Is it plausible for the Japanese to strike south but fail to seize a major objective?

Engaging the Japanese cruiser group they came within 10,000 yards of might have been enough. Maybe the Japanese would have suspended some supply convoys into Malaya and given how baddly the otl supply situtation in Malaya was that could have been enough.

Engaging them is one thing, but are we sure the Royal Navy would have come off best?

Just how well the British radar was working is very questionable, we know HMS Prince Of Wales Type 273 Surface Radar was not working, HMS Repulse had Type 284 gunnery radar which could have been used as a surface search, but I've never read anywhere, that it was used. The Japanese, despite no Radar, had invested in superb optical equipment, and may have seen Force Z first in an encounter.

The British big guns should have pulverised the four Japanese heavy cruisers, with effective radar control, something akin to Cape Matapan, without it, and ignorant of the Japanese 'Secret weapon' Type 93 Long Lance Torpedo, a very different outcome may have occurred.

And strategically, I think the Japanese would have considered it a success if the loss of their four cruisers, brought about the demise of Force Z
 
It's not Penang that I think is important but holding NW Malaya. Penang cannot be held without holding the mainland opposite given the forces available (I believe the prewar plan was to leave a battalion in Penang if forced to withdraw South, it's hard to see that making any difference). The British needed to hold Jitra or Gurun to shield Penang, and if they do that then outflanking moves by sea become more difficult, while both the invasion of Sumatra and interdiction of allied supply convoys become much more difficult and less likely, meaning resupply of Malaya is possible.

I think Percival was a decentish staff officer but not suited to command. He dispersed his troops around the peninsular to try to defend everything rather than decide what the crucial area was and focus on that. There were a range of other reasons for the dispersion including underestimating Japan, deterrence (totally undermined when the Germans captured a British defence appreciation revealing how bad things were), prestige, a defence plan based on delaying an advance until reinforcements arrived, and an expectation of more time before things came to the crunch (hindsight is great), but he still failed to command rather than chair the defence.

In the absence of prewar reinforcements and given the difficulty of moving troops from coast to coast in the North, the best options would have been either to concentrate troops in Johore for a siege, abandoning Northern Malaya, or to gamble everything on holding Jitra, sacrificing Kuantan and Khota Bahru. In principle the former might have prolonged resistance and the latter potentially retained Singapore. The Japanese and the rest of the Far East would have have known if either of these were adopted, and in the event of a British evacuation of the East coast the Japanese might well have advanced by sea down the East leading to the fall of Singapore while the British held out in the NW until the Japanese turned north, but at least the British could be resupplied and might have held a defensible perimeter for a while.

Basically, I think there are many ways the British could have done better in Malaya but with hindsight it's hard to see them holding the peninsula without additional forces, and these were never going to come in 1941 unless Britain could somehow generate more resources (fewer losses, larger prewar rearmament, more assistance from the US, France not falling). Similarly, the Dutch might have done better but not dramatically so. It's also probably worth pointing out that strategically the British did OK, their fundamental goals were the defence of India, the Middle East and the convoys along the African coast, none of these required Singapore to be held, although this would obviously make things easier. Singapore was of most value for an offensive strategy in the Far East, that Britain was not capable of until 1944/5.
 
And strategically, I think the Japanese would have considered it a success if the loss of their four cruisers, brought about the demise of Force Z

Assuming it goes that way they would have considered it a success but any success probably would have been phyrric. My own most likely scenario would be 3 sunk Japanese cruisers one heavily damaged and either Repulse sunk or POW crawling for safe harbour.

What did those cruisers do over the next few months and could it have been replaced. From the last time i looked into the subject those ships were very busy escorting convoys, providing fire support for landings all over the place.

Force Z's loss would probably have been considered a waste by the admiralty at the time but compared to otl it would be a massive success.

If our objective is to find a small point of departure which begins to bring the Japanese advance off the rails this would be it.
 
It's not Penang that I think is important but holding NW Malaya. Penang cannot be held without holding the mainland opposite given the forces available (I believe the prewar plan was to leave a battalion in Penang if forced to withdraw South, it's hard to see that making any difference). The British needed to hold Jitra or Gurun to shield Penang, and if they do that then outflanking moves by sea become more difficult, while both the invasion of Sumatra and interdiction of allied supply convoys become much more difficult and less likely, meaning resupply of Malaya is possible.

I think Percival was a decentish staff officer but not suited to command. He dispersed his troops around the peninsular to try to defend everything rather than decide what the crucial area was and focus on that. There were a range of other reasons for the dispersion including underestimating Japan, deterrence (totally undermined when the Germans captured a British defence appreciation revealing how bad things were), prestige, a defence plan based on delaying an advance until reinforcements arrived, and an expectation of more time before things came to the crunch (hindsight is great), but he still failed to command rather than chair the defence.

In the absence of prewar reinforcements and given the difficulty of moving troops from coast to coast in the North, the best options would have been either to concentrate troops in Johore for a siege, abandoning Northern Malaya, or to gamble everything on holding Jitra, sacrificing Kuantan and Khota Bahru. In principle the former might have prolonged resistance and the latter potentially retained Singapore. The Japanese and the rest of the Far East would have have known if either of these were adopted, and in the event of a British evacuation of the East coast the Japanese might well have advanced by sea down the East leading to the fall of Singapore while the British held out in the NW until the Japanese turned north, but at least the British could be resupplied and might have held a defensible perimeter for a while.

Basically, I think there are many ways the British could have done better in Malaya but with hindsight it's hard to see them holding the peninsula without additional forces, and these were never going to come in 1941 unless Britain could somehow generate more resources (fewer losses, larger prewar rearmament, more assistance from the US, France not falling). Similarly, the Dutch might have done better but not dramatically so. It's also probably worth pointing out that strategically the British did OK, their fundamental goals were the defence of India, the Middle East and the convoys along the African coast, none of these required Singapore to be held, although this would obviously make things easier. Singapore was of most value for an offensive strategy in the Far East, that Britain was not capable of until 1944/5.

I agree with most of what you say except your view on the best options to be taken. Withdrawing to Johore would invite an air siege, making the supply of Singapore untenable. The alternative you suggest is holding the Jitra line, which was chosen more for the political reasons of not giving up the state of Kedah, and surrendering the air base at Alor Star. Given the quality of the troops they had, the British couldn't hope to hold Jitra for any length of time, indeed they just about avoided a complete disaster when they did withdraw. A bit further back is Gurun, a natural defensive position, and with a few months hard work they could have transformed it into a decent place to fight it out.

There is of course still the famous road leading from the 'Ledge' , a back door to the defence of Jira/Gurun, which had to be blocked, and again the British failed miserably to do that.

I think the importance of Penang was that after Singapore, it was the next largest European enclave, having a considerable number of businesses established there. The telephone/telegraph cables to India surfaced here, and the sea roads between the island and mainland could be used to assemble convoys prior to sailing across the Indian Ocean. To this end the 'Fortress' was conceived. The German cruiser Emden had exposed the lack of any coastal defences in the first world war.
 
I agree with most of what you say except your view on the best options to be taken. Withdrawing to Johore would invite an air siege, making the supply of Singapore untenable. The alternative you suggest is holding the Jitra line, which was chosen more for the political reasons of not giving up the state of Kedah, and surrendering the air base at Alor Star. Given the quality of the troops they had, the British couldn't hope to hold Jitra for any length of time, indeed they just about avoided a complete disaster when they did withdraw. A bit further back is Gurun, a natural defensive position, and with a few months hard work they could have transformed it into a decent place to fight it out.

There is of course still the famous road leading from the 'Ledge' , a back door to the defence of Jira/Gurun, which had to be blocked, and again the British failed miserably to do that.

I think the importance of Penang was that after Singapore, it was the next largest European enclave, having a considerable number of businesses established there. The telephone/telegraph cables to India surfaced here, and the sea roads between the island and mainland could be used to assemble convoys prior to sailing across the Indian Ocean. To this end the 'Fortress' was conceived. The German cruiser Emden had exposed the lack of any coastal defences in the first world war.

I think we're in practically total agreement. I was trying to abbreviate my post and didn't want to be constantly saying Jitra or Gurun, but this was what I meant (and as I had referred to earlier) and we're in agreement on the implications of withdrawing to Johore, as I said, it might have prolonged resistance, I never said or implied it would enable Singapore to be held indefinitely, indeed, the thrust of my argument is that the area around Penang needs to be held to enable resupply in the event of a siege (not that I'm saying it can be held) so withdrawing to Johore means inevitable defeat but with potentially prolonged resistance. From what I've read the Gurun position makes more sense as the main defensive position with Jitra possibly as an advanced position, but I don't know enough about the Gurun position itself.

As events turned out (and was probably predictable) the Ledge couldn't be reached in force in time, a better option would have been fortifying the road in British territory as part of the Jitra/Gurun position, even if the position isn't as good as one that couldn't be reached in any event.
 
I think we're in practically total agreement. I was trying to abbreviate my post and didn't want to be constantly saying Jitra or Gurun, but this was what I meant (and as I had referred to earlier) and we're in agreement on the implications of withdrawing to Johore, as I said, it might have prolonged resistance, I never said or implied it would enable Singapore to be held indefinitely, indeed, the thrust of my argument is that the area around Penang needs to be held to enable resupply in the event of a siege (not that I'm saying it can be held) so withdrawing to Johore means inevitable defeat but with potentially prolonged resistance. From what I've read the Gurun position makes more sense as the main defensive position with Jitra possibly as an advanced position, but I don't know enough about the Gurun position itself.

As events turned out (and was probably predictable) the Ledge couldn't be reached in force in time, a better option would have been fortifying the road in British territory as part of the Jitra/Gurun position, even if the position isn't as good as one that couldn't be reached in any event.

Wasn't the problem that the troops, most of whom had been in Malaya for months and years, were not well trained or knowledgeable about the terrain in which they'd have to fight?
 
Wasn't the problem that the troops, most of whom had been in Malaya for months and years, were not well trained or knowledgeable about the terrain in which they'd have to fight?
Poor training including the milking of the Indian units was a problem. However, even if the British troops were excellently trained they couldn’t have held Singapore once the Penang area and Sumatra had fallen because of the difficulty of resupply. Penang couldn’t be held without much greater forces. Something like 21 Japanese infantry battalions were deployed through there by the end of January, with the British deploying about 12 initially plus 3 in Malay command reserve with no trained reinforcements available until much later. Given it took about 2:1 British superiority to defeat the Japanese in 1944 there was no way the British could hold the Penang area without both better training and abandoning other areas of Malaya. Better British training might have delayed the fall of Singapore but since few of the Japanese forces involved were employed elsewhere in the initial onslaught the implications would have been minimal.
 
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Poor training including the milking of the Indian units was a problem. However, even if the British troops were excellently trained they couldn’t have held Singapore once the Penang area and Sumatra had fallen because of the difficulty of resupply. Penang couldn’t be held without much greater forces. Something like 21 Japanese infantry battalions were deployed through there by the end of January, with the British deploying about 12 initially plus 3 in Malay command reserve with no trained reinforcements available until much later. Given it took about 2:1 British superiority to defeat the Japanese in 1944 there was no way the British could hold the Penang area without both better training and abandoning other areas of Malaya. Better British training might have delayed the fall of Singapore but since few of the Japanese forces involved were employed elsewhere in the initial onslaught the implications would have been minimal.

Isn't it normal to need a 2:1 superiority for attackers against an entrenched enemy? Meaning that this is a normal force ratio so the British needing this ratio in 1944 isn't surprising. So shouldn't the British have been able to hold in 1942 IF they were in a good defensive position?
 

trurle

Banned
Isn't it normal to need a 2:1 superiority for attackers against an entrenched enemy? Meaning that this is a normal force ratio so the British needing this ratio in 1944 isn't surprising. So shouldn't the British have been able to hold in 1942 IF they were in a good defensive position?
From tactical manual, attacker typically takes 3:1 losses of defender on prepared positions. The tactical manual says nothing about outcome of battle though - because outcome of battle involves strategy. Japanese clearly had better strategy planning in late 1941 IOTL (compared to British), and strategic planning was the key for Japanese early successes. It is common to compare DEI and Malaya Japanese campaigns to the clockwork - because of pre-timed operations.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
On 1st July 1940, Japanese primary target was french Indochina, not anything of list above. I find very difficult to believe any British-held positions could be attacked by Japanese in 1940, due political reasons. Dutch positions (Java, Sumatra) can be attacked in principle, although it is already a terrible stretch without French Indochina logistical bases.

With later attacks (1941+), wider attacks may be tried and some are likely to fail. IOTL, New Guinea was the narrowest-margin target for invasion.

I think you are misreading my post as requiring the Japanese to attack on 1 July 1940. Nope I was not saying that. Basically I set that as the earliest POD permitted so that France has fallen and gone Vichy, and Italy is in the war. I was expecting the Japanese would be far more likely to try a broad attack in 1941 rather than 1940 after having eased into Indochina. I just wanted to give responders more than a year before OTL’s Pearl Harbor attack for the Allies to get more things right or for the Japanese to screw things up.
 

trurle

Banned
I think you are misreading my post as requiring the Japanese to attack on 1 July 1940. Nope I was not saying that. Basically I set that as the earliest POD permitted so that France has fallen and gone Vichy, and Italy is in the war. I was expecting the Japanese would be far more likely to try a broad attack in 1941 rather than 1940 after having eased into Indochina. I just wanted to give responders more than a year before OTL’s Pearl Harbor attack for the Allies to get more things right or for the Japanese to screw things up.
Understood. Yes, i clearly misread.
 
Isn't it normal to need a 2:1 superiority for attackers against an entrenched enemy? Meaning that this is a normal force ratio so the British needing this ratio in 1944 isn't surprising. So shouldn't the British have been able to hold in 1942 IF they were in a good defensive position?
In 1944 the British were fighting defensively in the Arakan and around Imphal, had massive air and heavy equipment superiority, weren't starving and still had at least 2:1 superiority on the ground, the Arakan was something like 4 divisions (with more in reserve) against 1. The Japanese had the initiative and so could choose where and when to attack (the British were on the defensive), thus the Japanese could achieve more favourable relative strengths at the point of attack by concentration.
 
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We might want to discuss how the British were going to fight this war. Their military doctrine in Malaya, was still a carry over from the first world war. Infantry hold a defensive line, supported by artillery. Any enemy penetration of the line would be countered by local company attacks. Given the poor training and inexperience of the troops they had there, that was about as much as most of them could do. The only exceptions to that was the 12th Indian Brigade and both the Australian Brigades, which could fight a war of manoeuvre.
 
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