Is the German army during WW2 underestimated or overestimated?

[John Dusk]

Is the Heer during WW2 overestimated or underestimated (on history forums particularly) in your opinion in terms of its capabilities, skill, fighting power etc and why?

 

[David Floyd]

Overestimated, at least after 1942/3.

 

[John Dusk]

Overestimated, at least after 1942/3.

Can you elaborate?

 

[David Floyd]

Well, I guess it depends on what you mean, too. Do you mean tactically, or in terms of small units? Or are you talking about a Heer vs US Army comparison, holistically?

If the former, almost up to the end of the war the Heer performed well tactically and could scrape together defeated units and reconstitute them.

If the latter, give me the 1943 British, American, or Red Army against the Heer any day of the week.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Both depending on the subject. In general I think they are overestimated from 1942 on, as are the Allies. In certain areas the Allied powers liked to pat themselves on the back and pretend that they became superior to their enemy (US and artillery for instance...the more I read about artillery from more specialist sources is seems that the US innovations were not unique, they just had more industry to ensure they had full motorization, unlimited shells, and air supremacy, the latter ensuring the enemy could not use their artillery capabilities properly; at Normandy there was a huge ammunition famine for the German forces, so their artillery was neutered while the Allies had unlimited aerial observation by artillery spotters). Currently the historiography of the Eastern Front has swung too much in the other direction away from the Teutonic übermensch toward the Soviet operational genius übermensch and not really allowing for the role of Lend-Lease, other fronts, attrition, and plain numerical superiority played in Soviet success. The narratives about the conflict are still based on people trying to flatter memories of their fathers/grandfathers (Ambrose), propaganda, and even just trying to come up with a 'new' iconoclastic narrative to get attention so they can sell books. There has been a TON of the latter lately, so trying to get to objective truth is probably not going to happen with history of the conflict any time soon.

 

[Erick]

They were fully able to get lots of functionality out of how they structured their forces, and were heavily decentralized, highly successfull. The USSR on the other hand at the outbreak of hostilities had a unsuccessful force structure and though I believe they cut its complexity down in time to save Moscow, it still was a work in progress (even as the Soviets went on the offensive at Stalingrad), though, in terms of operational planning they showed how dangerous their understanding was early in the war.

 

[Gudestein]

I Think the answer here must depend on where you draw the line between heer and wehrmacht and all the rest.
If you ASB a functional railway system, fuel, ammo and air superiority and signals security in favor of the wehrmacht, they probably would have continue to perform above average throughout. But that is ASB'ing most of what makes an army work.

 

[Riain]

Given that the Heer is only responsible for Tactics and Operations and the realms of military strategy, grand strategy, diplomacy and total war mobilisation/production are political responsibilities with non-binding input/advice from joint command in the form of OKW I'd say the Heer is underestimated.

With the resources they were given and the campaigns they were tasked to undertake they performed at or above the levels of their enemies whenever the tactical situation was bearable. They got more out of their fighting men on the battlefield did than the Allies which in a large way made up for their materiel deficiencies.

That Germany was fighting too many enemies with not enough resources without high quality politico-military leadership is not the Herr's fault and it is incorrect to say that wasn't any good because of factors outside of its control simply because the Allies were better at these things.

 

[missouribob]

How important was Lend and Lease for the Soviets? If they didn't receive Lend and Lease could they have repelled the Germans? Or let's say Lend and Lease ends on Jan 1 1943, would the Soviets have enough industry to win the Eastern Front at that point?

 

[Thoresby]

How important was Lend and Lease for the Soviets? If they didn't receive Lend and Lease could they have repelled the Germans? Or let's say Lend and Lease ends on Jan 1 1943, would the Soviets have enough industry to win the Eastern Front at that point?

Lend lease was very important to the Soviets overall but mostly by providing force multipliers. The war wouldn't have been extended by more than a week or two if the WAllies had never sent a tank or plane East however, however the trucks, radio's and fuel they provided made the post-1943 Soviet Offensives possible. The WAllied provision of radio's was especially important. While it took until 1945 and the collapse of the Wehrmacht for the Red Army to have as many radio's per Division as the Germans without the Allies the 1941/42 situation of the Soviets having 1/10th the numbers of the Germans would have persisted and with that the Germans would have been able to keep out fighting them on a operational level. Tanks and artillery are nice, but as Barbarossa showed without command, control, and communication they aren't much use. There is a reason why the cost breakdown of a modern tank shows the Sensors, Computers and Radio's cost more than the rest of the tank put together.

 

[missouribob]

While it took until 1945 and the collapse of the Wehrmacht for the Red Army to have as many radio's per Division as the Germans without the Allies the 1941/42 situation of the Soviets having 1/10th the numbers of the Germans would have persisted and with that the Germans would have been able to keep out fighting them on a operational level.

So basically without Lend and Lease (or even other Allies in the war) the Soviets would have been able to repel the Nazi's but not driven them back to Berlin?

 

[Thoresby]

So basically without Lend and Lease (or even other Allies in the war) the Soviets would have been able to repel the Nazi's but not driven them back to Berlin?

It depends, in the absence of Lend Lease the Soviets would certainly have to change their industrial priorities, less tanks more trucks, more exports to pay for imports of electronics and petrol from abroad etc. So the Red Army would be considerably weaker, but that being said the Soviet Union still has some advantages of Germany that wouldn't have gone away, more recruitable and usable soldiers, less stretched logistics, single front, imho more sensible (though equally evil) leadership etc. But it would be a much more even fight and Soviets certainly wouldn't be in Berlin April '45. My personal view is that a straight Nazi-Soviet war probably ends in a Brest-Litvosky sort of peace.

 

[pattersonautobody]

Here at ALT History they are underrated. In reality, the German military punched way above its weight. They had positive kill ratios against the Soviets until 1945, where they were fielding geezers and children. Yet, the Soviets had air superiority, motorization, numerical superiority, and an enemy intent upon not withdrawing and allowing themselves to be surrounded--every advantage one can ask for. Yet, the Germans still did a better job at killing Soviets than vice versa.

What the German military had done in Belgium (taking impregnable forts in 24 hours), France, and North Africa when they had inferiority in numbers and crap logisitcs is amazing. At some point, we have to admit the average German soldier was simply a better shot and better at a tactical level.

By 43 and on, the western allies simply faced the dregs of the German military (training divisions, penal batallions, fortress divisions, Ostruppen--the worst of the worst) with the exception of a quality division here or there. Operation Anvil literally came against a numerical superiority of Axis soldiers--most of which withdrew as fast as they could because they had no combat value, they were occupation forces at best.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

How important was Lend and Lease for the Soviets? If they didn't receive Lend and Lease could they have repelled the Germans? Or let's say Lend and Lease ends on Jan 1 1943, would the Soviets have enough industry to win the Eastern Front at that point?

In terms of food it kept the USSR from collapsing:
https://www.amazon.com/Hunger-War-P...&qid=1470624556&sr=1-1&keywords=9780253017161

So basically without Lend and Lease (or even other Allies in the war) the Soviets would have been able to repel the Nazi's but not driven them back to Berlin?

The Germans have a limit of how far they could logistically push into the USSR. LL didn't impact that part of things, but it did impact Soviet ability to counterattack....and produce weapons and feed itself. Even after LL kicked into high gear and the Soviets were pushing back the worst deaths from starvation happened in 1943-44. Without LL weapons, raw materials, explosives, trucks, communications equipment, logistics, etc. they couldn't have pushed the Germans back nearly as quickly and would face economic collapse if the Germans sat on the Volga much longer and they'd face mass famine by 1943.

By 43 and on, the western allies simply faced the dregs of the German military (training divisions, penal batallions, fortress divisions, Ostruppen--the worse of the worse) with the exception of a quality division here or there. Operation Anvil literally came against a numerical superiority of Axis soldiers--most of which withdrew as fast as they could because they had no combat value, they were occupation forces at best.

That's not exactly true. The German paras mostly fought the Wallies, the HG Panzer Division was a quality formation despite it's incomplete organization and lack of experience, Panzer Lehr and several very high quality SS formations (as much as that could be said about the SS except for equipment and experience) fought in France. Any number of good army divisions fought in the West too. Just as there were dregs (and more importantly lack of replacements and supplies) in the West, there was also disproportionately good armored divisions too.

 

[longsword14]

Three options are just too few.
Which qualities would one consider when evaluation is done? Do the fundamental limitations imposed because of resources matter? Modern wars are inherently entangled with material and firepower, so subtracting this is just about impossible. I would even go as far as saying that discussing 'purely military prowess' is absurd.
After the first phase of the war was over (when Barbarossa failed to get its aims within time), and the Third Reich could not finish even one of the fronts, it merely became a question of how long and at what price. The overall balance of war, i.e the strategy, means more than anything else in a total war such as this. A great portion of fighting ability at all levels flows from the highest,i.e strategic, so declaring allied (say Soviet superiority) to some special formula would be incorrect.
A meaningful decision would demand that the poster should set some parameters and the time frame kept in mind.

I would agree with @wiking that it has become a repeated trope to replace German absolute superiority with Allied supremacy in 'pure military skill'. I have lost count about how many times people have repeated the term 'operational art' to give their statements some sort of foundation.

The most important decisions regarding the overall conduct of war and its result were made not during it but at some point in the 30s, within political circles.

I voted neither.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The Germans are more consistently overestimated. The Wehrmacht was impressive in its victories, and still dangerous in its defeats, but it had some mind boggling flaws which the myth of German military genius and the "blame Hitler" excuse often served to hide...

 

[John Dusk]

Here at ALT History they are underrated. In reality, the German military punched way above its weight. They had positive kill ratios against the Soviets until 1945, where they were fielding geezers and children. Yet, the Soviets had air superiority, motorization, numerical superiority, and an enemy intent upon not withdrawing and allowing themselves to be surrounded--every advantage one can ask for. Yet, the Germans still did a better job at killing Soviets than vice versa.

What were the exact kill ratios?

Why specifically when the Red Army had almost every advantage in 1944/45 did they still suffer immense losses from the German Army which was a shadow of its former self and the Volkssturm?

I would agree with @wiking that it has become a repeated trope to replace German absolute superiority with Allied supremacy in 'pure military skill'. I have lost count about how many times people have repeated the term 'operational art' to give their statements some sort of foundation.

What is operational art and how does it differ from tactics and strategies?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The Germans are more consistently overestimated. The Wehrmacht was impressive in its victories, and still dangerous in its defeats, but it had some mind boggling flaws which the myth of German military genius and the "blame Hitler" excuse often served to hide...

Hitler was in charge of strategy and left the operational tactical stuff up to OKH...sort of. So you can't not blame Hitler for the core strategic issues, the Nazi bureaucracy for production problems, and the very acquiescence of the officer corps on the bribes Hitler paid to them and the ideological purges his choice leaders inflicted on the service.

Edit:
like how the Soviet Army didn't deserve blame for the flawed strategy/operations forced on them by Stalin in the 1941-42 (and somewhat beyond that). Had Zhukov had control over operations in 1941 he wouldn't have made many of the mistake Stalin did. Similarly Hitler, despite some of the things he was right on, was more often than not wrong especially in choosing to go to war with the USSR in 1941.

Why even when the Red Army had almost every advantage in 1944/45 did they still suffer immense losses from a broken Heer and the Volkssturm?

The Soviets/Allies in general had greatly favorable casualty ratios in 1945 because that was when the German military collapsed; the Volkssturm was not achieving favorable casualty ratios.

What is operational art and how does it differ from tactics and strategies?

https://forums.spacebattles.com/threads/what-is-operational-art.495443/#post-31760054

In brief - Operational Art is the level between Strategy (overall high-level goals, primarily national- or at least theatre-level) and Tactics (actually engaging the enemy). It is the skill of linking battles together to accomplish your strategic goals, rather than just endlessly attriting the enemy until one side cannot continue.

According to the USAF: "Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles"

"Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions: What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends); What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways); How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means); and What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?"

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Hitler was in charge of strategy and left the operational tactical stuff up to OKH...sort of. So you can't not blame Hitler for the core strategic issues, the Nazi bureaucracy for production problems, and the very acquiescence of the officer corps on the bribes Hitler paid to them and the ideological purges his choice leaders inflicted on the service.

The German officer corps didn't just acquiesce to Hitler, they happily supported and aided him to the utmost of their abilities. Most of them proved totally blind to the strategic implications of Hitler's decision making. Those few who didn't realized where they were heading well before the war and, after their attemts to rally the others to their support failed, resigned. Additionally, even in the realm of operations, the Germans showed a incompetence towards key functions that Hitler had little to no interest in and were entirely their responsibility such as logistics, intelligence, and personnel management that proved fatal in the kind of war that they found themselves in in 1941.

Nor were these problems new. They all cropped up in WW1 as well. They were systemic to the German military and the culture of their high command.

like how the Soviet Army didn't deserve blame for the flawed strategy/operations forced on them by Stalin in the 1941-42 (and somewhat beyond that). Had Zhukov had control over operations in 1941 he wouldn't have made many of the mistake Stalin did.

Some of them. Others he might have though. As with Hitler and his generals, there are places in the early-war which conventional wisdom calls Stalin's fault where in actuality the blame is more shared. However, the Soviets got past their issues and became wise, ending the war as one of the strategic-operational masters. The Germans did not, indeed only becoming worse as the war progressed. This suggests their problems go much deeper.

Similarly Hitler, despite some of the things he was right on, was more often than not wrong especially in choosing to go to war with the USSR in 1941.

And yet, he proved to be more often right then his generals on strategic issues. Which is the point. Yes, Hitler's military strategy were insane and impossible, but then so were the goals his strategy was working towards. But the evidence is that he was in good company there...

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The German officer corps didn't just acquiesce to Hitler, they happily supported and aided him to the utmost of their abilities. Most of them proved totally blind to the strategic implications of Hitler's decision making.

That is an incredibly broad statement to the point of being meaningless. It leaves out the resistance he got from Blomberg and Fritsch, which got them purged and resulted in Hitler putting puppets in place in key positions, while seizing the office of War Minister for himself, thus taking over all strategic leadership with the military. He then did not just run national grand strategy as a dictator, but also military strategy. Everyone left that avoided the ideological purges that started in 1932 with Hindenburg appointing Blomberg in the first place learned the lesson to go along once Hitler made up his mind or be replaced. Add in the bribes that were being paid and few wanted to risk their livelihoods/lives to stand up to him.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bribery_of_senior_Wehrmacht_officers
A great many officers voiced opposition to things like Barbarossa and Hitler's initial desire to attack France in the winter of 1940-41, but once policy was decided they did their jobs and focused on operational and tactical issues, often forcing them to conform to Hitler's desires in a bid to ensure they kept their jobs.

Those few who didn't realized where they were heading well before the war and, after their attemts to rally the others to their support failed, resigned. Additionally, even in the realm of operations, the Germans showed a incompetence towards key functions that Hitler had little to no interest in and were entirely their responsibility such as logistics, intelligence, and personnel management that proved fatal in the kind of war that they found themselves in in 1941.

Operations officers were forced to conform their estimates and plans to Hitler's strategic desires and gloss over the issues of logistics and ignore intelligence to again save their positions. Plenty of assumptions were made because of political pressure or assumed political desires. There was actually a rather shocking similarity with the Bush administration and the move into Iraq and Operation Barbarossa; no one would say the US military was incompetent, they were following orders as relayed to them and told not to worry about all the issues that would come with invasion. What do you mean by issues with Personnel Management?

Nor were these problems new. They all cropped up in WW1 as well. They were systemic to the German military and the culture of their high command.

The issues in WW1 and 2 were different; there were certainly a fair bit of similarities in terms of the military being concerned with pure operations/tactics above all else, but it was the weakness of the civilian government to reign in the military that was the biggest problem there, while in WW2 it was the civilian government that was pushing the military along to increasingly extreme and stupid actions.