Independent British nuclear arsenal

My understanding is amongst other data required by the computer program(s) that convert the latitude and longitude of the "designated ground zero(s) (ie targets) into guidance commands for the missiles, that gravational data and geodetic survey data are required.
There's a variety of reasons why you might want this quite aside from nuclear missile targeting. For example, gravitational data is used in oil prospecting, something which is important in large swathes of the United States, while precision survey data is obviously useful for such mundane tasks as distinguishing different properties. I would expect that a fairly considerable amount of data, perhaps not precise enough to enable full accuracy but still quite enough to be useful for targeting purposes, could be found in public databases.
 
There's a variety of reasons why you might want this quite aside from nuclear missile targeting. For example, gravitational data is used in oil prospecting, something which is important in large swathes of the United States, while precision survey data is obviously useful for such mundane tasks as distinguishing different properties. I would expect that a fairly considerable amount of data, perhaps not precise enough to enable full accuracy but still quite enough to be useful for targeting purposes, could be found in public databases.
That very well could be the case. That being said it may or may not be an easy matter to load that data into the Trident targeting system, assuming it isn't already present. (This is all speculation on my part.)

In this day and age I'm inclined to agree that survey data is likely readily avaliable.

I'm less convinced gravational data sets in a form useful for SLBM launches are readily avaliable, but again this is just speculation on my part.
 
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Even assuming this data isn't publicly available (or through SIS and similar organisations), do they matter when you're launching up to forty 100kt warheads?

I mean, if we were stupid enough to be launching a missile at New York (a target of over 300 square miles), does it really matter if the explosion big enough to destroy a city lands on the right street when, really, the right general area will do?
 
Even assuming this data isn't publicly available (or through SIS and similar organisations), do they matter when you're launching up to forty 100kt warheads?

I mean, if we were stupid enough to be launching a missile at New York (a target of over 300 square miles), does it really matter if the explosion big enough to destroy a city lands on the right street when, really, the right general area will do?
If an attacker was trying to hit the entrance to the NORAD bunker, missile silo launch control centres or similar targets then accuracy is likely to be important. I really don't know how lack of precise data would affect accuracy vis a vis city sized targets (if it mattered at all.)
 
Even assuming this data isn't publicly available (or through SIS and similar organisations), do they matter when you're launching up to forty 100kt warheads?

I have my doubts about the UK having the 100kt W76 warhead, at least initially, it just doesn't seem to fit in with the time line of British warhead development. I suspect that the UK trident used an updated Chevaline warhead with extra cores coming from the rundown of the WE177 stockpile.
 
There's a variety of reasons why you might want this quite aside from nuclear missile targeting. For example, gravitational data is used in oil prospecting, something which is important in large swathes of the United States, while precision survey data is obviously useful for such mundane tasks as distinguishing different properties. I would expect that a fairly considerable amount of data, perhaps not precise enough to enable full accuracy but still quite enough to be useful for targeting purposes, could be found in public databases.

Warheads use inertial, celestial, magnetic guidance, plus GPS and GLONASS to maximum accuracy.

So even with GPS off or in fuzzy mode, there are other ways of knowing exactly where you are at, and where you want to go to
 
Warheads use inertial, celestial, magnetic guidance, plus GPS and GLONASS to maximum accuracy.

So even with GPS off or in fuzzy mode, there are other ways of knowing exactly where you are at, and where you want to go to
I'm very very skeptical that any U.S. designed system would use Glonass. I'm also not aware of trident having any form of active guidance once the warheads are released from the bus.
 
I'm very very skeptical that any U.S. designed system would use Glonass. I'm also not aware of trident having any form of active guidance once the warheads are released from the bus.
GPS and GLONASS are not, of course, used simultaneously, but that sort of thing is general practice for guidance systems. There has been talk that the United States developed maneuvering reentry vehicles, so it's possible that Britain's Tridents have something similar; that would, of course, give the warhead some guidance capability.
 
GPS and GLONASS are not, of course, used simultaneously, but that sort of thing is general practice for guidance systems. There has been talk that the United States developed maneuvering reentry vehicles, so it's possible that Britain's Tridents have something similar; that would, of course, give the warhead some guidance capability.
Well..

I believe there was some discussion of a proposed conventional trident having RV's with some form of guidance. I'm not aware of it ever being used for the nuclear armed tridents.

Also I seem to recall reading that the fuses for the warheads are U.S. supplied. If that is the case then potentially the U.S. could jam them (or perhaps pre detonate them) if they use a radar sensor for the air burst function (I believe this is a typical arrangement.)

Presumably there is a back up impact fuse but I'm just speculating here.

Still likely another complication in using Trident against a non coperative U.S.
 
I'm reminded of previous discussion about Exocets and the French giving Britain "the codes" or some shit. The whole point about these weapons is the difficulty in stopping them.

If there were ways to stop them the KGB would steal them and make sure that the US trident wouldn't hit Russia. As a result they deliberately don't make missiles with "the codes", and even if they did Britain would find it and disable "the codes" (maybe a patronus charm like Harry Potter) because warhead busses are just a piece of technology.

In actual fact any piece of the weapon that Britain uses US technology with will not be crucial for sovereign control. Britain has the ability to make any part of the Trident system, but doesn't because the costs aren't worth the benefits, thus she only builds what she absolutely needs to.
 
I'm reminded of previous discussion about Exocets and the French giving Britain "the codes" or some shit. The whole point about these weapons is the difficulty in stopping them.

If there were ways to stop them the KGB would steal them and make sure that the US trident wouldn't hit Russia. As a result they deliberately don't make missiles with "the codes", and even if they did Britain would find it and disable "the codes" (maybe a patronus charm like Harry Potter) because warhead busses are just a piece of technology.

In actual fact any piece of the weapon that Britain uses US technology with will not be crucial for sovereign control. Britain has the ability to make any part of the Trident system, but doesn't because the costs aren't worth the benefits, thus she only builds what she absolutely needs to.
While I'm inclined to agree there is no "off" code for Trident, I suspect there would be a considerable degree of unhappiness in the U.S. and the UK if the successor to the KGB were to acquire all the design doccumentation for the fuse for the trident warheads.
 
While I'm inclined to agree there is no "off" code for Trident, I suspect there would be a considerable degree of unhappiness in the U.S. and the UK if the successor to the KGB were to acquire all the design doccumentaion for the fuse for the trident warheads.

No doubt, but such knowledge isn't going to enable them to stop the warheads detonating, even if the Russian James Bond gets hold of the secret box and flies off in an L39 after ejecting the pilot with a witty comment.
 
No doubt, but such knowledge isn't going to enable them to stop the warheads detonating, even if the Russian James Bond gets hold of the secret box and flies off in an L39 after ejecting the pilot with a witty comment.

In my view...

If the UK and the U.S. didn't know the details of the fuse(s) had been compromised (or if they knew but didn't have the time to make changes) I'm not convinced that the weapons would necessarily work as intended. I'm really just speculating here.
 
In my view...

If the UK and the U.S. didn't know the details of the fuse(s) had been compromised (or if they knew but didn't have the time to make changes) I'm not convinced that the weapons would necessarily work as intended. I'm really just speculating here.

I'm not sure what you are saying: Are you suggesting that the KGB somehow can make the fuses not work? I'm certain that only physical sabotage of the warhead would be enough to make it not detonate. There is no off-board signal required to make the warhead detonate and as far back as the 50s the likes of the Blue Steel navigation system was designed with no external inputs that could leave the weapon open to enemy interference.

In short there is no simple vulnerability in nuclear weapons, and hasn't been since 1945.
 
In the USA you can get USC&GS maps for pretty up every square inch of the USA. These have an extremely high degree of accuracy. Basically given the CEP of Soviet warheads, later models were good but not as good as US guidance, the potential error from using publicly available data to fix an aiming point based on "open" data is really a very small issue.
 
I'm not sure what you are saying: Are you suggesting that the KGB somehow can make the fuses not work? I'm certain that only physical sabotage of the warhead would be enough to make it not detonate. There is no off-board signal required to make the warhead detonate and as far back as the 50s the likes of the Blue Steel navigation system was designed with no external inputs that could leave the weapon open to enemy interference.

In short there is no simple vulnerability in nuclear weapons, and hasn't been since 1945.
I'm saying the portion of the fusing system that provides for an air burst might be vulnerable to interferrance and that the vulnerability is probably higher if the details of how the fusing system works is known to the opposition. This is just speculation on my part.

Edit to add:

To recap it is my understanding that a form of radar is typically used for the air burst fuses in ICBM's and SLBM's RV's. I also expect there would be some form of backup impact fuse.

I'm told that radar proximity fuses in AA weapons can sometimes be pre detonated by ECM so perhaps a similar vulnerability could exist for RV's particularly if the design details of the fuses were compromised.

This brings me back to my point that it might be complicated to use SLBM's against the nation the orignally manufactured them.
 
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In the USA you can get USC&GS maps for pretty up every square inch of the USA. These have an extremely high degree of accuracy. Basically given the CEP of Soviet warheads, later models were good but not as good as US guidance, the potential error from using publicly available data to fix an aiming point based on "open" data is really a very small issue.
Probably although you still need to reference the co ordinate system used for the maps used to locate the target to the cordinate system used by the maps used for fixing your launch position.

Probably not a huge issue in this day and age but there are probably a number of steps where errors could be introduced.

My understanding is that a key part of the U.S. Nuclear weapons program was generating the necessary survey data to tie the various mapping systems together so targets could be precisely referenced to launch points at intercontinental ranges.

I expect it isn't much (if any ?) of an issue today with GPS and similar systems.

Edit to add...

Getting some what back on topic who knows what co ordinate system is used for the Trident targeting system and how easy it would be to correlate that back to say common co ordinate systems used by a typical GPS. It might be simple or it might be quite complicated. I'm just speculating here.
 
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I have my doubts about the UK having the 100kt W76 warhead, at least initially, it just doesn't seem to fit in with the time line of British warhead development. I suspect that the UK trident used an updated Chevaline warhead with extra cores coming from the rundown of the WE177 stockpile.
I've read accounts suggesting the UK also has sub strategic / tactical warheads on some Tridents.
 
This is just speculation on my part but...

I wonder if the (reportedly U.S. supplied ?) targeting systems would actually provide target data for the CONUS ?
Yes they can. The system is pretty simple in concept, though unsurprisingly difficult to obtain data on[1], but it's basically a latitude/longitude coordinate, plus detonation altitude. There's also a clock mechanism which, allied to gyros/accelerometers for inertial guidance and a series of optical sensors for exo-atmospheric stellar tracking.
The ability to re-programme the missiles on board the boats is limited but there are numerous pre-selected target plans.



[1] i was curious about how useful Trident would be if a SSBN was displaced in time. The answer comes down to not much really.
 
I'd suggest those inferring that the UK cannot launch nukes independently of US approval if she wishes need to have a good read up on the history of nuclear weapons development in the UK - specifically the tube alloys project in WW2 that preceded the Manhatten Project, then Britain's initial independent deterrent development in the 50's, and then most importantly the Skybolt crisis.

In short, independence in nuclear capability is a fundamental for Britain and always has been. In reality the US and UK share nuclear technology and material on an unprecedented level and the two nations programmes are very much intertwined and interdependent.

Britain has the capability to R&D and new completely standalone system but the costs would be enormous and the benefits compared to basing theirs on the US trident system are minimal at best.
 
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