans were playing in their hand. Well, the two panzers that did that were repelled with severe losses (Gembloux, Namur) but of course the seven others carried the day and strategic surprise. Dang.
An interesting question is whether the French could have resisted to 7 panzer divisions, not 2, in Gembloux and Namur. The battle as fought OTL was pretty hard for the best units of the French army - with four times more ennemies, would they hold on ?
Another fact that doomed france was the fate of Henri Giraud 7th army - the all too famous "strategic reserve".
Late 1939 it was held in reserve in Reims. Unfortunately that asshole Gamelin, and French politicians, pushed for the insane Dyle - Breda manoeuver. That is, the French armies were initially to deploy on the Escault river, in Northern France. Then this was moved deep into Belgium, on the Dyle. And then it was moved a third time, to Breda, in... The Netherlands, because since France was to help belgium, The Netherlands could not be left in the cold. The army that was to deploy in Breda was... Giraud 7th army, no longer in reserve in Reims, ready to bridge any gap near... the Ardennes. Instead it was send to Breda, 200 miles North. We all know how that ended...
An interesting question is whether the French could have resisted to 7 panzer divisions, not 2, in Gembloux and Namur. The battle as fought OTL was pretty hard for the best units of the French army - with four times more ennemies, would they hold on ?
Another fact that doomed france was the fate of Henri Giraud 7th army - the all too famous "strategic reserve".
Late 1939 it was held in reserve in Reims. Unfortunately that asshole Gamelin, and French politicians, pushed for the insane Dyle - Breda manoeuver. That is, the French armies were initially to deploy on the Escault river, in Northern France. Then this was moved deep into Belgium, on the Dyle. And then it was moved a third time, to Breda, in... The Netherlands, because since France was to help belgium, The Netherlands could not be left in the cold. The army that was to deploy in Breda was... Giraud 7th army, no longer in reserve in Reims, ready to bridge any gap near... the Ardennes. Instead it was send to Breda, 200 miles North. We all know how that ended...
As far as plans go, the TTL battle of Belgium would be fought in a narrow battlefield with high troop density, away from the Entente supply depots, against an enemy with tactical air superiourity. Do note that two Panzer-Divisions are still designated to Ardennes in the January 1940 version.
Mays in 'Strange Victory' is good English language description of the development of the German plans for attacking in the west. The short version is Mays describes a evolutionary development over five to six months of frequent map and field exercises. These repeated tests of many options led to the Sickle Cut plan in its final form.
Mays gives Manstein credit for planning one of many plans for placing the 'schwerpunckt' or main effort in the Ardennes, however that concept did not originate with him. It dates to a requirement from Halder for a early November 1939 map exercise run at the Zossen HQ facility. The advance to the Channel & the massing of multiple armored corps into a single operational entity emerged gradually over the winter, the most successful technique of many tried in the map and field exercises. Mansteins plan, written for Army Groups A role in the November 39 Zossen war game had the armored corps separated & still operating with the field armies as they had two months earlier in Poland.
Mays credits the Melichin Incident as the final event that led to the cancellation of the winter offensives Hitler had previously been in love with. He abruptly reversed his attitude and went from pressing Halder & the others to getting a attack underway immediately. Hitler ordered a fresh start & new plans, but Mays points out that Halder simply continued the developing the several plans on the table. Refining each as the optimal plan emerged.
Memos or reports on these exercises show that Halder & others felt the best results were when the main effort was in the Ardennes. However there were pressures from other directions to weaken that. The Air Force wanted the Dutch airfields for attacking Britain. Goering & his staff had no confidence the army would secure and airfields in western Belgium or France suitable & they argued for a right wing strong enough to capture the airfields they needed. Hitler was mercurial as always favoring one plan in the morning, and prohibiting it in favor of another in the evening. The logisticians pointed out correctly Army Group A could not be supplied through the Ardennes. Securing the rail network passing through Leige & across the Belgian plain was essential.
While Halder felt the Ardennes option had the best potential this was not realized in the regular map exercises. While tactical and operational successes were gained none of the plans produced a decisive result. In the end the German armies were stalled in Belgium or other France & the 'Panzerwaffe' so successful in Poland ground down to ineffectiveness. That changed in the March 1940 wargame. The intelligence officer running the French army proposed delaying French actions by 48 hours. He argued defects in the staff and command of the several army groups, and Georges HQ (the North Front) would slow French reactions drastically. Previously the French on the map had been run at what was thought to e normal speeds in terms of Observation, Decision, Action. Not unexpectedly allowing for a slower French reaction resulted in a desire result (successful breakout & exploitation by Kliests armored group). Most of the Generals and staff observing this exercise judged the result unrealistic. A German wank that would never occur on the battlefield. A few like Guderian & Kliest saw it as validating their arguments for the Sicklecut maneuver. Harder who in six+ months of testing plans had seen nothing better &continued with the plan as it has evolved.
One other point that Mays does not much address is the fact that the Channel dash was not the only option on the table for the exploitation. A exploitation to Paris was seriously considered and tested. Guderian in his memoir 'Panzer Leader' describes how as late s the 14th May he was unsure if his corps would be ordered to attack to the Channel, or Paris. Kleist told him the Channel & Guderian was off. This late decision for the exploitation target is discussed by a few others as well.
Getting back to this:
Aside from Mays, other historians like Horne of Chapman date the favor for the main effort in the Ardennes far earlier than January 1940. The idea that this January event dates a whole sale & radical change in plan seems to come from Hitler histrionic fit after the Mechelen Incident. His frequent nervous changing of favor from one plan to another confuses that at OKW there was a steady methodical development of multiple plans. It is correct that as a result of Hitlers post Mechelen order Halder ordered a top to bottom review of the plans, but the result was little different than previous. ie: one January proposal was Holland be excluded from attack, left neutral. This would help strengthen the attack further south. The Luftwaffe representatives blackballed this, insisting the Dutch airfields were essential. So nothing changed there. The armored group attacking thru the Ardennes before the Mechelen Incident had already been expanded. Guderian, & others, even Rundsteadt had been arguing before January for again strengthening that armored group.
So much about the development and execution of the Sicklecut plan in the books derives from recycling of third and fourth hand sources trying back to post war statements. Often statements not checked or by people speaking out of context. Mays went to the trouble of reviewing the surviving documents from the OKW, Halder & staff. Those show a much more evolutionary development by methodical Prussian staff work. Mansteins role was relatively early in this & minor. Mainly as the Army Group A Chief of Staff he did the research and investigation that showed a modern AG could advance rapidly through the region. Solid and credible work expected of the German General Staff Officers.
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Illustration 9 a is a reasonably accurate depiction of the plan/s previous to late October. Historians have since the 1960s recognized the seminal change occurs late October with Halders guidance issued for the 7 (?) November war-game at Zossen, (re: Horne, Chapman). Halder ordered three options tested: A. The main effort made in the Ardennes. B. The main effort made on the Belgian plain. C. The mass of maneuver held in reserve with no specific main effort, just a general attack. Since it had the main effort for option 'B' Army Group B had the lead in planning that one, AG A the lead in planning option A. As CoS for AG A Manstein was responsible for that plan. I've not seen the original documents for these three plans, but illustration b. fits the descriptions for option B, & illustration c fits Option A of Halders requirement.
At the end of the three tests option C, the general attack was clearly a failure. The defense of all four armies Netherlands, Belgium, BEF, & France was able to consolidate & repel the mass of maneuver that had been held in reserve. Options A & B were better, but failed to achieve any strategic victory. Halder left a opinion in the after action report that Option A showed more promise. Others had reservations based on the defensibility of the rugged terrain of the Ardennes and the close proximity of French forces making it easy for them to reinforce the Belgians defending there. It was also assumed the Belgians would post a strong defense there. A important point in this test is there were still only six actual armored divisions available, in three corps. And the corps were still linked to the local army commanders as in Poland. The concept pushed by Guderian and the other armor fanatics that the PzDiv be massed in a independent force was ignored. Manstein had his entire career in the infantry & zero experience in working with armored forces. Allocated only four armored div in two corps Manstein seems to have been intending there use to match the same two months earlier in Poland. Guderian claimed he had given Manstein a hour or two of instruction in his preference for the use of massed armored forces on or about 28 October 1939. Man stein left no record of this alleged meeting.
Between the November war-game Halder directed, and latter January the Germans acquired considerable intelligence on the enemy war plans. First they learned the Belgians were not planning a strong forward defense in the Ardennes. They were screening the border with light forces, but intended to abandon that and the numerous MG & AT bunkers there for a line roughly from Huy south. Halfway between the Luxembourg border & the Meuse River south of Namur. Subsequent map and field exercises showed the Germans how this allowed Army Group A to plunge deep into the Ardennes before hitting a solid defense. Second they learned the French might not send song forces into the Ardennes. A false alarm among the Allies during the winter did much to reveal & confirm the German intel on the French intent. A war order caused the French armies to start their movement into Belgium, executing the current version of the Dyle Plan. While the BEF & 1st Armies started their movement to the Belgian border, the Second army sat tight. Aside from a light mechanized & horse cavalry corps nothing of the French prepared to to move into Belgium.
Hitlers fit over the Mechelen incident is the item folks focus on, but in January two other important factors were emerging. The intelligence picture outlined above was becoming fairly clear. The weakness of the Allied defense of the Ardennes caused for Rundsteadt and Halder to see less risk & greater gains in that direction. There was also a change in the forces available emerging. For one some 25-35 new infantry divisions would be added to the German OB in the spring. These newly trained reserve divisions, mostly armed with old Reichweher & modern Czech weapons could be used to cover the frontier of Army Group C. The allowed the concentration of the better quality infantry corps in Army Groups A & B, making them more capable. Also there would be four more armored divisions available in the Spring. The conversion of the light mechanized divisions to regular PzD was nearing completion. In the early spring there would be ten of the armored div and up to five motor rifle div available. Finally the arguments of the tank fanatics were giving traction. Rundsteadt was seeing the advantages in a large tank force 'charging' through the Franco/Belgian screen in the Ardennes & 'rushing' the French defense on the Meuse River before in consolidated. The bottom line is Halder & Rundsteadt were looking at much different circumstance for the spring than existed November-January. Both were looking at drastically updating the attack plans & would have done so with or without Hitlers histrionics.
Lost in the pop history narrative is that the emerging Sickle Cut plan was not the only one on the table. The old Option B, across the Belgian plain still was on the table. Tho it had much less attention. Illustration d is closer to the winter version that the illustration b. Note that this was Hitlers favorite at the time. He had at at least one point favored the Ardennes option, but switched back Then there was the 'Paris Option' for the thrust of Army Group A. That remained on the table right up to 14 May, tho considered by Guderian and others as the inferior plan to the 'Channel dash'.
At the end of the three tests option C, the general attack was clearly a failure. The defense of all four armies Netherlands, Belgium, BEF, & France was able to consolidate & repel the mass of maneuver that had been held in reserve. Options A & B were better, but failed to achieve any strategic victory. Halder left a opinion in the after action report that Option A showed more promise. Others had reservations based on the defensibility of the rugged terrain of the Ardennes and the close proximity of French forces making it easy for them to reinforce the Belgians defending there. It was also assumed the Belgians would post a strong defense there. A important point in this test is there were still only six actual armored divisions available, in three corps. And the corps were still linked to the local army commanders as in Poland. The concept pushed by Guderian and the other armor fanatics that the PzDiv be massed in a independent force was ignored. Manstein had his entire career in the infantry & zero experience in working with armored forces. Allocated only four armored div in two corps Manstein seems to have been intending there use to match the same two months earlier in Poland. Guderian claimed he had given Manstein a hour or two of instruction in his preference for the use of massed armored forces on or about 28 October 1939. Man stein left no record of this alleged meeting.
Between the November war-game Halder directed, and latter January the Germans acquired considerable intelligence on the enemy war plans. First they learned the Belgians were not planning a strong forward defense in the Ardennes. They were screening the border with light forces, but intended to abandon that and the numerous MG & AT bunkers there for a line roughly from Huy south. Halfway between the Luxembourg border & the Meuse River south of Namur. Subsequent map and field exercises showed the Germans how this allowed Army Group A to plunge deep into the Ardennes before hitting a solid defense. Second they learned the French might not send song forces into the Ardennes. A false alarm among the Allies during the winter did much to reveal & confirm the German intel on the French intent. A war order caused the French armies to start their movement into Belgium, executing the current version of the Dyle Plan. While the BEF & 1st Armies started their movement to the Belgian border, the Second army sat tight. Aside from a light mechanized & horse cavalry corps nothing of the French prepared to to move into Belgium.
Hitlers fit over the Mechelen incident is the item folks focus on, but in January two other important factors were emerging. The intelligence picture outlined above was becoming fairly clear. The weakness of the Allied defense of the Ardennes caused for Rundsteadt and Halder to see less risk & greater gains in that direction. There was also a change in the forces available emerging. For one some 25-35 new infantry divisions would be added to the German OB in the spring. These newly trained reserve divisions, mostly armed with old Reichweher & modern Czech weapons could be used to cover the frontier of Army Group C. The allowed the concentration of the better quality infantry corps in Army Groups A & B, making them more capable. Also there would be four more armored divisions available in the Spring. The conversion of the light mechanized divisions to regular PzD was nearing completion. In the early spring there would be ten of the armored div and up to five motor rifle div available. Finally the arguments of the tank fanatics were giving traction. Rundsteadt was seeing the advantages in a large tank force 'charging' through the Franco/Belgian screen in the Ardennes & 'rushing' the French defense on the Meuse River before in consolidated. The bottom line is Halder & Rundsteadt were looking at much different circumstance for the spring than existed November-January. Both were looking at drastically updating the attack plans & would have done so with or without Hitlers histrionics.
Lost in the pop history narrative is that the emerging Sickle Cut plan was not the only one on the table. The old Option B, across the Belgian plain still was on the table. Tho it had much less attention. Illustration d is closer to the winter version that the illustration b. Note that this was Hitlers favorite at the time. He had at at least one point favored the Ardennes option, but switched back Then there was the 'Paris Option' for the thrust of Army Group A. That remained on the table right up to 14 May, tho considered by Guderian and others as the inferior plan to the 'Channel dash'.
As far as plans go, the TTL battle of Belgium would be fought in a narrow battlefield with high troop density, away from the Entente supply depots, against an enemy with tactical air superiourity. Do note that two Panzer-Divisions are still designated to Ardennes in the January 1940 version.
Carl: This is a great set of facts.
It poses one question: I have always been fascinated by Hitler's obsession of attacking in October/November 1939. The generals were not applauding this in great numbers, though.
You write that Halder looked at different options in November 1939.
… But what would have been the plan for an attack in November 1939? It would have meant that the planning would have to have been done while Poland was still being fought. The generals and their staff might have been a bit busy at that time.
Would it have been a matter of 'a plan is better than no plan'?
Surprise is obviously a great thing, but would that have won the day if the attack had been a Schlieffen v2.0? As that might have been the only plan Germany had?
It poses one question: I have always been fascinated by Hitler's obsession of attacking in October/November 1939. The generals were not applauding this in great numbers, though.
You write that Halder looked at different options in November 1939.
… But what would have been the plan for an attack in November 1939? It would have meant that the planning would have to have been done while Poland was still being fought. The generals and their staff might have been a bit busy at that time.
Would it have been a matter of 'a plan is better than no plan'?
Surprise is obviously a great thing, but would that have won the day if the attack had been a Schlieffen v2.0? As that might have been the only plan Germany had?