Iron discovered in Lorraine early, Longwy-Briey annexed in 1871

[Deleted member 1487]

What if the iron producing area of Longwy-Briey was discovered to have iron deposits prior to the Franco-Prussia war and the Germans then annexed the area during the peace treaty? More information is below, but to summarize Germany would have denied France of most of its iron ore and given Germany a massive boost in production of iron ore. Despite being filled with impurities, it was a major German war objective in WW1 and would already be occupied by the time that war, if it happens ITTL, would come around.
One of Germany's major war goals in WW1 would therefore already be achieved, somewhat reducing later war tensions.
Ultimately Germany would be economically strengthened while France would be significantly weakened.

On the border region, it would also deprive France of a border with Luxembourg, while placing the German border closer to Verdun. What does everyone else think this may lead to?

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/lorraine/photos/maps/MapII.jpg
http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/saar.htm
"Lorrain's Longwy-Briey-Thionville triangle (see detailed map below) contains 90% of France's iron ore and was one of the six richest iron ore deposits in the world at the end of the 19th century. (Berglund, pp. 531-534)

In the production of pig-iron and steel it was the common practice of the late 1800's to locate foundries and steel mills in coal producing areas and transport the ore to the coal by rail. The bulk of Germany's iron and steel industries were therefore located around Saarbrucke in the upper Rhineland and in the Ruhr. French heavy industry was located in its own coal producing areas in the Pas-du-Nord along its northern frontier with Belgium. This was centered on the city of Lille, although some iron smelters were located in Lorraine. During times of peace, trade furnished each industry with the raw materials that were naturally lacking locally. For much of the 1800's and into the 1900's French ore fed the metallurgic industry of Germany, while German coal fueled the furnaces of French industry. This economic relationship was, however, often strained by protectionist policies and used as a tool in geopolitical struggles. In times of war, the resources of one country became a coveted prize for the other."

"While the goal of each antagonist in the Franco Prussian war of 1870-1871 was not explicitly the occupation of territory rich in natural resources, the purpose of the concluding Treaty of Frankfort of 10 May 1871 certainly was. Along with indemnity payments meant to hamstring French investments in industry, the French province of Alsace and most of Lorraine were annexed by a newly united Germany. This transferred an estimated 2 billion tons of iron ore into German hands along with Lorraine's iron smelters.(Berglund, 531) Freed fom having to pay high prices for imported French ore, German iron and steel production flourished between 1871 and 1918, outstripping French production by a factor of three.(Munro, 7) Germany's industrial take-off of the late 1800's in turn fueled its military might and geo-political influence, allowing it to pursue its dream of building a Mitteleuropa to challenge the erstwhile continental hegemony of France. (Soutou, 21)

The German victory in 1871 and subsequent annexation of Lorraine and Alsace did more than just cripple France's industry. France was forced to recognize the importance of coal and iron production for producing the armaments that were the primary lever of geopolitical power. (Munro, 9) This put France in an economic and strategic conundrum. It still possessed great iron ore deposits in the area of Lorraine not annexed by Germany. However, due to a relative dearth of coal and inefficiencies in its metallurgic industry, France could not use all of the ore that it could mine. To buy coal, France needed money and its easiest way to get money was to sell its surplus iron ore. Germany, with a surplus of coal relative to iron despite the annexed resources of Lorraine, was the obvious customer, yet to export iron ore to Germany was to fuel Germany's war-making capabilities. (Soutou, 180-189) While a stagnating French economy fed the French population's revenge fever for the humiliating annexation of "French" territory, the French administrative and political classes were developing a solution for France's relative lack of coal."

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Here is a bit more information about the relative amounts of iron:

http://books.google.com/books?id=Rk...resnum=13&ved=0CGwQ6AEwDA#v=onepage&q&f=false
"The total supply estimated by Villain to be available in Luxemburg is 300 million tons. In France, taking the deposits at Nancy, Longwy, and Briey together, no less than 2500 million tons should exist. In German Lorraine the amount has been variously estimated at 1100 to 2200 million tons, but the former figure is regarded as the more accurate, while, inasmuch as the southern portions of the field contain poor siliceous ores which are practically unworkable, the estimate must be further largely reduced."


http://books.google.com/books?id=J4...Q6AEwCg#v=onepage&q=Longwy-Briey iron&f=false

"Dr. Schlenker proceeds to remark that there is no need of further argument to show that Sweden was not, and could not be, in a position to make good the deficiency arising thereby of 23.55 per cent; and continues: "It must therefore be described as a special stroke of good fortune that at the very commencement of the war Germany came into possession of the Briey ore basin, as without the French iron-ores it would have been impossible for the German iron industry to cover our own and our Allies' enormous requirements of munitions. Further, the great advantages which come to us from the occupation of the ore basin mean the reverse for France." As already shown above, the share with which the Department of Meurtheet-Moselle participated in the total extraction of iron-ores in France in 1913 was no less than 19,813,572 tons, whereof again the greater part came from the Briey basin, where the extraction of ores in 1913 soared up to 15,023,740 tons.
Seeing that even the iron mines in the districts of the Department still held by France, and which are situated chiefly in the neighborhood of Nancy, are scarcely likely to have remained at work, France has lost, through the occupation, no less than roughly 90 per cent of her normal output of ironore, or, if we make allowance for the higher percentage of metal contained in the other French iron-ore, fully 85 per cent.
According to a report submitted by Dr. Schroder, of Diisseldorf, on January 31, 1915, to the general meeting of the Association of German Metallurgists (Verein Deutscher Eisenhuttenleute) no less than 95 of the roughly 127 blast furnaces which were in blast at the commencement of 1913 out of the 170 altogether existing in France, are situated in the war zone, and even the furnaces situated behind the trenches are scarcely likely to have been kept in blast in view of the shortage of ores and the existing conditions in general, so that only some 30 blast furnaces remain which could continue to work uninterruptedly. As the later number includes some small furnaces of 30 to 60 tons daily output, while the large furnaces are situated mainly in the East of France, at least 80 per cent of the entire pig-iron production of France is likely to have been stopped by the war, and more especially by the rapid thrust forward beyond the Briey ore basin."

With this information, it is obvious that France will be VERY hard pressed to recover from the Franco-Prussian war, perhaps allowing the indemnity to actually serve its purpose and prevent French rearmament. This obviously has massive implications for the future: France not really a threat to German military power, Russia potential won't get its rail way loans from France, meaning its own industrialization is set back significantly. WW1 is butterflied away, especially if Germany is the premier power on the continent militarily. Of course all this serves to increase Anglo-German hostilities and may actually serve to increase the naval arms race. Germany itself could be significantly richer if it has to import less iron from other nations and can export more to its neighbors (France, who has to pay for both coal and iron from Germany, instead of OTL where they were able to pretty much offset coal purchases with iron sales).

 

[machine3589]

Doesnt this take away much of France`s capability to wage another war?

 

[Kelenas]

I think that's the point. Without those deposits, France doesn't have any realistic chance to recover - whether militarily or economically; not without massive outside help.
And without a strong France, there'll be no investments into Russian industry or military, either.

In my opinion, this would make for a very interesting PoD, given the butterflies it would cause.

- Kelenas

 

[machine3589]

I think that's the point. Without those deposits, France doesn't have any realistic chance to recover - whether militarily or economically; not without massive outside help.

There is always the possibility that Britain would provide said help because it really, really wants to prevent German continental hegemony, but that also raises the question weather the results of such a British comitment would be worth the effort.

 

[Kelenas]

And that's the problem. Britain would pretty much have to shoulder all the economic and financial responsibility for French re-armament by themselves -which were still one of Britain's chief rivals then! - with very little the French could offer in return.

They might change their opinion later, but for the next two or three decades they're likely to see Germany as a lesser "evil" then France before they switch this view around, much like OTL.
The conclusion might come a bit earlier ITTL, since Germany has more iron available to fuel its industry, meaning Britain might see them as an economic and military threat earlier, but it won't happen immediately.

- Kelenas

 

[Atlantic Friend]

With this information, it is obvious that France will be VERY hard pressed to recover from the Franco-Prussian war, perhaps allowing the indemnity to actually serve its purpose and prevent French rearmament.

The loss of Lorraine's iron ore would certainly cripple France's capacity to produce steel and lead to a reduced military-industrial potential.

This obviously has massive implications for the future: France not really a threat to German military power, Russia potential won't get its rail way loans from France, meaning its own industrialization is set back significantly.

WW1 is butterflied away, especially if Germany is the premier power on the continent militarily.

There I disagree, for a variety of reasons :

- WW1 had little to do with control of industrial resources, or lack thereof;
- Germany already was the premier military power on the continent and precious little it did to butterfly WW1 away;
- annexing more of Lorraine means even greater Franco-German tensions.

Also, supposing that either the Triple Entente does not form (but why wouldn't it since all three members would have good reasons to be wary of German intentions in the near future), or that the Triple Alliance dwarfs it in military might, that would mean a rather unipolar situation where Germany could think it can do basically what it wants and not suffer consequences, usually a good recipe for a clash somewhere down the road.

Of course all this serves to increase Anglo-German hostilities and may actually serve to increase the naval arms race.

Certainly. Anglo-German competition cannot be butterflied away, and a more dynamic Germany only means greater competition for Britain, be that a peaceful competition about steel output or a nastier one about sea domination.

Germany itself could be significantly richer if it has to import less iron from other nations and can export more to its neighbors (France, who has to pay for both coal and iron from Germany, instead of OTL where they were able to pretty much offset coal purchases with iron sales).

That is true.

 

[Atlantic Friend]

Also, what would prevent French industrialists who need steel, like Schneider, to exploit directly ore lodes in another country?