Iran-Iraq War doesn't end

Wikipedia tells me......
An Iranian scholar present at the conference said a turning point in Iran's thinking came with the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in July 1988 by the American cruiser USS Vincennes. That incident apparently led Ayatollah Khomeini to conclude that Iran could not risk the possibility of U.S. open combat operations against Iran and he decided it was time to end the conflict.

So, what if the USA does not acidentally shoot down the aircraft, and the war keeps going on?

Another quesition of mine is:It was a stalemate for 8 years, could either side have really won?
 
Your question as to what would have happened? The rest of the world would continue to sell weapons to both sides and make shitloads of money. Like the WMDs used in the halabja massacre.

The Iran would've won, probably. Not decisive in any way and only if noone intervened on behalf of Saddam. Like the US. *cough* Ah, the irony.
 
well, final Iraqi offensive(s?) really crippled Iran, destroying much of their armor and IRIAF was feeling the pressure of lack of spare parts. So it's likely war would have ended sooner rather than later.
 
Neither side had the capacity to win. Stalemate agreement reached at some point.

Tend to agree. While IRIAF had some very high end planes they were feeling the crunch. They had F-14s, F-5s, and F-4s from the US as well as a variety of aircraft from China and the Soviet Union but they were having money issues.

OTOH, trying to invade Iran would be folly from Iraq. The Zagros mountains run almost the entire length of the Iran/Iraq border and are pretty easily defended.
 
Tend to agree. While IRIAF had some very high end planes they were feeling the crunch. They had F-14s, F-5s, and F-4s from the US as well as a variety of aircraft from China and the Soviet Union but they were having money issues.

OTOH, trying to invade Iran would be folly from Iraq. The Zagros mountains run almost the entire length of the Iran/Iraq border and are pretty easily defended.

I do not think that Iraq had the capacity to occupy out-right the whole of Iran, but it had the capacity to win the war, especially by 1988. A major reason for the new found Iranian willingness to accept peace was the fact that the Iraqi's had gained the upper hand. In particular, The Iranian's were unable to effectively counter the Iraqi chemical threat. Khomeini was no fool, and knew that the war propped up his regime, and allowed the revolutionary leadership to consolidate their position. If the war had continued, and Iran was forced to suffer more defeats and lose ground, however little, the very excuse for his leadership would come into question and public grievances regarding the revolution would rise quickly to the surface.

The Iraqi strategy for a continuation of the war needs to be very much of a continuation of their initial war aims - the capture of Khuzestan. Once this has been achieved, all that Iraq needs to do is form a strong defensive line, and then strategically attack Iranian industry and agriculture. Coincide this with providing support for dissenting groups in Iran, and the country will collapse into a civil war. Why would this work? Well, it's quite simple really - Khuzestan contains the most significant amount of oil reserves in Iran. Remove that from their economy and they are in serious financial trouble. Then, when a strong defensive line has been formed, strategically attacking their industry and agriculture would mean that they would not have been able to sufficiently supply their army, nor feed their large population. Providing more significant support for group's such as the People's Mujahadeen of Iran will create a more active partisan movement within Iran. A disabled Iranian War machine + A war torn economy + armed and supplied partisans = civil war. I would say it is entirely plausible by 1990-92 at the latest. Iran would not be able to do anything to dislodge Iraq from Khuzestan, or should I say Arabistan... :). Such a scenario is ultimately what Khomeini was most worried about and demonstrates that Iraq did not need a total victory, or to occupy Iran, to win the war.
 

General Zod

Banned
The Iraqi strategy for a continuation of the war needs to be very much of a continuation of their initial war aims - the capture of Khuzestan. Once this has been achieved, all that Iraq needs to do is form a strong defensive line, and then strategically attack Iranian industry and agriculture. Coincide this with providing support for dissenting groups in Iran, and the country will collapse into a civil war. Why would this work? Well, it's quite simple really - Khuzestan contains the most significant amount of oil reserves in Iran. Remove that from their economy and they are in serious financial trouble. Then, when a strong defensive line has been formed, strategically attacking their industry and agriculture would mean that they would not have been able to sufficiently supply their army, nor feed their large population. Providing more significant support for group's such as the People's Mujahadeen of Iran will create a more active partisan movement within Iran. A disabled Iranian War machine + A war torn economy + armed and supplied partisans = civil war. I would say it is entirely plausible by 1990-92 at the latest. Iran would not be able to do anything to dislodge Iraq from Khuzestan, or should I say Arabistan... :). Such a scenario is ultimately what Khomeini was most worried about and demonstrates that Iraq did not need a total victory, or to occupy Iran, to win the war.

I am in full agreement here.

Of course, with this scenario, now you have a post-Khomeini Iran (the man was going to buy the farm very soon anyway) torn by civil war between the People's Mujahadeen (abundantly supplied by Iraq), the Islamists, and likely various minorities sensing a chance (most definitely including the Iranian Kurds, which Saddam would very much like to suppress: maybe he annexes Iranian Kurdistan to that scope; the other minorities he would prop up).

Who would win the civil war ? The People's Mujahadeen got Iraqi and very likely Western support, but did not get very much popular backing OTL (but that may change quickly if the Islamist regime led the coutnry to ruin), the Islamists would have more ideological appeal (but of questionable efficacy after the defeat) but no external backing. Whomever would win the civil war, is going to face a much more resource-poor Iran. If the Mujahadeen do, they can court Western support and move Iran back in the Western camp, as it was pre-Revolution. Even if Iran has lost most of its oil is still a value strategical asset. If the Islamists win it, they are going to be even more extremist, at least initially, and turn Iran into a big Shiite Taliban-equivalent, using Islamist terrorism as a weapon to recover influence. Even assuming someone wins the civil war at all, and Iran doesn't collapse into Somalia-like falied state anarchy.

Moreover, with such a victory, Saddam has got pretty much everything he sought: all the prestige in the Arab world he wants, without necessarily picking a dangerous fight with Israel, a truckload of extra oil reserves, has killed main competitor for regional hegemony for a generation, and has the sea access he wanted. Would he follow a moderate course, with his main goals achieved ? This PoD might easily butterfly the Gulf War away. The West is likely going to welcome him with open arms, if he's willing to moderate enough (leave Arabia alone, keep comeptition with Israel mostly confined to rethoric) to become their main regional proxy. Or would he let the victory go to his head, and do so something rash (invade Kuwait, start a war with Israel) which would force the West to put it down ? And how would the Gulf War be different in this scenario ? Saddam would have much more Arab backing.

The Russians are largely ininfluent in this timeframe, whatever Saddam does.
 

Ibn Warraq

Banned
By the time the war ground to a halt both countries were exhausted, even if Khomeini had been more obstinate, then it would have last at most maybe two more years and even that's doubtful.


That said, if the war last say two years longer, then we probably don't have Iraq invading Kuwait for a few more years if ever, which could cause some very huge butterflies.
 
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The Iraqi strategy for a continuation of the war needs to be very much of a continuation of their initial war aims - the capture of Khuzestan. Once this has been achieved, all that Iraq needs to do is form a strong defensive line, and then strategically attack Iranian industry and agriculture. Coincide this with providing support for dissenting groups in Iran, and the country will collapse into a civil war. Why would this work? Well, it's quite simple really - Khuzestan contains the most significant amount of oil reserves in Iran. Remove that from their economy and they are in serious financial trouble. Then, when a strong defensive line has been formed, strategically attacking their industry and agriculture would mean that they would not have been able to sufficiently supply their army, nor feed their large population. Providing more significant support for group's such as the People's Mujahadeen of Iran will create a more active partisan movement within Iran. A disabled Iranian War machine + A war torn economy + armed and supplied partisans = civil war. I would say it is entirely plausible by 1990-92 at the latest. Iran would not be able to do anything to dislodge Iraq from Khuzestan, or should I say Arabistan... :). Such a scenario is ultimately what Khomeini was most worried about and demonstrates that Iraq did not need a total victory, or to occupy Iran, to win the war.

Or the Iraqis could be sucked into guerilla war in Khuzestan that they have difficulty maintaining. I also don't see what Iraq is going to do to wreck Iran's agriculture. I think you're being overly optimistic.
 
[FONT=&quot]A quote from David Kelly regarding Iraqi BW capability in ‘Plague Wars’ by Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg - written before Gulf War 2.

[/FONT]‘Current Iraqi biological warfare capability? They could send a couple of Scuds with anthrax warheads against Israel or Kuwait today. The Israelis would certainly shoot them out of the sky. The Kuwaitis – not sure. There are about eight missiles missing, and the bio warheads can be made in any foundry. They can easily produce the 30 gallons of anthrax per warhead; we know they’ve hidden the growth medium. In a crude operation, they could use this stuff internally by spraying it from a helicopter. I believe they now have a dormant biological weapons programme. Remember, it was a programme always destined to mature in the late 1990’s and it would have done so, but for the Gulf War. Even after our inspections began, they continued their research and development right up till 1995, when I think, the defection of Hussein Kamel and the discovery of the chicken farm documents did put an end to the active programme. But it won’t take much to reignite the whole thing.’


For those outside of the UK, David Kelly was the inspector who questioned the ridiculous 45 minute to use the WMD claim in the British Government 'dossier on Iraqi WMD' and subsequantly comited suicide under questionable circumstances.


So if we have no Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and UN inspectors on the ground, does the Iraqi BW programme comes to fruition?

There is also the nuclear programme, inspectors were apparently amzed to find carbon copies of the plants the US used i the 1940's right down the where the plugs were for electrical applainces.
 
Control of Khuzistan would apparently give control of the majority of Iran's oil.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-1002.htm

OPLAN 1002-04 - The Khuzestan Gambit?

Forward presence of US forces in Iraq cements US credibility, strengthens deterrence, and facilitates transition from peace to war. Although ground forces provide the bulk of the long-term forward presence in Iraq, access to ports and airfields is essential to project other forces into the area. The continued presence of US forces in Iraq sends a strong visible message of the US commitment to defend this region. Presence is enhanced through on-going military-to-military interaction, cooperative defense measures, and prepositioning of equipment and supplies critical to US responsiveness and warfighting flexibility.



The term gambit comes from the Italian word gambetto, which was used for a tricky manoeuvre in wrestling. A chess gambit is a exotic way to enjoy a chess game -- there is a touch of recklessness necessarily to become a gambiteer. The term gambit applies to the opening of the game, involving an early sacrifice to achieve later superior attacking chances. The sacrifice is usually speculative, but hard to refuse.



During the Cold War there was speculation that the Soviet Union's war planning included the Hamburg Gambit, in which the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany would seize the port city of Hamburg, and then use this hostage in war-termination negotiations.



OPLAN 1002-04 has probably been revised to reflect the American occupation of Iraq, and the power projection opportunities this provides against Iran. The Zagros Mountains form a natural pallisade defending Iran from incursions from Iraq. The Iranian province of Khuzestan is the one large piece of flat Iranian terrain to the west of the Zagros Mountains. American heavy forces could swiftly occupy Khuzestan, and in doing so seize control of most of Iran's oil resources, and non-trivial portions of the country's water supply and electrical generating capacity.
Khuzestan [Khouzestan] is the most important pivot of Iran's economy. The existence of such huge resources as oil, gas and water in Khuzestan have changed the economic appearance of Iran. Oil first erupted from a well in the Massjed e Soleyman area, located in the southern Khuzestan province.
The two principal mountain ranges, the Zagros and the Elburz, diverge from a point of intersection in the Caucasus mountains; the former crosses Iran in a south-easterly direction toward the Persian Gulf.
Abadan is a large (pop. 308,000) oil-refinery boomtown, located at the junction of the Karun and Arvandrud rivers. It was largely destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War. Before the war, Abadan had a fairly good museum, but little else worth seeing; now it has even less. It is located 420 mi/675 km south-southwest of Tehran. Like Abadan, Ahvaz is a commercial city (pop. 580,000) that was heavily bombed during the Iran-Iraq War. The city's main attraction is its proximity to several historic sites: Choga Zambil (Elamite ruins and well-preserved ziggerat), Haft Tappe (ruins) and Shush 70 mi/115 km north of Abadan. Once Iran's largest port, Khorramshahr was almost destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War and is being rebuilt. The port, which lies near the Iraqi border on the Karun waterway, dates from ancient times (Alexander the Great founded a city nearby).



Khuzestan was home to one of the oldest human civilizations dating back at least 6000 years to Shoosh (Susa). In ancient tiems, such people as the Uxians (who gave their name to Khuzestan in southern Iran) were part of the Caucasic race of people. In the 17th century, in spite of their general poverty and rejection from public life, there were still a good number of Zoroastrians left throughout Persia, from Ahwaz in Khuzestan, to Kandehar in the east. Hautboy is occasionally used in Ashura ceremony in some provinces such as Khuzestan and Khorassan.



Generally, the Iranians whose mother tongue is Persian is estimated at more half of the total population of the country. Close to a quarter of the population speaks languages and dialects connected with the Persan one and which form part of the Iranian languages (guilaki, lori, mazandarani, Kurdish, baloutche). Another quarter of the Turkish languages (Azeri, turkmene, qashqhaï). There is also a minority Arabic-speaking person (less than 2 % of the population) living mainly in the province of Khuzestan and the coastal areas of the Persian Gulf.



The vast majority of Iran's crude oil reserves are located in giant onshore fields in the southwestern Khuzestan region near the Iraqi border and the Persian Gulf. Iran has 32 producing oil fields, of which 25 are onshore and 7 offshore. Major onshore fields include the following: Ahwaz-Asmari (700,000 bbl/d); Bangestan (around 245,000 bbl/d current production, with plans to increase to 550,000 bbl/d), Marun (520,000 bbl/d), Gachsaran (560,000 bbl/d), Agha Jari (200,000 bbl/d), Karanj-Parsi (200,000 bbl/d); Rag-e-Safid (180,000 bbl/d); Bibi Hakimeh (130,000 bbl/d), and Pazanan (70,000 bbl/d). Major offshore fields include: Dorood (130,000 bbl/d); Salman (130,000 bbl/d); Abuzar (125,000 bbl/d); Sirri A&E (95,000 bbl/d); and Soroush/Nowruz (60,000 bbl/d).



According to the Oil and Gas Journal (1/1/04), Iran holds 125.8 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, roughly 10% of the world's total, up from 90 billion barrels in 2003. In October 1999, Iran announced that it had made its biggest oil discovery in 30 years, a giant onshore field called Azadegan located in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, a few miles east of the border with Iraq. Reportedly, the Azadegan field contains proven crude oil reserves of 26 billion barrels. In July 2004, Iran's oil minister stated that the country's proven oil reserves had increased again, to 132 billion barrels, following new discoveries in the Kushk and Hosseineih fields in Khuzestan province.



Iran's energy generation capacity has risen to about 26,000 megawatts. The share of Khuzestan in total amount of energy produced in the country was 3,800 mega watts. The figure is expected to increase following operationing of three dams in Khuzestan province. Water resources are unevenly spread; 30 percent of surface water resources are concentrated in one province (Khuzestan), while many other populated provinces fully exploit their scarce available resources.



Following the downfall of the Shah, the new government in Iran used the army and other military forces to put down the movements of national minorities in Kurdistan, Turkman Sahra and the Arabs of Khuzestan province.



The main thrust of Iraq's attack on 22 September 1980, was in the south, where five armored and mechanized divisions invaded Khuzestan on two axes, one crossing over the Shatt al Arab near Basra, which led to the siege and eventual occupation of Khorramshahr, and the second heading for Susangerd, which had Ahvaz, the major military base in Khuzestan, as its objective. Iraqi armored units easily crossed the Shatt al Arab waterway and entered the Iranian province of Khuzestan. Dehloran and several other towns were targeted and were rapidly occupied to prevent reinforcement from Bakhtaran and from Tehran. By mid-October 1980, a full division advanced through Khuzestan headed for Khorramshahr and Abadan and the strategic oil fields nearby. Other divisions headed toward Ahvaz, the provincial capital and site of an air base. Supported by heavy artillery fire, the troops made a rapid and significant advance--almost eighty kilometers in the first few days. In the battle for Dezful in Khuzestan, where a major air base is located, the local Iranian army commander requested air support in order to avoid a defeat. President Bani Sadr, therefore, authorized the release from jail of many pilots, some of whom were suspected of still being loyal to the shah. With the increased use of the Iranian air force, the Iraqi progress was somewhat curtailed.
 
Or the Iraqis could be sucked into guerilla war in Khuzestan that they have difficulty maintaining. I also don't see what Iraq is going to do to wreck Iran's agriculture. I think you're being overly optimistic.

The Iraqi's would be absolutely ruthless with any dissent within Khuzestan. One only has to look at the way in which they dealt with resistance in Kuwait, which was disproportionate to the resistance faced, to see this. Also, it's likely that most of the Arab population within Khuzestan would be forcibly relocated around Iraq, with poorer Iraqi's taking their place. This was the demographic regime which was planned for Kuwait.

As for agriculture, the air supremacy enjoyed by Iraq in 1988 will allow them to spend the war using chemical weapons on farms throughout Iran. It won't destroy Iranian agriculture, but it will drastically affect the supply and prices, which will in turn lead to unrest.
 

General Zod

Banned
The Iraqi's would be absolutely ruthless with any dissent within Khuzestan. One only has to look at the way in which they dealt with resistance in Kuwait, which was disproportionate to the resistance faced, to see this. Also, it's likely that most of the Arab population within Khuzestan would be forcibly relocated around Iraq, with poorer Iraqi's taking their place. This was the demographic regime which was planned for Kuwait.

As for agriculture, the air supremacy enjoyed by Iraq in 1988 will allow them to spend the war using chemical weapons on farms throughout Iran. It won't destroy Iranian agriculture, but it will drastically affect the supply and prices, which will in turn lead to unrest.

Your are right, except I think your mean "most of the Persian population within Khuzestan would be forcibly relocated around Iraq, with poorer Iraqi's taking their place". Saddam would have no reason whatsoever to remove the native Arabs, they are his demographic Trojan horse and excuse to annex it in the first place.
 
Your are right, except I think your mean "most of the Persian population within Khuzestan would be forcibly relocated around Iraq, with poorer Iraqi's taking their place". Saddam would have no reason whatsoever to remove the native Arabs, they are his demographic Trojan horse and excuse to annex it in the first place.

True, but I think by 1988 or beyond, both groups would experience forced relocation. In 1980, I would have agreed with you, but considering that many of the Khuzestani Arabs fought for Iran against Iraq during the war, then they would not escape the wrath of the regime in my opinion. Besides, the whole nature of the conflict had changed after 8 years of brutal war.
 
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