Is it just me or were the "Gray Terror" plans for use of Spetsnaz before WW3 a really stupid idea?

I think it would be a case of deploying the Spetznaz against targets JUST before the outbreak of war. As in a few days or even hours, depending on where they wanted to hit. They could cause a lot of damage in places like the UK by hitting roads etc. You want to screw up london's roads, hit the Dartford tunnel and maybe one or two bridges in the city itself. Other attacks at short notice would be against NATO HQ's or nuclear storage sites to try and disable/destroy the weapons there. All very good in theory, but actually putting it into practice would be an entirely different kettle of fish.
 

Redbeard

Banned
NATO was well aware of this doctrine and from what I recall also was reasonably well prepared. In case of mobilisation we were expecting opposition from anything from Spetznaz to demonstrators, but also prepared mentally and physically to not let us stop. As an example I was issued with a service pistol in my home and with live ammo. In case of mobilisation I was expected "to look after my self" on the way to my mobilisation point - if necessary with armed force. An important part in making life tough for Spetznatz was the Home Guard - 70.000 men and women with weapons and ammo at home and capable of being on their war time posts inside an hour.

Spetznaz activity was seen as a clear indicator for coming major operations and in this context I think "Grey terror" would just make the decision to mobilise much easier for the western governments. IOW Spetznaz operations could easily throw away the most important weakness on the NATO side - not daring to mobilise. An example of a major Spetznaz operation which was expected and confirmed after the Cold war was landing a number of civilian cargo planes in Copenhagen Airport, unload light vehicles stuffed with Spatznaz soldiers and then race to the Government quarters in Copenhagen - with the intention of paralysing the Danish Government. The problem just was, that not only did the Home Guard have a good chance of being in place before Spetznaz could arrive at Christiansborg (Ministries and Parliament) but taking the Government quarters would in no way paralyse mobilisation - on the contrary it would initiate it immediately and BTW Government would legally work as long as there was a single citizen left alive.

If Spetznaz for that reason limited operations to a few hours before an offensive you really wouldn't have any terror effect, and I doubt they could do enough physical damage to be a true nuisance. And anyway, the Spetznaz forces in most cases would have to be in place before attacking, and that involves a high risk of being detected. There are after all not that many mountains or jungles to hide in in Europe.

During the cold war Polish or East German sailing boats some times visited Danish waters and ports. Officially as tourists but more likely to collect military intelligence. Anyway a handful of young trained men with "military" haircuts were quite visible and reported within minutes of arriving and customs officials usually found a reason to inspect their vessel. :cool:
 
Very true Redbeard, the Russians and their love of Maskrovia would have been throwing away one of their long established tools they planned to use to weaken and divide NATO in the event of a war. The military and Governments affected by a sudden surge in terrorist attacks would pretty much KNOW it was the Soviets, and it throws away any attempt at strategic surprise the Soviets would have liked to obtain.

I'd see the Spetznaz as being used to try hit air bases, radar installations, command posts, bridges etc in the final hours before an attack. it would probably be a series of missions with a very high casualty rate, but its a big risk/reward thing. If loosing 50 odd men meant destroying a dozen or so jets and wrecking an airbases fuel pumping system, its a cost the Soviets would happily be willing to trade.

It wouldn't be a sudden appearance of 'The Welsh Independence Liberation Army' launching attacks on Heathrow a month beforehand, because pretty much everyone in the Govermnent and military would KNOW that it was the Soviets. And this then gives away the whole game that they have decided to send the 1st and 2nd Shock Guards on a dash to get to Belgium to enjoy a holiday on the Beaches there.
 

trurle

Banned
Very true Redbeard, the Russians and their love of Maskrovia would have been throwing away one of their long established tools they planned to use to weaken and divide NATO in the event of a war. The military and Governments affected by a sudden surge in terrorist attacks would pretty much KNOW it was the Soviets, and it throws away any attempt at strategic surprise the Soviets would have liked to obtain.

I'd see the Spetznaz as being used to try hit air bases, radar installations, command posts, bridges etc in the final hours before an attack. it would probably be a series of missions with a very high casualty rate, but its a big risk/reward thing. If loosing 50 odd men meant destroying a dozen or so jets and wrecking an airbases fuel pumping system, its a cost the Soviets would happily be willing to trade.

It wouldn't be a sudden appearance of 'The Welsh Independence Liberation Army' launching attacks on Heathrow a month beforehand, because pretty much everyone in the Govermnent and military would KNOW that it was the Soviets. And this then gives away the whole game that they have decided to send the 1st and 2nd Shock Guards on a dash to get to Belgium to enjoy a holiday on the Beaches there.
The entire Spetsnaz operation must be cost-effective to be initiated. And generally operating expensively trained and equipped troops in the territory where they can be easily lost (in the middle of enemy territory) is the awfully cost-ineffective tactics. What is effective is to make enemy believe what such troops (spetsnaz) is going to be heavily used..and force enemy to spent a disproportionate resources trying to counter such an imaginary threat.

I.m.h.o., the spetsnaz operations deep inside Europe (or England) is the scenario not going to be implemented or going to be implemented only on token scale - to trigger a disproportionate defensive response. I do not believe (unlike steamboy in previous post) in any target having a value worth the nearly guaranteed loss of spetsnaz team. Bridges/tunnels will be repaired or bypassed. Aircraft relocated to another airport and airport will be fixed too. Stationary radar installations..are doomed anyway (average lifetime of radar on battlefield is 15 minutes by Russian estimates). Tactical surface-to-surface missile is cheaper and far more deadlier than the expendable spetsnaz member.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Very true Redbeard, the Russians and their love of Maskrovia would have been throwing away one of their long established tools they planned to use to weaken and divide NATO in the event of a war. The military and Governments affected by a sudden surge in terrorist attacks would pretty much KNOW it was the Soviets, and it throws away any attempt at strategic surprise the Soviets would have liked to obtain.

I'd see the Spetznaz as being used to try hit air bases, radar installations, command posts, bridges etc in the final hours before an attack. it would probably be a series of missions with a very high casualty rate, but its a big risk/reward thing. If loosing 50 odd men meant destroying a dozen or so jets and wrecking an airbases fuel pumping system, its a cost the Soviets would happily be willing to trade.

It wouldn't be a sudden appearance of 'The Welsh Independence Liberation Army' launching attacks on Heathrow a month beforehand, because pretty much everyone in the Govermnent and military would KNOW that it was the Soviets. And this then gives away the whole game that they have decided to send the 1st and 2nd Shock Guards on a dash to get to Belgium to enjoy a holiday on the Beaches there.
Indeed, but I doubt they in a short time could do significant damage. After all we were quite well prepared for this and all structures, be it decision making, logistic or physical, had a big redundancy for exactly this reason. But it perhaps reflects how the would looked like seen from the USSR. In their system everything was planned and you waited for orders, so taking out the boss would be quite serious. On our side, each Homeguard company was authorised to mobilise on their own initiative. And if the CO was gone, the XO instantly was in command, and if the XO was out, it would be the oldest platoon leader etc. And everybody were expected to know of tasks beforehand so as to act swiftly under all circumstances.
 

Insider

Banned
During the cold war Polish or East German sailing boats some times visited Danish waters and ports. Officially as tourists but more likely to collect military intelligence. Anyway a handful of young trained men with "military" haircuts were quite visible and reported within minutes of arriving and customs officials usually found a reason to inspect their vessel. :cool:
To tell the story from Polish point of view, it is just the military men, or their friends, were the only ones in who had access to materials and money to build, or upkeep a yacht. No doubt some wrote reports from their trips, but the main goal was to get house appliances unavailable on wrong side of Iron Curtain. As for checks and general assholishness, they simply thought it as a element of cold war. Any yacht arriving at Polish harbour would be most likely treated the same, and no doubt their crews on shore leave would be given a plain-clothes "guardian angels" by SB. No doubt that was the case on the other side.

As for hybrid war, it worked in Crimea... if it stupid and works, it is not stupid
 
NATO was well aware of this doctrine and from what I recall also was reasonably well prepared. In case of mobilisation we were expecting opposition from anything from Spetznaz to demonstrators, but also prepared mentally and physically to not let us stop. As an example I was issued with a service pistol in my home and with live ammo. In case of mobilisation I was expected "to look after my self" on the way to my mobilisation point - if necessary with armed force. An important part in making life tough for Spetznatz was the Home Guard - 70.000 men and women with weapons and ammo at home and capable of being on their war time posts inside an hour.

Spetznaz activity was seen as a clear indicator for coming major operations and in this context I think "Grey terror" would just make the decision to mobilise much easier for the western governments. IOW Spetznaz operations could easily throw away the most important weakness on the NATO side - not daring to mobilise. An example of a major Spetznaz operation which was expected and confirmed after the Cold war was landing a number of civilian cargo planes in Copenhagen Airport, unload light vehicles stuffed with Spatznaz soldiers and then race to the Government quarters in Copenhagen - with the intention of paralysing the Danish Government. The problem just was, that not only did the Home Guard have a good chance of being in place before Spetznaz could arrive at Christiansborg (Ministries and Parliament) but taking the Government quarters would in no way paralyse mobilisation - on the contrary it would initiate it immediately and BTW Government would legally work as long as there was a single citizen left alive.

If Spetznaz for that reason limited operations to a few hours before an offensive you really wouldn't have any terror effect, and I doubt they could do enough physical damage to be a true nuisance. And anyway, the Spetznaz forces in most cases would have to be in place before attacking, and that involves a high risk of being detected. There are after all not that many mountains or jungles to hide in in Europe.

During the cold war Polish or East German sailing boats some times visited Danish waters and ports. Officially as tourists but more likely to collect military intelligence. Anyway a handful of young trained men with "military" haircuts were quite visible and reported within minutes of arriving and customs officials usually found a reason to inspect their vessel. :cool:

Thank you for sharing.

The plans to raid Christianborg actually reminded me a bit of the Blue House Raid, and when I think about it it seems likely that North Korean SOF attacks on the ROK are a good model for how the Spetsnaz would fare in NATO. That does not say good things for the Spetsnaz.

The entire Spetsnaz operation must be cost-effective to be initiated. And generally operating expensively trained and equipped troops in the territory where they can be easily lost (in the middle of enemy territory) is the awfully cost-ineffective tactics. What is effective is to make enemy believe what such troops (spetsnaz) is going to be heavily used..and force enemy to spent a disproportionate resources trying to counter such an imaginary threat.

I.m.h.o., the spetsnaz operations deep inside Europe (or England) is the scenario not going to be implemented or going to be implemented only on token scale - to trigger a disproportionate defensive response. I do not believe (unlike steamboy in previous post) in any target having a value worth the nearly guaranteed loss of spetsnaz team. Bridges/tunnels will be repaired or bypassed. Aircraft relocated to another airport and airport will be fixed too. Stationary radar installations..are doomed anyway (average lifetime of radar on battlefield is 15 minutes by Russian estimates). Tactical surface-to-surface missile is cheaper and far more deadlier than the expendable spetsnaz member.

This part I actually disagree with. I think you're subconsciously equating Western SOF and Spetsnaz in your head and computing the cost-benefit ration based on how expensive and time consuming it is to train Western SOF to the required standard and how few of them there are actually are. The thing is that the Spetsnaz are far more numerous and a lot cheaper to train (most of them during the Soviet era were conscripts for heaven's sake). They went for their usual doctrine of quantity over quality with them. The sources I've found say there were about 30,000 operators serving in twenty brigades in the Army and Navy, a figure which didn't include up to 41 independent companies, a number of KGB units like Vympel (which alone had a further 1,000 operators), GRU units, or the SOF of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states, of which there were quite a lot. Given the value we know the Soviets placed on the lives of their men IOTL and how they clearly went for quantity over quality, it seems likely they considered them at least some degree of expendable.

I would also hit you with this link. Tl;dr numerous plans to sabotage targets deep in the U.S. and in other places have been uncovered in things like the Mitrokhin Archives and booby-trapped arms caches have been found in places like Switzerland. It does look like they legitimately planned to do this, whether or not it was a good idea. Remember, the Soviets were pretty inflexible about deviating from doctrine.

Indeed, but I doubt they in a short time could do significant damage. After all we were quite well prepared for this and all structures, be it decision making, logistic or physical, had a big redundancy for exactly this reason. But it perhaps reflects how the would looked like seen from the USSR. In their system everything was planned and you waited for orders, so taking out the boss would be quite serious. On our side, each Homeguard company was authorised to mobilise on their own initiative. And if the CO was gone, the XO instantly was in command, and if the XO was out, it would be the oldest platoon leader etc. And everybody were expected to know of tasks beforehand so as to act swiftly under all circumstances.

Yeah, that's about right. They also might have overestimated how much hitting the support structures would hurt us because we built in so much redundancy. The Warsaw Pact over focused on the teeth portion of their forces over the tail part, to the point where they actually had ill-developed logistics and significant losses there would have an outsized effect.

To tell the story from Polish point of view, it is just the military men, or their friends, were the only ones in who had access to materials and money to build, or upkeep a yacht. No doubt some wrote reports from their trips, but the main goal was to get house appliances unavailable on wrong side of Iron Curtain. As for checks and general assholishness, they simply thought it as a element of cold war. Any yacht arriving at Polish harbour would be most likely treated the same, and no doubt their crews on shore leave would be given a plain-clothes "guardian angels" by SB. No doubt that was the case on the other side.

As for hybrid war, it worked in Crimea... if it stupid and works, it is not stupid

I would seriously dispute whether it worked. It was a total failure from a secrecy point of view...every person who actually matters in the world (i.e. ones who don't get their news from Sputnik or Russia Today) knew instantly that they were Russian SOF. I guess they were successful at taking over the place, but it was in an area where everybody looked and spoke the same way as them, where the state organs had already disintegrated to a significant degree from the chaos of Euromaidan making effective response impossible, and where they had significant basing already (they pretty much just walked out of the gates of the Russian bases and set up shop). None of those conditions apply in the West.
 
IMHO striking at key targets (select military and civilian officials - could be colonels and assistant ministers not necessarily the top guys) and also perhaps select hard points (telephone exchanges,jamming lift bridges, etc) maybe 12 hours before the actual attack would provide maximum disruption without providing much additional warning. By this point the WP buildup would be unmistakable. Doing this a couple of weeks in advance almost guarantees some of the operatives will be caught, even if dead they will be found out and any temporary disruption will be outweighed by the extra warning.

I think it would be a case of deploying the Spetznaz against targets JUST before the outbreak of war. As in a few days or even hours, depending on where they wanted to hit. They could cause a lot of damage in places like the UK by hitting roads etc. You want to screw up london's roads, hit the Dartford tunnel and maybe one or two bridges in the city itself. Other attacks at short notice would be against NATO HQ's or nuclear storage sites to try and disable/destroy the weapons there. All very good in theory, but actually putting it into practice would be an entirely different kettle of fish.

Very true Redbeard, the Russians and their love of Maskrovia would have been throwing away one of their long established tools they planned to use to weaken and divide NATO in the event of a war. The military and Governments affected by a sudden surge in terrorist attacks would pretty much KNOW it was the Soviets, and it throws away any attempt at strategic surprise the Soviets would have liked to obtain.

I'd see the Spetznaz as being used to try hit air bases, radar installations, command posts, bridges etc in the final hours before an attack. it would probably be a series of missions with a very high casualty rate, but its a big risk/reward thing. If loosing 50 odd men meant destroying a dozen or so jets and wrecking an airbases fuel pumping system, its a cost the Soviets would happily be willing to trade.

It wouldn't be a sudden appearance of 'The Welsh Independence Liberation Army' launching attacks on Heathrow a month beforehand, because pretty much everyone in the Govermnent and military would KNOW that it was the Soviets. And this then gives away the whole game that they have decided to send the 1st and 2nd Shock Guards on a dash to get to Belgium to enjoy a holiday on the Beaches there.

The thing is that there's good evidence they weren't planning on going small. Soviet plans and doctrine called for hitting targets really far behind the lines. This is a good read. You can't insert people into countries and pull this off hours before the war starts, it has to be a lengthy effort. That wasn't going to fly.

The Soviets were genuinely committed to the idea of the Gray Terror, good idea or not.
 

Insider

Banned
They wouldn't apply? Who says that Soviets would pick just a normal day for their effort? More likely they would attack in the day, when their enemies would be as organised as Ukraine. And I am not just talking about some dreamt up situation... for example POD could be averting the bombing of Axel Springer printing shop, which had put a wedge between RAF and socialists, leading to a much more "interesting" seventies
 
They wouldn't apply? Who says that Soviets would pick just a normal day for their effort? More likely they would attack in the day, when their enemies would be as organised as Ukraine. And I am not just talking about some dreamt up situation... for example POD could be averting the bombing of Axel Springer printing shop, which had put a wedge between RAF and socialists, leading to a much more "interesting" seventies

NATO was never going to be as badly off as Ukraine was. It was a tinpot dictatorship that spent a whole 0.5% on defense and whose heavily rotten institutions had pretty much completely disintegrated post-Euromaidan.

Unless you can show how something like that could happen in the West (and even then that doesn't create equivalencies to the huge Russian garrisons in Crimea, the basic ease of operation given by everyone speaking Russian, or answer the problem created by the fact that it was totally and immediately obvious what was going on), I'm remaining skeptical.

For the record, I also don't see the RAF and more moderate groups being friends even if Axel Springer hadn't been attacked.
 
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