This looks like it would be interesting for the thread: http://www.alternatewars.com/WW3/Iran/Iran_Study.htm
Iran's Military without the Islamic Revolution
- Thread starter Binky the Clown
- Start date
Not even Great Britain, America's closest ally got to be a level 1 partner. However Iran would have theirs manufactured locally and would be among the first countries to receive their F-35's.
whatisinaname
Donor
You are wrong there as you can see from this link the UK is the only Level 1 partner for the F-35.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-35_Lightning_II_procurement
My apologies, I could've sworn they were level 2 but thank you for correcting me. So in this case yes, Iran would be a level 1 partner in the JSF.
True, it will depend on Iranian rule and how Iraq-Syria relations go. Though I can still see some residual anger at the Shah probably boiling over at one or two points from the extremists, maybe leading to a few assassinations and attacks here and there.
Which would of course fall on deaf ears where the Saudi's are concerned.
NothingNow
Banned
I could see that. They, and Iran Air might also place orders for Concorde B if that went ahead. A more efficient, larger aircraft would open up a decent number of options for both airlines. Like flying to Narita, Honolulu, and LAX, among other places.
Alternatively, If the Indians say no, they might still buy Concorde Bs, and fly over Sri Lanka, if possible.
Yeah, definitely. I'm willing to bet that Pakistan, Yemen and the Horn of Africa would probably be the major centers of the proxy wars. They would be the most unstable parts of the region really.
Pakistan would be a major challenge, certainly, as a neighbour of Iran. It might not be destabilized by the Afghan insurgency but it's likely Zia ul-Haq still stages his coup, and it's interesting to wonder how Iran would react to that. I'm sure there's some material on their OTL reaction but obviously they had more pressing concerns at the time.
Another battleground could by Sudan, where you have the relatively moderate and pro-Western Numeiry facing challenges from Islamists like Sadik al-Mahdi. In OTL he tried to compensate by taking a rightwards turn, instituting Sharia law, and repealing Southern Sudan's autonomy. In ITTL, with Iran in a position to help him, he could possibly avoid his rightwards turn. In turn, Gulf states would support opposition to his rule.
There could be a slow emerging division amongst the Middle East, with Gulf States aligning against Iran, (puppetised) Afghanistan, Egypt, Oman, Sudan, and maybe eventually Syria and post-intervention Lebanon and Iraq.
Iraq could very well turn into another battleground, with the Saudis et al ironically funding post-Baathist Sunni elements against the governing Dawa Party regime backed by Iran.
There could be a second round of the North Yemen Civil War, maybe even with reversed sides- Egypt (and Iran) supporting (royalist?) rebels as Saudi Arabia backs the Republic!
The Horn is a possibility as well; if the Derg is replaced by a more moderate regime or if the Ethiopian Democratic Union is able to take the lead in the Civil War and restore the monarchy, maybe even with Iranian support (would be in character). The Gulf States would continue support to the ELF and EPLF, as in OTL. A restored Ethiopian monarchy would receive Iranian support and probably Western support as well, but in turn the various nationalist movements in the region and Somalia (if we have the Ogaden War and a nominally pro-Western Somalia) would receive Arab monies.
You could have the odd position of Ethiopia and Egypt being on the same side of things. That could lead to detente along with Sudan, or it could present an air of illegitimacy to the Ethiopian government.
Such division would complicate US policy considerably.
Another battleground could by Sudan, where you have the relatively moderate and pro-Western Numeiry facing challenges from Islamists like Sadik al-Mahdi. In OTL he tried to compensate by taking a rightwards turn, instituting Sharia law, and repealing Southern Sudan's autonomy. In ITTL, with Iran in a position to help him, he could possibly avoid his rightwards turn. In turn, Gulf states would support opposition to his rule.
There could be a slow emerging division amongst the Middle East, with Gulf States aligning against Iran, (puppetised) Afghanistan, Egypt, Oman, Sudan, and maybe eventually Syria and post-intervention Lebanon and Iraq.
Iraq could very well turn into another battleground, with the Saudis et al ironically funding post-Baathist Sunni elements against the governing Dawa Party regime backed by Iran.
There could be a second round of the North Yemen Civil War, maybe even with reversed sides- Egypt (and Iran) supporting (royalist?) rebels as Saudi Arabia backs the Republic!
The Horn is a possibility as well; if the Derg is replaced by a more moderate regime or if the Ethiopian Democratic Union is able to take the lead in the Civil War and restore the monarchy, maybe even with Iranian support (would be in character). The Gulf States would continue support to the ELF and EPLF, as in OTL. A restored Ethiopian monarchy would receive Iranian support and probably Western support as well, but in turn the various nationalist movements in the region and Somalia (if we have the Ogaden War and a nominally pro-Western Somalia) would receive Arab monies.
You could have the odd position of Ethiopia and Egypt being on the same side of things. That could lead to detente along with Sudan, or it could present an air of illegitimacy to the Ethiopian government.
Such division would complicate US policy considerably.
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NothingNow
Banned
And Israeli policy, and Kuwaiti policy among others.
I could see US Policy becoming kinda distant and schizophrenic depending on the administrations involved.
Actually, thinking about it, Kuwait might just become stubbornly neutral in disputes between the two nations, and generally be armed to the teeth, seeing as they're now sandwiched between a madman, and two competing regional powers. It is a fairly safe place to be in, but not necessarily a comfortable one.
Having enough firepower to keep everyone civil is probably a good investment.
I'm pretty sure that even if less violent, things could get more schizophrenic than they are OTL in some cases. Take Egypt for example. Looking at it, ceteris paribus, in the sort of post Arab Spring situation. You would have a Mubarak regime supported by the US, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, and then you have a revolution. You have Saudi Arabia funding Salafists and at the same time opposing Morsi, you have Qatar simply trying to buy influence by supporting the Brotherhood, and you throw Iran in the mix. What happens then? Meanwhile the US is on everyone's side here.
It would be hopelessly confusing, with US allies fighting proxy wars against one another. Has this happened before? I'm sure it has, but I'm coming up blank.
But actually, Israeli policy would become easier, if anything. With an ally in Iran, Hezbollah would form no threat, considering it wouldn't exist in the first place. Syria would be kept at an arms length. There would be no nuclear threat whatsoever.
But for the other states- Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, Morocco, and even Khadaffy- it is interesting to speculate where they would fall. And it's also interesting to wonder how Kuwait would react in the sort of scenario I suggested where a pro-Iranian government takes power in Iraq. They could very well be "compelled" to take a pro-Iranian stance a la Hungary vis a vis Nazi Germany. The reaction of the Gulf States to the hypothetical takeover of Bahrain I mentioned on the first page.
It would be hopelessly confusing, with US allies fighting proxy wars against one another. Has this happened before? I'm sure it has, but I'm coming up blank.
But actually, Israeli policy would become easier, if anything. With an ally in Iran, Hezbollah would form no threat, considering it wouldn't exist in the first place. Syria would be kept at an arms length. There would be no nuclear threat whatsoever.
But for the other states- Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, Morocco, and even Khadaffy- it is interesting to speculate where they would fall. And it's also interesting to wonder how Kuwait would react in the sort of scenario I suggested where a pro-Iranian government takes power in Iraq. They could very well be "compelled" to take a pro-Iranian stance a la Hungary vis a vis Nazi Germany. The reaction of the Gulf States to the hypothetical takeover of Bahrain I mentioned on the first page.
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whatisinaname
Donor
I would have thought tha the Iran Iraq war would be more likley to happen, also I would have thought that the invasion of Afganistan by the SU would happen as well, as this would have been in 79 before any of these second wave purchases would have been delivered.
If the Iran Iraq war, I can see the US/UK supplying Iran and the SU and France supplying Iraq being the main suppliers in such a war.
Also I can see Iran gaiing the upperhand very quickly, after the initial Iraq attack and Iraq paying a much heavier price than in OTL?
If the Iran Iraq war, I can see the US/UK supplying Iran and the SU and France supplying Iraq being the main suppliers in such a war.
Also I can see Iran gaiing the upperhand very quickly, after the initial Iraq attack and Iraq paying a much heavier price than in OTL?
The Soviet Union felt particularly threatened by Revolutionary Iran. While not overly friendly with the Shah, the USSR considered him to be fairly rational and not overly threatening to their interests. If the Shah was in power the USSR would not feel threatened, nor would it do much, I think, to even save the Communists there who were prone to infighting and for whom they cared little. So Iran could have "liberated" Afghanistan, perhaps after a secret agreement with the USSR.
And I think an Iraq-Iran without the revolution is nearly ASB. It would have been a curbstomp, if not quite to the levels where a general once told the Shah "if your Majesty would so desire, you could inform us at breakfast that you desire to dine in Baghdad and we shall make reservations for you that night", it would have been over in a week at most. Iraq took the opportunity of the revolutionary disarray as well as felt threatened by overt calls from Khomeini for his overthrow. It would not have happened, because if it did, it would have been over before it started.
Realise that the war dragged on only as long as it did after the total liquidation of the top brass via execution, the purge of 12,000 officers, the desertion of 60% of the force, the refusal of the Revolutionary Guards to fight alongside the Revolutionary Guards, and the complete lack of spare parts for everything. It is a testament to the sheer superiority of the armed force the Shah built that despite these gargantuan handicaps, Iran was still able to repel the Iraqi invasion. It's nigh impossible to imagine many other nations repeating the feat under the same constraints, indeed the whole thing seems ASB.
An Iraq-Iran war with an intact Iranian armed forces would just... it wouldn't. One day Iraq is independent and the next you'd discover the whole country was under Iranian occupation. If you happened to not follow the news for a day or two that would actually happen to you. Also why would France support Iraq? The Soviets would keep out, indeed any intervention of any kind by any one would be made impossible by the simple brevity of the conflict. It would be over in days.
whatisinaname
Donor
I would agree with you if it where anyone else but Saddam Hussein as this guy was a class 1 nut job and anything is possible when dealing with a dictator like him.
Also I do not see the Soviet Union not invading Afghanistan because of Iran military power, I think that this was 'on the cards' due to the wonky nature of the pro Soviet goverment in Afghanistan.
Also if Iran is occupied with Iraq then I doubt the Shar of Iran would want to engage the SU and Iran in a two front war, that would be stupid?
In spite of all the comparisons made in US propaganda was not some latter-day Hitler. He was a ruthless, nasty SOB but he wasn't an irrational, stupid, nasty SOB. He got into power by being canny enough to seize the right moments and opportunities; if there's an intact Iran with the Shah still in command and the Iranian military in its pre-Revolution state he's not crazy enough to try picking a fight there. Iraq, unlike Iran, does not have much in the way of defensible terrain and historically speaking as a region it's very militarily "soft"; once you crack any serious outer defenses there's nothing in the geography or topography outside of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers that can really slow you down.
Iran, in such a war (if it happened at all), would have more trouble in the post-war mop-up than they would actually fighting the war. This is doubly true in the case of Saddam's Iraq where the Iraqi military was definitely NOT on the same qualitative level as the Iranian military.
It should be pointed out that one of the main reasons Iran's armed forces got to be as big as they did was because of the concern posed by the USSR. It is true that the Russians didn't mind the Shah (they thought of him a damn sight better than they thought of Khomeini), but the problem would inevitable end up being that if Iran is going to be as close to the West as people here think it would be (and would be entirely logical if the Shah stays in power long enough and can transform his nation enough), the USSR is invariably going to see Iran as a problem that's right on its borders. That could have a lot of effects with regards to how they fight the war in Afghanistan, or even whether they do so at all.
As far as the armed forces go, that's gonna be entirely dependent on economic growth. They will undoubtedly draw down a fair bit at the end of the Cold War - nearly everyone did - and their country's economic growth is a critical point for the idea of Iran as a regional power. The Shah built a system of government that was centered around him, and that's gotta change at some point (long before the 70s) or else when he gets cancer he'll end up with a mess. I'm looking at this and assuming he gets cancer, but stays in power and is treated successfully, in the process vindicating the work of his government and probably his wife. They'd need to keep Khomeini from getting too much influence - the mullahs aren't gonna like modernization in any form and suppressing them is a tall order. The 1979 revolution didn't immediately go the way of Khomeini and the mullahs, so if many of the other forces are part of the Iranian government at the time when Pahlavi has to get cancer, the system could make it through.
The 1980s will be a tough time, as oil prices were rather low for most of the decade, which will put a hurting on Iran's income and thus the money it can invest in modernization. By this point, economic growth will also have raised the expectations of the populace as well. That said, this would also be the point were the industries the Shah was cultivating would start being able to produce export income, and oil is not the only thing Iran could export as far as minerals go, though it would still be the biggest export earner. If we assume a young population here (probably to the same degree as OTL, as the higher birthrate of the post-Revolution Iran and the number of dead from the Iran-Iraq war would largely cancel each other out), this makes for a rapidly growing population in the 1980s, but it would also lead to growing numbers of highly-educated professionals and skilled people and thus smooth economic growth, particularly considering the afflence of the time. If the Shah can make the middle class even somewhat on his side, this will be a good decade for him, but I don't see a peaceful transition to democracy being out of the question towards the end of this decade, particularly as said young population starts to be able to vote.
Here, the Gulf War may well be averted. Saddam wouldn't dare attack Iran here, with its massive, powerful and well-trained armed forces, lavishly supplied by the West - he'd get smoked in short order and he'd know it. He'd be more inclined to have good relations with Tehran, namely because he'd be thinking about the Shi'a majority in Iraq and what happens if Tehran comes to see Saddam as an enemy. No Iran-Iraq War, which probably means Saddam doesn't have his massive armed forces with which to invade Kuwait in 1990. This has a few effects in itself - does this allow Saudi to end up on the US' side to such a degree? What about Iran's relationship with Israel - it was much warmer than that of the Arab nations, but they'll still want a solution to that mess and they will have FAR more ability to influence the Israelis than the Arabs, and the money to back up Palestinian attempts to improve their lot.
Now, as far as the armed forces go....
The Navy would take longer to build and assemble than the other forces, though I'd bet on the fast-attackers being done first and then the big ships. Some of the frigates and destroyers go in the Gulf, but most would be with the carriers on the open seas, particularly in the Indian Ocean and watching over the Straits of Hormuz, with tankers and supply ships (probably British-built, these) to allow them to have a long reach. Combine that with the long reach of Iran's air force here and you have a force that can drop bombs of targets thousands of miles from home, which is a useful deterrent. Iran's amphibious assault crews used a lot of British-built hovercraft for their duties and they knew how to use them, so I'd expect plenty of these in their fast-attack and assault units. Big amphibious assault ships would be around in the 1980s or 1990s to carry these and thus give an even bigger range to the fleet.
As far as the armed forces go, that's gonna be entirely dependent on economic growth. They will undoubtedly draw down a fair bit at the end of the Cold War - nearly everyone did - and their country's economic growth is a critical point for the idea of Iran as a regional power. The Shah built a system of government that was centered around him, and that's gotta change at some point (long before the 70s) or else when he gets cancer he'll end up with a mess. I'm looking at this and assuming he gets cancer, but stays in power and is treated successfully, in the process vindicating the work of his government and probably his wife. They'd need to keep Khomeini from getting too much influence - the mullahs aren't gonna like modernization in any form and suppressing them is a tall order. The 1979 revolution didn't immediately go the way of Khomeini and the mullahs, so if many of the other forces are part of the Iranian government at the time when Pahlavi has to get cancer, the system could make it through.
The 1980s will be a tough time, as oil prices were rather low for most of the decade, which will put a hurting on Iran's income and thus the money it can invest in modernization. By this point, economic growth will also have raised the expectations of the populace as well. That said, this would also be the point were the industries the Shah was cultivating would start being able to produce export income, and oil is not the only thing Iran could export as far as minerals go, though it would still be the biggest export earner. If we assume a young population here (probably to the same degree as OTL, as the higher birthrate of the post-Revolution Iran and the number of dead from the Iran-Iraq war would largely cancel each other out), this makes for a rapidly growing population in the 1980s, but it would also lead to growing numbers of highly-educated professionals and skilled people and thus smooth economic growth, particularly considering the afflence of the time. If the Shah can make the middle class even somewhat on his side, this will be a good decade for him, but I don't see a peaceful transition to democracy being out of the question towards the end of this decade, particularly as said young population starts to be able to vote.
Here, the Gulf War may well be averted. Saddam wouldn't dare attack Iran here, with its massive, powerful and well-trained armed forces, lavishly supplied by the West - he'd get smoked in short order and he'd know it. He'd be more inclined to have good relations with Tehran, namely because he'd be thinking about the Shi'a majority in Iraq and what happens if Tehran comes to see Saddam as an enemy. No Iran-Iraq War, which probably means Saddam doesn't have his massive armed forces with which to invade Kuwait in 1990. This has a few effects in itself - does this allow Saudi to end up on the US' side to such a degree? What about Iran's relationship with Israel - it was much warmer than that of the Arab nations, but they'll still want a solution to that mess and they will have FAR more ability to influence the Israelis than the Arabs, and the money to back up Palestinian attempts to improve their lot.
Now, as far as the armed forces go....
The Pattons would be phased out over the 1980s - they are beyond their use-by date to start with, and the Chieftain is a far superior tank to the Patton. The fact that Iran was wanting to have them made in Iran, and the fact that Britain would probably agree to this if the price was right, makes this that much more likely. It also means that British tanks would be Iran's primary source, which means the oldest Chieftains would probably end up replaced by Iranian-built Challenger 2s in the 1990s. The drawdown would also see the Mk.3 and Mk.5 Chieftains retired, with the older ones replaced by the Challengers.
The F-84s and F-86s were obsolete by 1980 and would go immediately. The F-5s would be replaced next as well, with the Phantoms going in the early 90s as part of the drawdown, leaving a force of Tomcats and Eagles for air-defense, Vipers and Hornets for attack duties. Iran ordered E-3s and had 747 and 707 tankers as well, so if Iran can maintain and operate all of this, they have a seriously potent air force by the mid-80s. I can't see the Europeans being entirely shut out of this, and the Panavia Tornado is an excellent strike aircraft which would fill in a hole in the IIAF here. I'm thinking that the F-14s would be rebuilt to F-14D standards over the late 1980s and 1990s, probably with some Iranian-designed improvements as well. The F-16s would be rebuilt in the 1990s to F-16C standards, the F/A-18s also doing so in the 2000s. The Panavia Tornado enters IIAF service in the mid-1980s and remains there today. The E-3s get replaced by new AWACS aircraft in the mid-late 2000s, and the 707 and 747 tankers get retired, probably replaced by either 767s or A330s.
Where does one start here? First, dump the WWII vets - too old by half even in 1980s. The Knox class vessels weren't particularly good ones and Iran can afford better, so no bother there. No Russian ships, either. The assault vessels would be pointless in the 1980s, though the Invincibles could be used as carriers in the Indian Ocean. That would be a package deal with the Brits, too - the carriers, Sea Harriers to equip them and a full set of Merlin helicopters for other roles. I would imagine that Iran would pick between the British or American vessels, no both, so the Type 42s never get bought, preferring the Kidds and Spruance class. AEGIS ships would be ordered in the 1990s at the earliest. The Alvands would be retired in the 1990s with the drawdown. Kortenaer-class vessels would probably get major upgrades in the 1990s. The Bayandors would have been retired in the 1980s. Tangs and Type 206s wouldn't have been bought, but plenty of Type 209s would have been, probably with most Iranian Type 209s built in yards in Khorramshahr and Bandar Abbas. The La Combattantes would probably be built, and I can see a bunch of Sa'ar 4.5s and Super Dvoras in the service of the Iranian Navy in the Gulf.
The Navy would take longer to build and assemble than the other forces, though I'd bet on the fast-attackers being done first and then the big ships. Some of the frigates and destroyers go in the Gulf, but most would be with the carriers on the open seas, particularly in the Indian Ocean and watching over the Straits of Hormuz, with tankers and supply ships (probably British-built, these) to allow them to have a long reach. Combine that with the long reach of Iran's air force here and you have a force that can drop bombs of targets thousands of miles from home, which is a useful deterrent. Iran's amphibious assault crews used a lot of British-built hovercraft for their duties and they knew how to use them, so I'd expect plenty of these in their fast-attack and assault units. Big amphibious assault ships would be around in the 1980s or 1990s to carry these and thus give an even bigger range to the fleet.
@ TheMann Very detailed response. I really need to look at GNP figures and actual budgets but still, the scale just makes my eyes pop. How quickly do they purchase and integrate such a force?
The Army alone makes my inner accountant queasy. Then the navy and the Air Force?!? You'd need the non-US military budget of NATO to field and maintain those forces.
Iran was/is a rich country and under decent management, a good second world economy assuming good economic growth 1975-1995. That's a dangerous assumption things stay good that long w/o a hiccup, though.
Wouldn't that military be a burden that'd shank Iranian economic growth?
The Army alone makes my inner accountant queasy. Then the navy and the Air Force?!? You'd need the non-US military budget of NATO to field and maintain those forces.
Iran was/is a rich country and under decent management, a good second world economy assuming good economic growth 1975-1995. That's a dangerous assumption things stay good that long w/o a hiccup, though.
Wouldn't that military be a burden that'd shank Iranian economic growth?