In terms of hopelessness, was the Battle of the Bulge comparable to Sealion?

[GauchoBadger]

AH.com has already had many arguments and discussions and rants about why Operation Sealion was a hopeless endeavour (which i totally agree on), but, oddly, i haven't seen as many discussions on the unlikelihood of German success in Operation Wacht am Rhein, also known as the Battle of the Bulge of late 1944. IIRC, Hitler's plan for the offensive lied in the hope that the Allies would enter negotiations with Germany due to logistical exhaustion or due to the notion that bringing the war to German soil would not be worth it, which, IMO, is as unlikely as having Britain sign an instrument of surrender rather than continue resisting at the sight of German troopers marching towards London. My primary question is, was the 1944 land operation as doomed to failure as a hypothetical Sealion would be, to the point of making the option of not executing it more advantageous for the Germans?
If Wacht am Rhein and the accompanying Bodenplatte air offensive at the end of it were indeed Sealion-esque in how hopeless they were, could a point be made about the effect of Hitler's psychological degradation (resulting from successive failures in the previous war years) on his decision-making abilities later in the war? Were we to transplant late 1944 Hitler to mid 1940 Hitler, would he have greenlit Sealion?

 

[marathag]

If the Nazis rolled nothing but sixes, maybe they could have reached the Channel, but there would be nothing to stop Patton from cutting it off at the root by driving North from Metz, and backed by Dever's Sixth Army Group with the French 1st Army and Patch and his Seventh.

 

[wcv215]

The big difference IMO is that Sealion is more impossible, but Watch was more pointless. Sealion has no way of succeeding, while the Battle of the Bulge could theoretically have reached its objectives. But while a successful Sealion might have forced Britain out of the war (ignoring the impossibility), Watch on the Rhine would have done absolutely nothing even IF it had succeeded. Except maybe leaving more Nazi forces unable to retreat when the Allies don't buckle.

Both were bad ideas, but for different reasons. One was impossible, the other pointless.

I voted for practically impossible on those grounds. Short term goals could have been achieved, but the greater strategic goals couldn't.

 

[Michel Van]

The Battle of the bulge was totally pointless
The Nazi believed naively the Americans would go to negotiations after this offensive

Oh boy were they wrong so wrong
There ultimatum to US Army for surrender at Malmedy was answer by word „NUT’S“
It took them allot time for Germans to understand that message
While a enrage General Patton was moving fast to the north like Attila the Hun.
Next to that the Wehrmacht and SS Learn the hard way,
That US Army in Term on Firepower were superior as them.

But face it in November 1944 any Nazi military action was pointless
It was matter of time the Allies conquer The Third Reich

Like Operation Bodenplatte the actually Luftwaffe operation for „Wacht am Rhein“
But do bad weather delay AFTER defeat of that battle
Göring send last remains of Luftwaffe into Battle against Targets of Wacht am Rhein offensive
And Hell they got butcher by USAAF...

 

[TonyA]

The Battle of the bulge was totally pointless
The Nazi believed naively the Americans would go to negotiations after this offensive

Oh boy were they wrong so wrong
There ultimatum to US Army for surrender at Malmedy was answer by word „NUT’S“
It took them allot time for Germans to understand that message
While a enrage General Patton was moving fast to the north like Attila the Hun.
Next to that the Wehrmacht and SS Learn the hard way,
That US Army in Term on Firepower were superior as them.

But face it in November 1944 any Nazi military action was pointless
It was matter of time the Allies conquer The Third Reich

Like Operation Bodenplatte the actually Luftwaffe operation for „Wacht am Rhein“
But do bad weather delay AFTER defeat of that battle
Göring send last remains of Luftwaffe into Battle against Targets of Wacht am Rhein offensive
And Hell they got butcher by USAAF...

Bodenplatte did produce one thing of note...the dog fighting in the stacks of ?smelter refuse? is classic...

 

[manav95]

Patton would have eaten any Nazi counteroffensive for breakfast.

 

[Alex1guy]

I agree it was pointless, Hitler was delusional at this point.

 

[Thanksforallthefish]

Even if it was amazingly sucessful and managed to stop the Allied advance on its tracks, Stalin would come from the east with a giant hammer. Perhaps he would even march to the border of France, or even Paris, in such a situation. The Battle of the Bulge was a manotazo de ahogado, as we say in Spanish.

 

[ivanotter]

At that stage the alternative would have been to sit on the defense and await final destruction anyway.

I don't think that a comparison to Sea Lion is the right one. Sea Lion was built on a success story, whereas Ardennes '44 was a desperate move.

Even if the offensive had been successful (definition of that in this context) from a military perspective, the objectives (a peace treaty) would still have been unlikely.

Even if the petrol dumps had been found and more luck on the German side, it would be miracle time to get to Antwerp.

In essence: it might have prolonged the war a bit and even that is unlikely.

USSR would still have been knocking on the door in the East and if any re-enforcements should have gone West, it would only have helped USSR in the East.

If any comparison is to be sought, it might be more relevant to liken it to Kursk.

 

[Post]

The tactical objective was Antwerp. I don't see how that could be realistically reached and kept for a significant time.

 

[Riain]

The fundamental practical difference is the in 1940 Germany didn't have landing craft and a formidable navy, whereas in 1944 Germany did have tanks, guns and troops. This makes the Bulge possible in a way Sealion was not, in a practical way.

That doesn't make the wider objectives realistic, only that the army could go onto the offensive in 1944 but couldn't cross the channel in 1940.

 

[steamboy]

I'm sure the usual suspects will soon come in here in a flurry or well oiled and greased up bratwurst to tell us that this is 100% possible and it was only that nasty Mr Hitler that stopped their Cleen Heer fron doing things correctly.

 

[Saint_007]

The Battle of the Bulge was possible to win, but its strategic goal would have been utterly unrealistic. Sealion wanted to remove Britain from the war, though it would have theoretically been possible for Britain to keep fighting, effectively forcing the Germans to give up the offense.

The Bulge was predicated on the Americans being such big babies that a serious defeat would be enough to weaken their determination so they'd be begging for peace. Even if the Germans had reached Paris, the Americans would have brought in another million men to crush what was left of the Germans in France, while the Soviets were still coming from the East. The British had hit the last of their reserves, and would have needed to shift people from India and ANZAC to continue the heavy duty fighting, but the Americans had barely warmed up. Not to mention that Germany was basically on the dredges of the formerly formidable Wehrmacht, which couldn't have hoped for a strategic victory.

So yeah, Hitler was incredibly delusional about sending those men.

 

[HARRY]

A better comparison would be to Operation Market Garden they both could have had a big effect on the war one shorten it the other lengthening it but almost everything had to go as planned which in war is almost impossible.

 

[TDM]

Yeah Battle of the Bulge is a classic case of "something must be done, this is something therefore we must do it",

But ultimately what is Germany going to do here? Dig in in the west knowing they're going to get steamrollered in the East? Their only hope is to some how scare the Wallies into some kind of negotiation and peace while not standing on German soil that also calls off Stalin. Of course that's not going to happen the Wallies are not going to be scared off (and even if we where I doubt Stalin's going to stop just because of that).


thing is looking at the losses in the Battle of the Bulge 1944/45:

American
89,500[5]
(includes killed, wounded, missing, captured)
733 tanks and tank destroyers lost[6]
~1,000 aircraft lost, over 647 in December[7] and 353 during Unternehmen Bodenplatte[8]
British
1,408 (200 killed, 969 wounded, and 239 missing)[9]
German
63,222[10][11][c] – 98,000[12]
(includes killed, wounded, missing, captured)
554 tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns lost[13]
~800 aircraft lost, at least 500 in December and 280 during Unternehmen Bodenplatte[8]
that's in a 6 week period

which side is going to be best able to sustain them?


Interestingly given in the Bunkers in Berlin this was going to the mighty German Blitzkrieg driving all before it in full effect ala 1940 again, the German loses compared to 1940 in a pretty similar time frame, are pretty similar:

German:
27,074 dead[c] 111,034 wounded, 18,384 missing,[4][5][6] 1,129 aircrew killed[7] (c. 27,000 dead)
1,236 aircraft lost[4][8]
795–822[9] tanks destroyed[d]
157,621 total casualties


Blitzkreig is expensive in terms of men and materials even if you win and so unless you have an overwhelming superiority in both it's not a sustainable tactic unless it also comes with a secession of fighting.

 

[stubear1012]

I agree that it was hopeless. The German should have looked at the American Civil War to see how many people died and yet both sides kept fighting.

Germany would have been better off if the Germany Army had sent the units involved to the Eastern front. They could have bought time for more German civilians to flee to the West. I have often wondered what would have if the Germany General Staff had given Hitler false reports about the Army attacking in the West while they were really fighting in the East.

 

[Jukra]

We must remember we're watching things with almost 80 years of hindsight. War is a contest of wills. From 1940 viewpoint, Seelöwe might be seem to have a reasonable chance of succeeding - before you yell, let me explain. Democracies were seemingly weak as displayed by many examples in years before, and there might be thought to be a chance that actual German boots on English ground might have driven Britain to negotiations. We know it's a pipedream and actual landing would have been a mess of gigantic proportions, but looking at it from 1940 viewpoint there's some logic to thinking.

Wacht Am Rhein and Bodenplatte, on the other hand, are nothing but rearranging the deck chairs from anything but National Socialist viewpoint.

 

[Zincwarrior]

At that stage the alternative would have been to sit on the defense and await final destruction anyway.

I don't think that a comparison to Sea Lion is the right one. Sea Lion was built on a success story, whereas Ardennes '44 was a desperate move.

Even if the offensive had been successful (definition of that in this context) from a military perspective, the objectives (a peace treaty) would still have been unlikely.

Even if the petrol dumps had been found and more luck on the German side, it would be miracle time to get to Antwerp.

In essence: it might have prolonged the war a bit and even that is unlikely.

USSR would still have been knocking on the door in the East and if any re-enforcements should have gone West, it would only have helped USSR in the East.

If any comparison is to be sought, it might be more relevant to liken it to Kursk.

Indeed. The best option would be to immediately surrender and the entire population to run West to avoid the Soviet armies.

 

[Scott Washburn]

There was almost no hope of any great success coming out of the Wacht am Rhein offensive, but to simply sit on the defensive would have meant eventual defeat. Hitler may have been delusional but he had no delusion about that. Sending the forces accumulated for the bulge offensive against the Russians would have accomplished little. So even though the hope of victory was microscopically small, attacking in the west was the only option which had any hope at all. So that's what Hitler did.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
There ultimatum to US Army for surrender at Malmedy was answer by word „NUT’S“
It took them allot time for Germans to understand that message
...

That message was from Brigadier General McAufflie, assistant commander of the 101st Airborne Division & senior commander of the US forces in the Bastonge pocket. Malmedy was some distance away & the name associated with the massacre of the ground crew for a Army air observation company assigned to First Army.