Ireland Independent....1867.

I have to disagree with you here, both on whether france instantly fell out with Prussia and how opposed Napoleon III was to the Prussians. The thing is, immediatly after the war, distrust and fear of Prussia was far more widespread in france than simply a few far-sighted individuals. A large portion of the government foresaw a looming threat from Prussia. Even Adolphe Thiers was calling for immediate intervention to salvage the balance of power. This did not happen in large part because of Napoleon III. Why? Because the french were caught with their pants down when the Austrians were defeated in detail, and were unready for war with germany. Napoleon attempted to halt the spread of Prussian influence, especially in the south, bue he repeatedly found himself wrong-footed. In short, the french government, including Louis-Napoleon, realized that the rising power of prussia was in danger of eclipsing france, but were unable to do much to stop it (much of the failure was indeed Napoleon's fault, but he wasnt quite as clueless as you seem to think, and the rest of his government certainly wasnt). In fact, finding a way to reassert french superiority over prussia became the driving force behind french policy in the interlude between the austro-prussian and franco-prussian wars.

This seems to me like a drastic over-simplification of the events, re-interpreted in hindsight. I've been re-checking some material and in fact it seems that the Franco-Russian breach came earlier and might be placed at the earliest in the late spring of 1867. But I must contradict your claims about Napoleon. I don't imagine him as clueless, I imagine him as an idealist and prone to distraction, which is where Venetia comes in, and you've still completely failed to adress the issue of Venetia: it was practically impossible for France to give physical aid to Austria while Venetia remained in her hands, as far as Napoleon III was concerned. Napoleon's sentiment made him anti-Austria, unable to commit to any anti-Prussian line (such must logically have also been an anti-Italian one: you can hardly expect Napoleon, the sentimental revolutionary, to turn on his own creation). You yourself have admitted that you whole argument is dependent on the idea that France wanted Austria to succeed in the war and Prussia to fail. This was not the case: quite apart from Venetia, Prussia was mistakenly considered the underdog by most observers (this and the Franco-Prussian was were the last European wars where one side had no general staff, leading to an astonishing failure to analyse the actual military situation) and so the expansion of Prussian influence wasn't considered an immediate mortal threat by anyone, whereas the end of Austrian primacy in Germany seemed to Napoleon III (again mistakenly, but I don't think anyone is clueless for making mistakes: Bismarck made plenty) an opportunity for an expansion of French influence. It wasn't that he was scrambling to forestall Prussian domination of Germany: the French were scarcely aware of the extent to which Prussia had influenced the southern states until not long before the war. It was rather a simple attempt to extend French influence and adjust the balance of power in French favour. Napoleon's insistence on independent states south of the Main was at Austria's expense, since all Prussia's pre-war plans had suggested a two-way partition of influence, and Bismarck's defensive treaties with the states were again an anti-Austrian measure: Napoleon didn't voice any objection when they went public in 1867. Bismarck wasn't immediately trying to reach out pan-Germanist tentacles: he actually turned down an 1867 offer from Baden to hoin the NGF, so as not to anger France. France was in no greater state of military readiness in '67 than she was three years later, and Austrian intervention was less of a threat. If Bismarck had planne deverything in advance and been resolved to fight France, he'd have done it then, or for Luxembourg. But we're discussing Napoleon, not Bismarck.

As I said, all that I can say at this moment is that it is pre-1870 (although upon further reflection this is probably close to the outbreak of the war. I'll see if i can find the original date of the statement). However, it does serve as an example which shows that france was aware of the potential threat posed by germany. If you would prefer, I can produce other quotations from government officials which express the same sentiments.

You've mentioned Thiers, but he and Napoleon did not see eye-to-eye, obviously. In fact, when in the run-up to the war (May 3rd 1866) Thiers made a speech claiming that Napoleon was backing the wrong horse (French policy in the run-up to the war being first of all pro-peace and pro-Italian, but given the circumstances this translated into being pro-Prussian in practice, and if this was not the case, why did Thiers make the speech?), he mentioned that France ought to work on the basis of the balance of 1815 (thus Austrian primacy in Germany). Napoleon, three days later, expressed his "detest for the treaties of 1815 which people want to make the whole basis of our policy." Notably, even Drouyn, the barometer of a pro-Austrian conservative policy in France, had a speech prepared for the abortive June congress in which he was planning to basically fleece the Austrians: the congress' program had called for Prussia to get Schleswig-Holstein and in a roundabout way north German primacy, France to be "compensated" with some Rhenish scraps (although Napoleon never cared very much for these: see later quotes), and Italy, of course, to get Venetia. The Austrians were also to be "compensated": they'd gotten into their heads that this meant Silesia and weren't going to accept anything else, but Drouyn planned to offer them Bosnia (which was impossible: Britain, to say nothing of the Ottomans, would not see Ottoman integrity gratuitously jeopardised, while the Russians wouldn't see Austria as the sole beneficiary), and therefore presumably leave them out in the cold.

And I repeat: almost everybody who had some influence over policy saw that the war had ended as a setback for france, including Napoleon III.

Again, I may have been wrong in that by late 1867 a breech between France and Prussia may have been fairly apparent, but I still disagree with your insistence that Napoleon saw the war as a defeat from the minute it ended. Napoleon III, negotiating with Goltz, had played a substantial role in drafting the peace settlement (why else the Schleswig clause?). He imagined that he had won Venetia, the gratitude of German national sentiment, prestige, Prussian acquiesance in his schemes elsewhere, and an adjustment of the balance of power which made France the arbiter of Germany and Europe. These notions were to be disabused before 1870, but again, it took some time for this to happen. I don't think you've actually provided any quotes, certainly not from Napoleon, in 1866-7. Whereas I've pointed out that the peace treaty was in part his own doing, and here are some choice snippets:

"The true interest of France is not to obtain some insignificant increase in territory, but to help Germany establish herself in the most favourable way for her interests and those of Europe." (Napoleon in August 1866 (during the negotiations) poo-pooing "compensation" and repudiating Drouyn's policy. The rough draft said "our" interests. The upshot was that Drouyn was replaced by Rouher, who's firsts acts were to try and make an alliance with Prussia, with France betting Belgium and Luxembourg. This hardly suggests to me that Napoleon was anxious to check Prussia the instant the smoke was gone from Sadowa.)

"The Emperor does not believe that the greatness of a country depends on the weakness of its neighbours; he sees a true balance only in the satisfied wishes of the nations of Europe." (Septermber 1866, Napoleon basically contradicts you directly.)

"The Emperor tried to bring France to his opinion of events in Germany; he has not succeeded and the country is not satisfied." (Talleyrand to Gorchakov, demonstrating that there was indeed a rift between Napoleon and both the ministers and the general feeling based on Napoleon's idealism.)

Yes. I have already said that I would not expect this (in fact, im having some difficulty thinking of a plausible flashpoint). However, the possibility remains, at least in theory, of him trying to distract the populace by scoring some minor diplomatic victory against britain.

Oh, this would be far from impossible, but it would have to be in "the colonies". French meddling with the Irish question would be considered beyond the pale, an act of naked hostility.
 
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Originally posted by Alex Richards
Actually Gladstone was a major supporter of Irish Home Rule. His bill in the 1860s was beaten

Gladstone's first Home Rule bill in 1886 was defeated in the House of Commons because 93 Liberal MPs voted against it. His second Home Rule bill in 1893 was vetoed by the House of Lords.
 
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