Iran-Iraq war ends early

In OTL as i understand Saddam was asking for peace as early as 1981. The iranians tooks back all thier territory occupied by Iraq in the early stage by mid-1982, but the mullahs decided to invade Iraq rather than stop, dreaming of their shia empire. But what if Khomeini has a lucid moment and actually decides to take Saddam's offer and make peace at the best moment, Iran just defeated Iraq and took all it's territory back, they have the high ground with all the propaganda and moral benefit this entitles.

As i understand USSR was actively courting Iran, if the war ends in 1982 the reproachment that OTL happend only in late 1980s could happen from 1982. What effect would this have, would Iran actually end up HELPING USSR in Afghanistan against the US western sponsored jihadists, and have a major role into the 1990s, fighting against Osama and his ilk that are still backed by the americans?

With much less damage to Iran's and Iraq' economy would they have enough to funnel into their nuclear programs and both get the bomb in the nineties?

And if the war ends in 1982 what will Saddam do, after being defeated would he still get proped by the GCC and the west against the "iranian threat", maybe still invade Kuweit in say 1985 and actually keep it? Or would he get duly eliminated for his failure and replaced with someone else?

What about the influence of all this on the arab-israeli conflict?

Again, no nuclear wars of any kind to be considered.
 
Price of oil falls sooner so western economies are probably healthier sooner. I suspect even more meddling in Lebanon by the Iranians that OTL. I doubt the Soviets and Iranians would cozy up. The Soviets were held in almost as low a view as the Americans. Possible but I dont see it. If Hussein goes ahead with Kuwait in 1985, the US will have a much, much harder time with it. The Soviets wont be so accommodating and the US will be less able to pull so many troops out of Germany for the ground attack. Further, a lot of the systems so effective in the war were still in their infancy. Apaches were just introduced in 1985, M1's were still first generation with the 1A starting to deploy in late 1984. And the airland tactics were still being developed and the reforms to unit deployment still being implemented. The political rationale will be harder too as the US was still operating under the shadow of Vietnam. So Desert Storm isnt nearly as effective.
 
A few other things about Iran that might be possible in this TL: I'm sure some of you read about the rumours that Iran gave USSR acces to F-14's radar, missiles etc., but that is of course not true (Iran was at war with a soviet ally, why would they share tech with the enemy?) But in this TL, being cut of from US spares and looking for ways to replace their losses they might as well give USSR some F-14s and other american systems in exchange for generous help, so you might as well actually see F-14 with soviet stars, not that it would be terribly important for the soviet MIC, the F-14 was late 1960s tech after all, engines were crap etc.

As to Aghanistan, as i understand it Iran sided with the jihadists against USSR as pay back for soviet support of Iraq, but with the war ending early, there is no incentive for that. And as USSR is in a more and more difficult situation i would think they would be happy to let Iran take over, as i still think the mullahs would want to extend their influence, and in Afghanistan you have US backed and saudi (sunni) bred jihadists in danger in taking over a neighbouring country, which would be bad news. If Iran would actually help take some of the pressure off in Afghanistan, and as a potentially large and lucrative weapons and economical market, this might mean more revenue for USSR, and perhaps far fetched, but even prevent Gorbachev and perestroika from gaining traction.

Finally, another possible effect might be on communist Romania, in OTL 1989 there were advanced negotiations on economical and military contracts (on of the reasons Ceausescu went to Iran in December), apparently Iran wanted 100 IAR-93s and the licence among other things. In fairness, i don't see why Iran would want the IAR-93 (especially if they would have access to soviet gear), except perhaps to equip the IRGC, but if these economical and military contracts happen much earlier, Iran could get IAR-93 and even better, IAR-99 and licence for them, going a long way to estabilish their own aeronautical industry, and of course bringing large sums of revenue to Romania, so 1989 might turn out differently. Romania could also potentially get acces to american tech to study and reverse engineer.
 
no Tanker War, no terrible shoot down of Iran Air 655...
Price of oil falls sooner so western economies are probably healthier sooner. I suspect even more meddling in Lebanon by the Iranians that OTL. I doubt the Soviets and Iranians would cozy up. The Soviets were held in almost as low a view as the Americans. Possible but I dont see it. If Hussein goes ahead with Kuwait in 1985, the US will have a much, much harder time with it. The Soviets wont be so accommodating and the US will be less able to pull so many troops out of Germany for the ground attack. Further, a lot of the systems so effective in the war were still in their infancy. Apaches were just introduced in 1985, M1's were still first generation with the 1A starting to deploy in late 1984. And the airland tactics were still being developed and the reforms to unit deployment still being implemented. The political rationale will be harder too as the US was still operating under the shadow of Vietnam. So Desert Storm isnt nearly as effective.

Regarding Iraq, i was thinking more and more of a Desert Storm in 1985, leaving aside if it is even possible given that USSR is still strong, Gorbachev is not in charge yet, or if he is, he just came in, so appeasing the americans and showing weakness will not please the hardliners in the slightest, they would want to give the americans a bloody nose for Aghanistan so they would support Iraq as much as they could and/or try to get the americans to drop support for the jihadists in Afghanistan in exchange for allowing them to attack Iraq etc.

But yeah, technologically the discrepance in 1985 would be significantly less than in 1991, for instance the americans would have no Patriot ABMs, no F-15E, no or very few F-16C and F-18, older aircraft like F-4, A-7 and the like would play a much more significant role for USAF, USMC and USN as they are yet to be replaced with modern tech, no or very few AH-64s as stated above, no DU tank armour and the 120mm gun (or if any, very few), and not sure what ECM and C3 systems they wouldn't have in 1985 that they had in 1991 etc. etc.

Conversely, most iraqi weapons systems would be the same ones as in 1991, though perhaps a bit fewer in numbers, they might have no extended range Scuds though, no Iglas, and no MiG-29s or Su-24s, and the KARI system will likely be incomplete. But still, all thing being equal, with USSR supporting Iraq (if not take actual part in the fighting except through advisors), a Desert Storm in 1985 could easily triple or more US losses in the air, while if they try the ground operation they might have casualties in the thousands, not to mention potential spillovers like large numbers of attacks against US interests in the region, and of course potentially dangerously increase tensions between US and USSR again.
 
The entire Gulf War could easily be butterflied. Kuwait was after all an ally of Iraq during the OTL Iran-Iraq War, and Iraq's economy is less battered. So if you end up with an uneasy peace (which is inevitable) and less war-weariness on both sides, there's going to be more "Oh shit, just bribe them and prop them up because we never know when the next one will start and we don't want them dropping the ball again."

Yes, Iraq would theoretically keep claiming Kuwait, but it's less likely in practice.
 

Cook

Banned
Price of oil falls sooner so western economies are probably healthier sooner.

The decline in the global price of oil in the mid to late 1980s had nothing to do with the end of the Iran-Iraq war since they predated the end of the war and was mostly caused by events outside of the Persian Gulf, indeed, largely outside of the Middle East region entirely.

The principal reasons for the decline in global oil prices were the decline in demand, brought on by a combination recession in the industrialised nations (itself a product of the artificially high OPEC oil prices of the 1970s) and the introduction greater fuel-efficiency measures, and increased supply; new sources of oil, all of them controlled by non-OPEC nations, came online in the late 1970s - early 80s (the Alaska pipeline, Britain’s North Sea Oil) and the Soviet Union became the world’s largest oil exporter. Oil exports were the Soviet’s biggest source of foreign hard currency and, desperate to prop up their collapsing economy, they exported oil at rates that drove down the value of theirs, and everyone else’s exports (Thus the fundamental failure to understand market economics led directly to the collapse of the world's largest command economy).

If anything, the continuing Iran-Iraq War further contributed to the decline in the price of oil, because it resulted in distrust and disunity among the OPEC member states and drove individual OPEC members to pump crude oil at rates above their agreed quotas in their efforts to pay off debts generated by the Iran-Iraq War; ultimately this led to Saudi Arabia’s decision to abandon the quotas entirely in 1986 and simply produce crude at the maximum rate possible. If the war had ended earlier, before it had generated the enormous debts it did (not just to Iran and Iraq, but for much of the GCC as well), OPEC unity would have been stronger and the members not motivated by their own debts to undercut the cartel's quotas.
 
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The decline in the global price of oil in the mid to late 1980s had nothing to do with the end of the Iran-Iraq war since they predated the end of the war and was mostly caused by events outside of the Persian Gulf, indeed, largely outside of the Middle East region entirely.

The principal reasons for the decline in global oil prices were the decline in demand, brought on by a combination recession in the industrialised nations (itself a product of the artificially high OPEC oil prices of the 1970s) and the introduction greater fuel-efficiency measures, and increased supply; new sources of oil, all of them controlled by non-OPEC nations, came online in the late 1970s - early 80s (the Alaska pipeline, Britain’s North Sea Oil) and the Soviet Union became the world’s largest oil exporter. Oil exports were the Soviet’s biggest source of foreign hard currency and, desperate to prop up their collapsing economy, they exported oil at rates that drove down the value of theirs, and everyone else’s exports (Thus the fundamental failure to understand market economics led directly to the collapse of the world's largest command economy).

If anything, the continuing Iran-Iraq War further contributed to the decline in the price of oil, because it resulted in distrust and disunity among the OPEC member states and drove individual OPEC members to pump crude oil at rates above their agreed quotas in their efforts to pay off debts generated by the Iran-Iraq War; ultimately this lead to Saudi Arabia’s decision to abandon the quotas entirely in 1986 and simply produce crude at the maximum rate possible. If the war had ended earlier, before it had generated the enormous debts it did (not just to Iran and Iraq, but for much of the GCC as well), OPEC unity would have been stronger and the members not motivated by their own debts to undercut the cartel's quotas.

All true except you forgot about the part about the "Tanker War" in 86ish when Iran threatened to mine the Straits of Hormuz and the US navy had go in. This was the same time as the Vincennes shot down the airliner and Iranian speed boats would go out and challenge US frigates etc. Price of oil jumped over concerns the Iranians would close off the Gulf to Iraq oil if not the entire thing.
 

Archibald

Banned
IMHO both Western and Eastern blocks happily poured oil on the fire to weaken two major military powers growing too fast for their taste - Iraq and Iran bleeding themselves to death made a lot of people happy. Weapons were sold to both sides, one year it was Iran, the year after, Iraq. I understood it was the main reason why the bloodfest lasted so long. Damn, even West Germany sold weapons to both sides (think it was Bo-105 helicopters with TOWs missiles)
 

Cook

Banned
All true except you forgot about the part about the "Tanker War" in 86ish when Iran threatened to mine the Straits of Hormuz and the US navy had go in. This was the same time as the Vincennes shot down the airliner and Iranian speed boats would go out and challenge US frigates etc. Price of oil jumped over concerns the Iranians would close off the Gulf to Iraq oil if not the entire thing.

In 1980 the price of a barrel of crude oil peaked at $37.40 ($109.50 adjusted to 2016 values); caused by a combination of the Iranian revolution, the commencement of the Iran-Iraq war, and the OPEC cartel’s production restrictions. From then onwards prices declined steadily as demand decreased and non-OPEC sources came online. When the “Tanker War” commenced in 1984, the price of crude was down to $28.75 a barrel ($66.67 in 2016 values) and continued to fall steadily until 1986, when it collapsed to just $14.44 ($31.72) - the lowest price for crude oil since OPEC jacked up the price in response to the Yom Kippur War, 13 years earlier. The tanker war continued until the end of the Iran-Iraq war itself in 1988, and throughout that period there were no significant increases in the price of crude oil, indeed, the price rose more in the year following the end of the Iran-Iraq war, than it had at any time during the war; so no, the “Tanker War” was not significant.
 
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Cook

Banned
With much less damage to Iran's and Iraq' economy would they have enough to funnel into their nuclear programs and both get the bomb in the nineties?

The Iranian nuclear weapons program began in the late 1960s, using nuclear technology provided by the United States under the ‘Atoms for Peace' program. (The nuclear weapons programs of India, Pakistan and Israel, all began with nuclear technology provided by ‘Atoms for Peace’, as did the abandoned weapons programs of South Africa, Australia and Argentina; the ‘Atoms for Peace’ program must therefore rank as the most counterproductive and stupid foreign aid program in U.S. history.) Following the Islamic revolution, the nuclear program, the overt civil program as well as the cover military program it supported, were considered by Ayatollah Khomeini to be vanity projects of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi; of no benefit to the Islamic Republic or its people. As a consequence, work on Iran’s nuclear facilities was halted following the revolution. Khomeini disapproved of nuclear technology in general and considered nuclear weapons to be morally reprehensible and un-Islamic.

While he was later persuaded that a limited nuclear energy program could be beneficial to Iran, permitting work to resume on two nuclear reactors at Bushehr in 1984, he maintained his abhorrence of nuclear weapons. Consequently, even if the Iran-Iraq war had ended earlier, there would not have been an Iranian nuclear weapons program while Ayatollah Khomeini was alive. He died of a heart attack in June 1989, aged 86 years. Khomeini’s strong disapproval of all things nuclear seems to have held sway well after his death; Iran did not resume interest in of a civil nuclear program until 1995 despite the capacity to afford one much earlier, and interest in a military nuclear program did not begin until the 2000s.

If anyone has doubts that morality was the decisive factor in nuclear weapons decision making, they should consider the Iranian decision not to develop chemical weapons; in 1983 Iran notified the United Nations that Iraq was using chemical weapons and this was independently verified by international chemical weapons experts. Iran at the time did not possess chemical weapons, but its domestic chemical industries were more than capable of rapidly producing mustard and phosgene gas unassisted, and could have made more complex nerve gasses if they’d purchased the requisite chemical formulas from Europe. They chose not to. Khomeini considered chemical weapons to be cruel, immoral and un-Islamic. They did not even develop the weapons to deter further Iraqi attacks, reasoning that even if they had such weapons Saddam would not be deterred and if they possessed them then the pressure to use them would then be overwhelming after another Iraqi CW attack. Therefore, to prevent their moral downfall, the Iranians chose not to manufacture the weapons and simply rely on preventative measures to counteract Saddam’s chemical attacks.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi nuclear weapons program commenced in 1975 with assistance from the French, who built a 40MW light-water reactor for Saddam at Al Tuwaitha, on the outskirts of Baghdad (actual construction beginning in 1979). In addition to the reactor, the Iraqi’s built, with Italian assistance, a plutonium separation and handling facility on the same site. The reactor was nearing completion in June 1981 when the Israeli air force bombed the site, destroying the reactor and related facilities (Operation Babylon). Initially France agreed to rebuild the facility, but then pulled out of discussions in 1984, principally because the Iraqis were unable to meet the cost of reconstruction.

If the Iran-Iraq War had ended in 1982, then Saddam would have been more than capable of meeting the cost of rebuilding the facility at Al Tuwaitha, or building a nuclear plant in a more defensible location. Assuming construction of a new reactor beginning in 1983, then Saddam would have a working nuclear reactor by 1986, and with it the facilities necessary extract plutonium. From there, depending on the size and type of reactor he chose to build, he would begin to manufacture nuclear weapons.

As it was, without having a completed nuclear reactor, and using only the 75kg of enriched uranium supplied by the French in the initial contract, Saddam had been a matter of months away from having a nuclear weapon when he invaded Kuwait in 1990; Iraqi explosives experts were already working on implosion lenses in 1990, and Saddam’s ‘crash program’ would have delivered 25kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by the end of 1991 (15kg of UEU is necessary for an implosion device). If the Iran-Iraq war was ended in 1982, and this work, which largely commenced in 1988, were brought forward, then Saddam could be expected to have had a nuclear weapon any time from 1985 onwards, if not earlier.

We know from the Saddam tapes (Saddam’s propensity for taping his meetings made Nixon look like a mere amateur) that he believed the Arab nation to be threatened from three outside powers: Iran, Israel and the United States. He’d gone to war in 1980 in an effort to ‘liberate’ Arabistan (Khuzestan); the invasion of Kuwait was a further step in his efforts to unite the entire Arab nation under his control (either directly or indirectly) prior to ultimately attacking Israel, driving the Zionists from the region and liberating the Al-Aqsa mosque. If the Iran-Iraq War had ended in 1982, Saddam’s objectives would still have been the same, but he would not have been faced with the enormous debts to the Kuwait and the other GCC members that he did; this might have left him with feeling that he had more room to manoeuvre and greater flexibility – he might therefore have had the patience to wait until he had acquired nuclear weapons with which to deter the United States from interfering in the Arab nation, and ultimately to destroy the Zionists.
 
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Cook

Banned
…would Iran actually end up HELPING USSR in Afghanistan against the US western sponsored jihadists...

No chance whatsoever. The Iranians were heavy supporters of the Tajik members of the Mujahidin in their fight against the Soviets, including Ahmed Shah Massoud – the most successful Mujahidin commander of the war. While the Iranians provided aid to the Mujahidin in an effort to counterbalance the aid (and therefore influence) provided by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United States, there was never a possibility that they would aid invading infidels against fellow Muslims. It is worth noting that when the United States lost interest in the region in the 1990s, Iran remained as the principal foreign supporter of the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance against the Pakistani supported Taliban. An earlier end to the Iran-Iraq war would have meant more aid to the Mujahidin against the Soviet occupation, not less.
 
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Thanks for your insight Cook.

Regarding the nuclear weapons, even if Khomeini helds those views, if as you say Iraq rapidly develops it's nuclear program and is getting the weapon as early as second half of the eighties, Khomeini would be an utter fool not to respond with his own nuclear program. He was a fool in OTL in many ways, yes (the cherry on the cake being dreaming of conquering Iraq and gutting Iran in the process), but in this TL i gave him a little bit more astuteness, he agreed to an armistice with Iraq in 1982, so he might as well realize that the only way to repond to the iraqi nuclear program is one of his own. Plus nuclear weapons would go a very long way to guarantee the country's integrity and islamic regime in the face of the american (and others) imperialist infidels. Besides, if Saddam has the bomb, what preventative measure could Iran possibly take to counter the threat of several tens of iraqi nuclear warheads falling on iranian cities?

As to the Iran-USSR relations, as i understand it one of the incentives for Khomeini to help the jihadists (again, sunni jihadist groomed and armed by the archenemies US and KSA, mainly) against USSR was to payback USSR for their help to Iraq. With an 1982 armistice, that incentive dissapears. So if we give Khomeini a little bit more astuteness, surely he will realize that closer relations with USSR are the right way to go, Iran's armed forces has many losses to replace and only USSR could do that. Perhaps they could reach some kind of agreement on Afghanistan regarding sphere on influence and have the iranian's support AGAINST the US backed jihadists in exchange for major iranian influence in Afghanistan, i don't know, maybe split it, have someone else, iranian backed, in charge instead or alongside Nadjibullah etc. Imo the soviets would be happy to have some kind of way out of that mess that would still superficially look like a success (ie preventing the US backed jihadits from winning and having a more "friendly"-read iranian backed- regime in control) and have someone else share the burden of the fighting there.
 

Cook

Banned
Khomeini would be an utter fool not to respond with his own nuclear program. He was a fool in OTL in many ways, yes...

You have missed the fundamental point to Ayatollah Khomeini: he made his decisions on moral grounds. To argue geo-strategy, realpolitik or military necessity would simply to have been arguing irrelevancies; either something was moral or it was not, and he would not continence acting immorally. Quite simply, to propose that Khomeini would have based his decisions on any other principal is to argue that a compass needle can be persuaded to point in another direction.

(the cherry on the cake being dreaming of conquering Iraq...

Iran’s war aim was never to conquer Iraq, they continued the war to remove the apostate Saddam from power; it was their principal precondition for peace for nearly eight years.

As to the Iran-USSR relations, as i understand it one of the incentives for Khomeini to help the jihadists... was to payback USSR for their help to Iraq.

Iran provided aid to the Mujahidin because they were Muslims fighting a holy war against an apostate invader; to have not done so would have been immoral. In addition to which, the Tajiks are ethnically related to Iranians and have had long and close ties for centuries. To aid apostates against Muslims would have been simply inconceivable. Nor was the Shia-Sunni schism ever considered that much of an obstacle; Iran was also providing aid to the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
 
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Someone linked to this topic in another thread about Iran-Iraq war, just something i wanted to reply about Khomeini. Imo, despite what is said about his supposed "piousness", i still believe that he and his accolites, like any totalitarian regime, were first and foremost determined to do and say anything to keep in power, and that they would react accordingly to anything, inside and outside of Iran, perceived to threatening their grip to power. But even if what is said about Khomeini is true, perhaps a USSR-Iran reproachment and /or an iranian nuclear program (to counter Iraq's) might be doubtful, but then, looks like there might be a "simpler" way around all this: apparently, there was an attempted coup against Khomeini in 1982 by the military. Let's say that succeeds, but the masses would probably overwhelmingly support another islamist leader. Who could be Khomeini's most likely successor in 1982?
 
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