Is it true that the mechanized Italian Army was literally losing to an army of spearmen in Ethiopia?

Though, in that case, the victors were using rifles, AFAIK, some of them were even repeaters. Custer got himself trapped in a classic ambush, he wasn't overwhelmed by more primitive tactics, as did in fact happen in

Just goes to show, though. No matter how "superior" a force may be on paper, it can still be defeated if it is led badly enough.
 

yourworstnightmare

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Yup, one thing often repeated is that Italy had advanced alot since Adwa, while Ethiopia had not (and no, Ethiopia did not beat the Italians with spearmen at Adwa). This is both true and false. It's completely ignorant to say Ethiopia hadn't advanced at all since Adwa, but it's correct to say Ethiopia had not become a modernized state, and still was a feudal/ tribal mix. Adwa was not the spark to reform Ethiopian society, it was proof that Ethiopia could take on anyone.

Was Italy better equipped than Ethiopia: yes. Was Italy having more modern rifles and equipment a deciding factor: not really. Things like having aircraft and poison gas were huge factors (especially psychologically, most Ethiopians had never seen an aircraft and couldn't fathom the concept of poisonous gas attacks). The commanders tried to convince the soldiers that the priests knew secret words that'd make the iron birds fall to hinder them from fleeing the battlefields.

However the most deciding factor was how the Ethiopian army was not a coherent professional force, but a mish mash of private armies, commanders that sought glory, ethnic groups that had no love for the Amhara monarchy, and thus did not lift a finger to assist, and even leaders with a grudge or two against Selassie that simply defected with their men to the Italian side.
 

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So?

He isn't the only person to ever ask the same question on two separate internet forums. Nothing wrong with a second opinion.

Also he posted that thread over three YEARS ago in March 2013. It isn't like he made the same thread twice within minutes of each other.
Most of his posts relate back to a question he's seen or posted somewhere else. Not really wrong but odd.
 
Google "Little Big Horn", or just "General Custer".

Good one : ) The plainsmen Custer ran into had more rifles, and better rifles - the Henry repeater, than the 7th Cavalry had. The Ethiopian problem was logistics and communications. Even a a telegraph to late 19th Century European standards would have done a lot for the defense against the Italian invasion.
 
... I created a thread a few months back about a plan of theirs to use an imported converted fast bomber to destroy the Italian's oil storage tanks at Massawa so as to deny them the use of aircraft and tanks or lorries but unfortunately events moved too quickly for it to be attempted.

Imagine the effect on military thought in 1939 had the effort been even partially successful :O
 
Imagine the effect on military thought in 1939 had the effort been even partially successful :O
It would certainly have given the idea of interdiction a fillip. Wing Commander, later Air Marshal, John Slessor was already advancing the idea with his book Air Power and Armies which he published in 1936. Here there would be a concrete example of the effectiveness which could translate into more support, alternatively I'm sure it could be easily disregarded by the usual suspects as merely a colonial action so therefore didn't count. It would certainly be interesting to see what would have happen if the Allies had developed and implemented interdiction tactics in France in 1939.
 
It would certainly have given the idea of interdiction a fillip. Wing Commander, later Air Marshal, John Slessor was already advancing the idea with his book Air Power and Armies which he published in 1936. Here there would be a concrete example of the effectiveness which could translate into more support, alternatively I'm sure it could be easily disregarded by the usual suspects as merely a colonial action so therefore didn't count. It would certainly be interesting to see what would have happen if the Allies had developed and implemented interdiction tactics in France in 1939.

They tried such in 1940, but circumstances conspired against success. The best known example are the attacks on the Meuse River bridges from north of Liege, through Dinant, & south at Sedan. Over 140 Allied bombers attacked the German crossing in a day, 14 May, and failed to hit any of the several pontoon bridges emplaced there. One ferry was damaged at a cost of over half the aircraft shot down, or badly damaged. Earlier on the 12th May forty LeO45 bombers made low level attacks on the mechanized columns in the Ardennes, mostly on the XIX Pz Corps. Losses were severe and the columns not severely damaged.
 
Bugger, first off meant to write 1940. Secondly that one would hope that if they put a bit more thought into the idea they would also develop some better aircraft than the Fairey Battle and Bristol Blenheim. At the end of the day however the main problem seems to have been facing three to one odds with regards to fighters, doesn't matter how good you are if you just get completely mobbed.
 
Yes, both the Battle & the Blenheim were obsolete & inadequate in speed. Not having a escort aircraft hurt as well. The commitment to short range point defense interceptors hurt everyone.

However the French LeO45 bombers were modern & high speed, & their low level approaches avoided interception. Still they took severe losses in the 12 May attacks.
 
The Ethiopian army was a mish-mash at the time.

First of all, you had the Kebur Zabagna, the Imperial Guard. This was a force trained by the Belgian military mission to about regular European infantry level. They used FN-Mausers, FN-BARs and Czechoslovak ZH-29 semi-automatic rifles. They also had heavy machine guns, a brigade of artillery with 40 French 75mm mle1897 field guns, at least (and probably more) 40 81mm mortars, a bunch of 20mm Oerlikon AA guns and 12 German 37mm Pak35 AT guns. The men were recruited among those loyal to the Emperor, but also men that had military experience. There were veterans from Italian Ascari units and British King's African Rifles among the Imperial Guard. The main problem for this about division-siezed force (after expansion at the outbreak of war) was that the Emperor relied on them to keep his internal enemies down, which made him reluctant to use them. They were not used in force until the last large battle of the war, at Mau Cei in March 1936.

Then you have the Mahel Safari, the traditional regular army of Ethiopia. These men carried pretty much what their fathers had carried at Adua 40 years earlier. Single shot and bolt action rifles were common, some in very high calibre and using black powder. They also had heavy machine guns, which they also used for AA purposes. They also had about 50 Russian 63,5mm mountain guns M1883, 56 ex-Italian 70mm M1885 mountain guns (captured at Adua 1896), 40 42mm Hotchkiss quick-firing guns and a smattering of Hotchkiss 37mm revolver cannons. There were also a smattering of old muzzle-loaded bronze artillery from the second half of the 19th century used.

Total number of artillery pieces in Ethiopia at the outbreak of war was reported as 234.

Thirdly, you have the Chitet, the feudal levies of the lords and governors of Ethiopia. They varied a LOT in quality and equipment. There were formations from the southwestern and southeastern part of the country where half the men carried spears and swords and shields exclusively. However, the formations in the northern and central part of the country often had exclusively rifles and some artillery and machine guns. The Swedish military mission in the north started the Oleta Cadet School and convinced the northern feudal levies to dye their traditional white garb tan for war and to use rudimentary infantry tactics (cross-fire, taking cover, flanking attacks, digging in on defence and so on). The Oleta Cadets marched out together with old men that arrived late in Spring 1936 and fought under Viking Tamm, a Swedish officer, in a battle before dispersing and joining the Abernyotch resistance.

The Ethiopians had 3 Ft 3000 tanks and captured about 18 L3/33 tankettes, at least one of which was used with the Army of Illub Abor in the Ogaden desert together with 6 MG-armed (and possibly armoured) trucks.

They also had a smattering of planes, mostly transports and trainers, but 6 Potez 25 recon/bombers were present. They were mostly used for recoinnasance and liason flights, as the supply of bombs was really low and their MGs had been removed earlier.

There was also a Turkish military mission training the mostly muslim feudal levies around the Harar region and a Swiss military mission trainding the Addis Ababa Gendarmerie.

The main problem for the Ethiopian forces were the lack of coordination and communication. Most orders went by horseback and the troops were slow to assemble and move. Supply was hard, especially as many weapons were outdated and food and other supplies moved mostly by mules. The Italians, enjoying total aereal superiority could attack the supply columns with impunity, often using mustard gas against them.

Many of the Ehtiopian officers and military governors were still fighting the old traditional Ethiopian way of charching right at the enemy and then retreating if he had not been broken after three days. The Ethiopian supply system was patchy at best, and the ability of the troops to stay in the field was limited. Several formations formed, fought, went home and formed again. The feudal levies of the sons of Ras Kassa reformed and attempted to recapture Addis Ababa in June and July 1936, arriving after the capitol had fallen to the Italians and the Emperor had fled.
 
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