Indonesian what-ifs - Suharto doesn't rise to power

As I recently visited Indonesia, I became somewhat more interested in the recent history of that country. So I did some reading about the circumstances of Suhartos rise to power. The following is mostly based on the book:


Pretext for Mass Murder
The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia
John Roosa
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006

[The following summary of content and interpretation are mine...]

In the fall off 1965, Suharto moved against the Communist's and isolated President Sukarno under the pretext that he was just countering a Communist Coup. There are, however, many incoherences about the alleged Communist coup - so that even the allegation that the whole thing was just a framing by Suharto and the CIA doesn't look totally impossible.

During the late 1950's, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) under Chairman Aidit had gained much influence, especially in Java. When President Sukarno suspended parliamentary rule, the PKI supported this move and joined the national unity government under Sukarnos principle of NASAKOM (Unity of Nationalism, Islam, and Communism.). The US government, afraid about rising communist influence, covertly supported right wing secessionist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Those movements were put down by the national army and President Sukarno. Although there have been hints about the involvement of the CIA with the rebels, and the US-Indonesian relations became quite difficult, the CIA still kept good contacts to many officers of the Indonesian Army. But both President Sukarno and the PKI decried the formation of Malaysia in 1963 as a plot of British and American Imperialism. Sukarno declared the 'Confrontation' with Malaysia - never officially called a war. The Confrontation didn't see major military action, partly because the pro-US forces within the Indonesian army didn't really support the war effort.
So the PKI did demand the formation of a peoples militia, both to support the 'Confrontation' and to counter the right wing influence within the army. In mid 1965, rumors about an imminent army coup were running wild in Jakarta.

According to Roosa, the right wing army leaders were aware that they couldn't strike first (staging an outright coup), because President Sukarno was still very popular. They needed a (at least halfway) credible pre-text to move against the PKI, and thus the Communist had to be lured in to a trap, so that they would move first.
Most PKI leaders weren't involved in (or even informed about)the September 30 Movement. But party Chairman Aidit had been involved. He had become convinced that a coup from the army was likely, and that the pro-PKI forces in the Army should thus strike preemptively. The Movement relied, however, mostly on the PKI's contact man to the Army, a certain Sjam. [Some people think he was a double agent]. Sjam was not a known Communist (he pretended to be a businessman). He was the key contact figure between PKI Chairman Aidit and pro Communist military-officers. Aidit trusted Sjam and his judgement. [One possible interpretation is that Sjam launched the Movement entirely on his own initiative - stating towards Aidit that it is an entirely internal Movement within the Army, asking for political support by the PKI, and towards the involved pro-communist officers - that the Movement is backed by the party and hence their duty as loyal comrades]
The aim of the Movement was to arrest leading army officers believed / accused to be plotting a coup - be in league with the CIA. The abducted officers should then be presented to President Sukarno, the Movement would publicly be announced as a move (of forces within the Army) to protect the President. Hopefully, the President would support the arrest of those officers, allow the intended formation of revolutionary councils - including many communists, but not evidently dominated by them - with the task of purging the Army from 'agents of Neocolonialism and US-Imperialism'.

Planning and execution of the Movement, however, were extremely in-adept. The Commandos ordered to capture the generals were prepared insufficiently, the most prominent General (Nasution) escaped, other generals were probably already fatally wounded during their capture. The plotters didn't have adequate data about the whereabouts of President Sukarno during the night to October first (although the nominal leader, Colonel Untung, was an officer of the Palace guard.). So they could not present the captured officers to the President ASAP. When the prisoners were brought to Halim air-force base (the headquarter of the plotters), some were already dead or dying. Although the Movement controlled the national radio, and the main square in down-town Jakarta, there were no clear public announcements about the intentions, as they were waiting for approval by the President. When the President finally arrived at Halim, he could not approve of a Movement that had killed - and not only arrested - some of his leading generals. But he appointed a new Chief of the Army, General Pranoto, who was acceptable for the Movement. At the same time, the more desperate forces of the Movement had announced over the radio that the revolutionary councils would replace the government, and thus had moved themselves totally in to the offside. Pranoto could never take office as new Chief of the Army, as Suharto didn't allow him to meet the President. So, how had Suharto emerged as the strong man in that situation so fast?

At the time, Suharto was chief of Kostrad, the Army's strategic reserve. Kostrad didn't command troops on it's own, it had to lend them from other military regions. The Kostrad headquarter was on Merdeka Square in Downtown Jakarta, that was occupied by the Movement. But neither was Suharto arrested nor the Kostrad building occupied by the Movements forces. When Suharto learned about the successful abduction of many leading officers, he appointed himself acting Army Chief, and was accepted in that position by army commanders in much of the country, while the President was still incommunicado. But even after Sukarno had appointed General Pranoto as new Army Chief, Suharto kept that position and did not allow Pranoto to meet the President, and he himself did not go to Halim Air-force base to meet Sukarno, as ordered.

Why didn't the plotters include Suharto in the list of Generals to be arrested, and why didn't they occupy his headquarter, although they had troops in front of the building? One explanation given is that they didn't consider Suharto to be an opponent. The two leading Army officers among the plotters, Colonel's Latief and Untung, considered themselves personal friends of Suharto, Latief even claimed at his trial that he had informed Suharto in person at the evening of September 30th about the Movement. The Movements troops occupying Merdeka square had been recently moved from East- and Central Java at the orders of Suharto, they were intended to participate in an Army parade on October 5th, and Suharto had inspected them just on the day before the rebellion. And then, the plotters hadn't even organized food supplies for the troops involved in the Movement, so Suharto could turn one Battalion over to his side by just offering to feed them. Roosa argues that Suharto didn't just act spontaneously, but that he did implement a pre-existing plan of the Army command for a counterstrike in case a pretext would be found. Striking fast against the plotters, seizing media-control and demanding emergency competencies from the President to deal with the crisis, Suharto managed to blow up the Rebellion (who had only killed seven officers) out of every proportion. Army forces and militias instigated by the army killed hundreds of thousands of people in the next months, but this wasn't mentioned in the censored mass media of the country. President Sukarno was opposed to Suhartos actions, but with emergency powers granted to the army, and the Media censored, he couldn't make himself heard. So he became more and more isolated, until Suharto was finally capable to push him aside and assume the Presidency for himself.

--------------------------------------------

So this situations offers at least room for three possible PoD's.

1. What if Aidit and Sjam don't fall in to the trap of the Army leadership, don't act on the rumors of an imminent military coup?

2. What if they plan more carefully and use commanders that - rightfully - distrust Suharto? So Suharto is arrested as well. The arrested generals remain alive, and Sukarno supports their suspension until the allegations of 'sabotage to the war effort in league with the forces of Neocolonialism' are resolved.

3. What if General Pranoto would have met with President Sukarno and accepted to be the new Army Chief?

If #1 - it seems likely that the stalemate between PKI and Army command would have lasted for quite some more time. Thus, it might be possible that the PKI successfully campaigns for the creation of a peoples militia and for investigations of the rumors about a US inspired coup complot and the accusations about sabotage against the nations efforts in 'Confrontation'. If this leads to a gradual purge of the army leadership and the creation of a new armed force under strong PKI influence, this might finally lead to a situation were the PKI (disguised as the _one true patriotic and Sukarnoist force_) can achieve the leading position in the Nasakom coalition,

If#2 - the September 30th Movement would actually succeed. This doesn't mean an imminent Communist takeover, but would most likely mean activities of 'revolutionary committees' all over the country, an intense purge of the army from 'pro-imperialist' forces and the quick formation of militias to support the activities. Thus, the PKI might emerge as the leading force of the Nasakom coalition much faster - and much more certain - than in scenario #1.

#3 - assuming that Sukarno can communicate to the nation the appointment of another Army Chief (other than Suharto, that is), it seems well possible that most officers would rally behind the President and accept General Pranoto in that position. Thus there would likely be no counterstrike. The officers leading the plot would be arrested, but the investigation would not only be directed against them, but the question 'Was there really a plot to overthrow the President?' and 'Are there forces within the Army sabotaging the war effort (Confrontation)?' would also be addressed. There would be no major bloodletting. The PKI leadership might succeed in whitewashing themselves from any involvement in the Movement. The Movement could be depicted as the unauthorized - and thus unacceptable - move of over-active junior officers, acting out of genuine concern about right-wing plots within the army, but unfortunately without coordinating their actions with the President or the PKI leadership. If they manage to do that somewhat successfully, we might still end up in a situation where the army is purged from more pro-US than pro-Communist officers, were a militia is still formed, and the PKI still rises to the position as the leading group among the 'Sukarnoist' forces.

So we end basically with two alternate mid-and long term scenarios.

In the first, the Communists become the leading factor in Indonesian politics and emerge more or less in control within two to three years (sometime between 1967 and 1969). This seems likely if the September 30th Movement is a success (#2), well possible if they don't fall in to the trap set by the army (#1), still possible - but not that likely - if they screw up the Movement, but another Army Chief instead of Suharto (#3) emerges on top.

What would be the effects of a successful communist takeover in Indonesia at the time of the height of the Vietnam War be on the wider world?

In the second scenario, the communists don't emerge on top, but aren't pushed in to the abyss either. This seems fairly possible in case of PoD #1 above, and the most likely outcome of PoD #3. So Sukarno remains President until his death (may be in 1970 as OTL), as the head of a fragile coalition. What happens after his death? What are the effects of longer lasting Sukarno presidency?


Any thoughts and comments?

Cheers
Good Habit
 

Rockingham

Banned
Well, Indonesian communism was Chinese alligned as far as I know....

So if they come to power, their are a few immediate issues:
-Would the US intervene?
-What would China do in such a scenario?

This could be very bad for China, leading to a longer estrangement from the Western world.

If Sino-American is not significantly worsened by these events, and Mao reforms the communist system like he did OTL:

-Would Indonesia follow Albania in estranging itself from China
-Or would it reform its own system in a similar style to Mao with China.

If the latter option is followed, this could have very positive effects on Indonesia. Granted, it would not be the liberal democracy it is OTL, but it may well experience the same massive economic growth that China did after ther reform....couple with some level of wealth distribution and some aspects of capitalism, it would be the first state to emulate China's economic model. Presumably, it would be more stable then OTL as well.

I could see Indonesia developing nukes as well.

Finally, how would it react to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia? Cambodia was Chinese alligned, but China didn't really provide any assistance. Assuming Indonesia has a navy of any quality, it could provide military aid against the vietnamese....which is probaly a bad thing for Cambodia, a few more decades under Pol Pots thumb....

Another possibility, the US funds an Islamic insurgency, ala afghanistan
 
Wyell, Indonesian communism was Chinese alligned as far as I know....

I'm afraid, ideology is often overrated... ¨
What Comrade Aidit might have done when in power might be quite different from what people would have expected from their ideological background...;)

So if they come to power, their are a few immediate issues:
-Would the US intervene?
-What would China do in such a scenario?

Depends much on how and when. - Let's assume that the September 30th movement is a success, which means that revolutionary commitees and a peoples militia are formed nation wide, the army and bureaucracy is toroughly purged from (real and alleged) US sympatizers, and then - say mid 66 - the second stage of the revolution is offically proclaimed (say - Sukarno remains President as figurehead, but a PM is in charge of the real administration, nominated by the 'Nasakom coalition' (de facto controlled by the Communists), and the high command of the armed forces is transfered from the President to the 'Chairman of the national revolutionary council', which happens to be Comrade Aidit. His pictures are now placed beside those of Sukarno in all government offices....

Don't forget that this is at the height of the Vietnam war - so all the Domino theorists have the proof that they are right (except that it's worse than their worst nightmares) - 'Who lost Indonesia' might be a big question?
The US don't really have that many troops to spare, unless they pull out of Vietnam or go on a full war footing.
And, ideology aside, I can easily see the new regime seeking support from both Bejing and Moscow against the threat of US intervention - so all bets are open - depends if Johnson can accept defeat and withdraw from the entire region (which might, in turn, make the Domino theory true - no point in siding with the US when they just walk away when it get's hot - let's join the winning team...) If not, things might get a bit scary...:eek:

This could be very bad for China, leading to a longer estrangement from the Western world.
Depending if this TL sees WW III or not, this might matter - or not....
If Sino-American is not significantly worsened by these events, and Mao reforms the communist system like he did OTL:
To points..
?Mao reforms the communist system like IOTL? Is this a DBWI? :confused:
Mao supported the 'great leap forward', and the 'cultural revolution'. He supported / or at least tolerated the campaign against Deng and the 'followers of the capitalist way' imediatly before his death. Such a TL might as well see the 'Gang of four' emerge on top.
And second - yes - the Sino-American relations would almost certainly not recover during Nixons presidency, or who ever will be in the white house ITTL.

Finally, how would it react to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia? Cambodia was Chinese alligned, but China didn't really provide any assistance. Assuming Indonesia has a navy of any quality, it could provide military aid against the vietnamese....which is probaly a bad thing for Cambodia, a few more decades under Pol Pots thumb....

The above is likely butterflied away... If Indonesia goes communist in 1966, the Vietnam war will likely take a different turn - so that the CIA still supports Lon Nol's coup against Sihanouk, and that the Khmer rouge still arrise as the 'patriotic alternative', seems very improbable.
To say that China didn't provide assistance to Cambodia might be a bit unfair, BTW. They invaded North Vietnam (not very sucessfully...), and sent weapons to all the Cambodian resistance forces (via Thailand).

Another possibility, the US funds an Islamic insurgency, ala afghanistan

This is well possible, especially because I wouldn't count to much on Communist Indonesia aquiring a very efficent navy very soon - so smuggling weapons in per boat might be rather frequent. This would, most likely, not be enough in itself to overturn the situation, and could easily lead to a longer, mulitside cold war.
 
If the latter option is followed, this could have very positive effects on Indonesia. Granted, it would not be the liberal democracy it is OTL, but it may well experience the same massive economic growth that China did after ther reform....couple with some level of wealth distribution and some aspects of capitalism, it would be the first state to emulate China's economic model. Presumably, it would be more stable then OTL as well.

Hasn't Indonesia's economy been growing respectably for a while anyway?

Hmm, I dunno. It seems to me that this sort of situation could lead to the fragmentation of Indonesia.
 
Top