Ireland joins the Allies in June 1941.

A Luftwaffe bombing raid had accidentally dropped bombs on Dublin on the 31st of May, 1941, killing 34 people. Although there had been other unknowing attacks on Irish cities, that one had the largest body count. Suppose that the bombing ended up killing more people than that, and the Germans fail to try and compensate for the deaths, pushing Ireland to officially join the Allies?
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
It makes the Battle of the Atlantic rather easier, what with access to Irish air bases. Thousands of Irishmen from the Free States served in the British Army during the Second World War anyway, but an outright declaration of war would probably increase recruitment considerably.
 
I think may 41 is likelier than June. There would be difficulties about being Stalin's co-belligerant

As the bombing was on the 31st, I'd assumed the declaration of war would happen after a following breakdown of diplomacy between Ireland and Germany, which would put it a near to dead in the middle between the date of the bombing and the start date of Barbarossa.
 
ASB that the Irish Free State weren't snivelling cowards who were blinded by Anglophobia

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I mean. Yeah Battle of Atlantic is a bit easier.
 
The ports would have needed significant upgrades and there would have needed to have been diversion of AA guns and fighters for defence that would have needed to have come from somewhere at the time.

Also a search would bring up more than a few of these what if's, it's been asked before.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
~12,000 citizens of the Irish Republic served in the

ASB that the Irish Free State weren't snivelling cowards who were blinded by Anglophobia
I mean. Yeah Battle of Atlantic is a bit easier.

Roughly 12,000 citizens of the Irish Republic served in the British armed forces (Army, RN, RAF) during WW II, and tens of thousands more were in the British and Irish merchant navies, British civil defense organizations, and British industry. In addition, Irish neutrality was decidedly partial to the Alllies, in terms of allowing British and American personnel who were interned to "escape," trade, intelligence, and joint planning in the event of Irish entry into the war - certainly far more so than any of the other European neutrals with the exception of Portugal (which allowed Allied use of Portuguese territory for base rights).

Ireland was a small, very weak and poor republic that had gained its independence from the UK less than two decades earlier, after a long and bloody struggle.

With all due respect, given all of the above, that's a more respectable record of contribution to the Allied cause in 1939-45 than (for example) Portugal (WW I member of the Allies), Switzerland (which after 1944, had an open border with France and, by extension, the Allies), and Sweden (which given the geographic circumstances, really could not have done more than it did until 1945).

In terms of the "white" dominions, the above is roughly equivalent to Newfoundland, which was even smaller and poorer (300,000 people compared to 3 million, more or less) but again, Ireland was independent; Newfoundland was a dominion.

In terms of the smaller independent allies, Ireland's population was significantly less than that of Cuba, which never sent any troops overseas (although the Cuban Navy participated in the naval war in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, and is credited with the very respectable tally of multiple convoys escorted and one German submarine sunk).

So, all in all, Ireland's neutrality was certainly skewed in favor of the Allies; if Ireland had entered the war (after US entry presumably to provide some domestic political cover) and the Irish citizens serving in the British forces were allowed to transfer to the Irish forces, and overseas service was limited to volunteer (conscription for home service and coastal convoys), one could see (presumably) at least the historical 12,000 being sustained...

So cut that in half for replacements, and call it 6,000; figure one or two IrAF squadrons, and an infantry brigade group/regimental combat team ...

One could expect attachment to the US forces in NW Europe might go down a little easier than attachment to the British forces, so call it a fighter squadron (P-40 Warhawks transitioning to P-47 Thunderbolts?), a patrol/observation squadron (PBO Hudsons transitoning to PV-1 Venturas?), and an RCT. A USN patwing sets up shop in Ireland, itself, and the infantry RCT and fighter squadron go to France with the 12th Army Group.

Best,
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
ASB that the Irish Free State weren't snivelling cowards who were blinded by Anglophobia

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I mean. Yeah Battle of Atlantic is a bit easier.

Well, isn't that charming?

Nationalist bigot much?

Rejoice! I decided NOT to ban you for trolling right out of the gate.

Kicked for a week. You might want to consider the policies of the Board when you return.
 
All the major parties backed De Valera's neutrality policy. James Dillon
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Dillon_(Fine_Gael_politician) was the only important anti-neutrality politician, and he was isolated within his party (in fact, he resigned from it). You would really have to have proof of *intentional* German bombing of Eire to change that IMO.

Yes, this. Dillon's stance was enormously unpopular outside all but but former-Southern Unionist circles.

On purely practical grounds though, the big issue I've always seen is less fear of invasion than fear of aerial bombardment and the belief, justified or not, that the British would be unable or unwilling to supply the planes needed to defend Ireland - bluntly how many squadrons of fighters would Churchill spare for Ireland in 1941? The precedent of the RAF in France was not neccessarily a happy one.
 
It makes the Battle of the Atlantic rather easier, what with access to Irish air bases. Thousands of Irishmen from the Free States served in the British Army during the Second World War anyway, but an outright declaration of war would probably increase recruitment considerably.

Well first the airbases would have to be made/rebuilt, the RN seaplane bases of WW1 had been disused for the two decades, the Foynes base would have been up to spec but other than that the airbases and supporting infrastructure would have to be built. Though it would be interesting post WW2 if like the UK there was a wide amount of airbases built up.

Politically it might be easier for Commonwealth forces followed by US forces to be based in Ireland rather than direct British forces though.
 
Yes, this. Dillon's stance was enormously unpopular outside all but but former-Southern Unionist circles.

On purely practical grounds though, the big issue I've always seen is less fear of invasion than fear of aerial bombardment and the belief, justified or not, that the British would be unable or unwilling to supply the planes needed to defend Ireland - bluntly how many squadrons of fighters would Churchill spare for Ireland in 1941? The precedent of the RAF in France was not neccessarily a happy one.

Considering that any bombers attacking Ireland wouldn't be escorted by fighters, even a few squadrons of Hurricanes would have a significant impact I would think. The greater question would be issues like the support elements (ground crew, radar sets etc). I'm not sure looking at the reduction of aircraft in France during the Battle of France would/should be used to judge, I mean given what Churchill decided to throw into Greece for example later on...

On the other hand, the question of how much effort would be spent by the Luftwaffe on Ireland at this period? I mean how much would they detach from bombing the UK (with a much higher chance of damaging important targets), to bomb Ireland with few strategic targets? There's also the issue that if they were to use night bombing the UK's number of effective nightfighters were slim even without any political interference.
 
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