Instead of Kursk, evacuation of Orel bulge

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Deleted member 1487

I know that Kursk has been done to death, but I haven't seen this specific POD before. What if Hitler had listened to Model and cancelled the Kursk offensive in April for a pull back to the Desna river (Bryansk)?

It would mean the evacuation of the Orel bulge, but would straighten the German lines dramatically and create an operational mobile reserve, while disjointing the planned Soviet Orel offensive.

This would be the only change to the lines, so nothing south of Kursk would be evacuated. Last time we discussed this topic we decided a major pull back to the Dniepr would be too much for the Axis to accomplish by the time the Soviets would attack and disrupt the effort, but a pull back to the much closer Desna river seems feasible, as by this time the Orel bulge wasn't all that heavily occupied by German forces.

Is this feasible and what would be the result of this come May/June/July depending on how quickly the Soviets could go on the attack?
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I think a pull back to the Desna would be a bit too much, as it would unhinge 2nd panzer army from 4th army, requiring army group center to conduct a withdrawal as well in order to maintain contact with 9th and 2nd panzer army. More feasible is a withdrawal to the Hagan position, which was what Model originally advocated.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think a pull back to the Desna would be a bit too much, as it would unhinge 2nd panzer army from 4th army, requiring army group center to conduct a withdrawal as well in order to maintain contact with 9th and 2nd panzer army. More feasible is a withdrawal to the Hagan position, which was what Model originally advocated.

Where was the Hagan position? What effect do you think it would have had on the follow up Soviet offensives?
 
IMO, considering you have to get Hitler to go along with it

the best plan was to fortify the existing line and otherwise sit put and do nothing
 
Where was the Hagan position? What effect do you think it would have had on the follow up Soviet offensives?

20km east of Bryansk, about where 9th and 2nd panzer army withdrew IOTL. The effects would mixed. Positively it would avoid German forces be mauled defending the salient, and give AGC an operational reserve (Which they did have IOTL as a result of the later evacuation).

There are also a number of downsides. First it frees up an even larger Soviet operational reserve, including 11th Guards Army, 13th, and 48 armies. 11th guards in particular was a powerful shock group. The Soviet's mobile group will also be very powerful. IOTL 2nd tank army was damaged on the defensive, 3rd Guards Tank Army suffered, and 4th Tank Army was so badly damaged that it spent the rest of 1943 refitting. Most of the participating rifle armies suffered heavy losses as well. Finally, the Red Army can begin operations on a broad front earlier than OTL.

As a whole the advantages lean in favor of the Red Army, and play to it's strength of superior concentration and deception.
 
As a whole the advantages lean in favor of the Red Army, and play to it's strength of superior concentration and deception.

Indeed, what most people forget about pulling back to straighten front-lines is that it works both ways. Just as the Germans free up more forces to go into the reserve, so does the Soviets. Once you get down too it, the force ratios will be unchanged.
 

Deleted member 1487

IMO, considering you have to get Hitler to go along with it

the best plan was to fortify the existing line and otherwise sit put and do nothing

Let's run with this. Assuming the German bulges just fortify in place from April on, the Soviets are likely to attack in May some time. What is the likely outcome of that, losses like the OTL versions of the Soviet offensives, just minus the Kursk losses?
 
Let's run with this. Assuming the German bulges just fortify in place from April on, the Soviets are likely to attack in May some time. What is the likely outcome of that, losses like the OTL versions of the Soviet offensives, just minus the Kursk losses?

I'd say slightly lighter than IOTL. While the Germans will have a strategic reserve availiable, said reserve will likely be dispersed due to Soviet Maskirovka efforts. The Red Army will also be able to, like IOTL. conduct serious demonstrations and offensives in the Smolensk region to tie down more reserves. They'll have Central Front available to conduct operations at full strength, so 9th and 2nd Panzer armies will have to defend all three faces of the salient. Both German armies will also lack many of the numerous switchlines and defenses which were constructed prior to the Kursk offensive. The last one is particularly important, as those defenses were what saved German forces in the Orel bulge from destruction after 11th Guards Army shattered the northern face of the salient.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'd say slightly lighter than IOTL. While the Germans will have a strategic reserve availiable, said reserve will likely be dispersed due to Soviet Maskirovka efforts. The Red Army will also be able to, like IOTL. conduct serious demonstrations and offensives in the Smolensk region to tie down more reserves. They'll have Central Front available to conduct operations at full strength, so 9th and 2nd Panzer armies will have to defend all three faces of the salient. Both German armies will also lack many of the numerous switchlines and defenses which were constructed prior to the Kursk offensive. The last one is particularly important, as those defenses were what saved German forces in the Orel bulge from destruction after 11th Guards Army shattered the northern face of the salient.

What about if they evactuated the forces over the Oka river in late April/early May, using it as a defensive position, strengthening it before they conduct a scorched earth withdrawal over the river? The Soviets would be unlikely to be able strongly press over the river if they were attacking thereafter in May. Instead the Germans in the sector can focus their reserve centrally against threats from the North and South.
 
@ wiking

This HyperWar series might help:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-EF-Defeat/USA-EF-Defeat-7.html

The Germans had three operational plans: Zitadelle (which they went with), Habicht and Panther, both of which they did not. IMO, the Germans should've continued their pre-Zitadelle build-up, then wrong foot the Soviets by launching Habicht and Panther, limited operations that would've shortened German lines north of Kharkov. Then, with the Soviets scrambling to answer these new German operations, Ninth army and Second Panzer Army withdraw to the Hagen Positions (they are denoted on a map in the article I've posted). The Ninth Army, being the largest German army ever assembled (335 000 as opposed to 330 000 in the 6th Army pre-operation blau) would be able to hold the Hagen Positions, allowing the Germans to remove 2nd Panzer Army from the front and use it as a command to control units taken out of the line for rest and refit, or as a strategic reserve (a reserve which operation zitadelle was supposed to allow for the creation of). Or, the Germans could do what they did in OTL, which is send 2nd Panzer Army to the Balkans (a poor choice ITTL).

But that's just my two cents.
 
It's doubtful the Germans would be able to build up for and execute Habicht or Panther undetected. More likely the Red Army will detect such a large buildup, as they did for Citadel IOTL, and adjust its deployments to prevent a serious German operational penetration. It had an entire front, Steppe, in reserve to deploy wherever it might be needed.
 
The Soviets would be unlikely to be able strongly press over the river if they were attacking thereafter in May.

The Soviets already hold territory on the other side of the Oka which the Germans have to defend. Furthermore, they would likely still manage to establish several beachheads via the usual methods and work at expanding those while focusing their main attention further to the north and south. The Germans would then be forced between trying to save Army Group Center or holding onto the Crimea, since they wouldn't have the forces to do both. If either goes, a defense line along the Oka loses any defensive value.
 
What about if they evactuated the forces over the Oka river in late April/early May, using it as a defensive position, strengthening it before they conduct a scorched earth withdrawal over the river? The Soviets would be unlikely to be able strongly press over the river if they were attacking thereafter in May. Instead the Germans in the sector can focus their reserve centrally against threats from the North and South.

11th Guard's forces were concentrated West of the Oka, as was Central Front; any defenses along the river could easily be outflanked from the north and south. Bryansk front was already very artillery/engineer heavy (Including a full artillery penetration corps), as it still had to cross several river lines east of the Oka.
 
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Deleted member 1487

11th Guard's forces were concentrated West of the Oka, as was Central Front; any defenses along the river could easily be outflanked from the north and south. Bryansk front was already very artillery/engineer heavy (Including a full artillery penetration corps), as it still had to cross several river lines east of the Oka.

Understood. However evacuating the Oka bridgehead would free up German forces and if timed right disjoint the Soviet offensive to clear the East bank of the river. The withdrawal could then play a part in a wider phased withdrawal to the Hagen line. There are limits to Soviet maneuver, so a properly conducted mobile defense in the Orel pull out could be handled by the German armor forces not depleted in the Kursk offensive. Yes, of course they would have to deal with extra Soviet armor, but given that the Germans fought best in open armor maneuver warfare, those extra Soviet armor units would likely suffer the same fate they experienced at Prokhorovka. On balance both forces would end up with less overall losses come the end of the operation compared to OTL without the Kursk offensive, but the Soviets wouldn't be overrunning the German repair facilities that were loaded with damaged armor from the Kursk campaign, which resulted in a major shortfall of equipment for the Germans after the Orel offensive IOTL.

Instead the Germans would have more armor to use for the coming Ukraine offensive, something they could spare less than the Soviets.
 
Understood. However evacuating the Oka bridgehead would free up German forces and if timed right disjoint the Soviet offensive to clear the East bank of the river. The withdrawal could then play a part in a wider phased withdrawal to the Hagen line. There are limits to Soviet maneuver, so a properly conducted mobile defense in the Orel pull out could be handled by the German armor forces not depleted in the Kursk offensive. Yes, of course they would have to deal with extra Soviet armor, but given that the Germans fought best in open armor maneuver warfare, those extra Soviet armor units would likely suffer the same fate they experienced at Prokhorovka. On balance both forces would end up with less overall losses come the end of the operation compared to OTL without the Kursk offensive, but the Soviets wouldn't be overrunning the German repair facilities that were loaded with damaged armor from the Kursk campaign, which resulted in a major shortfall of equipment for the Germans after the Orel offensive IOTL.

Instead the Germans would have more armor to use for the coming Ukraine offensive, something they could spare less than the Soviets.

The Red Army learned a number of lessons about executing a pursuit operation from its Rzhev-Vyazma Operation in March, where it attempted and failed to disrupt the German withdrawal from the Rzhev Salient. The most important lesson was to conduct active Razvedka (A similar term to Maskirovka, meaning "reconnaisance") in order to keep track of German intentions and preempt them. A withdrawal, even a fairly short one, is a complicated procedure which involves constructing switchlines, a new rearward position, and falling back in good order to avoid a breakthrough. As I mentioned earlier, 9th and 2nd Panzer Armies were aided by Model's decision to construct numerous rear positions, which made their eventual withdrawal to the Hagen position much easier. ITTL they have only had a short period of time to conduct an intermediate position along the Oka, and the Hagen position won't have even begun construction.

I do agree that Soviet armor will suffer heavily; but not nearly as much so as IOTL where it was never able to achieve a full penetration into the German operational rear, and only then were mauled by German armored counterstrokes.

German armor operating in the Orel salient was used in the Smolensk region, at Bryansk, and at Sevsk. Army Group Center, even when the most dramatic offensives were happening in the sout. It remained a very powerful formation and was only reduced in size later as the front stabilized and the situation in the Ukraine degenerated further.
 
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