Invasion of Britain 1941.

Does the workings of the board have the ability to when someone types the 'words that should never be mentioned' direct that poster to the many many many many all too mnay posts on 'the words that should not be mentioned' and destroy the attempt at posting a new thread on 'the words that should not be mentioned'?
 
Which means at best, it's not proof of anything. Except of course that after the Battle of Norway Germany had a navy that only wanted to hide in port, which isn't conducive to invading the British isles. I'm also not sold on the idea that Germany ever gained an airforce particularly suited to attacking ships.

Just like Bismarck, Scharnhorst etc. which only wanted to hide in port... German surface forces were active in waters close to Britain up to April 1945 and were actually not that ineffective. Should you perhaps study the issue? According Smith's "Naval warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945" German destroyers and torpedo boats were constantly making sorties against Channel shipping in 1940-1944.

I'm not at all that sure that RAF and FAA of 1941 were yet that effective in striking ships at sea, how many ships had they sunk under way by that time? This is a honest question, could you please have a reference? In contrast, like it is well known, RN ships put out of action in the period included carriers (HMS Illustrious, HMS Formidable), cruisers and destroyers etc. even when main attention of Luftwaffe had turned towards preparation of Barbarossa.

Ju-87's and Ju-88's were very effective against shipping in this period, just like dive bombers of other countries were. This was an era when proximity fuze shells were not yet available and close-in weaponry was badly lacking.

As has been pointed out, the only plane the Germans have that is even remotely effective against ships is the Stuka, and the geography of the Western Approaches dictates that distance and fuel constraints would make it useless in such a case.

No, Stuka wasn't the only plane effective, Ju-88 was used with high efficiency too and it had decent range in anti-shipping missions.

Oh, and submarines, too. Because of Ultra, the British would know EXACTLY where your mythical Franco-Italian fleet is, and could easily position submarines everywhere along their course.

Could you provide an example of this kind of action in 1941 era?

In sum, while BigPhil's scenario is clearly flawed it is disconcerting to see forum posters not holding up high standards when giving replies. In essence what we're seeing is a shouting contest with no use. The exceptions are CalBear etc. who are giving a new poster fair chance to try to reply.
 
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Just like Bismarck, Scharnhorst etc. which only wanted to hide in port... German surface forces were active in waters close to Britain up to April 1945 and were actually not that ineffective. Should you perhaps study the issue? According Smith's "Naval warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945" German destroyers and torpedo boats were constantly making sorties against Channel shipping in 1940-1944.
Perhaps you should? Many German ships languished in port over this period, and light destroyer and torpedo boat raids are a nuisance, not the incredible fleet action you seem to make out. As for Bismark, that was heavily damaged by Torpedos dropped by aircraft while under way, I seem to remember. I see no basis for the KM being anything more than a minor nuisance greatly diminished after the battle for Norway.
I'm not at all that sure that RAF and FAA of 1941 were yet that effective in striking ships at sea, how many ships had they sunk under way by that time? This is a honest question, could you please have a reference?
Taranto of late 1940? It doesn't refute that the Luftwaffe wasn't particularly stunning in that area either, you've not provided any evidence of that.
In sum, while BigPhil's scenario is clearly flawed it is disconcerting to see forum posters not holding up high standards when giving replies. In essence what we're seeing is a shouting contest with no use. The exceptions are CalBear etc. who are giving a new poster fair chance to try to reply.
He's been given plenty of chances to reply by everyone, he just doesn't. Well unless you think saying "then some magic happens" is a reply. You're also demanding a much higher burden of evidence from 'us' than you do of Big Phil, or yourself for that matter.
 
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I'm not at all that sure that RAF and FAA of 1941 were yet that effective in striking ships at sea, how many ships had they sunk under way by that time?
I can't recall any major Italian or German warships sunk solelly by the action of FAA aircraft at this stage in the war but there are several examples of FAA aircraft dealing considrable damage to major surface combatants. Cape Matapan produces two examples... Vittorio Veneto hit by one torp, took on 4,000 tons of water, stopped, took the better part of two hours to return to a useful operational speed; Pola, torpedoed, stopped dead, run down and blasted to pieces by British Battleships. Then of cause there is the Bismark... Swordfish took out her rudder, Battleships and cruisers pounded her to a wreck.
 
Perhaps you should? Many German ships languished in port over this period, and light destroyer and torpedo boat raids are a nuisance, not the incredible fleet action you seem to make out.

The German ships did not "languish in ports", destroyers and torpedo boats were being used, it's just that there were quite few of them. They were especially efficient in English Channel area. Major surface combatants, whose story is far better known, were not being used as effectively as they could have been.

By the way, as a honest question, how many operational ships of each category did RN have by summer of 1941 in OTL? As the war had gone on for almost two years by that date a large number of ships were damaged, being overhauled or deployed to training duties. The difference between fleet sizes may be rather smaller than one does think simply by looking at the number of total ships in commission. The same pressures naturally applied to Kriegsmarine, but not as much as the (crappy) destroyers and torpedo boats weren't being used as exhaustively.

Taranto of late 1940? It doesn't refute that the Luftwaffe wasn't particularly stunning in that area either, you've not provided any evidence of that.

In Taranto the ships weren't moving... As for merchant tonnage alone, Luftwaffe sank the following number of ships:

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsMineWarfare1.htm

Apr-Dec 1940: 172 ships, 546 k tons (subs: 363 ships, 1842 k tons)
Jan-Dec 1941: 371 ships, 1071 k tons (subs: 432 ships, 2172 k tons)

This seems to indicate that Luftwaffe sank some ships.

As for RN, see the following:

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2BritishLossesbyDate1.htm

"Sunk by aircraft" is rather common cause. I'm fairly sure much more were seriously damaged as in contrast to torpedo hits, for example, aircraft attacks had a tendency to damage rather than sink ships.

In summary tables it seems

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2aBritishLosses10tables.htm

that out of 153 destroyers lost, for example, 55 were lost to aircraft. Most of the losses were for German aircraft. And I must stress out that anti-ship missions weren't exactly the key area of Luftwaffe. In 1940-1941 after failure of BoB most attention was being given to recuperating air units for ground support of Barbarossa. If invasion of Britain was decided upon, much more attention to anti-ship duties would have been given.

I can't recall any major Italian or German warships sunk solelly by the action of FAA aircraft at this stage in the war but there are several examples of FAA aircraft dealing considrable damage to major surface combatants.

Thanks, Bismarck was perhaps so an obvious example I missed it... :rolleyes:
 
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Big Phil

Banned
The German ships did not "languish in ports", destroyers and torpedo boats were being used, it's just that there were quite few of them. They were especially efficient in English Channel area. Major surface combatants, whose story is far better known, were not being used as effectively as they could have been.

By the way, as a honest question, how many operational ships of each category did RN have by summer of 1941 in OTL? As the war had gone on for almost two years by that date a large number of ships were damaged, being overhauled or deployed to training duties. The difference between fleet sizes may be rather smaller than one does think simply by looking at the number of total ships in commission. The same pressures naturally applied to Kriegsmarine, but not as much as the (crappy) destroyers and torpedo boats weren't being used as exhaustively.



In Taranto the ships weren't moving... As for merchant tonnage alone, Luftwaffe sank the following number of ships:

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsMineWarfare1.htm

Apr-Dec 1940: 172 ships, 546 k tons (subs: 363 ships, 1842 k tons)
Jan-Dec 1941: 371 ships, 1071 k tons (subs: 432 ships, 2172 k tons)

This seems to indicate that Luftwaffe sank some ships.

As for RN, see the following:

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2BritishLossesbyDate1.htm

"Sunk by aircraft" is rather common cause. I'm fairly sure much more were seriously damaged as in contrast to torpedo hits, for example, aircraft attacks had a tendency to damage rather than sink ships.

In summary tables it seems

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2aBritishLosses10tables.htm

that out of 153 destroyers lost, for example, 55 were lost to aircraft. Most of the losses were for German aircraft. And I must stress out that anti-ship missions weren't exactly the key area of Luftwaffe. In 1940-1941 after failure of BoB most attention was being given to recuperating air units for ground support of Barbarossa. If invasion of Britain was decided upon, much more attention to anti-ship duties would have been given.



Thanks, Bismarck was perhaps so an obvious example I missed it... :rolleyes:

Very good post.
 
it's just that there were quite few of them.
Which rather supports my point, doesn't it?
By the way, as a honest question, how many operational ships of each category did RN have by summer of 1941 in OTL? As the war had gone on for almost two years by that date a large number of ships were damaged, being overhauled or deployed to training duties. The difference between fleet sizes may be rather smaller than one does think simply by looking at the number of total ships in commission. The same pressures naturally applied to Kriegsmarine, but not as much as the (crappy) destroyers and torpedo boats weren't being used as exhaustively.
Right, so they had few vessels, not used as exhaustively, but were still a force to rival the RN. On the face of it, that would seem to be self contradictory.

Anyway, the information you ask for is in your own cites. The RN losses include vessels not yet repaired, so between 1939-1941 the RN had been reduced by:
5 Capital Ships
4 Carriers
14 Cruisers
62 Destroyers
36 Submarines

The total strength of the Kriegsmarine can be found here:
http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/index.html

It gives a quick overview, essentially at the outbreak of war in 1939 the KM had 11 craft of the size of Linienschiffe(pre-dreadnought battleships) or larger, with 7 more under construction. Many of those were not completed however. There were 5 Heavy Cruisers, and 6 Light Cruisers by 1941 (though that's a little more open to interpretation) and 21 destroyers (Nearly half of which were were sunk in the battle of Norway).

By my reckoning, that means even if we ignore the ships the RN had built, and the losses the KM had taken, the RN was more than double the size of the KM.
As for merchant tonnage alone, Luftwaffe sank the following number of ships:
Big difference between Merchant ships and warships.
In Taranto the ships weren't moving...
...
that out of 153 destroyers lost, for example, 55 were lost to aircraft. Most of the losses were for German aircraft. And I must stress out that anti-ship missions weren't exactly the key area of Luftwaffe. In 1940-1941 after failure of BoB most attention was being given to recuperating air units for ground support of Barbarossa. If invasion of Britain was decided upon, much more attention to anti-ship duties would have been given.
Your source makes no distinction upon whether the ships were moving, and it's for all war years put together. So while you demand I provide examples of the RAF or FAA sinking vessels moving at sea, and only during the period between 1939-1941, you're happy to compare that with every ship sunk by the Luftwaffe, regardless of whether it meets the stringent requirements you place on me or not.

Indeed if you look at the years 1939-1941 in your own source, most vessels sunk are trawlers, or are given at being in port, or in situations where they are likely to not be moving/have very low manoeuvrability, like the evacuation of Dunkirk. Very quickly skimming your source and stripping out all the vessels that don't meet your own criteria, for instance, looks to drop the number of Destroyers sunk from 55, to 2. Hardly a stellar showing given the target rich environment and the far greater opportunities the Luftwaffe had to sink vessels.
 
By my reckoning, that means even if we ignore the ships the RN had built, and the losses the KM had taken, the RN was more than double the size of the KM.

I was not curious about number of ships in commission but rather about ships available for operations. Long-range operations and patrol duties of RN inflicted more wear and tear upon ships than short range operations of KM. The difference was large especially in light craft and destroyers. As for ship numbers, here's calculations for late May 1941 _without_ taking losses in Greece into account.

MTB's
RN: 44
KM: 38

MGB's:
RN: 60
KM: -, hundreds of R-boats

Submarines:

RN: 45
KM: ca. 200 (?)

Destroyers:

RN: 77 modern + 51 V and W(without losses in Greece)
KM: 15 DD + 19 Flottentorpedoboote

Battleships / Battlecruisers:
RN: 14
KM: 3

CA:
RN: 13
KM: 4

CL:
RN: 30
KM: -

As a note, in Crete where Luftwaffe deployed just a fraction of it's strength three RN cruisers and six destroyers were sunk in short order together with severe damage to two BB's and one CL.

It must be noted that RN had some commitments outside the home waters, like Mediterranean, Far East, convoy traffic etc. All I'm saying is that the difference in numbers is slightly lower than sheer numbers seem to imply.

Big difference between Merchant ships and warships.

Yes, but Luftwaffe in general concentrated on merchant shipping, not on Allied warships. With Sealion looming the tasking would have been different. And as I must stress, historically Luftwaffe units tasked for anti-ship duties were minuscule in comparison to whole Luftwaffe strength.

In sum, any RN task force challenging the invasion would have to run the gauntlet of U-boats and Luftwaffe anti-ship strikes before engaging the landing force which would be defended by not inconsiderable numbers of KM ships. All this means that 1941 Sealion cannot be written off as a fantasy as the 1940 variant. What I think that various posters do not grasp the difference. Just like in early post-war Allied accounts the Germans were supermen it seems that all too often, perhaps as a counter reaction, in this board the Allies are supermen.
 
Still, the Luftwaffe first needs to win a second round of the Battle of Britain, which will cause them serious losses even if they succed and whatever land forces manage to reach Britain will be facing far more opposition than in 1940
 
I was not curious about number of ships in commission but rather about ships available for operations. Long-range operations and patrol duties of RN inflicted more wear and tear upon ships than short range operations of KM. The difference was large especially in light craft and destroyers. As for ship numbers, here's calculations for late May 1941 _without_ taking losses in Greece into account.
As I already said, your source gives allied losses including vessels that are under going repair. Where did you get the numbers from? They'd seem to disagree with what I've seen of KM strength, and your source for the RN.
As a note, in Crete where Luftwaffe deployed just a fraction of it's strength three RN cruisers and six destroyers were sunk in short order together with severe damage to two BB's and one CL.
Where they were at the end of their supply lines, and supporting ground operations, and had limited room to manoeuvre. You asked for ships moving in open water, and still bring up examples that fail your own criteria.
It must be noted that RN had some commitments outside the home waters, like Mediterranean, Far East, convoy traffic etc. All I'm saying is that the difference in numbers is slightly lower than sheer numbers seem to imply.
Which only matters if I didn't take that into account. In my last post whenever I was unsure of numbers, whenever there was a doubt, I swung it the way of the KM, and they still came out as a tiny force compared to the RN.
Yes, but Luftwaffe in general concentrated on merchant shipping, not on Allied warships. With Sealion looming the tasking would have been different. And as I must stress, historically Luftwaffe units tasked for anti-ship duties were minuscule in comparison to whole Luftwaffe strength.
I was merely pointing out that drawing conclusions on the Luftwaffe's capability to attack warships from success with merchant shipping, is meaningless.
In sum, any RN task force challenging the invasion would have to run the gauntlet of U-boats and Luftwaffe anti-ship strikes before engaging the landing force which would be defended by not inconsiderable numbers of KM ships. All this means that 1941 Sealion cannot be written off as a fantasy as the 1940 variant. What I think that various posters do not grasp the difference.
And any landing would have to run the gauntlet of an incredibly considerable naval advantage to the RN, and the RAF. Then once they've landed they have to run the gauntlet of the extensive fortifications, not present in 1940. German fleet strength was greater in 1940. That is why I find a Sealion 1941 less believable than Sealion 1940, because if anything the Allied position is stronger and the German's weaker in the areas required to pull off a successful landing on the British Isles. Which is rather the point, various posters have grasped the difference between Sealion 1940, and Sealion 1941, we've grasped that Sealion 1941 is even less likely to succeed.

If you really want to argue against that you've got to make a case for how the Germans were in a stronger position for controlling the channel, with an air force that would also be contested by the RAF, and a Navy a fraction of the size of the RN.
Just like in early post-war Allied accounts the Germans were supermen it seems that all too often, perhaps as a counter reaction, in this board the Allies are supermen.
No one's suggesting that, in fact suggesting that the Germans could out fight everyone on land, on sea and in the air simultaneously would be back to the German supermen thing, and what we're doing is arguing against that. Look, it's not a question of supermen, it's the question of a nation that has put the vast majority of it's resources into it's land forces, pulling off the invasion of an island nation that has put the vast majority of it's forces into it's navy.
 
How many complete, fully armed divisions did the UK have by 1941?
IIRC basically the entire Canadian Army was based in the UK at that time in addition to UK troops. How many aircraft? How many more destroyers/escorts did they have - the things that would really do the damage to any invasion flotilla?


Did the Germans ever have the resources to pull off D-Day? The allies had near total air and naval dominance by 1944 in addition to huge concentrations of men and materiel directed against France. If the Germans in 1941 did not have this - they would at best have transient, localised superiority, with one eye on the Soviets and the remainder scattered across the Med - then they'd fail.
 
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