Ineffective US in WWII

[DrakonFin]

With all the threads about how the Axis could do better in the war, how about looking at the US weak points for a change?

What PoD(s), in your opinion, would make the American war effort most ineffective, bungling and lame, and how would this affect the overall results of the war? PoD(s) must take place after July, 1939 and the US must still make war against both the European Axis and Japan.

 

[SRegan]

The timeline I'm currently working on diminishes the impact of the US on the war by having it wholeheartedly embrace eugenics and racial hygiene - which means a vastly delayed Manhattan Project (no poaching Jewish and Italian scientists from British and European universities), as well as a war economy crippled by race riots. However, I've had to progressively move the P.O.D. back until now it's in the early '20s (with a beefed-up 1924 Immigration Act as a major lynchpin).

Chuichi Nagumo authorising a third wave of attacks against Pearl Harbour targetting the carriers, drydock facilities and fuel stocks is very unlikely given the risk it would have involved, but if the US had provoked Japan into making a more decisive strike, it could have kept America out of the Pacific for a good 18 months. Similarly, no attack on Pearl at all * might have had a similarly crippling effect: it would have kept the US focused on Plan D/Plan Dog (AKA keeping Japan out of the East Pacific), allowing Japan time to absorb its conquests and (correct me if this is incorrect) means the USN wouldn't be forced to rely on the carriers, putting them at a considerable disadvantage against the IJN once they finally decide to get around to Japan (I believe none of the salvaged Pearl Harbour battleships were actually used in battle, as by that point it was obvious they were obsolete compared to Japanese ships). These P.O.Ds, however, still hinge on what someone else does to the US, rather than something the US does to itself, which is probably what you want.

The US Presidential elections 1940 could be another good P.O.D. - I can't see any way for Willkie to win an outright victory (particularly as Roosevelt will always bury him in the electoral college), but another candidate campaigning on a purely isolationist platform could prove popular enough to weaken US response to the war (Willkie promised "unlimited aid" to the UK which meant he wasn't seen as sufficiently different). Alternatively, if the Republicans put up a pro-war candidate (a little ASB in itself), Roosevelt might have to make more hay of his "no foreign wars" promise to win the popular vote, which could encourage him to stick to it (at least as far as Germany is concerned) and avoid deploying troops on European soil.

* Perhaps if the Hull Note made no mention of Japanese-occupied Indochina, which after all had a veneer of legitimacy, and the attack force is recalled.

 

[Peter]

The US was bungling and lame. It fought a tenth (and not the best tenth) of the German army for a year, and hardly achieved more then the Germans had done in a month against the unified armies of Britain, France and Benelux in 1940, and that with the undoubtedly vastest resources of all the participants of the war.

 

[Inferus]

You could have Zangara's assassination attempt on FDR succeed in 1933 making John Nance Garner effectively the President. Garner was notorious for wanting to balance the budget (deficit spending and the New Deal will not happen), a staunch isolationist, and lacking in personal charisma. His policies may have hurt the American economy worse and the American people may have been on the verge of riot without a uniting force like FDR who was able to convey that things would improve. Garner would definitely not have prodded the Japanese or the Nazis the way FDR did attempting to incite a war. Also, with his tight budgets, whether or not the American military would expand or modernize under his aegis is debatable. This includes the expansion of the US Navy that became important during the early 1940s. The man fully believed the natural boundaries of the US (Atlantic and Pacific Oceans) were enough to keep enemies at bay.

 

[Redbeard]

With a slightly less determinded person than FDR a "Germany first" war effort would have been unlikely and USA in general would have been less prepared for war in 1941. A less "escalationist" policy in the North Atlantic in 1940-41 will also lessen the chance of Germany declaring war on USA after PH.

Had Churchill not could tell and show his government in 40-41, that FDR and USA promised full support and active participation ASAP, I doubt Churchill would have lasted long as PM, and a peace with Germany had been sought.

So have FDR choke in an applepie - and the world would be a terrible place to be in...

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Mostlyharmless]

A very late POD might be if Yamamoto's resignation was accepted by Nakano and Japan attacks only the British and the Dutch. Assume that FDR just manages to get a declaration of war with only one or two spare votes. Assume that the Germans notice the low majority and do not declare war immediately but start to ignore the Neutrality Zone. Again FDR just gets a DoW against Germany. However, he has two big problems.

The first is economic. In order to win the DoW, FDR may have denied that full economic mobilization was needed to fight Japan. Thus he may not be able get economic controls through Congress. OTL the USA stopped making cars etc. What if industry continues to make consumer goods? There could be very serious inflation within a year and much lower production.

The second is conscription. If the war is fairly unpopular in some area, such as Chicago, this could cause some problems.

If the war goes badly, there will be almost a third of Congress saying that all this is not their fault. The war in the Pacific could very well start badly if political pressure does not allow MacArthur to be abandoned and Kimmel's fleet takes on the Japanese without reinforcement or the training provided by the island raids. Note that rather few ships had radar in 1941. The result could be that FDR has to discuss/adapt his strategy to appease critics and this could be much worse after the November 1942 elections.

If we allow multiple PODs, we could have Germany treating the Western USSR much better, allowing American journalists to travel and talk to Ukrainians etc. Reports of previous Soviet atrocities could undermine support for Lend-Lease to Russia.

If Germany had realized in 1940 that Sealion was impossible and not launched the Battle of Britain or London Blitz, support for Britain and Lend-Lease would also have been lower.

No Churchill from May 1940, might have meant no Tizard mission even if Britain decided to fight on. America's forces might then have worse radar, no proximity fuses and less information on nuclear fission.

 

[Markus]

Chuichi Nagumo authorising a third wave of attacks against Pearl Harbour targetting the carriers, drydock facilities and fuel stocks is very unlikely given the risk it would have involved, but if the US had provoked Japan into making a more decisive strike, it could have kept America out of the Pacific for a good 18 months.


Similarly, no attack on Pearl at all * might have had a similarly crippling effect: it would have kept the US focused on Plan D/Plan Dog (AKA keeping Japan out of the East Pacific), allowing Japan time to absorb its conquests and (correct me if this is incorrect) means the USN wouldn't be forced to rely on the carriers, putting them at a considerable disadvantage against the IJN once they finally decide to get around to Japan (I believe none of the salvaged Pearl Harbour battleships were actually used in battle, as by that point it was obvious they were obsolete compared to Japanese ships).

Don´t let CalBear read this!
A third wave was neither planned, nor possible, nor desirable because it would not have had the effect you describe but the opposite one.

An attack on the tank farm and repair facilities by carrier planes with a very limited payload would not have done enough damage to put PH out of action for 18 days, much less 18 month. Plus one can send supplies to Australia from the west coast.

No attack on PH could have encouraged the US to send more ships and planes to the DEI and Australia.

Most US BB were as new or as old as most IJN BB.

The Essex-class CV were already under construction.

 

[Dilvish]

The US was bungling and lame. It fought a tenth (and not the best tenth) of the German army for a year, and hardly achieved more then the Germans had done in a month against the unified armies of Britain, France and Benelux in 1940, and that with the undoubtedly vastest resources of all the participants of the war.

Here's the answer. Have the USA be as bungling and lame as a lot of people believe.

dilvish

 

[Markus]

Here's the answer. Have the USA be as bungling and lame as a lot of people believe.

dilvish

He´s blunt but he does have a point or do battles like Falaise, Hürtgenwald or the Bulge pass for textbook examples of quick, daring action? Not to mention Clark´s screwup in Italy.

 

[Bearcat]

He´s blunt but he does have a point or do battles like Falaise, Hürtgenwald or the Bulge pass for textbook examples of quick, daring action? Not to mention Clark´s screwup in Italy.

He's right but wrong.

Yes, the US had no clue about manuever. Our infantry were not quite as good as Britains, and they were a distant second to the Wehrmacht (third, really; the Soviets were untrained but tough bastards).

The US was a 'hey Diddle, Diddle, straight up the middle' army. With lots of artillery and air support.

Notice, however: it worked. The US Army circa '44 was far from pretty, but given time, firepower did its mojo.

 

[Bearcat]

I believe none of the salvaged Pearl Harbour battleships were actually used in battle, as by that point it was obvious they were obsolete compared to Japanese ships

Ummm.... no.

Read up on the Battle of Surigao Straight.

The old US battleships, once refitted with fire control radar and other upgrades, were useful ships. They weren't in the class of the Iowas, but with their fire control, they could shred any of the older IJN BBs they encountered.

Really their one big handicap was being slow, which meant they couldn't operate with a fast task force.

 

[Markus]

Bearcat, if you take the Wehrmacht as an institution, that is true. If you look at the specific situation in France in 1944 it´s not.

US divisions were all full strength, the GI were younger, in better shape and much, much better trained, they enjoyed good tank support and very good artillery support. On the strategic level they Allies had air supremacy and could read the German mail. Apart form few armoured and motorized divisions German units were well below the American standard and almost all of those “elite” formations were destroyed soon after the invasion.
Case in point Patton: He did not take much risks in his race across France, he knew from Ultra there weren´t many just small, static garrison one could bypass.
Bradley at Falaise is the other extreme. In spite of the US troops advancing against little German opposition he had them stop short of their objective because of a vague fear there might be a tough fight ahead. Same with Ike at the Bulge. Clearly the US Army suffered from severe over caution. He calls it lame and bungling.

 

[xchen08]

Honestly, when you have massive superiority in firepower and manpower, expect continuous reinforcements from home, and the enemy is continually bleeding and getting weaker, there is good cause to be cautious. You know that victory is assured if there is no disaster, so there's no need to throw the dice.

 

[9 Fanged Hummingbird]

He´s blunt but he does have a point or do battles like Falaise, Hürtgenwald or the Bulge pass for textbook examples of quick, daring action? Not to mention Clark´s screwup in Italy.

Oh yes, because the Brits never lost a single battle or made a single mistake. Ever. Riiiight...

Anyways, another thing in addition to the previously mentioned ideas would be to have some sort of foul-up or political meddling higher up so that the M1 Garand is never issued out and the US Army has to settle for Springfields. It ain't a bad rifle, but the Garand did make a significant difference and influence infantry tactics. Basically, just have US arms development take a significant hit so that their more advanced designs take longer to get to the field.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

As to this myth that Lucas mishandled the landings, the operation had Patton in anguish, convinced that disaster was so likely that he told Lucas his only hope to keep his life and his career might be a wound sufficiently debilitating to force his evacuation for medical reasons on the first day. When Patton believes an operaton is so risky that drive and determination can't save it...

Clark didn't matter until December 1944 when Italy was an extremely secondary campaign with supplies in constant demand and all the best troops going to France or Greece.

 

[Jukra]

With all the threads about how the Axis could do better in the war, how about looking at the US weak points for a change?

What PoD(s), in your opinion, would make the American war effort most ineffective, bungling and lame, and how would this affect the overall results of the war? PoD(s) must take place after July, 1939 and the US must still make war against both the European Axis and Japan.

Here's two options in no particular order of importance:

Patton as Supreme Allied Commander

After screwing up diplomatic relations with all allies he would lead the Allied Armies recklessly into some gigantic trap. As a result, we'd see Red Army on Rhine at the end of the war.

M6 instead of M4 as standard tank

Allied armored units lose the few ingredients of flexibility they have due to massive logistic needs and slow speed of M6.

 

[Markus]

Clark didn't matter until December 1944 when Italy was an extremely secondary campaign with supplies in constant demand and all the best troops going to France or Greece.

I was refering to the advance after the breakout from the beachhead. That was long after Lucas had been made the scarificial lamb. Clark had a great opportunity to cut off the 10th Army but let it escape because he wanted to be first in Rome. I included this event in "The Italian Job"

Oh yes, because the Brits never lost a single battle or made a single mistake. Ever. Riiiight...

OT as were are not talking about the British Army.

 

[zoomar]

The US was bungling and lame. It fought a tenth (and not the best tenth) of the German army for a year, and hardly achieved more then the Germans had done in a month against the unified armies of Britain, France and Benelux in 1940, and that with the undoubtedly vastest resources of all the participants of the war.

Clearly an invite to flame, but it is a point worth making. US victory (which would have been inevitable even if they were alone in fighting Germany and Japan) was due more to overwhelming odds and logistics rather than inspired generalship, technological innovation, and selflless courage.

I think one of two main things are necessary to truly diminsh the impact of the US in WW2: (1) have the US enter the war without the clear call to arms provided by Pearl Harbour, or (2) have the Wallies fail to come to an agreement on the "Germany first" strategy. In either case, the US effort could be desultory, misdirected, or both.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

How about not having them fight in WW1? Without that experience there would be an awful lot of learning on the job, making them more of a nuisance to their allies than a help. I'm sure they could get more proficient by the end, but they may not be all that good by the time it ends.