Indonesia ATL: The Presidency of Try Sutrisno (1997-)

Hello guys, it's been a hectic two weeks and a bit in OTL for me. Basically I'm in a household of 7 and 4 of us tested positive with Covid. I'm lucky to be one of the 3 who tested negative and have had no symptoms even though I had to stay indoors for a bit because I was a close contact. I managed to post the previous update because that was mostly done but since that time, just been busy with the household stuff; (cleaning the dishes, sweeping the floor, washing clothes etc.) a lot of which has been entrusted for me to do in addition to keeping an eye on the family member who have required treatment at hospital. Yes, we have to live "side by side" with covid but it's still pretty stressful when it happens.

Yes, I can say that images from the ITTL world flashed through my head when doing the chores and have kept me cheerful during this stressful time. It's just that by the time I'm done with the chores and work, there's not a whole lot of energy left.

-Somewhere over the Congo
 
Thank you very much all for the best wishes. Everybody who has tested positive has now tested negative again.

Now moving on to business. Still making my way through Africa and it's a whole different beast than Latin America. So many countries (the next chapter is set to have 16 countries when there are 12 countries in all of South America) across a big continent. I am taking my time with this one not only because I'm doing this in between everything else but also because this update has some pretty heavyduty African countries (Zimbabwe, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Kenya) and Indonesia's showing up a lot as well.

As far as updates go, we are looking at the following:

Africa Part 2 (What I'm working on now)

Africa Part 3 (Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Sudan)

Africa Part 4 (Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia)

Then it'll be (this will consist of parts of course):
-Middle East
-Western Europe
-Central Europe
-Eastern Europe
-Central Asia
-South Asia
-Oceania
-North Asia
-Southeast Asia

Anyway, based on the last paragraph. THE HYPE IS REAL... Though will wait till "the world americas part" is done(i'm sorry but it's soooooo boring 🤣, not your fault. It's just how it is over there).
I would say that it's not boring. But I would say that it does takes me away from Indonesia and that it's unavoidable. I tried to avoid it at first but it hit me around ITTL November 1999 when Try was able to say that Indonesia had gotten past the financial crisis that things wouldn't just be the same for everybody else. And as I said before, something is going to happen that involves the good old NKRI but part of what happens will be determined by where everybody (ie. countries and nations) is positioned on the chessboard.
 
Thank you very much all for the best wishes. Everybody who has tested positive has now tested negative again.

Now moving on to business. Still making my way through Africa and it's a whole different beast than Latin America. So many countries (the next chapter is set to have 16 countries when there are 12 countries in all of South America) across a big continent. I am taking my time with this one not only because I'm doing this in between everything else but also because this update has some pretty heavyduty African countries (Zimbabwe, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Kenya) and Indonesia's showing up a lot as well.

As far as updates go, we are looking at the following:

Africa Part 2 (What I'm working on now)

Africa Part 3 (Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Sudan)

Africa Part 4 (Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia)

Then it'll be (this will consist of parts of course):
-Middle East
-Western Europe
-Central Europe
-Eastern Europe
-Central Asia
-South Asia
-Oceania
-North Asia
-Southeast Asia


I would say that it's not boring. But I would say that it does takes me away from Indonesia and that it's unavoidable. I tried to avoid it at first but it hit me around ITTL November 1999 when Try was able to say that Indonesia had gotten past the financial crisis that things wouldn't just be the same for everybody else. And as I said before, something is going to happen that involves the good old NKRI but part of what happens will be determined by where everybody (ie. countries and nations) is positioned on the chessboard.
Best of luck, hope you don't get overwhelmed on thinking how all these countries fate would be when it's getting further from this TL. It can be really hard researching this and that but yeah, it's a satisfying feeling when your world building is finished.
 
The World Circa May 2002 Part 6: Africa Part 2
Angola:
The nation entered the new century with President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos still at its helm trying to implement the necessary economic policies to improve his nation’s economic conditions. In January 2000, he had signed on with the IMF that would give it leeway to spend more on infrastructure on the condition that revenue would be raised through taxes and spending cuts in other areas. The reality was that the country was still struggling with a drought in late 2000 and a civil war which pushed Dos Santos to spend more on defense even as spending was being cut in other areas. When the IMF reviewed Angola’s performance in February 2001, it was not impressed with Angola’s budget deficits and all assistance were cut off.

Angola’s great fortune came from the east. If at FOCAC, in September 2000, Angola’s reaction to the notion of increased aid and investment from the People’s Republic of China had been merely favorable, its stance towards China after the aid from the IMF was cut off was now an enthusiastic embrace. For its part, China also came rushing in Angola’s direction. In June 2001, Politburo Standing Committee Member Luo Gan visited Angola at the head of a delegation from various ministries. Speaking to Dos Santos, Luo said that China’s goal is to import Angolan oil in exchange for aiding Angola with its infrastructure projects. The two nations moved quickly and in January 2002, Premier of China Zhu Rongji came to visit. Together with Dos Santos, Zhu signed off on agreements across various areas bringing the two nations closer together.

The flow of aid and investment from China, with all the additional funds that it brings, could not compensate the Angolan Government’s failure to end the Civil War. In February 2002, personnel of the Angolan Armed Forces ambushed a convoy of the rebel group the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Among those ambushed was UNITA’s Leader Jonas Savimbi. But in the confusion, Savimbi managed to escape allegedly to Zambia and Dos Santos was left wondering how he could deal a decisive blow.

Being the largest Lusophonic nation in Africa and for its support for the Timor Leste, it was Angola rather than Mozambique which occupies Indonesia’s attention and suspicion as a strong supporter of East Timor separatism in Africa. Increasingly, however there was something of a begrudging respect and admiration for Angola’s Armed Forces within the ABRI Headquarters. Angola’s installation of a government in the Republic of the Congo and its defense of the government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, served as a model for some officers of how Indonesia could impose itself militarily on the region.

Zambia:
For Zambia, which had complained bitterly about obeying the IMF’s conditions to the letter but had only economic stagnation to show for it, there was nothing they could do as the Stanley Fischer-led IMF, backed by the McCain Administration hardened its stance on nations getting leniency. President Frederick Chiluba became bitter; claiming that Zambia did not see, much less feel, the leniency from the IMF that other nations had experienced prior to the IMF’s taking a hardline stance with the arrival of the McCain Administration. At the 2001 Non-Aligned Movement in Bangladesh in October 2001, Chiluba voiced his grievances even going as far as criticizing close neighbor and ally Tanzania which was receiving debt relief from the IMF and the World Bank.

Chiluba’s time however ran out having failed to obtain a constitutional amendment for a third term and with a Presidential Election in December 2001. For this contest, Chiluba’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) nominated former vice president Levy Mwanawasa as its candidate. Among the field of presidential candidates, Mwanawasa’s main opponent was the United Party for National Development’s (UNPD) Anderson Mazoka. Mazoka focused his attack on the Chiluba government’s economic record saying that while market reform was the way to go, blindly following the IMF and the World Bank’s prescriptions was not the correct way of going about things. In late December 2001, on election day, Mazoka defeated Mwanawasa. In January 2002, he was inaugurated as president.

Mazoka sought a break with the past and within days of taking office, he reintroduced free education and medical care. Within weeks of taking office however, Mazoka found himself in a stand-off with the IMF over the fact that such policies were not in line with the IMF’s expectations. With the IMF threatening to withheld aid, Mazoka received an unexpected source of help. At the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) in Brisbane, Australia in March 2002, Mazoka met with British Foreign Secretary Gordon Brown. Brown, seeking to make his mark in his new job and prevent Zambia from “falling into China’s hands” the way Angola did, came to an agreement with Mazoka. Mazoka would continue to fulfill existing Zambian obligations to the IMF, but the United Kingdom would increase its aid to Zambia so that it can fund its education and health policies.

Zimbabwe:
Prime Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa’s international debut came at the 2001 G-15 Summit in May 2001 at Jakarta, Indonesia; his visit to Indonesia being his first trip overseas since assuming office. Though President Robert Mugabe still held office, Mnangagwa was already being seen as Zimbabwe’s de facto leader and the Indonesian press enjoyed drawing parallels between Mnangagwa and Soeharto; the latter seen as holding de facto power in Indonesia for some time before becoming president. Mnangagwa shied away from the comparison saying that he saw himself as being “in the mould of President Try”. Though he was the G-15 leader that signed the least agreements, the trip was seen as a successful one for Mnangagwa. The coverage Mnangagwa received was second only to that of the host city of Jakarta itself which got a lot of positive coverage for being the center of a burgeoning economy.

Things were also looking good for Mnangagwa at home. He had retained Simba Makoni as minister of finance and together they formed a partnership to stabilize Zimbabwe’s economy throughout 2001 with Makoni being backed by Mnangagwa on the agreed policies. Mnangagwa also consolidated his position in the Armed Forces by committing himself not to cut the size of military personnel; all of the budget savings being made by Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the Second Congo War. Through sound economic policies, non-participation in the Congo War, and clamping down on an increasing tendency to print money, inflation, which reached 45% in 2000, was reduced to 21% in 2001. If all goes well, inflation would be below double digits in 2002.

As power rapidly dissipated around him, Mugabe made some noise about the damage it was doing to the prestige of Zimbabwe to withdraw from the Second Congo War. He was not wrong for it had been his idea that Zimbabwe intervene in what became the Second Congo War. There was speculation that he was looking for a face-saving exit out of the Second Congo War and Mnangagwa was the answer. It was why he did not get in Mnangagwa’s way.

As the Zimbabwean Presidential Election approached, the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai felt his support eroding as the general populace looked with favor at the results of Mnangagwa and Makoni’s work. On the other hand, Mnangagwa continued to gain momentum and was nominated as presidential candidate by the ruling ZANU-PF party. Though he would continue to be supported by those wanting Mugabe’s regime to fall Tsvangirai lost momentum and in March 2002, he was defeated by Mnangagwa in the Presidential Elections.

Not long thereafter, Mugabe’s time at Zimbabwe’s helm became history. He watched on as Mnangagwa took office as the new President of Zimbabwe and named Makoni as prime minister.

Malawi:
In December 2001 and early 2002, it became clear that Malawi was undergoing a famine after it had suffered a bad harvest across all of its crops. Taking advantage of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s focus on Afghanistan, Russia was the first nation to give aid in the form of grain. The advantage of being the first to assist, however, was that it allowed one to voice their opinion on the matter. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov said that the Russian government felt “there might be something” to the notion that the IMF had got it wrong by telling Malawi to sell its grain reserves in 2001. Not to be outdone, the United States and the United Kingdom combined to also provide their own aid. United States Secretary of State Richard Williamson said that the IMF was not to blame saying that it was using the excellent 2000 harvest as reference for its instruction for Malawi to sell its grain reserves.

Based on its actions elsewhere in the world, including in Africa, however, it was easy to cast the IMF as the villain and it was easy to see the point of view advocated by Russia. IMF Managing Director Stanley Fischer said that he makes no apology about the stance that the IMF had taken.

Sao Tome and Principe:
After the three-way meeting with his comrades of Mozambique, Xanana Gusmao departed for Libya. He took the opportunity for overseas travel to transit at Sao Tome and Principe. Xanana’s intention had been to consolidate support for East Timor’s cause in a country where that support began to cool. There, Xanana met Prime Minister Gabriel Costa, who had been asked to form government after an inconclusive legislative election. Costa, who was Sao Tome and Principe’s Ambassador to Portugal prior to being summoned back to become prime minister, only had bad news for Xanana. The news from Lisbon is that diplomatic relations with Indonesia is only a matter of time and that Brazil and Spain had exerted their own respective pressures on Portugal to mend fences with Indonesia. In all likelihood, Costa said, Sao Tome and Principe will follow suit. At the end of the meeting, Xanana could not have gone to the airport any more quickly to depart for Libya.

Sao Tome and Principe continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Equatorial Guinea:
As the new century dawned, Equatorial Guinea was home to the highest economic growth rates in the world. The arrival of the McCain Administration saw the the US Embassy in Equatorial Guinea, closed in 1995, being reopened. Being an oil rich nation and with American oil companies making a lot of investments in the country, Washington was not keen to see this nation fall into the Russia and China camp even if it meant supporting the regime of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo; seen to have only benefitted the political elite rather than the general populace in addition to being repressive. After 9/11, with Middle Eastern nations being less than absolute in their support for the War on Terror, more aid and investment flowed Equatorial Guinea’s way from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Gabon:
Indonesia’s courtship of Gabon continued. Since 2000, Indonesia would send a cake to the Presidential Palace at Libreville on 17th August to mark Gabon’s independence. President of Gabon Omar Bongo returned the favor by making sure a cake was also sent to the Presidential Palace in Jakarta on 17th August on Indonesia’s Independence Day. A delegation led by Indonesian Minister of Mining and Energy Djiteng Marsudi visited Gabon in April 2001 concluded a deal for technical exchange between Pertamina and the Gabonian Societe Nationale Petroliere Gabonaise, Gabon’s state-owned oil company.

The Republic of the Congo:
In the Republic of the Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso assumed power as president with the backing of his followers and Angola in 1997. For the first two years of his presidency, Sassou-Nguesso fought a war against the followers of his deposed predecessor, Pascal Lissouba. It was only in late 1999 that the last of the rebel militias surrendered to Sassou-Nguesso’s government. Over the next two years, Sassou-Nguesso tried to normalize political and economic life in the Republic of the Congo including attempting to formulate a new constitution though this was not without its distractions.

With Second Congo War just across the river at the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sassou-Nguesso quickly came under pressure from Angola’s Dos Santos in the middle of 2000 to join the war; a pressure made all the more real by Angola still having a contingent of troops stationed in the Republic of the Congo. With Mugabe losing de facto power to Mnangagwa after a disastrous legislative election in Zimbabwe and the latter wanting to pull Zimbabwe out of the war to focus on its economy, Angola was keen to make up for Zimbabwe’s absence. Sassou-Nguesso was a tough customer and refused to take part, pointing out that President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Laurent Kabila had supported Lissouba in the Congo Civil War. Sassou-Nguesso instead offered to support Angola’s campaign against the UNITA in the Republic of the Congo in exchange for non-participation in the war. Dos Santos could not reject this offer especially after the failure to get Savimbi in 2002.

The Republic of the Congo would be seen as the first case of a nation successfully playing off the various powers if one wanted to look at the present era as the New Cold War. It received investment infrastructure investment from China in exchange for exporting crude petroleum as well as aid from France and the United States to supplement the conditionalities it agreed with the IMF. On the basis of these factors, the Republic of the Congo’s economy stabilized, a new constitution was approved by referendum in early 2002, and Sassou-Nguesso himself was decisively re-elected as president in March 2002.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo:
At Indonesia’s Army Staff and Command College, the ABRI Staff and Command College, the Lemhanas and where such strategic matters are discussed in Indonesia, the Second Congo War had become a case study; the question being put forward usually asking on whose side Indonesia should enter if it was to hypothetically get involved.

The kneejerk response would usually side with the Democratic Republic of the Congo with ABRI Headquarters’ General Planning Staff declaring that having rebels rising up to fight the government backed by other countries would be a “worst case scenario” if it was to happen to Indonesia and that the Democratic Republic of the Congo was where Indonesia’s sympathies should be with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Department of Foreign Affairs argued that Indonesia should not take sides because the Democratic Republic of Congo itself are also supporting rebels in Rwanda and Uganda and that if Indonesia supported rebels and separatists, it meant that other countries would feel justified in supporting separatist rebellions.

Try Sutrisno had other ideas and scrawled the following on a paper summarizing the views of various agencies on the Second Congo War and Indonesia’s hypothetical role in it:

“Given the ambiguities of the situation, we probably would have done well being a part of the UN Peacekeeping Effort that was deployed there and then was ignored by the belligerents. But we all know that Secretary General Annan doesn't really like us”

Far away from the comfortable meeting rooms, Laurent Kabila continued his fight against rebels who received foreign backing from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. He was dealt a blow in January 2001 when Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Emmerson Mnangagwa, holding the de facto power in Zimbabwe, made good on his promise to begin withdrawing Zimbabwean troops, numbering 12,000 at the end of 2000, from the Second Congo War.

The loss of Zimbabwe caused Kabila to consolidate on the support he had even before the troops were withdrawn. Angola continued to support Congo in exchange for the latter’s support for its campaign against the UNITA. It was to Kabila’s secret delight that Angola failed to deal a decisive blow on the UNITA in early 2002 and then promptly began increasing its troop presence in the Congo. President of Namibia Sam Nujoma remained committed to the war and in his support for Kabila even at the cost of losing aid from EU member states and getting caught in a diplomatic row with South Africa. In December 2000, Kabila concluded a deal with Nujoma that would see Namibia increase its troop presence in exchange for a larger stake in Congo’s natural resources most notably its diamond mines. Kabila also continued to receive both Russian and Chinese backing. Aside from weapons from Russia, there was investment from China.

On the domestic front, Kabila began to improve conditions for his child soldiers, the kadogos. Even if the pay had not improved by much, by late 2000, the kadogos now at the very least had better food for they were consuming Russian rations sent to the Congo as aid. The kadogos saw the situation not so much as improved morale as it was less disgruntlement but said that at the very least, Kabila’s position is safe. Kabila himself said he took these steps regarding the kadogos saying that he needed to make up for 12,000 Zimbabweans that had withdrawn its participation.

It was with these preparations that Kabila and his forces entered 2001. Kabila’s forces, under the leadership of Commander of Land Forces and Kabila’s son Joseph Kabila, added to their territory by July 2001, crossing the demilitarized zone agreed to in the Lusaka Peace Accords in 1999 to overtake regions in the north most notably Lisala, the birthplace of Kabila’s old foe Mobutu Sese Soko. After spending some months consolidating, Kabila made further advances. While the world’s eyes were focused on 9/11 and its immediate aftermath in September 2001, Kabila took Gbadolite near the border with the Central African Republic, a city which Mobutu had built to be a showcase for the country in the past.

Kabila’s advances in 2001 in the north of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had been at the expense of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) which was backed by the Rwandan Government. The advances made by Kabila was supplemented diplomatically; making approaches to President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir to enter the war on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s side. In early 2002 he made no further advances, making a visit to Angola in March 2002 to persuade Dos Santos not to make incursions into Zambia lest it provokes Zambia into entering the war on Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi’s side.

Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi:
The progress Kabila made in the second half of 2001 worried those to his east. While they had sent regular forces to the Second Congo War, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi’s strategy has been to also support the various rebel groups which Kabila had been fighting against. The sight of Kabila’s advances, prompted President of Rwanda Paul Kagame to send the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) through the demilitarized zone to occupy the diamond-rich city of Mbuji-Mayi in October 2001. The Rwandan Army and its rebel allies faced a combined Congolese and Namibian resistance. This resistance, reinforced by Angolan presence forced the Rwandan to retreat by December 2001 to regroup.

One idea was for Burundi to double its troop presence in the war. However, President of Burundi Pierre Buyoya was reluctant. Buyoya had secured the end of the Burundian Civil War in 2000 and begun to implement the terms of the peace which included his government transitioning into becoming a transition government to allow a new government to assume power in April 2001. With peace in his country still relatively tenuous and his becoming a transitional leader, Buyoya was not keen on increasing involvement.

That left Uganda. Though they had been allies in their effort to replace Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda had had gone into war with one another for a few short days over territory occupied in the Congo in June 2000. Amidst continuing suspicion of each other, Kagame visited President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni in January 2002. Museveni, having been re-elected with a reduced majority in 2001 on account of Uganda’s participation in the Second Congo War, was also reluctant to commit extra troops. Museveni did concede that how Sudan stood would be important and said that he would try to persuade Sudan from his end, having seen improved relations with Sudan in the past few years.

Tanzania and Kenya:
“East Africa was a region which we emphasized in those early years of the 2000s as far as building relations were concerned. A big deal is made about our relationship with Nigeria and that’s not without reason, but East Africa and the nations that make up the Eastern African Community (EAC) are important for Indonesia.

First and foremost in this region, for Indonesia’s interests, was Tanzania. We have significant cooperation commitments with them in the field of agriculture and in other areas; they experienced a terrorist attack and as a result from that, share a common attitude with us when it comes to combatting religious extremism. They have also agreed to introduce more of our fast-moving consumer goods into their markets while we have agreed to import their cotton from a better than expected harvest in 2000-2001.

Ultimately, Indonesia and Tanzania’s increasingly close relationship during this period was brought about by our shared experience in the New Cold War. We were both nations which had played important roles in supporting the formation of the NAM, but which was now seen by the NAM as being “pro-Western”; Indonesia because of our strong stance on terrorism and the 10-year moratorium on the payment of debt and Tanzania because it has complied with the IMF’s guidelines and had actually done well by it. In Tanzania’s case, this “pro-Western” reputation was “solidified” when just days after I ended my visit, it was given debt relief by the IMF and the World Bank. By the time of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Bangladesh, they were some glares being thrown their way.

The opportunity in this relationship is that in addition to the cooperation we have across the various areas, we now have the common goal of wanting to work on our non-aligned credentials. This is why after securing the 10-year moratorium on the payment of debt, I wanted to make sure that my March 2002 overseas trip included Iran in the itinerary. Meanwhile, Tanzania had gone about trying to work on its non-aligned credentials more energetically; that early 2002, President Benjamin Mkapa was busy trying to deepen economic relations with its fellow East African Community member countries. In March 2002, President Mkapa also announced Tanzania’s desire to join the G-15. I immediately wrote to President Mkapa saying that he would get Indonesia’s support if this was the case.

The other nation in East Africa with which we built close relations with in the early 2000s is Kenya. Much as Tanzania, it experienced a terrorist attack in 1998 and have as a result also developed a strong stance against terrorism and religious extremism. Much like Tanzania, Kenya is also a market for Indonesian fast-moving consumer goods.

But much like Tanzania, Kenya also has an interesting characteristic that makes it important for us to maintain good relations with it. If in Tanzania, that characteristic is its status as a fellow non-aligned nation seeking to bolster its non-aligned credentials in the face of being seen as pro-Western, Kenya’s unique characteristic is that it unwittingly provides us with a glimpse of what Beijing is thinking.

In 2000 and 2001, President Daniel arap Moi began to drift in the direction of China and taking in aid from it after having run afoul of the IMF and aid was suspended in 2001. This was at the same time that Kenya was taking in our goods, which is completely fine with me. The report I got from our Embassy in Nairobi was that there was a lot of sneering going by Chinese diplomats in Kenya saying that no amount of instant noodles sold by Indonesia will match the highways that China will built as far as gaining influence in Kenya was concerned.

I have no intention of competing with China in Africa. The way I saw it at the time, the more focus they put at building their presence in Africa, the more they see their presence in Africa as part of being a great power, the less focus they have on Southeast Asia. And China was increasing their presence in Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Namibia and other countries. For me that’s just great. I want them busy with Africa instead of focusing on Southeast Asia. I know they certainly enjoyed it when Indonesia was distracted away from them for some time.

The agenda then for Indonesia in Kenya is to ensure that we will have good relations with Kenya regardless of who becomes president after the 2002 Presidential Elections so that we can continue to have an insight into how China is doing. President Moi was term-limited so Kenya was going to get a new president. We’ve had an Embassy in Nairobi since 1982 so we decided to make use of that to maintain relations with those in involved in presidential politics.

In President Moi’s Kenya African National Union (KANU), we kept in touch with those jockeying to become the presidential nominee. Our Embassy in Nairobi told me based on what they heard from the President’s inner circle that President Moi originally wanted to nominate Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of his predecessor. But then he came to the G-15 in Jakarta, learned enough about Indonesian politics that my two challengers were the two respective daughters of my two predecessors, and became uncomfortable with his own plans. By early 2002 Vice President George Saitoti and Minister of Finance Raila Odinga looked the favorite. From the opposition, Mwai Kibaki looked to be the favorite.”

-Excerpt from a speech delivered by the 3rd President of the Republic of Indonesia Try Sutrisno to the Indonesia-Africa Society Anniversary Dinner, 2021.

The Comoros:
An archipelagic nation off the east coast of Africa, the Comoros faced breakdown when two of the four islands in its archipelago declared independence and seceded in 1997. Perceiving weak leadership in the face of these developments, Chief of General Staff Azali Assoumani seized power in a coup in April 1999. Azali consolidated control in the Grande Comoro where the capital Moroni was located. Meanwhile, the OAU maintained a stance which rejected both the secessionists and Azali’s government.

In the end the Comorians themselves settled the peace. Azali met with Said Abeid, the military leader of Anjouan, one of the islands that had seceded. In September 2000, Azali and Said formulated an agreement which stated that the Comoros will be a unitary government with special legislations relating to each island to reflect the uniqueness of the islands and limited autonomy for each island using the principle of deconcentration. Azali said that they are seeking to emulate the arrangements between the central and regional governments in Indonesia saying that it is “an arrangement that works”. By the end of the year the Comoros’ political parties, pro-secessionists elements from the two islands and the OAU were involved in dialogue to flesh out the agreement that had been reached and begin the writing of a new constitution. The new constitution received popular approval through a referendum held in December 2001, it began taking effect in December 2002 and presidential elections were held in March 2002 in which Azali emerged victorious.

Not all were happy with the arrangements. Since 1978, Comoros’ official name had been the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros and the ratification of the new constitution meant that the official name of the nation would now be the Unitary State of the Comoros. The National Front for Justice, an Islamist Party, withdrew from the governing coalition at the dropping of the word “Islamic” from the nation’s official name asking sarcastically in their official statement whether this was also part of the “Indonesian arrangement”.

Seychelles:
In Seychelles the present international situation, whether one called it the New Cold War or the Multipolar Moment, was welcomed. President France-Albert Rene, who had held power since 1977 and was re-elected in September 2001, said in his 2001 NAM Summit speech at Bangladesh in November 2001 that it was an opportunity for NAM. Unlike 40 years ago when the NAM first met, there are now NAM member nations seeking to become major economies in their own right and that this provides an opportunity for the NAM to assert itself and perhaps collectively become a “pole” in the multipolar world. Rene’s speech, however, was drowned out by condemnations of the United States’s recent invasion of Afghanistan and of verbal shots at nations seen to be pro-Western.

---
Angola’s Armed Forces as in OTL alternately installed and defended leaders in the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its road departs from OTL when it failed to kill Savimbi.

Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation gets butterflied away here.

The Second Congo War is truly complicated with nations fighting each other, supporting allies, fighting amongst allies and supporting rebels. The difference between OTL and ITTL is that Kabila doesn’t get assassinated because Zimbabwe’s imminent withdrawal from the war causes him to treat the people that assassinated him in OTL better.

China is growing its presence in Africa more quickly than OTL. The why will be revealed in China’s section but Indonesia’s all good with it as long as it keeps China less focused in SE Asia.

As in OTL, the Comoros got themselves a new constitution and takes down the word “Islamic” from its official name. What’s different ITTL is that they don’t copy Indonesia in terms of the relation that the federal government has and the respective islands in the archipelago. I'm trying to convey here that ITTL Indonesia, being in a better position than OTL, is something of a model for other countries, in this case an archipelago facing islands trying to break away from it.
 
Best of luck, hope you don't get overwhelmed on thinking how all these countries fate would be when it's getting further from this TL. It can be really hard researching this and that but yeah, it's a satisfying feeling when your world building is finished.
Thank you. As it's an Indonesia-centric thread, even if I'm not necessarily writing about Indonesia, I do keep in mind and try to make links in my head of how these countries (can) have a consequence for Indonesia.
 
If China noticed the amount of indonesian fast moving consumer goods in Kenya, and compared it with its own infrastructure investments, that alone tells the high value of East Africa as a key destination for Indonesia exports. I assume this is studied to be reflected in other destinations.

I see affinity between Comoros and Indonesia. How this will play with comorian claim to Mayotte?
 
If China noticed the amount of indonesian fast moving consumer goods in Kenya, and compared it with its own infrastructure investments, that alone tells the high value of East Africa as a key destination for Indonesia exports. I assume this is studied to be reflected in other destinations.

I see affinity between Comoros and Indonesia. How this will play with comorian claim to Mayotte?
I agree. I would add that it's also valuable as an export destination because Tanzania and Kenya has large populations. Based on google, the population for Kenya in 2001 was 32.85 million and Tanzania was 34.3 million so that's nearly 70 million potential consumers for instant noodles, coffee flavored candies, bottled teas, and soaps.

Now, the comments from the Chinese Embassy in Kenya that will be a trend in the TL. Their mouths will say "It's no problem" but their actions will say something else.

As for the Comoros, territorial disputes are a different ball game to rebels or secessionists or separatists where Indonesia would happily support the national government but as I like to say, we will see. In the main TL, we've already seen the Indonesian Government selling weapons to Sri Lanka to help it against the Tamil Tigers and in these "around the world" updates, its sympathizes with Colombia in its struggle against FARC.
 
I feel the entire Congo affair is like a minefield - one wrong move and everything blows up.

Also, the Gabon courtship is interesting, considering that OTL Gabon was at odds with IMF. Maybe the technical exchange its a first step for some gabonese-indonesian joint ventures?
 
I feel the entire Congo affair is like a minefield - one wrong move and everything blows up.

Also, the Gabon courtship is interesting, considering that OTL Gabon was at odds with IMF. Maybe the technical exchange its a first step for some gabonese-indonesian joint ventures?
Regarding the Congo, there is the added dimension of it occurring during the New Cold War and for sure it is more chaotic.

Anybody catch Try's comment there that Indonesia probably could have helped in a peacekeeping capacity but the UN Secretary General isn't really such a big fan of Indonesia to allow it to be part of the peacekeeping?

About Gabon, this follows on storyline that happens "off-screen", namely Indonesia trying to build good relations with countries who were non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in 1999 who voted to acknowledge East Timor as a Special Region of Indonesia.

Gabon being at odds with the IMF made it to the previous around the world update:

Gabon was a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council in 1999 that had voted to acknowledge Indonesia’s claim over East Timor, leading to it being put on Vice President of Indonesia JB Sumarlin’s itinerary in June 2000. President Omar Bongo was very friendly and drew parallels between Indonesia’s less than friendly relationship with the IMF with Gabon’s own. Indonesia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita wanted to issue a statement emphasizing this but got into an argument with Sumarlin. The latter pointing out that the IMF’s problems with Bongo was over the Gabonese Government’s reliance on off-budget funds and having a budget deficit. “Not being in line with the IMF does not mean not being economically irresponsible”, argued Sumarlin. The visit ended with a more moderate statement promising exchanges of delegations to learn about each other’s countries.
 
Also, dont forget the Congo: Its a huge market with more than 100 M potential customers, once the situation is neutralized.
 
In before someone asks if there's an update.

A combination of being very busy, fitting in my first real holiday (going on a plane to fly somewhere instead of staycationing) since the pandemic began, and returning to more busyness has made progress slow though there's already 9 countries so far in the current update I'm writing up and aiming for another 6.

Just finding the time in between everything. I've got no problem thinking about where I want to go with the TL. As my wife likes to tell me from time to time, I look like "I'm thinking about the world".
 
Good to know - personally I like where TTL is going, with Indonesia playing as a big guy and expanding/colliding interests with this multipolar world.
 
The World Circa May 2002 Part 7: Africa Part 3
Cape Verde:
In April 2002 President Pedro Pires and Prime Minister Jose Maria Neves welcomed Chairman of the Timor Leste Government-in-Exile Jose Ramos Horta. Horta was on his way back home from Mozambique in New Zeland but wanted to transit in Cape Verde first. Pires and Neves would remember Horta as thanking Cape Verde for its continuing and steady support for Timor Leste but also for placing a lot of hope in Gusmao’s trip to Libya.

“We will not be by ourselves this time”, Horta declared with great optimism.

Senegal:
President Abdoulaye Wade’s disillusionment with the United States, stemming from having to sign on to IMF conditionalities in March 2001, did not mean he adopted an anti-US stance. Between 2001 and May 2002, Dakar hosted United States Secretary of State Richard Williamson, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, British Foreign Secretary Gordon Brown, and French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Vedrine. Senegal continued to assert itself in the continent, with Wade advocating a poverty eradication plan known as the OMEGA Plan and then having that adopted and merged with the Millenium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) to form the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in July 2001 by the OAU. Though not passive by any means, Wade provided a less confrontative option to President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki in the multipolar world.

Wade also sought to build relations with developing economies in other continents. In May 2001, he attended the G-15 Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. There he found other nations that felt discontented with the IMF and how it went about things.

With the hosts Indonesia, Wade found a friend willing to support Senegal’s struggle against the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MDFC), a separatist movement seeking to break away from Senegal. Since 1999, Senegal’s worry about the MDFC had been augmented by the assumption and consolidation of power in Ansumane Mane in Guinea Bissau. Both he and the Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh were known to hold sympathies for the MDFC’s cause.

An MoU was signed with Indonesia’s Minister of Defense and Security Wismoyo Arismunandar to send Liaison Officers from ABRI to act as consultants to the Armed Forces of Senegal and to explore the possibility of selling Pindad assault rifles to Senegal's military.

The Gambia:
South of the border from Senegal was the Gambia, led by President Yahya Jammeh. Though Jammeh had instructed the Gambian delegation in the United Nations, Gambia being a Non-Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council at the time, to vote in favor of acknowledging East Timor as a Special Region of Indonesia in 1999, Jammeh soon came to view Indonesia with ill-favor. Jammeh had welcomed a delegation in 2000 led by the then-Indonesian Minister of Trade Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti as part of Indonesia’s effort to return the favor of those who had supported its cause. Upon knowledge of Indonesia’s sympathy for Senegal in 2001, Jammeh, who supported the MDFC, closed the door on any Indonesian delegation that might come Gambia’s way.

The world, as Jammeh himself said, did not spin on Try as an axis. In the aftermath of 9/11, Jammeh declared his support for the United States’ War on Terror though critics pointed out that this was just a pretext for him to tighten his political control in the Gambia without incurring any reproach from the United States or the West. Whether Jammeh was truly committed to the War on Terror was another story for he was seen to be in the company of Prime Minister of Malaysia Najib Razak at the 2002 CHOGM, a leader who did not approve of the War on Terror.

Guinea-Bissau:
A civil war broke out when President Joao Bernardo Vieira tried have Commander of the Armed Forces Ansumane Mane arrested for smuggling arms to the MDFC in Senegal and the latter rebelled. A majority of the military sided with Mane prompting Vieira to call in assistance from both Senegal and Guinea. In December 1998, in Nigeria, Vieira and Mane signed an agreement. Elections would be held in March 1999, Senegal and Guinea would withdraw their troops, and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) would set up a monitoring group to ensure the terms are observed. In its implementation, the elections were delayed, Senegal and Guinea withdrew, and the ECOWAS set up a monitoring group. What was unexpected was when Mane, using a flimsy pretext, ousted Vieira in a coup in May 1999.

Mane now declared himself Chairman of the Supreme Command of the Junta amidst all the international condemnation. After some weeks, he bought the acceptance for his regime by allowing Vieira to leave. In the meantime he was in no rush to hold elections seeing that military regimes or military-backed regimes still held sway in parts of the world. Mane instead focused on providing his regime with economic legitimacy. Cooperative as he was with the IMF, Mane also began welcoming aid and investment from Russia and China in 2000 after visits to Moscow and Beijing and obtaining agreements from the two capital that the aid will be for the economy rather than military. On this basis, he had achieved enough to run for president in Presidential Elections held in March 2001 and emerge victorious.

The presence of Mane was of concern for Senegal. Much like the Gambia’s Jammeh, Mane sympathized with the MDFC. Indeed, most of the soldiers of Guinea-Bissau belong to the same ethnicity as that of the MDFC.

Mane also joined other Portuguese-speaking nations in Africa in its support for the Timor Leste Independence Movement though it looked for a while that Guinea-Bissau’s support would be an unreliable one. It would take news that Indonesia was sending “Liaison Officers” to Senegal to push Mane into renewing its commitment to Timor Leste.

Guinea and Liberia:
Guinea positioned itself to the benefit from the multipolar environment which was entrenching itself around the world by using its natural resources as an asset to strengthen itself strategically. It exported bauxite and alumina to the United States even as at the same time, it allowed Russia’s RUSAL, to operate an alumina refinery in the country beginning in 2001. To mark the occasion, Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin visited Guinea in June 2001.

But it was in Guinea that the world was provided with an example of how it was becoming multipolar. After economic reforms stalled in 1999 when President Lansana Conte dismissed the reform-minded Prime Minister Sidya Toure, the IMF’s New Managing Director Stanley Fischer suspended assistance in June 2000 saying that Guinea had not fulfilled its performance criteria. Not long thereafter, President of the World Bank Caio Koch-Weser spoke out in Guinea’s defense saying that it had fulfilled its social spending target. Though the situation never heated up, it was known that behind closed doors, the leaders of the IMF and the World Bank had found themselves engaged in a disagreement about whether nations receiving aid should prioritize fiscal responsibility or social spending, with Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder siding with Koch-Weser who was his fellow German national and encouraging France’s Jacques Chirac and Italy’s D’Alema to join him.

In April 1999, rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), supported by the Government of Guinea, attacked Liberia from Guinea. Conte would maintain Guinea’s innocence. In September 2000, troops loyal to President of Liberia Charles Taylor from Liberia and its ally from Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), launched an attack into Guinea; prompting Conte to condemn Liberia for formenting rebellion. For his part, Taylor pointed out to the LURD’s having launched its attack on Liberia from within Guinea. In late 2000, Guinea fought off another rebellion by disgruntled ex-soldiers, also thought to be formented by Taylor.

Effort was made at mediation by the UN and the ECOWAS but skirmishes at the Guinean-Liberian border in early 2001 continued, until finally in April 2001, Conte ordered the invasion of Liberia. There was an initial round of condemnation for Guinea from the region, before geopolitics intervened. President of Sierra Leone Ahmad Tejan Kabbah appealed to the Foreign Office in the United Kingdom to ease its pressure on Guinea. Meanwhile, both the United States and Russia were not keen to lose their access to Guinean bauxite and alumina. The revenue Guinea obtained from its bauxite and alumina exports were now being used to finance its military operations in and, after June 2001, occupation of Northern Liberia as it sought to establish a buffer zone to secure itself from incursions from Liberian and RUF attacks.

Sierra Leone:
“At the time, which was in the second half of 1999, ABRI had been approved to take part in the United Nations Mission in the Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The UN at the time wanted to expand UNAMSIL from 260 military observers to 6000 personnel and we were going to send some personnel along. That was until October 1999 when the UNAMSIL was officially formed and I received notification from the UN that we were no longer required to send personnel to become peacekeepers. After making some enquiries, the information got back to me that this was correct and that the cancellation was made on the discretion of the UN Secretary General. I reported this to the President in written form and he scrawled “Noted”.

The consensus within ABRI Headquarters was that if not Sierra Leone then perhaps ABRI personnel would be required in the Second Congo War where the UN were also planning to send in peacekeepers. Alas, it was not to be and now there were questions about whether this was deliberate. I made enquiries once again but it was not until Mr. Juwono Sudarsono became the Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations that I got my answer: that despite of our enthusiasm to participate in peacekeeping mission, the UN Secretary General was not “positively disposed” towards us. Some would say that Secretary General Annan just snubbed us.

But it all worked out for the best. Australia, which originally was supposed to contribute a police contingent, accepted the UN’s offer to take up the slot that had originally been ours. They sent four batches’ worth of military personnel and won plaudits for the way they conducted themselves. But they would stretch themselves thin, sending personnel to the Solomon Islands and then to Afghanistan and then to…[page ripped]”

Excerpt from My Time as the Commander of ABRI by Gen. Wiranto

Ivory Coast:
In December 1999, President of Ivory Coast Henri Konan Bedie was overthrown in a coup and in his place, Robert Guei, a retired general took office as president. There was a lot of international reaction to this. First France considered military intervention to restore Bedie back to power; President of France Jacques Chirac’s intentions only thwarted by Prime Minister of France Lionel Jospin. Canada, first under Prime Minister Jean Chretien and then under Paul Martin, suspended aid to the Ivory Coast. The United States of America and the EU also shut down aid. From these corners, Guei quickly fell under pressure to hold elections but would not succumb to pressure, citing that the situation on the ground was still unstable. He was right for there were mutinies in the military in June 2000 for him to quell.

The situation was indeed unstable that Guei would not see how it would be resolved. In September 2000, Guei was assassinated by young soldiers who attacked his residence in the morning. The assailants would be arrested, tried, and thrown to jail but not before Minister of Security and Guei’s second-in-command Lassana Palenfo assumed power in the vacuum. Though receiving plenty of condemnation in his first few days, Palenfo was able to secure the flow of aid back into Ivory Coast by appointing Alasanne Ouattara as prime minister. Ouattara’s attraction to donors in the west was his former status as a Deputy Managing Director at the IMF. By February 2001, Guei and Ouattara signed an agreement with the IMF and committed itself to reforms to stabilize the economic crisis arising out of Guei’s coup d’etat and accompanying political uncertainty.

The unresolved question and one which Ivory Coast’s neighbors demanded to know was when elections would be held; indeed the OAU had already excluded the Ivory Coast from its meeting in July 2000 for failing to announce an election schedule. Palenfo and Ouattara had been in no rush; their emergence to power had been favorable to the United States. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, with its attention turned to Afghanistan and elsewhere, Russia’s Igor Ivanov and France’s Hubert Vedrine agreed that Ivory Coast should hold elections as soon as possible. In January 2002, Palenfo announced that new elections would be held in July 2002 whilst at the same time announcing his candidacy for presidency. France was not without horses in the race. Chirac favored Bedie, the overthrown president eager to get back his seat while Jospin favored National Assembly member Laurent Gbagbo.

Ghana:
The main achievement of President John Kufuor’s government in its first year was economic. An spike in inflation in the middle of 2001 was under control by early 2002. Ghana also received debt relief from the IMF and the World Bank, placing it firmly into the ranks of non-aligned nations seen to be pro-western after being dubbed as the IMF’s “star pupil” for some time.

Ghana was the homeland of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan who was up for re-election in 2001. It had been a term in which the ground had shifted beneath his feet. In 1997, “The End of History” was still in vogue. Now it was 2001 and no one could make up their minds if it was the New Cold War, the Second Cold War or the Multipolar Moment. Annan was happy enough with his work, the fight against AIDS being taken seriously by the member states being a particular highlight.

The only thing that stood between Annan and re-election was the Asia-Pacific Group. This grouping of UN member states had argued that Boutros-Boutros Ghali and Annan’s respective terms as secretary general constituted Africa’s two terms secretary general and that it was now Asia’s turn. Two possible candidates emerged from this bloc: Singapore’s Kishore Mahbubani and Bangladesh’s Anwarul Karim Chowdhury.

Mahbubani eventually withdrew his candidacy when it became clear there was too much of an implication for ASEAN’s internal politics. Indonesia was willing to support Mahbubani’s candidacy but Singapore did not want to feel like it owed Indonesia a debt; the latter wanting acknowledgement as a regional leader in Southeast Asia. China was also willing to consider Mahbubani’s candidacy but Singapore also did not want to feel like it owed China a debt; the latter wanting to increase its influence in Southeast Asia. In time Chowdhury withdrew with the Africa Group promising that the next Secretary General would come from Asia. By January 2002 Annan began his second term.

Togo:
“Regarding our economic progress, I think what has amazed is that no matter how many toll roads or factories or dams we built, no matter how much we’ve advanced, we’re still concerned with things like food. This was made clear to me when I made my Africa trip in June 2000. In Togo, a contract was signed that would see Indonesia import raw phosphate from Togo. At the time, we were constructing a phosphoric acid factory in Gresik, East Java but we needed the phosphate and we’re still a few years away from putting our own phosphate mines to good use in Madura. Phosphoric acid is used as material to make fertilizer, fertilizers are used to increase food production, and at the time we needed to increase food production because people are not only eating more but also wanting more variety on their plates. This means we’ve graduated, or at least we are graduating, from the problem that we had in the 60s where just producing enough rice to fill the plates and the stomachs of Indonesians was something of a struggle.

Of course, little did we know it at the time but with the likes of China and India and Russia and Brazil going around the world to look for commodities for their own economic development and signing similar contracts, our respective nations were helping to bring about a commodities boom.”

-JB Sumarlin: The Vice Presidential Memoirs

Nigeria:
Nigeria was the prime beneficiary of Indonesia’s policy of wanting to export its fast-moving consumer goods to African markets. Other Indonesian FMCG companies, seeing that Indomie had set up shop in Nigeria, wanted to prioritize Nigeria first even as they were being encouraged by their government to also expand their other countries. Meanwhile, Nigerian importers and distributors, having already seen the performance of Indomie, were more knowledgeable and better-prepared than counterparts in the continent. At the G-15 Summit in Jakarta in May 2001, they attracted a lot of attention by the amount of deals they concluded.

It was not all smooth sailing. In the aftermath of 9/11 and Indonesia’s strong stance against extremism, there was an effort by some of the states which had adopted Sharia Law to boycott Indonesian FMCG products, most notably Indomie, in November 2001. The Indonesian FMCGs however, were too popular among Nigerian consumers to be properly boycotted.

In March 2002, Obasanjo attended the CHOGM in Brisbane, Australia. Various issues were discussed including 9/11 and terrorism and it was in the course of discussing such matters that mention was made by Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair that Indonesia, being the world’s largest Islamic nation, would be an important ally to have in the War on Terror.

Though the CHOGM’s official agenda did not dwell for long on Indonesia, the conversation when the meeting finished did dwell on Indonesia and its characteristics. Obasanjo would later write in his memoirs that he had a great view of the range of opinions that various nations across the world, at least in the Commonwealth, had about Indonesia. Obasanjo counted Nigeria, South Africa, Fiji, and Jamaica as those wanting to establish good relations with Indonesia. The United Kingdom, perhaps owing to its close proximity to the United States on world issues, recognized the strategic value of Indonesia rather than wanting to have good relations with it in particular. India was recorded as wanting good relations and recognizing Indonesia’s strategic value in equal parts. Malaysia, Obasanjo recorded, was hostile, with Najib Razak warning all who would listen about Indonesia’s “hegemonic aspirations” in Southeast Asia. Australia was not so much hostile, but ambivalent.

There was a lot more on Obasanjo’s plate than the nation bringing FMCG-related business in its direction. Obasanjo had declared Nigeria to be on the side of the United States in the War on Terror. This combined with President of Russia Yevgeny Primakov’s exhortations that Islamic nations should not be under any obligation to “prove themselves” that they are for or against anything led by the United States, the invasion of Afghanistan, Nigeria’s increasingly close relationship with Indonesia, the existence of states in Nigeria which had adopted Sharia Law, and Obasanjo’s own Christian faith made for an environment in which he had to tread carefully.

Within his own People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Obasanjo already had to tread carefully. Vice President Atiku Abubakar, though of the Islamic faith, shared Obasanjo’s distaste the idea of Sharia Law being enacted on the nation. But having seen Indonesia’s Try Sutrisno from up close when the latter visited in October 2001 and chatting with other members of the Indonesian delegation, Atiku concluded that though Try’s stance would make him enemies in some circles, the main reason why Try was able to have some success in taking such a stance was because he himself was Muslim. It would take a Muslim to stand up successfully to those wanting to enact Sharia Law. With the 2003 Presidential Elections appearing on the horizon, such logic made Atiku increasingly saw himself as the man who could lead the party to victory.

Benin and Cameroon:
Whatever success the boycott of Indonesian FMCGs in Nigeria in late 2001 had, it only produced a surplus to be exported across the border to Benin where the public’s interest in Indomie, Kopiko and Teh Botol meant that said products just proved themselves worthy of the interest that would be Beninese importers and distributors were showing. Not to miss an opportunity, Indonesian Minister of Trade Anthony Salim ordered the Trade Attache’s Office at the Indonesian Embassy in Nigeria to facilitate and encourage such developments.

Though the opportunity in Benin in Nigeria’s west side was not to be missed, the Indonesian FMCGs were more keen to market their products to Cameroon on Nigeria’s east side; Cameroon being more familiar to Indonesia as a result of its football exploits in the World Cup. In May 2002, as the World Cup in South Korea and Japan begun, the commercial breaks in Cameroon featured football star Roger Milla. Having played for two years in the Indonesian Football League in the past, Milla now found himself recruited by the Department of Trade to become an ambassador for Indonesian FMCGs in Cameroon but more generally in Africa. The commercial features Milla living in Indonesia enjoying various FMCGs, being sad because he had to leave for Cameroon, but cheering up upon realizing that the goods he used to enjoy are now available or are coming soon in his homeland.

---
The whole “Indonesia supports nations who are fighting against rebels or separatists” is something that I never planned but just happened naturally. Who knows where this will lead.

The situation where Guinea invades Liberia is a departure from OTL.

Africa certainly has a lot of situations where it’s like country A hates country B because country B supports the rebels in country A. Then country A retaliates by supporting the rebels in country B.

One thing I’ve known for some time but which the TL has not given me the opportunity to do thus far is show that ITTL Kofi Annan is not a fan of ITTL Indonesia. In OTL, Indonesia were sent peacekeepers as part of the UNAMSIL but here, it gets snubbed. Australia picking up the slack here because in ITTL October 1999 there is no situation in East Timor to intervene into.

The alternate candidates for the secretary general’s position is based on https://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/03/15/un.annan/index.html

For an example of Nigeria’s Atiku Abubakar’s view on Sharia Law and Islam in politics: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news...s-atiku-tells-nigerias-religious-leaders.html
 
Great update!

I would place Togo with Benin and Cameroon, Togo is very close to Nigeria, and is selling phosphates so a relationship exists that can help to push FMCGs there. Also, Lome is on the gates of Ghana :biggrin:
 
Great update!

I would place Togo with Benin and Cameroon, Togo is very close to Nigeria, and is selling phosphates so a relationship exists that can help to push FMCGs there. Also, Lome is on the gates of Ghana :biggrin:


tkoh-01_biografi-anthony-salim_karier-di-salim-group_800x450_ccpdm-min.jpg.webp


"This Pio2013 fellow is making a lot of sense, I wonder if I could find a vacancy for him at the Department of Trade"

OOC, yes that is Anthony Salim the current ITTL Minister of Trade.
 
"This Pio2013 fellow is making a lot of sense, I wonder if I could find a vacancy for him at the Department of Trade"
Thanks! Im just thinking up new technical details about how Indonesia asserts itself.

An increase on trade logically means an increase on traffic, being by air or sea. Obviously a tiny reflection of this could be new direct air lanes btw Jakarta and their growing markets, lets see, Lagos, Nairobi, Zanzibar and so on.

And i see the Senegal exchange as a necessary exercise, not just for placement of Pindad equipment, but for the experience with probable insurgencies.
 
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