Irredentist European populist right-wing

BigBlueBox

Banned
Wars of conquest are anti-constitutional, but peaceful irredentism was official FRG policy for a long time, admittedly more in the sense of "RoC claim to mainland China"-style virtue signalling, but still. The bigger issue is that no one really cares about the Ostgebiete anymore, and AfD doesn't want to integrate 20 million Poles that badly.
The 2+4 Treaty included a clause in which German basic law had to be amended to ban irredentism of any kind.
 
The 2+4 Treaty included a clause in which German basic law had to be amended to ban irredentism of any kind.
The only place where the post-2+4 basic law indirectly mentions irredentism is the preamble, which isn't exactly legally binding - if it were, the often-discussed-but-never-happening reorganization of the states would be unconstitutional, since the preamble lists the 16 constituent states.
 

BigBlueBox

Banned
The only place where the post-2+4 basic law indirectly mentions irredentism is the preamble, which isn't exactly legally binding - if it were, the often-discussed-but-never-happening reorganization of the states would be unconstitutional, since the preamble lists the 16 constituent states.
2+4 Treaty said:
Article 1
(1) The united Germany shall comprise the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin. Its external borders shall be the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and shall be definitive from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force. The confirmation of the definitive nature of the borders of the united Germany is an essential element of the peaceful order in Europe.
(2) The united Germany and the Republic of Poland shall confirm the existing border between them in a treaty that is binding under international law.
(3) The united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever against other states and shall not assert any in the future.
(4) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall ensure that the constitution of the united Germany does not contain any provision incompatible with these principles. This applies accordingly to the provisions laid down in the preamble, the second sentence of Article 23, and Article 146 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.

(5) The Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America take formal note of the corresponding commitments and declarations by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and declare that their implementation will confirm the definitive nature of the united Germany's borders.
I'm not sure if there is a clause in the Basic Law explicitly forbidding a party from running on an irredentist platform, but the 2+4 Treaty seems pretty clear in stating that Germany must recognize irredentism as being unconstitutional.
 
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There's not much support for revanchism among the populist parties. The wackos in the NPD want to get Kaliningrad oblast back, but on territorial issues the AFD seems to be well within the German overton window, they're not pushing for border changes.

The Austrian government might make some noise about South Tyrol, and Orban has considered offering dual citizenship for ethnic Magyars outside Hungary, but there aren't enough minority groups left it Europe to provide fuel for revanchism or a fascistic separatist group like the NDH.
 
I'm not sure if there is a clause in the Basic Law explicitly forbidding a party from running on an irredentist platform, but the 2+4 Treaty seems pretty clear in stating that Germany must recognize irredentism as being unconstitutional.
The actual constitutional changes ( translations by myself) coming from 2+4 ratification are as follows:

Pre-2+4 preamble said:
Recognizing its responsibility before God and man, and desiring to preserve its unity as nation and state and serve world peace as an equal among equals in a unified Europe, the German People in the states of Baden, Bayern, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern, by its constitutionally constituent power and with the aim of defining a temporary new order for its civic life, has enacted this Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. In this, it has also acted in the name of those Germans who were denied from participation. The whole German People is called upon to continue the peaceful struggle for fulfillment of Germany's unity and freedom.

Post-2+4 preamble said:
Recognizing its responsibility before God and man, and desiring to preserve its unity as nation and state and serve world peace as an equal among equals in a unified Europe, by its constitutionally constituent power the German People has enacted this Basic Law. The Germans in the states of Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thüringen have fulfilled Germany's unity and freedom. Therefore this Basic Law is effective for the whole German People.

Pre-2+4 Article 23 said:
This Basic Law is effective initially in the states of Baden, Bayern, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. It is to be ratified by other parts of Germany upon their joining [of the FRG].

Article 23 was abolished without replacement upon ratification of 2+4; an entirely different Article 23 was instated in 1992 as part of Maastricht Treaty ratification.

Pre-2+4 Article 146 said:
This Basic Law loses its validity on the day a constitution is enacted by the German People by its free volition.

Post-2+4 Article 146 said:
This Basic Law, effective for the whole German People following fulfillment of Germany's unity and freedom, loses its validity on the day a constitution is enacted by the German People by its free volition.

I wouldn't read this as irredentism is banned, only as irredentism is a moot point. Which it is.
 
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I don't think that the Church in Italy has much clout over Italian politics.
Oh, they really do.
It is changing rapidly as the Vatican is actually concerned about stuff that is the Gospel these days, things like good Catholics being supposed to adhere to hospitality, sharing and compassion toward less fortunate people (such as, for instance, refugees), a point that many of the current Italian mainstream politicians (MOSTLY of the populist right) vehemently deny on a identity politics nationalistic basis; the conundrum is that identity politics nationalism in Italy needs to pay lip service to Catholic identity (supposedly threatened by all these dark-skinned persons trying to reach safe haven in Europe). So the right cannot really play anti-clericalism, indeed there's a faction there that aligns closely with the most conservative groups on the Church on things like equal marriage, reproductive rights, divorce, abortion, and similar issues. They actually espouse a far more narrow and patriarchal view than anything the Church ever officially approved, but their views on family are quite in synch. The centre-left opposes this (and often saw its Catholic and secularist wings clash) but is traditionally very keen on working with the Church on social issues and shares at least notionally some ingrained Catholic ideals about solidarity and welfare.
As immigration and identity increasingly become centerpieces of public debate, of course, all these tensions explode and the traditional alignments of the Church on the Right become less and less tenable as the Vatican really insists that Salvini's rhetoric is plain un-Christian. The result so far is alienating a lot of right-wingers from the Church, or from the current Papacy at least (with a lot of internal unease about Pope Francis emerging) but in the long run, the Italian populist right cannot afford to just turn anti-clerical outright. The secular left also cannot provide an alternative interlocutor for the Church since they a) are weaker anyway b) while they cooperate with Catholics on social issues, they disagree on almost everything else, and despise some significant Church interests (private schools being particularly contentious). So, the Church has a lot clout but cannot use it effectively for internal divisions.

As a side note, even Neo-Fascists are divided in "Catholic" and "Secular" camps, with two distinct political movements (the secular one being by far the most numerically significant right now); the Church disavows both and both show sympathy to Salvini, but in some places, the "Catholic" neo-fascist movement has connections to local sympathetic clergy.
 
However, I am sorta surprised that, in the current diplomatic kerfuffle between Rome and Paris, nobody of note in Italy has raised the point of Nizza and Corsica yet (I think).
 
Oh, they really do.
It is changing rapidly as the Vatican is actually concerned about stuff that is the Gospel these days, things like good Catholics being supposed to adhere to hospitality, sharing and compassion toward less fortunate people (such as, for instance, refugees), a point that many of the current Italian mainstream politicians (MOSTLY of the populist right) vehemently deny on a identity politics nationalistic basis; the conundrum is that identity politics nationalism in Italy needs to pay lip service to Catholic identity (supposedly threatened by all these dark-skinned persons trying to reach safe haven in Europe). So the right cannot really play anti-clericalism, indeed there's a faction there that aligns closely with the most conservative groups on the Church on things like equal marriage, reproductive rights, divorce, abortion, and similar issues. They actually espouse a far more narrow and patriarchal view than anything the Church ever officially approved, but their views on family are quite in synch. The centre-left opposes this (and often saw its Catholic and secularist wings clash) but is traditionally very keen on working with the Church on social issues and shares at least notionally some ingrained Catholic ideals about solidarity and welfare.
As immigration and identity increasingly become centerpieces of public debate, of course, all these tensions explode and the traditional alignments of the Church on the Right become less and less tenable as the Vatican really insists that Salvini's rhetoric is plain un-Christian. The result so far is alienating a lot of right-wingers from the Church, or from the current Papacy at least (with a lot of internal unease about Pope Francis emerging) but in the long run, the Italian populist right cannot afford to just turn anti-clerical outright. The secular left also cannot provide an alternative interlocutor for the Church since they a) are weaker anyway b) while they cooperate with Catholics on social issues, they disagree on almost everything else, and despise some significant Church interests (private schools being particularly contentious). So, the Church has a lot clout but cannot use it effectively for internal divisions.

As a side note, even Neo-Fascists are divided in "Catholic" and "Secular" camps, with two distinct political movements (the secular one being by far the most numerically significant right now); the Church disavows both and both show sympathy to Salvini, but in some places, the "Catholic" neo-fascist movement has connections to local sympathetic clergy.
The distinction between economic migrants and refugees is one that probably would need to be made for the Church to have much sway over the right in Italy. There is the identity factor, yes, but it is plainly obvious that people from Burkina Faso and Eritrea are not all Syrians fleeing from ISIS, and the conflation of the two I believe did much to discredit the pro-migration forces in Italy especially, where the overland route from Turkey and Greece has not been utilized and the arrivals seem almost entirely from Libya and the North African coast via people smugglers and NGOs.

As for the current Papacy, I believe as time goes on and the Vigano letter's allegations go unanswered day after day, that too will diminish the Church's ability to have sway over right leaning Catholics. I don't predict outright schism, but I would predict the sway of the Church to diminish in politics. Of course, much may rest on the upcoming Vatican summit, but if Francis really did know about the sanctions on McCarrick and was told directly as much and then proceeded to put him back in a position of power, the moral authority of his Papacy is shot.
 
Anyway most or some of the populist European right-wing parties like the National front or the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy or the AFD adopt irredentism as major policies

What would be the impact of this on their popularity in recent years

Would they be as cooperative with each other or with parties outside Europe
The Balkan countries have irredentist parties for sure. Only 25 years ago Dayton ended an Irredentist war in Europe. And the Kosovo issue is even fresher.
 
Hungary is easiest, what with integrating Szeklerland or something.

The Széleky land is separated from Hungary by ethnically Romanian areas. Irredentism in the ethnically Hungarian areas of Southern Slovakia, which is contiguous with Hungary, is a much better bet. As for other countries, Austrian irrendentism in South Tyrol is a good bet.
 
I mean Geert wilders

I was thinking Flanders and maybe the French flanders as well for the former and Walloon for the latter and maybe Luxembourg as well .

Geert Wilders is in theory a proponent of a unification between Flanders and the Netherlands. The problem though us, nobody in the Netherlands (including Geert Wilders) cares about it and I don't think anybody reaky cared for it in the 50 years, maybe even the last century or so. Flanders is simply no issue. You can't get any votes with it. Especialy since it should be a decission of the Flemish (and they don't want to, although most Dutch don't realise that). Nobody, really nobody thinks that the Netherlands should annex Flanders whatever the Flemish think about.

I believe this is true for most of Western (and democratic) Europe. Everybody basicly acceps that if people living somewhere don't want to be part of your country, you should not invade another country to make those people part of your country. It is better to have good relations with your neighbours. And with the current relations within Europe it is easy to connect with the people living across the border, even outside the EU. It is not the 19th or early 20th century after all.

So if you can't get any votes by wanting to annex Flanders or Alsace-Lorraine, or Scania, or whatever, why would a populist party propagate it? The idea is to propagate what people want and regular parties aren't (like getting rid of foreigners, opposing the EU, etc). That is why you don't see irredentist claims in Western European populist parties. If you want to change that, you probably need some POD around WWII. Maybe Germany loses territory on the west to The Netherlands and France after the war, the EU and Nato arent formed and relations between European countries are worse than OTL. No Soviet Union as the bogeyman. Something like that.
 
The distinction between economic migrants and refugees is one that probably would need to be made for the Church to have much sway over the right in Italy. There is the identity factor, yes, but it is plainly obvious that people from Burkina Faso and Eritrea are not all Syrians fleeing from ISIS, and the conflation of the two I believe did much to discredit the pro-migration forces in Italy especially, where the overland route from Turkey and Greece has not been utilized and the arrivals seem almost entirely from Libya and the North African coast via people smugglers and NGOs.

As for the current Papacy, I believe as time goes on and the Vigano letter's allegations go unanswered day after day, that too will diminish the Church's ability to have sway over right leaning Catholics. I don't predict outright schism, but I would predict the sway of the Church to diminish in politics. Of course, much may rest on the upcoming Vatican summit, but if Francis really did know about the sanctions on McCarrick and was told directly as much and then proceeded to put him back in a position of power, the moral authority of his Papacy is shot.

I cannot really answer about the Viganò letters, my understanding is that Italian right-wingers (except the relatively few who portray themselves as actually devout) largely tend not to really care about such sort of things seeing them as internal Church conflicts; criticism of Francis is significant but not on this basis.
The sway of the Church is likely to diminish in politics, but I am still inclined to think this is in large part because the Church is not united in confronting Italian politics. However, Eritreans are largely regarded by Italian authoritties as rightful recipients of asylum; they are actually among the highest-ranking immigrant nationalities in having asylum demands accepted (though this is likely to change soon). The distinction between "refugees" and "economic migrants" is not as clear cut as most European right-wingers (who constructed the distinction in the first place) depict it, and many of them would likely reject both anyway.
The Libyan route for example allowed some Nigerians to escape from areas where Boko Haram held sway (one of those refugees was killed in a racially motivated brawl in my hometown; the culprit is an acquainatance of mine; the victim was hosted in Church facility; and many people heere sided with the killer).
 
Geert Wilders is in theory a proponent of a unification between Flanders and the Netherlands. The problem though us, nobody in the Netherlands (including Geert Wilders) cares about it and I don't think anybody reaky cared for it in the 50 years, maybe even the last century or so. Flanders is simply no issue. You can't get any votes with it. Especialy since it should be a decission of the Flemish (and they don't want to, although most Dutch don't realise that). Nobody, really nobody thinks that the Netherlands should annex Flanders whatever the Flemish think about.

I believe this is true for most of Western (and democratic) Europe. Everybody basicly acceps that if people living somewhere don't want to be part of your country, you should not invade another country to make those people part of your country. It is better to have good relations with your neighbours. And with the current relations within Europe it is easy to connect with the people living across the border, even outside the EU. It is not the 19th or early 20th century after all.

So if you can't get any votes by wanting to annex Flanders or Alsace-Lorraine, or Scania, or whatever, why would a populist party propagate it? The idea is to propagate what people want and regular parties aren't (like getting rid of foreigners, opposing the EU, etc). That is why you don't see irredentist claims in Western European populist parties. If you want to change that, you probably need some POD around WWII. Maybe Germany loses territory on the west to The Netherlands and France after the war, the EU and Nato arent formed and relations between European countries are worse than OTL. No Soviet Union as the bogeyman. Something like that.

Point is, this wonderfully peaceful situation whereby it is, for instance, very fine to be a German-speaking Sudtiroler with Italian citizenship who is nevertheless free to travel to Austria as well their Austrian friends or family are free to come to Italy, is not a given. This is what nationalist right-wing voters all over Europe fail to realize. The EU is the institutional framework that makes this think sustainably possible (even regarding some non-member countries).
If it fails, and no other institution takes that spot, suddenly Sud-Tyrol, Translylania, Flanders, hell, even Alsace and Schleswig might become trouble. We do not really need hypotheticals: in real life, Northern Ireland is proof enough.
 
Point is, this wonderfully peaceful situation whereby it is, for instance, very fine to be a German-speaking Sudtiroler with Italian citizenship who is nevertheless free to travel to Austria as well their Austrian friends or family are free to come to Italy, is not a given. This is what nationalist right-wing voters all over Europe fail to realize. The EU is the institutional framework that makes this think sustainably possible (even regarding some non-member countries).
If it fails, and no other institution takes that spot, suddenly Sud-Tyrol, Translylania, Flanders, hell, even Alsace and Schleswig might become trouble. We do not really need hypotheticals: in real life, Northern Ireland is proof enough.
I am not going to defend populist parties and their delusions. One thing I do want to say that of tomorrow the EU and NATO collapses and we get a border between Belgium and the Netherlands just like the borders were in the early 20th century,still noone in the Netherlands would care enough for Flanders to join the Netherlands. The Dutch identity does not include the Flemish people. There is no irredentism in the Netherlands. All parts of the world that should be Dutch are already Dutch ( I would even say the opposite is true, I think you can get votes if you want to kick the Dutch Carribean out of the Netherlands). I suspect the same is true for most other parts of Western Europe. Whatever happens, the Germans do no longer care about Alsace-Lorraine or Eupen-Malmedy, etc.

Mind you I am specifically not talking about Eastern Europe and I am willing to admit that Northern Ireland is an interesting exception.
 
The Széleky land is separated from Hungary by ethnically Romanian areas. Irredentism in the ethnically Hungarian areas of Southern Slovakia, which is contiguous with Hungary, is a much better bet. As for other countries, Austrian irrendentism in South Tyrol is a good bet.

Having 1 enclave within a country you have open borders and free trade with should not be an issue.
 
I am not going to defend populist parties and their delusions. One thing I do want to say that of tomorrow the EU and NATO collapses and we get a border between Belgium and the Netherlands just like the borders were in the early 20th century,still noone in the Netherlands would care enough for Flanders to join the Netherlands. The Dutch identity does not include the Flemish people. There is no irredentism in the Netherlands. All parts of the world that should be Dutch are already Dutch ( I would even say the opposite is true, I think you can get votes if you want to kick the Dutch Carribean out of the Netherlands). I suspect the same is true for most other parts of Western Europe. Whatever happens, the Germans do no longer care about Alsace-Lorraine or Eupen-Malmedy, etc.

Mind you I am specifically not talking about Eastern Europe and I am willing to admit that Northern Ireland is an interesting exception.

I trust you fully that there is not irredentism in the Netherlands. There is separatism in the Flanders though. My point was more general however: while the Dutch indentity does not include the Flemish (nor the current German identity the Alsatians, or the Austrians for that matter) this can change. People did not expect Croatian or Montenegrin nationalism to re-emerge in the nineties, or Scotland holding a relatively close referendum on independence in 2014. If the current framework collapses, many things may be put into question.
That said, for the Netherlands specifically, I suppose that no-one would want to march into Antwerp.
 
A weaker EU that results in looser economic ties between countries that have territorial conflicts could result in more irredentist rhetoric, and maybe action. Interconnected economies make territorial disputes harder to actually bring to the fore of politics. A rougher end of communism that results in the EU not looking to grow into Central Europe as fast could result in tensions between Hungary and Slovakia over the Hungarian majority areas, as has been mentioned above.

An Italy that doesn't fare so badly in WW2 and is in a stronger position post-war could either seek a return of Adriatic territories, or hold/try to regain a foothold on the African continent if the Arab Spring and Western intervention take down Qaddafi as happened in OTL. I could easily see the chaos of Libya prompting calls from the Italian right to "restore order in the place we never should have left."

A different end to WW2 could result in a Poland that's more willing to make noise about its eastern territories. Maybe they don't get the Western areas they did in OTL to mollify them.

A stronger Greece, maybe one that avoids the trauma of WW2, could make a play for the Greek inhabited areas of Southern Albania if things happen correctly. Obviously the GD is irredentist, but a Greece that isn't suffering from the economic problems of OTL could have Greeks in Albania clammering for Enosis.

Romania could have desires to bring Moldova back into Romania, not sure how that could get to be a bigger issue, would probably require a different WW2 or substantially altered Communist period.

The only way I could see Germany having irredentism as a major political issue is if WW2 happens differently. Basically one of the coups against Hitler would have to work, but the Soviets would also have to get basically as far as they did OTL, and Germany is then created with its OTL borders as a unified, but neutral, buffer state. In that situation there'd probably be a lot less population movement, as Germany is still capable of doing damage to the Allies, and the Soviets can't just do whatever they want. With Germans still living in the East, primarily in Poland, there will definitely be German factions who want to reexpand German territory. However, this scenario requires so a lot of things not only occurring, but occurring together, so I'd say it's very near ASB.
 
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