Invasion of Norway fails in April 1940-what next?

[Rich Rostrom]

One thing this would do is butterfly away Churchill coming to power when he did OTL...

Technical point - not a 'butterfly effect', but a 'knock-on'.

A 'butterfly effect' is a change in a downtime event that is extremely sensitive to circumstances, such that any trivial change is likely to produce a different outcome; as the conception of any particular individual.

The result of the effect is unknowable, except that the OTL outcome is essentially impossible.

A 'knock-on' is a predictable positive consequence of the PoD, as when one billiard ball strikes another, which then hits another. The non-elevation of Churchill (or more precisely, Chamberlain continuing in office) would be a knock-on.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

• Group 1: Scharnhorst & Gneisenau escorting 10 destroyers carrying 2000 troops to Narvik
• Group 2: Hipper and 4 destroyers carrying 1700 troops to Trondheim
• Group 3: Köln and Köningsberg with 7 minor vessels carrying 1700 troops to Bergen
• Group 4: Karlsruhe and Tsingtau with 8 torpedo boats carrying 1100 troops to secure the ports of Kristiansand and Arendal (one company to secure the telegraph line, the main thrust against Kristiansand)
• Group 5: Panzerschiff Lutzow, cruisers Blucher and Emden and 13 light vessels carrying 2000 troops to Oslo
• Group 6: 4 minesweepers carrying 150 troops to Egersund.

Ah, information! Thanks much.

But was there not also a paratroop attack against Stavanger airfield?

Now, what else could go wrong?

Initially, one might go with the weather – the commander of the paras attacking Oslo/Fornebu actually forced the pilot to land despite a solid overcast and opposition from Norwegian Gladiators. If the pilot had held his opinions more strongly, the paras would have returned to Denmark. With Blucher sunk at Oscarsborg in the Oslo fiord, the mobilization of the Norwegian forces around Oslo would have been unimpeded, the loss of leadership as the government fled to Lillehammer would not take place and the Germans would have to fight from their toehold in Stavanger and Bergen while the Trondheim landing could be left to starve and the 6 Division in Troms would be sufficient to handle the 2000 in Narvik – far from any supplies or support.

Another obvious thing to go wrong is that the Allies could intercept and destroy Groups 1, 2, and 3. No German "toehold" at Stavanger and Bergen; Norwegian forces in Trondelag can fully mobilize and march south to defend Oslo and retake Egersund and Kristiansand. (IIRC Kristiansand fell fairly quickly though not immediately.

Or one could have a mix of favorable results, instead of every bit of luck breaking in German favor.

Then, what if the Norwegians do get their act together – slightly? ...f the warnings of the Norwegian diplomats on 1 April and 5 April were believed...

Unfortunately, I consider this very unlikely. Norway like most countries at peace was unable to consider the possibility of "bolt-from-the-blue" attack with any seriousness. Like the U.S. in 1941, war warnings would be discounted and little would be done until the firing started. (I recognize that different levels and branches of command are being compared here, but I think the analogy holds.) The inertia of peacetime habits and thinking would be too much to overcome.

 

[DaleCoz]

I did a little more research on the issue of tanks in the Norway invasion. While the Germans did not have any panzer divisions in the invasion, they did have 3 light companies that had been detached from panzer divisions. Those companies initially had a total of 69 tanks, of which 42 were panzer 1s, 21 Panzer 2s, and, weirdly enough, 3 Panzer VI prototype heavy tanks, plus some command tanks.

The tank in the picture is a Panzer VI prototype. The Germans used the big, but apparently not very useful Panzer VIs for a lot of photo ops and some limited fighting.

Of the tanks sent, 15 to 18 Panzer 1 and 2s were on a ship sunk on its way to Norway. The Germans then brought in 7 to 10 Panzer IIIs as replacements.

Bottom line: Not enough tanks in the Norway invasion to cause much of a traffic jam in France, but enough to give the Norwegians issues.

Source:
http://www.achtungpanzer.com/german-panzer-unit-in-norway-april-june-of-1940.htm

I recall reading and seeing a documentary about this, so I did a quick search on wiki, and found this:

A German Neubaufahrzeug tank advancing through the streets of Lillehammer in April 1940

 

[ChrisBen]

I guess that one of the things the studies of the Norwegain campaign clearly demonstates is that the Norwegian army would be unable to hold the German attack, if it managed to land in force at any main communication point. The Germans were extremely able to improvise in any given terrain and with the forces at hand. In most of the clashes between mobilised Norwegian forces and German units the Germans managed to fix the Norwegian front by mortar/light artillery (better equipment) and then utflank the Norwegian position (better leadership) resulting in the Norwegians falling back from prepared positions instead of holding their ground (really bad leadership). The Germans then invariably exploited the retreat turning it into a rout.

However, the campaign also demonstrated the effects of terrain - most of these clashes were really skirmishes as the valleys and highlands do not allow for German deployment of mass. And they all radiated out of Oslo, mainly north, trying to link up with the Trondheim detachment. If Oslo does not fall, the terrain would make it almost impossible to link Stavanger with Trondheim, and the expansion out of a pocket would be a very slow affair. And the Norwegians were about to lay the mines on the evening of 8 April, in my previous post I simply moved that reaction forward wtíth a couple of days (say that the pacifist foreign minster Koht was abroad on the 1 April and unable to meddle in the discussion taking place then).

It is an interesting idea with a Stavanger pocket as the harbour was undefended, quite large and close to Norway's biggest airfield at Sola, which OTL was captured by paras without much of a problem although the very improvised defenders were only minutes away from torching the fuel depot and turning an operational airfield into a spare landing site. Anyway, if the field is captured intact, the Germans could provide fighter cover over the area/harbour and support supply convoys from the air. They would then need to build sufficient force in the bridgehead and start to expand towards Bergen and along the coast.

The point would be that the inlet to Stavanger harbour would be the focal point for all supply convoys and the British could patrol all available submarines outside and await targets. Stavanger and Bergen is also equidistant from Scapa so the Skua attack that sunk Köningsberg in Bergen harbour on 10 April could be repeated - although with any Me109 at Sola I really wouldn't want to be a Skua pilot. In any case, the Germans would have to commit serious maritime transport to the reinforcement of the pocket and serious Luftwaffe resources to cover them. That could possibly have a knock-on effect on France, especially as the Norwegian campaign would take significantly more time from Stavanger than from Oslo.

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

On the point raised earlier about how Norway holding means that the U-Boats are effectively bottled up in Germany, if the Battle of France goes as per OTL how feasible is it for the Germans to set up U-Boat construction in France and how long would it take?

 

[HMS Warspite]

On the point raised earlier about how Norway holding means that the U-Boats are effectively bottled up in Germany, if the Battle of France goes as per OTL how feasible is it for the Germans to set up U-Boat construction in France and how long would it take?

Basically the BdU started building U-Boote Flottilla's up in Fracne as soon as the French ports had been secured. Norway was a relative late point of interest for the BdU, as it was at the "wrong" geographical location for the intended Atlantic War. Distances to travel for U-Boote to reach their patrol area from France was only a third compared to a journey from Norwegian bases. these operational area's were mainly in the Irish Sea and in the Western Approaches, both North and South of Ireland. Only after the stream of the Murmansk Supply route began in earnest, the BdU started to deploy U-boote in Norway as well.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

On the point raised earlier about how Norway holding means that the U-Boats are effectively bottled up in Germany,

That's an exaggeration, IMO. U-boats would have much greater difficulty in reaching the Atlantic through the Greenland-Iceland-UK line, as they would also have to evade patrols from Norway - but they could still do it.

Or they could (after June 1940) slip down the English Channel to the Biscay coast, and operate from there. Fairly difficult, but far from impossible.

if the Battle of France goes as per OTL how feasible is it for the Germans to set up U-Boat construction in France and how long would it take?

It wouldn't be necessary (see above) and it wouldn't work if it was tried. French dockyard workers regularly sabotaged German ships and subs under repair; subs under construction would be extremely vulnerable to sabotage. (Would you want to submerge in a submarine built by resentful slaves?)

 

[Some Bloke]

The outright fall of France is not necessarily a given here.
After a victory in Norway the French Army wouldn't suffer as much from the
morale problems that led to its collapse IOTL.

However, this does not eliminate the huge deficiencies in doctrine and leadership, so the Battle of France will be a rude awakening. Having said that they know the Germans can be beaten and that one of their invasion attempts has been thwarted, which makes continuing the fight from North Africa a more attractive option after all the Germans failed to cross the strait of Denmark with a fleet.

 

[von Adler]

I guess that one of the things the studies of the Norwegain campaign clearly demonstates is that the Norwegian army would be unable to hold the German attack, if it managed to land in force at any main communication point. The Germans were extremely able to improvise in any given terrain and with the forces at hand. In most of the clashes between mobilised Norwegian forces and German units the Germans managed to fix the Norwegian front by mortar/light artillery (better equipment) and then utflank the Norwegian position (better leadership) resulting in the Norwegians falling back from prepared positions instead of holding their ground (really bad leadership). The Germans then invariably exploited the retreat turning it into a rout.

However, the campaign also demonstrated the effects of terrain - most of these clashes were really skirmishes as the valleys and highlands do not allow for German deployment of mass. And they all radiated out of Oslo, mainly north, trying to link up with the Trondheim detachment. If Oslo does not fall, the terrain would make it almost impossible to link Stavanger with Trondheim, and the expansion out of a pocket would be a very slow affair. And the Norwegians were about to lay the mines on the evening of 8 April, in my previous post I simply moved that reaction forward wtíth a couple of days (say that the pacifist foreign minster Koht was abroad on the 1 April and unable to meddle in the discussion taking place then).

It is an interesting idea with a Stavanger pocket as the harbour was undefended, quite large and close to Norway's biggest airfield at Sola, which OTL was captured by paras without much of a problem although the very improvised defenders were only minutes away from torching the fuel depot and turning an operational airfield into a spare landing site. Anyway, if the field is captured intact, the Germans could provide fighter cover over the area/harbour and support supply convoys from the air. They would then need to build sufficient force in the bridgehead and start to expand towards Bergen and along the coast.

If the Norwegian army has time to mobilise and assemble properly, they have artillery support and most of all enough men to always keep a reserve - which they did not OTL.

If properly mobilised, the NBorwegian army has more than 110 000 men with a further ~200 000 in reserve/2nd line/local defence units.

 

[ChrisBen]

It is true that the Norwegian army would have had 110 000 men with a decent amount of artillery if the German landings had not overrun the mobilization depots on the morning of 9 April. However, the fighting from Trondheim and north towards Narvik provided several possibilities for both Norwegian and British units to stop the German advance on numerically equal terms and teh fact remains that the German infantry tactics were excellent and the Norwegian were not. And the Germans generally won.

Anyway, the thread asked about butterflies from a failed Weserubung. Again, I believe that would depend on how Weserubung failed. If the Germans manage to get to Oslo, Southern Norway will fall, and rather quickly. If the mines are deployed, there is no way the Germans will be able to get to Oslo quickly and the question will be whether they land along the southern coast and try to unite their bridgeheads and push inland. Which is eminently doable, but requires time, Luftwaffe resources and shipping.

The shipping will be heavily exposed to British - and even Polish - submarines generating logistical problems that either will have to be resolved by even more Luftwaffe transports or by pulling out. My point is that a completely failed invasion will simply have the remainder of the German navy returning home. A partially failed invasion will require significant Luftwaffe assets to support and protect. And the subsequent offensive into central Norway will take far more time than originally foreseen. So, with significant parts of the Luftwaffe (far more than the 500 transports and 400 bombers originally used) committed to protect the German forces in Norway and attrition increasing, do you still lauch the invasion of France in June?

 

[rip89]

If Norway doesn't fall and joins the allies then Norway would supply raw materials to the UK plus equipment would be going to Norway, this could have some interesting effects, convoy battles in an area where the allies have more air cover could see increased u-boat losses 1940-41, as well as less u-boats in the Atlantic which can only be a good thing. What raw materials did Norway produce in this time period?

 

[HMS Warspite]

If Norway doesn't fall and joins the allies then Norway would supply raw materials to the UK plus equipment would be going to Norway, this could have some interesting effects, convoy battles in an area where the allies have more air cover could see increased u-boat losses 1940-41, as well as less u-boats in the Atlantic which can only be a good thing. What raw materials did Norway produce in this time period?

Norway itself hardly had anything to offer in terms of raw reasources, as oil was only found after the WW2, while iron Ore was not so interesting to ship from Norway, as it could be transported form more saver places anywhere around the world. (If the Swedish continued to run Oretrains to Narvik, when their biggest customer had been Germany.) Norway only had one resource to offer the Allies as supply: fish, due to Norways vast fishingfleet. This commercial fishingfleet was not likely to remain active with norway at war, simpy due to the dangers fro their crews (mines and so on.)

 

[von Adler]

It is true that the Norwegian army would have had 110 000 men with a decent amount of artillery if the German landings had not overrun the mobilization depots on the morning of 9 April. However, the fighting from Trondheim and north towards Narvik provided several possibilities for both Norwegian and British units to stop the German advance on numerically equal terms and teh fact remains that the German infantry tactics were excellent and the Norwegian were not. And the Germans generally won.

Yes, one to one, the Germans are clearly superior - although the Norwegians learned quickly and by mid-May they were doing decently one-on-one against the Germans in Narvik.

However, if the Norwegians manage to mobilise, the Germans will not face one-to-one, they will face one-to-three. And with that, the Norwegians will have enough men to keep a reserve to counter any flanking attempt in the battles. And then the Germans will have to slug it through.