Is early Griffon engine too boring and tedious?
- Thread starter Just Leo
- Start date
IIRC that's an urban legend, the hangar doors were something like 115 feet wide plus the original specification called for outdoor servicing, the 100 foot limit seems to have been more about the Air Ministry trying to keep the weight of the aircraft down via the set width limit.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lindseyman
The Stirling wasn't helped by being designed to fit through standard width hanger doors!
IIRC that's an urban legend, the hangar doors were something like 115 feet wide plus the original specification called for outdoor servicing, the 100 foot limit seems to have been more about the Air Ministry trying to keep the weight of the aircraft down via the set width limit.
As you say 'urban legend', Colin Sinot's 'The RAF and Aircraft Design 1923 to 1939', Goulding and Moyes ' RAF Bomber Command and its Aircraft 1936 to 1940' and British Secret Projects all blow that out of the sky.
Originally Posted by Lindseyman
The Stirling wasn't helped by being designed to fit through standard width hanger doors!
IIRC that's an urban legend, the hangar doors were something like 115 feet wide plus the original specification called for outdoor servicing, the 100 foot limit seems to have been more about the Air Ministry trying to keep the weight of the aircraft down via the set width limit.
As you say 'urban legend', Colin Sinot's 'The RAF and Aircraft Design 1923 to 1939', Goulding and Moyes ' RAF Bomber Command and its Aircraft 1936 to 1940' and British Secret Projects all blow that out of the sky.
I suppose I could write a story around a sane, rational and non-biased AM, but I would feel so dirty....
I suppose I could write a story around a sane, rational and non-biased AM, but I would feel so dirty....
Go on, if it's half as good as whale has wings it be great. How about starting in 1918 and the RAF is not created?
Well we already have Alratan's For Want of a Competent Air Ministry which was pretty interesting.I suppose I could write a story around a sane, rational and non-biased AM, but I would feel so dirty....
It was a cool and rainy day in April, 1930. I can't quite remember the exact date, but I can remember it was a tuesday because that's the day I visit my mistress. The boys from the ministry, the Air Ministry, that is, were finished work for the day and were lounging at the Club, Lord Brabazon had dropped off something he'd picked up in his travels, and the boys were smoking it. Sir Arthur Pewty stood up and, withdrawing the pipe from his lips, announced "Harrumph! I say, chappios, I think we've been moderately ignorant, as well as highly obstinate and objectionable. If we don't smarten up soon, I'm moving to Canada to seek a new livelihood."
Freeman, the only man not testing out Lord Brabazon's bounty, piped up. "Don't be preposterous, dear boy. Of Course we'll smarten up. I've just been chatting to some FAA boyos down at the Admiralty, and they've got some absolutely wizard notions. We'll talk about it tomorrow. Pass that pipe."
The 1928 Rolls Royce Buzzard. 36.7 litres, 825 hp.
Freeman, the only man not testing out Lord Brabazon's bounty, piped up. "Don't be preposterous, dear boy. Of Course we'll smarten up. I've just been chatting to some FAA boyos down at the Admiralty, and they've got some absolutely wizard notions. We'll talk about it tomorrow. Pass that pipe."
The 1928 Rolls Royce Buzzard. 36.7 litres, 825 hp.
in 1929 the RR, R type engine of 36.7 litres capacity as used in the Schnieder trophy Supermarine S6 was developing 1800hp ar 2750rpm with a boost pressure of 13psi. Yes this was a racing engine with a very short flying life but it shows what was possible if the RAF wanted it. By 1931 RR was getting a peak of 2300hp from the R series in Schnieder racing foremat and a peak of 2600bhp in wprld speed record form. onre of the biggest problems was providing enough cooling area on the small airframes of these aircraft for such a beast of an engine
By 1931 RR was getting a peak of 2300hp from the R series in Schnieder racing foremat and a peak of 2600bhp in wprld speed record form. onre of the biggest problems was providing enough cooling area on the small airframes of these aircraft for such a beast of an engineFirst Butterfly of the timeline, the UK never outlaws Marijuana.
Wait till the early '60s when 4 young men in sunglasses and goatees create a new sound, Mersey Jazz. "She Digs You" Ya Ya.
in 1929 the RR, R type engine of 36.7 litres capacity as used in the Schnieder trophy Supermarine S6 was developing 1800hp ar 2750rpm with a boost pressure of 13psi. Yes this was a racing engine with a very short flying life but it shows what was possible if the RAF wanted it.
Pressurized cooling systems, ethylene glycol production by Union Carbide, mixed at proper ratio, improvements in casting techniques and head gasket performance, better, compatible hoses and seals, much to do. You have to do it wrong until you get it right.
in 1929 the RR, R type engine of 36.7 litres capacity as used in the Schnieder trophy Supermarine S6 was developing 1800hp ar 2750rpm with a boost pressure of 13psi. Yes this was a racing engine with a very short flying life but it shows what was possible if the RAF wanted it.
Didn't it also require a highly specialised and trained support crew just to stop the damn thing blowing up?
Yes and the engines were only rated for 1 hour of flight time. The point was that the R engines showed that there was a lot of stretch in the 800hp RR Buzzard as posted earlier. Therefore it is not unreasonable to conjecture that if the Buzzard had been developed further as the proposed Griffon 1 from say 1931 by the mid 1930's (for arguments sake lets say early 1936) It would have probably been giving in excess of 1500HP with a 100hr ticket. After all RR engines were 'The triumph of developement over design'. So following that line of reasoning you have a tried and tested Griffon on 97 octane fuel flying 4 years before OTL. The problem is where is the requirement for such and engine in 1930/31?
Deleted member 1487
@Leo, I understand your point, good luck.
Not exactly, the following sources provide alternate viewpoints about the irrationality of the German armaments industry from 1933 and on:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_and_the_Second_World_War
http://www.amazon.com/Goering-Hitle...qid=1399908126&sr=8-12&keywords=richard+overy
http://www.amazon.com/War-Economy-T...179&sr=8-4&keywords=richard+overy+third+reich
http://www.amazon.com/Arming-Luftwa...99908206&sr=8-2&keywords=arming+the+luftwaffe
http://www.amazon.com/Arming-Luftwa...99908206&sr=8-1&keywords=arming+the+luftwaffe
The reality was that under Goering from 1936 on the German economy was organized chaos, only made worse by Hitler's increasingly irrational whims.
It got better under Speer in 1942 on, so that by 1944 they were as rational in their production as they were going to get, Wunderwaffen aside.
Luftwaffe production was a special case of irrationality, but not the only one by far; by 1944 most of that had been cut out, but there were still silly projects going on that took labor and resources away from necessary projects. Part of the problems go to bureaucracy, leadership issues, ideology, etc. rather than being a purely (warped) logical system constrained by resource deficiencies that Tooze tries to portray. There was waste and mistakes made in rearmament and in the wider economy, though of course Germany was also constrained by resource issues in a way that Allies were not. Its far more nuanced than Tooze suggests and in fact outright lies in some cases about to establish himself as a unique iconoclast in the field of WW2 economics. Tooze is trying to sell books by misrepresenting the research in the field before him, because the field is so saturated that the only way to make a name for oneself is by selling oneself as unique and special.
That's not to say Tooze doesn't contribute valuable information to the subject, rather his crime is that he selectively presents or misrepresents information to make his thesis work, which, if true, would indeed set him apart in his field; the problem is that he is nowhere near the first to present the anti-Speer argument, nor most of the other arguments he puts forth, but he does have an overarching thesis dating from the early 1930s to the end of the war, which is the most comprehensive look at the subject I've seen in English, other than the Germany and the Second World War series, which is more a series of essays than a coherent narrative.
He still gives the best and most logical rationale for why the German rearmament did many of the things it did. Following the numbers is far more believable that the 'OMG, Speer is so cooool, we must believe him!!' earlier school...
Not exactly, the following sources provide alternate viewpoints about the irrationality of the German armaments industry from 1933 and on:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_and_the_Second_World_War
http://www.amazon.com/Goering-Hitle...qid=1399908126&sr=8-12&keywords=richard+overy
http://www.amazon.com/War-Economy-T...179&sr=8-4&keywords=richard+overy+third+reich
http://www.amazon.com/Arming-Luftwa...99908206&sr=8-2&keywords=arming+the+luftwaffe
http://www.amazon.com/Arming-Luftwa...99908206&sr=8-1&keywords=arming+the+luftwaffe
The reality was that under Goering from 1936 on the German economy was organized chaos, only made worse by Hitler's increasingly irrational whims.
It got better under Speer in 1942 on, so that by 1944 they were as rational in their production as they were going to get, Wunderwaffen aside.
Luftwaffe production was a special case of irrationality, but not the only one by far; by 1944 most of that had been cut out, but there were still silly projects going on that took labor and resources away from necessary projects. Part of the problems go to bureaucracy, leadership issues, ideology, etc. rather than being a purely (warped) logical system constrained by resource deficiencies that Tooze tries to portray. There was waste and mistakes made in rearmament and in the wider economy, though of course Germany was also constrained by resource issues in a way that Allies were not. Its far more nuanced than Tooze suggests and in fact outright lies in some cases about to establish himself as a unique iconoclast in the field of WW2 economics. Tooze is trying to sell books by misrepresenting the research in the field before him, because the field is so saturated that the only way to make a name for oneself is by selling oneself as unique and special.
That's not to say Tooze doesn't contribute valuable information to the subject, rather his crime is that he selectively presents or misrepresents information to make his thesis work, which, if true, would indeed set him apart in his field; the problem is that he is nowhere near the first to present the anti-Speer argument, nor most of the other arguments he puts forth, but he does have an overarching thesis dating from the early 1930s to the end of the war, which is the most comprehensive look at the subject I've seen in English, other than the Germany and the Second World War series, which is more a series of essays than a coherent narrative.
Indeed a relevant argument. A man named Whittle, later called Sir Frank, faced a similar problem. His new-fangled engines would set tube-and-rag biplanes afire.
The Bristol engine company board made a time-relevant decision to debut a new format of engines in the form of a 9 cylinder Aquila and Perseus because they were more likely to fit the aircraft which existed in the past. Cart before the horse tradition. People with vision, like Kevin Costner and Ed Heinemann have made relevant quotes. Kevin's was "Build it, and they will come". Ed just said "Take the very best engine and build an airplane around it". That is what a man named Mitchell did. There is no requirement for the Griffon unless you want to win, be it a trophy or a war. The way it was was that Gloster built the Gladiator because that's what was wanted, and followed it with the F5/34 to show what they could have had if they weren't such idiots.
The more you read about history, the more questions arise. History is largely written by, at best, semi-rational people with an overblown sense of their own wisdom and understanding. Historians who impart the sense of "this is the best I can do with the information available" are rare, but are my favorites. Total rationality is like the speed of light. You can only approach it by degrees. I thought I was rational once, but it was the drugs.
How come we're finally in agreement, and yet I feel like a doormat at the Gateway of Truth?