Experts in the field - in this case, strategic warfare.
That's fine since you name one below.
I want to be clear that at no point have I said that the Soviets did not have such a policy, or even that they
probably did not have such a policy. I don't know - I don't pretend to argue one way or the other. I mention this because I get the sense that I've given you the impression that I'm saying just that. I'm not.
What I am doing is arguing that an assertion of the existence of sources is insufficient for serious discussion in the medium of our discussion. We are a bunch of screen names on a discussion board - trust has to be built on some basis other than blanket statements. My objection was not of the conclusion of the conventional wisdom, but that it was both (in some ways) counterintuitive and justified on the basis of received wisdom. The two go together poorly.
The mechanism by which the defence community very rarely publishes anything. Security classification makes sure that much material cannot be published. What remains is either minor bits of trivia, or such an obscure area of study that a publisher wouldn't be able to make a profit. Maybe, in the age of the internet, they could - but even then you need to find someone interested in talking. The security point is drilled so well into people in the defence community that they will not talk about many things unless given explicit instructions - not merely permission, but instructions - to do so.
By comparison, many things on the shelves of a bookshop that shouldn't be are full of saleable falsehoods, urban myths and breathless commentary. Such things are wildly profitable since they sell very well.
You've hit on my point exactly, albeit from your own angle. This Soviet plan for the event of a late-Cold War nuclear exchange is conventional wisdom here, and by implication among tens or hundreds of thousands of people who are familiar with the idea, though most may know of it only second or third hand. This Soviet plan is
also the sort of thing that would sell like crazy (to a certain market) if it were published in book form. It would sell well
even if there were no hard evidence for its claims and even if the author was not in a position to know first-hand himself.
Because, as you say, bookshops are full of saleable falsehoods et al. I mean, how many different books are there about how Hitler
almost won the war? They don't need evidence to make money. So given that someone could never have been in the military or a think tank advising it, yet still speak off the record to the same experts in the field we have access to - where are the books?
You answered why American and British experts with clearance haven't written books, but that's pretty straightforward. I wouldn't be surprised at that. The question of how this board can be full of people who all "know" this, but there are no books about it, is different. What has stopped one of the Protect and Survive authors - just for example - from writing an article about this on Wikipedia, or self-publishing an e-book? It's a gripping narrative - this is the stuff book deals are made of.
In this case, the authority is Stuart Slade, with whom I have one degree of separation online and two in the real world. Everything I've been able to independently verify of his claims checks out, which means I'm inclined to believe him. Not blindly, but I have a general presumption that he knows what he's talking about in his areas of expertise.
Fair enough, fair enough. Did he mention anything about the United States planning to blow up all the neutrals when the balloon went up? That was the implication by Perfidious Albion that I first questioned, which prompted your first reply to me. I've heard it about the Soviets before, but PA was the first person I've seen assert that the US would do the same.
How are Soviet sources regarding military plans, since the fall of the CCCP? I'm aware of a huge amount of documents that became available with the fall, but it'd be understandable if nuclear targeting details didn't quite slip through the cracks.
Absence of evidence is not evidence of falsehood, either. This is not a court of law where we require proof beyond reasonable doubt.
I agree completely with the first, but not with the second. I don't necessarily view the lack of evidence given to me as an indication that it is inherently false. All it indicates is a lack of evidence. However we can't have fact based discussions here without some minimum standard of proof. I am expressing the fact that this topic is unique in the combination - both great certainty of board members and a lack of specifics and evidence.
I think it's natural to seek either the same certainty you and others have, or - failing that - to remain doubtful about the veracity of all this. No?
Thinking critically about this particular situation, it is consistent with Soviet behaviour. They did not tolerate threats to their position - witness their behaviour in Hungary in 1957 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and their internal security apparatus. They had significant civil defence apparatus, implying that they expected a nuclear war to be survivable, and their industrial defence stance suggests that they expected to be in a position to continue fighting after an exchange. Also, they retained nuclear delivery systems (for example, Echo I cruise missile submarines) well after they were obsolete against the defences of major countries.
I hadn't known that last. Interesting. And suggestive. Of course, nations do invest in and retain obsolete weapon systems - the US itself has had trouble with that since the '90s - but it is definitely a point in favor of the idea.
So, where does nuking neutrals fit in? The Soviet Union expected to remain a viable, though weakened, state after a nuclear exchange. Neutral powers would be able to conserve their strength and present a threat to the Soviet Union. These powers did not have the same standard of defences as NATO and other Western allied powers, so could be attacked using assets that would otherwise be ineffective.
It's not the only interpretation of the facts. But it is consistent with them, and shouldn't be rejected on the grounds that it hasn't appeared in a mass-market paperback.
Of course the Soviet Union was quite entwined in international trade, so they're bombing the same people who could be selling them reconstruction materials and untainted grain. And they would recognize that if Russia could survive a concentrated Anglo-Franco-American assault, Brazil would certainly survive Russia's leftover nuclear capabilities. It's an incredible gamble to count on the damage caused outlasting the memory of Russia's unprovoked attack.
You're right, though, that countries do sometimes make insane gambles. And anyway, it was if anything a plan - countries test limits in plans that most governments would shy from in practice. So the insanity isn't necessarily a strong argument against it.