Is Paris Burning?
- Thread starter Amerigo Vespucci
- Start date
Hendryk
Banned
If you have no better comments to make than this, kindly stay out of here, we're having an adult conversation.
whatisinaname
Donor
Interesting points, I wonder if there would be an EEC or even and EU in this TL?
If not what would be the effect on the rest of europe accross the board?
The pro-Europeanist feeling was quite strong among centre-right and centre-left politicians. It could take longer or involve a different setting of countries (and support from parties which will be different than in OTL, in name and/or in ideology, whether in France or in other countries where the political system doesn't mirror the pre-war system), but an EEC analogue would still happen.
It was not just an excellent idea to end wars in Europe but also an economic necessity for Europe to rebuild faster.
It was not just an excellent idea to end wars in Europe but also an economic necessity for Europe to rebuild faster.
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Either way, I think the ECSC will still happen. That's too obvious a need for reconstruction to pass over, antagonism or not.
Amerigo
One thing puzzling me. Despite Paris being held by the Germans a lot longer, both blocking a lot of supply routes and meaning large numbers of refugees to look after you have the western powers meeting the Soviets outside Berlin? Know you make a comment about the Bulge offensive being launched earlier and hence being defeated more quickly but not sure that would make such a big difference as the allies would still be restricted by the winter conditions from exploiting a weaker German defence.
Otherwise good, if grim story. All too likely I fear given what happened elsewhere in Europe during this period. Think it would have left France even more divided and resentful after such an ordeal than OTL.
Steve
One thing puzzling me. Despite Paris being held by the Germans a lot longer, both blocking a lot of supply routes and meaning large numbers of refugees to look after you have the western powers meeting the Soviets outside Berlin? Know you make a comment about the Bulge offensive being launched earlier and hence being defeated more quickly but not sure that would make such a big difference as the allies would still be restricted by the winter conditions from exploiting a weaker German defence.
Otherwise good, if grim story. All too likely I fear given what happened elsewhere in Europe during this period. Think it would have left France even more divided and resentful after such an ordeal than OTL.
Steve
Agreed on the second point, Steve. As to the situation along the fronts, my thought was this: Although the failure to capture Paris isn't going to change the number of troops available in any substantive manner -- it took very few to liberate the city, and few were used to administer it after liberation. What it will change is the supply situation. For the first month or two after the divergence, the Allies' supply lines will be stretched much less due to fewer civilians under Allied control.
Without an increased need for supplies, Patton will be able to get much closer to the Rhine before being brought to a halt. With Metz in his hands and the Rhine seemingly open beyond it, I think Eisenhower has a better chance of launching a Market-Garden analogue in the south instead of the north. It doesn't stand any greater chance of success, though. The increased distance from English airbases and the lengthened lines of logistics will counterbalance the fewer numbers of German soldiers in the area.
Thus foiled in his plan to launch Market-Garden, Montgomery will be forced to use his original, slower plan in the north -- clearing the estuary downstream of Antwerp. Though he's not going to be happy about it, and it might be viewed as a mistake by ATL historians looking at Monty's Market-Garden plan, British and Canadian forces will be able to open Antwerp for business a month or two earlier than OTL. This improves the Allied supply situation to the point that when the Parisian refugees start to be a bigger drain on supplies than they were in OTL -- it's much more work to feed and clothe homeless, displaced people than those who haven't had their homes destroyed -- it's balanced by the capture of Antwerp.
Now we look at the fall of Paris itself. Instead of Stalingrad, I looked at the Battle of Aachen for an example. Aachen was OTL's "Western Stalingrad," featuring all sorts of nasty street-by-street fighting. There's more German soldiers in this ATL Paris than there was in OTL Aachen, but the Parisian Germans' supply situation is worse, they're up against partisans as well as the Allies, and they're more willing to surrender. This keeps Allied casualties down, at least in the non-partisan force.
Then, because Hitler launches ATL's Battle of the Bulge earlier in OTL and in good weather, it has nowhere near the success of OTL's attack. Though Patton is even more out of position than OTL, the good weather will allow the Allied Air Force to absolutely obliterate any large-scale Wehrmacht movement. In addition, the lack of preparation time means that Germany will use up its last organized mobile reserves on the Western Front. Without something to shore up the line and buy time for reorganization, the Allies are able to cross the Rhine a few months later, before the spring thaw, because their supply situation has been sorted out and the Germans have shot their bolt. This accelerates the rest of the fall of Germany, and thus the Allies meet the Soviets just to the west of Berlin.
Hendryk
Banned
Sorry, the board's anti-European contingent used up my limited stores of patience a long time ago. I'm in no mood to put up with such a non-sequitur in an otherwise serious thread.
We all have our buttons that others push at their own risk. Mine is European integration, something I have studied at length in university.
Hendryk
Banned
Here's one possible outcome: without de Gaulle, the British and Americans successfully impose AMGOT on France and, while decidedly unhappy about it, the non-Communist resistance movements grudgingly accept it as they consider it a lesser evil to the risk of Communists refusing to relinquish their strongholds to civilian authorities. The Communists themselves are, predictably, even more reluctant to submit to an Ally-controlled government, but they receive orders from Moscow (Stalin was uninterested in having France go Communist at that point). Your idea to make Pierre Koenig the first post-liberation prime minister is a good one.
Now, reconstruction aside, one of the most pressing issues facing the French government was decolonization. In Indochina, the pro-independence forces were under de facto control of the country, and everyone who took a lucid look at the situation (such as Leclerc in OTL) understood that it was a question of when and in what conditions France granted Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia formal independence, not if. In your TL I suggest Koenig have gen. de Lattre de Tassigny be sent as plenipotentiary to oversee an orderly, negociated transfer of power. Let's say that by 1949 the three countries of former French Indochina are independent (with Ho Chi Minh as president of the Republic of Vietnam).
The next step is dealing with Algeria, which is an altogether thornier problem. In OTL, a demonstration by Arabs was brutally repressed on the same day as Germany surrendered, 8 May 1945. Hopefully the butterflies from your POD may lead to that demonstration not taking place, but the Pieds-Noirs would still be at loggerheads with the Arab majority. I can't at the moment think of how things could turn out, but the French government could do worse than putting gen. Georges Catroux in charge (he had already been governor-general of Algeria between 1943 and 1944).
Now, as regards European integration, my personal guess is that it would, in fact, proceed along much the same lines as in OTL until the signature of the Treaty of Rome, so there would be an EEC. Beyond that, if we have the Fourth Republic hold together after 1958 (without an Algerian crisis to destabilize it and de Gaulle to take over), it may in fact advance faster than in OTL: de Gaulle was unenthusiastic about political integration and, when push came to shove in 1965, paralyzed the EEC institutions by having French representatives boycott them, leading to the so-called Luxemburg Compromise. For nearly 20 years, political integration remained stalled, and only economic integration inched forward, until the implementation of the Single European Act. In your TL, Walter Hallstein, then president of the European Commission, would likely get his way, and political integration would proceed apace.
Obviously, another butterfly is that the British application (alongside those of Ireland and Denmark) would be accepted the first time around, in 1961, so all three countries would become members in 1962.
I'm not sure about the European Defense Community; for simplicity's sake, you may assume that it's defeated in your TL as well (possibly as a result of a stronger Communist presence at the French national assembly, to make up for the weaker Gaullists), so that NATO is set up on schedule.
My main concern is the question of whether a quicker decolonization is too rosy a picture? What in TTL makes France more willing to decolonize? Is it the lack of Gaullist influence, American pressure through AMGOT, or something else?
Hendryk
Banned
For Indochina, I'll say a relatively quick resolution would have been the default outcome--in OTL, the shit hit the fan because adm. d'Argenlieu, a reactionary SOB who didn't understand anything about the local situation and thought he could get away with gunboat diplomacy, tried to derail the independence process. On his own initiative, he violated the agreement between Ho Chi Minh and French delegate Yves Sainteny, and proclaimed a puppet Republic of Cochichina in southern Vietnam; then, using a minor incident as a pretext, he had his ships open fire on Haiphong, killing thousands of civilians. This marked the beginning of an entirely avoidable war. In other words, put someone less unhinged than d'Argenlieu in charge (I suggest adm. Muselier or possibly adm. Auboyneau) and Indochina doesn't become a mess; in turn, this gives the French government the breathing room it needs to deal with Algeria.
whatisinaname
Donor
I don't know if this idea is a crediable?
But instead of an EEC or EU, what if NATO becomes more that a military alliance, it goes into other areas as well, NATO = EEC/EU ??
Or is this just too daft?
Comments?
But instead of an EEC or EU, what if NATO becomes more that a military alliance, it goes into other areas as well, NATO = EEC/EU ??
Or is this just too daft?
Comments?
I think the main reason that it's unworkable is that sort of alliance would be dominated by the United States from the start, simply on economic grounds.
Hendryk
Banned
No, it wouldn't be attempted; NATO was a purely military organization. Even the Soviet bloc needed two different organizations to differentiate between military and economic/trade matters, and that was despite having a command economy.
One possibility, if it's the kind of thing you want, is to have the OEEC (now OECD) evolve into a more integrated organization.
whatisinaname
Donor
Agreed.
But it would be interesting, as the US would be helping Europe rebuild post war (as in OLT), if you get what I mean, imagine a "NATO/EU/EEC" hybryd with the US as part of it, that would be a very powerful force?
But it is a daft idea, but fun
Dr. Strangelove
Banned
What I like from these european integration posters from the 40's, 50's and 60' is how they always include Turkey, sometimes Portugal and never Spain.
Hendryk
Banned
In this case it makes sense: those are the flags of the countries that received US aid under the Marshall Plan (the blue flag being that of the Territory of Trieste, which existed between 1947 and 1954). Turkey did but not Spain (also, note that Turkey joined NATO in 1952 but Spain only in 1982).What I like from these european integration posters from the 40's, 50's and 60' is how they always include Turkey, sometimes Portugal and never Spain.
Another similar poster:
